DOCUMENTS ON
GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
1918-1945
LONDON: HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE
1956
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BOARD OF EDITORS'
United States: Paul R. Sweet, Editor-in-Chief: Howard M. Smyth;
James Stuart Beddie ; Arthur G. Kogan ; George Kent.
Great Britain: The Hon. Margaret Lambert, Editor-in-Chief:
K. H. M. Duke; M. H. Fisher; K. Ronau; F. G. Stambrook.
France: Maurice Baumont, Editor-in-Chief; Georges Bonnin; Andre
Scherer; Jacques Grunewald.
1 This list shows the composition of the Board of Editors at the time of the final
editorial work on this volume. Former editors, with their terms of service, were :
United States: Raymond James Sontag, Editor-in-Chief, September 1946-July 1949-
Bemadotte E. Schmitt, Editor-in-Chief, July 1949-July 1952; Fredrick Aandahl'
January 1 95 1-September 1953; E. Malcolm Carrol!, October 1946-August 1949-
Jean Brownell Dulaney, December 1946-April 1951; Fritz Epstein, October 1946^
July 1948; Anna Maria Herbert, April 1951- August 1952 ; John Huizenga, January
1947-September 1952; Otto Pflaroe, January 1948-August 1949; Joachim Remak
December 1947-July 1951; Norman Rich, August 1949-August 1954.
Gkeat Britain: John W. Wheeler Bennett, Editor-in-Chief, September 1946-May 1948,
thereafter Historical Adviser; James Joll, Editor-in-Chief, June-December 1948;
General Sir James Marshall-Cornwall, Editor-in-Chief, June 1948-January 1951;
E. K. Bramsted, January 1948-February 1952; L. Branney, September 1946-^
July, 1948; P. Ericsson, January 1948-May 1952; W. H. C. Frend, March 1947-
October 1951; D. C. Watt, October 1951-October 1954; T. F. D. Williams, Septem-
ber 1947-September 1949
France: Jean Estienne, July 1947-ApriI 1950; Leon de Groer, July 1947-October 1950.
Ill
ir&xrt
DOCUMENTS ON
GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
1918-1945
Series D (1937-1945)
Volume VI
THE LAST MONTHS OF PEACE
March-August 1939
CONTENTS
Page
Pbeface Ix
Analytical List or Documents xin
Documents 1
Addendum 1103
Appendices :
I. Italo-German Staff Talks 1107
II. Organization of the German Foreign Ministry 1128
III. List of German Files Used 1132
IV. List of Persons 1141
V. Glossary of German Terms and Abbreviations .... 1146
VII
PREFACE^
In June 1946 the British Foreign Office and United States Department
of State agreed to publish jointly documents from captured archives
of the German Foreign Ministry and the Reich Chancellery. Although
the captured archives go back to the year 1867, it was decided to limit
the present publication to papers relating to the years after 1918, since
the object of the publication was "to establish the record of German
foreign policy preceding and during World War II." The editorial
work was to be performed "on the basis of the highest scholarly objecti-
vity." The editors were to have complete independence in the selection
and editing of the documents. Publication was to begin and be con-
cluded as soon as possible. Each Government was "free to publish
separately any portion of the documents." In April 1947 the French
Government, having requested the right to participate in the project,
, accepted the terms of this agreement.
In accordance with the understandings on the basis of which the
project was originally undertaken, the editors have had complete
freedom in the selection and editing of the documents published in this
volume. They were selected jointly by the American, British and
French editors. For the footnotes and other editorial matter the British
editor has entire responsibility. The translations were prepared by
the British translation staff. The British editor wishes to record her
gratitude to Mr. E, J. Passant, Director of Research and Librarian at
the Foreign Office, the Deputy Librarian, Mr. C. H. Fone, and Miss
A. C. Johnston, for their co-operation and to Miss E. C. M. Breuning,
Mr. T. H. Frame, Miss V. Klein, Mr. G. K. Meister, Mr. D. A. R. H.
Webster and Miss F. H. Yorke for their assistance in the preparation of
the volume.
II
The documents published in this the sixth volume of Series D cover the
period from March 16, 1939, the day following the German occupation
of Prague, to August 8, 1939, the eve of the resumption of direct German-
Polish exchanges, which brought to an end the German policy adopted
the previous spring of maintaining "complete reserve" in relations with
1 In each of the first four volumes published in the series there appears a General
Introduction, The editors have not felt it necessary to repeat this introduction, in the
present and succeeding volumes. Interested readers may wish to refer to it for informa-
tion, on the nature of the German Foreign Ministry archives on which the publication is
based, their present condition, and some of the principles which have guided the editors
in their work.
IX
PREFACE
Poland, and which was to herald a new, acute phase in the European
crisis. Because so many of the main strands of German policy are
intertwined in this brief but crowded period of less than five months
the editors have thought it preferable to present the documents in
strictly chronological order rather than to follow their previous practice
of arranging them by topics. A topical arrangement of the analytical
list at the beginning of the volume is designed to ease the problem of
those who wish to read on selected topics. The present volume thus
forms the sequel to Volumes III, IV and V in Series D >
The main theme of the present volume is provided by the effects on
the European situation of the German occupation of Prague on March
15, 1939. Within a few days of this action, Ribbentrop endeavoured
to induce Poland to accept German incorporation of Danzig and "a
corridor through the Corridor" in return for a German guarantee. The
lull German record of this offer is here printed for the first time The
occupation of Prague produced a sharp reversal in British and French
policy as mamfested in the guarantee to Poland, which was extended
after the Italian occupation of Albania and reports of a German ulti-
matum to Rumania, to include Greece and Rumania also. Britain and
i! ranee also entered into negotiations with the Soviet Union. German
reactions to this new situation are very fully documented in the present
selection, which also includes a certain number of military documents
bearing on German foreign policy, in particular the directives issued
early in April requiring the German Armed Forces to be prepared for
an attack on Poland by September 1 .
German relations with Italy during this period include the con-
solidation of the Axis into a military alliance; Italo-German Staff
lalfes for concerting a common military policy are documented in
Appendix I. In spite of this relationship, Italo-German points of
friction remained, especially over such issues as supplying Italy with
German coal and anti-aircraft guns, the Croat question and the question
of the German-speaking population in the South Tyrol. The documents
here printed also provide some evidence of German attempts to enlist
Italian aid in promoting a rapprochement between Germany and the
U.S.S.R. The main outlines of the negotiations directed to this end
are known from the documents previously published in Nazi-Soviet
delations. Additional documents showing the close attention with
which Germany followed the progress of the Anglo-French negotiations
in Moscow, and filling in the story of German-Soviet exchanges par-
thP ^« £?f P' eCedin f y° lu ™es. ™ th th <^ topical arrangement, do not all end on
™v B ™?L v ,' C vT°^t m t-u certai » ai ™^t of material which relates to the period
fa ^iffi, ™ v "^f^f 1 ° f the German oeou P^ of Memel on March 23
m^SSTi" 7°tT ^??' l! t the documents ° n German-Spanish relations in Volume
SL^SSfM™i°l«^i 939 V The present volume likewise contains some items which
ante-date March 16, 1939, notably document No. 1 , and the Editors' Notes on pp. 81-83
PREFACE
XI
ticularly on the economic side, are published in the present volume for
the first time.
Overseas, Germany's relations with the United States of America
deteriorated still further after the occupation of Prague, particularly in
the economic sphere as manifested by the controversy over American
"countervailing duties". In the Par East, negotiations to bring Japan
into a tripartite military alliance with Germany and Italy failed to
overcome Japanese reservations.
Further German diplomatic efforts were directed towards the
traditional European neutrals and the smaller States of South Eastern
Europe. German offers to conclude non-aggression pacts with the
Northern States led to the signature of a pact with Denmark, but
Sweden, Norway and Finland declined. With the Baltic States'non-
aggression treaties were signed with Estonia and Latvia, thus com-
pleting the treaty system begun by the German Lithuanian Treaty
signed on the occasion of the German incorporation of Memel.
In South East Europe German economic power, especially the pros-
pect of the supply of war materials, was used with a view to drawing
Yugoslavia, Rumania and Bulgaria into the Axis orbit and a number
of documents deal with this politico-economic policy. Hungary, whose
disputes with Rumania and attitude to Poland provoked German
displeasure, proposed to cooperate in planning for war economy with
the Axis Powers. With Turkey, Germany proved unable to prevent
the Anglo-Turkish and Franco -Turkish Declarations, nor could she
afford entirely to dispense with the supply of Turkish raw materials
in order to reinforce diplomatic action with economic pressure.
The present volume also documents German policy towards the
various attempts made during this period of mounting tension in
Europe to bring about a peaceful settlement of the various issues
involved. These attempts include President Roosevelt's peace appeal
proposals for a conference made by the Pope, the exchange of letters
between Bonnet and Ribbentrop, the Wohlthat talks in London, and
Mussolini's ideas for postponing the outbreak of war. The volume
closes with the Polish-Danzig Customs Inspectors' dispute assuming
increasingly menacing proportions. Volume VII will take the story
down through the last weeks of peace to September 3, 1939.
Ill
The documentation for the period covered by this Volume is not
complete (see General Introduction, Section IV). The post- 1936
Economic Policy Department collection (see Volumes I and II of this
Series Appendix I, item 97) contains no files on Russia and none on the
Far East for the period 1936-1942. The economic files of the Embassy
in Moscow are also missing, but it has been possible to trace German-
Russian economic relations from documents contained in the personal
XI1 PKJEFACE
files of Wiehl and Clodius and in the special State Secretary file dealing
with the economic negotiations connected with the German-Soviet
Non-Aggression Pact. The documentation of German-Japanese
economic relations in the files of the State Secretary and of Clodius for
this period is only fragmentary. In particular, nothing has been found
on the negotiations leading ap to the initialling of the German -Japanese
economic agreement oh July 28, 1939.
Readers should bear in mind that these documents are presented as
a source book for the study of history and not as a finished interpreta-
tion of history. It has been the aim throughout to keep any interpre-
tative comment out of the footnotes, and to use them exclusively for
the factual elucidation of the text or, on occasion, to draw attention
to other publications of documents which contain relevant material
No reference has been made in footnotes to the altered versions of
numerous documents, here produced in their original form, which
were published in the German White Book, Dokumente zur 'vorges-
chtchte des Krieges, Auswartiges Amt 1939, No. 2 (Berlin 1939). An
appendix to be published in Volume VII will give either volume and
document numbers (in cases where the original has been reproduced in
Volumes VI and VII of this Series) or the film serial and frame numbers
of all documents published in the German White Book, falling within the
period March 15 to September 3, 1939, of which the editors have been
able to trace the originals in the Foreign Ministry Archives.
All the microfilms of documents falling within the period covered by
Volumes I to VIII of this Series will be made available to the public
simultaneously with the publication of Volume VII.
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS 1
AXBAiOA
Date
1939
Apr, 6
Apr. 6
Apr.
Subject
The Ministry in Albania to the Foreign Ministry
Reports has been informed by Albanian M.F.A, that
Italians have requested immediate reply to their proposals
for closer alliance between Italy and Albania. Albania has
gone to utmost limits of what was tolerable for her inde-
pendence; she would offer armed resistance to an Italian
invasion.
The State Secretary to the Legation in Albania
■ S A?J eS * hat Germar, y agrees to take over Italian interests
in Albania on Italian request; instructions to do nothing
which might cast doubts upon German approval of Italian
action.
Circular of the State Secretary
States that Italian action in Albania has Germany's com-
plete approval; no difficulties are expected from Yugoslavia.
[See also under Italy,]
Doc. Ho.
164
166
172
Page
200
203
209
Baltic States
Date
1939
Mar. 22
Apr. 14
Apr. 15
Apr. 17
Subject
Editors 1 Note
The German occupation, of Memel on March 23, 1939.
Circular of the State Secretary
Refers to receipt of confidential information that both
Britain and U.S.S.R. have offered guarantees to Estonia and
requests information on possible similar offers to other
Baltic States.
The Charge d' Affaires in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry
Reports categorical assurance given by Deputy MFA
that Estonia has received no offer of British guarantee.
The Minister in Latvia to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 213 (see under Europe: General)
and reports on preliminary Latvian reply to German
questions on Roosevelt message.
196
202
214
Page
80
238
246
265
1 The documents in this volume have been arranged chronologically. For the con-
venience of readers who w,sh to trace topics through the volume this analytical list of
document has been arranged alphabetically by countries or, as in the case of the
Baltic and Northern States where policies are closely inter-related, groups of countries
Documents which deal with a number of different countries have been included under
the heading Europe: General". In addition one subject heading, "Military Directives
and Conferences ", has been included. J ™
XIII
XIV
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Date
Subject
I Dae. No.
1939
Apr. IS
Apr. 19
Apr, 24
Apr. 25
Apr. 29
Apr. 29
May 1
May-
May 4
Mav
Mav
Page
Memorandum by the State Secretary 228 283
Records telephone conversation with German Minister in
Riga, whom he informed that the German Government -were
unable to understand Latvian M.F.A.'s reply to German
question about President Roosevelt's message.
The Minister in Latvia to the Foreign Ministry 230 286
Refers to document No. 214, and transmits reply from
Latvian Government.
The Minister in Estonia to the Foreign Ministry 253 315
Reports conversation with Vice M.F.A. and suggests pos-
sible exchange of Notes in which Estonians should confirm
their policy of neutrality and of holding aloof from group-
ings of Great Powers.
The State Secretary to the Legation in Estonia 260 323
Refers to document No. 253, and states that it is not
possible at present to make statements of the kind proposed
vis-it-vis a country mentioned in the Roosevelt message.
An Official of the Economic Policy Department to the Gauleiter 292 369
in Konigsberg
Confirms his telephoned instructions that the Fiihrer has
decreed that all present Lithuanian economic interests in the
Memel territory are to be preserved.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secre-
tariat 294 371
Records a conversation between Ribbentrop and the
Estonian Minister who was informed that Hitler was pre-
pared to consider a German-Estonian non-aggression agree-
ment.
The State, Secretary to the Legation in Estonia- 302 394
Explains reasons for treating the conclusion of a non-
aggression pact between German;' and Estonia as a matter
of urgency.
Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI 311 401
Assurances given by the Lithuanian Minister that the visit
of the Lithuanian Commander-in-Chief to Warsaw in no way
denotes an anti-German trend.
Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI 328 422
Records private conversation with the Lithuanian
Minister, who feared dangers to Baltic States inherent in a
possible distribution of guarantees to them, and showed
concern over Polish policy of courting Lithuania, especially
about Vilna.
Memorandum by the Head of Political Divi&ioji VI 329 424
Account by the Latvian Minister of latter's conversation
with Ribbentrop, who had accepted the Latvian view that
the proposed pact of non-aggression should be on a basis of
absolute reciprocity and should not include minorities
questions.
Memorandum by the State Secretary i 352 461
Conversation with Estonian Minister, who brought a list
of points on the German draft for a non-aggression pact.
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
XV
Date
1939
May 10
May
16
May
19
May
22
May
27
June
3
June
6
June
7
June
■ 7
June
29
Subject
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Records statements made by Latvian Minister concerning
Latvian and Estonian desire to have included, in projected
non-aggression pact with Germany, a reservation with
reference to the Latvian-Estonian Treaty of Alliance;
Minister cited as precedent, similar reservation in Latvian-
Russian Non-Aggression Pact of 1932.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
German proposals for amendments to German-Estonian
non-aggression treaty handed to the Estonian Minister.
Latter again put forward Estonian Government's reasons
for desiring reservation in respect of the Estonian-Latvian
Treaty. -
Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI
Reviews political relations between Germany and
Lithuania; sole present cause for complaint lies in the ill-
treatment of the German minority; recommends this be
taken up with the Lithuanian Government.
Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Depart-
ment
Account of reception by Hitler of Lithuanian M.F.A., and
subsequent conversation, between latter and Ribbentrop on
German-Lithuanian relations; assurances on Lithuanian
policy of strict neutrality.
Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Depart-
ment
Reviews course of negotiations leading to German-
Lithuanian agreements on trade relations, Memel problems,
and establishment of Lithuanian free zone in Port of Memel
and provisions contained in these agreements.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Views expressed by Estonian Minister, who is an expert on
Russia and believes Russia is only waiting for a friendly
gesture from the totalitarian States, whom she mistrusts
less than the democratic States.
Memorandum by an Official of Political Division VI
Reviews policy of neutrality pursued by Estonia and
Latvia, both of whom have rejected a Soviet Note, stating
that they would themselves preserve their national inde-
pendence.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal
Staff
Records reception of Latvian M.F.A. by Hitler and Rib-
bentrop; Hitler's views on economic foreign policy and
advantages of Germany as a trading partner.
Editors' Note
Signature of German-Estonian and German- Latvian Non-
Aggression Treaties.
S3 -Qruppenf Mirer Heydrich to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop
Letter, enclosing a report on the supporters of Voldemaras,
who are pressing for assistance from the Reich, and expres-
sing view that, whilst financial aid could be granted, no arms
should be supplied.
Doc. So.
359
Page
460
390
408
421
445
469
484
485
587
511
538
554
593
630
850
651
664
S12
XVI
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Date
Subject
Doc. No,
Page
1939
June 30
July
The State Secretary to the Legation in Latvia
Instructions to ascertain whether Latvian Government
have been informed by Britain or Russia of negotiations in
Moscow on guarantee for Baltic States. In event of Latvia
receiving such guarantee, Germany expects her to reject it.
The Minister in Latvia to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 589 and reports information sup-
plied by Latvian M.F.A. on Russian and British communica-
tions about guarantees of the Baltic States.
[See also under Europe: General and Northern States.']
589
608
814
836
Belgium
Date
Subject
Doc. No. Pago
1939
Mar. 31
June 1 2
June 1 2
June 27
July 21
July 21
July 22
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Has been informed by Belgian Ambassador, in connection
with Anglo-French conversations on assistance to Switzer-
land, Holland and Belgium, that nothing new has been
asked of, or received from, Brussels.
Ambassador Biilow-Schwante to State Secretary Weizsdcker
Believes has found a suitable person who, on account of
personal relations with the King, could be employed by
Germany at a critical moment.
Ambassador Biilow-Schwante to State Secretary Weizsacfcer
Refers to instructions to tell a leading Belgian general
that Berlin has reports on contacts existing between the
Belgian and French armies, and describes tho results of such
action as he has been able to take.
Ambassador BiMow-Schwante to State Secretary Weizsacker
Letter, referring to document No. 517, and describing
conversation with Belgian Minister for War, to whom he
stated it was known in Berlin that Belgian General Staff
had initiated talks with French General Staff. Minister
emphatically denied this report.
The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry
Reports conversation with his Belgian colleague, who said
that King of the Belgians had recently explained to President
Lebrun absolute necessity for Belgium to pursue a policy of
strict independence towards all sides.
Minute by a Member of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat
Conveys Bibbentrop's instructions that Weizsacker should
make representations to Belgian Ambassador about present
Belgian press campaign, and should inform him confiden-
tially of the Bonnet-Ribbentrdp correspondence (documents
Nos. 602 and 669 — see under France).
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Conversation with Belgian Charge d'Affaires to whom he
i spoke as instructed in document No. 697.
[See also under Europe: General and Netherlands.]
139
516
517
575
174
712
713
799
69* 951
697
701
953
956
ANALYTICAL LIST OP DOCUMENTS
Btjlgabia
XVII
1939
Mar. 17
Mar. 21
Subject
Mar.
22
Apr.
13
Apr.
17
Apr.
21
May
3
May
8
May
16
May
21
Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Depart-
ment
Has informed the Bulgarian Minister that Germany is
prepared to increase the arms credit to Bulgaria by SO rail-
hon RM under certain conditions. Minister expressed die-
appointment that increase was not greater and mentioned
possibility of supplying Bulgaria from Czech army stocks.
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Conversation with the Bulgarian Minister, who requested
information on the general situation, and pressed for increase
in arms credit to Bulgaria.
The Charge" d' Affaires in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
Conversation with Bulgarian Minister President, who
stated he had informed Turks that Bulgaria declined to
enter Balkan Pact without previous frontier revision
Minister President enquired about German offers to
Rumania and requested support for Bulgarian nationalist
aspirations.
The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 186 (see under Europe: General)
and reports that King Boris has assured him that no attempt
has been made to involve Bulgaria in British encirclement
policy.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Has been asked by Bulgarian Ministers of Commerce and
Finance to see that Germany delivers equipment for two
divisions to Bulgaria
German- Bulgarian Secret Protocol
The German Government agree that the Bulgarian
Government may place orders in Germany for the delivery
of war materials except aircraft to the value of 45 million
RM, on same conditions as agreed in Secret Protocol of
March 12, 1938. Article 6 of previous Protocol revised
accordingly.
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Conversation with the Bulgarian Minister on British and
Turkish efforts to achieve agreement between Bulgaria and
Rumania on the Dobruja question, and on Bulgaria's other
aspirations.
The Chafgi d' Affaires in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry
Reports account given him by Minister President of results
of second visit of Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign
Affairs, Potemkin.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Conversation with the Bulgarian Minister about possible
supply of former Czech war material to Bulgaria.
The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry
Reports conversation with King Boris, who requested
favourable consideration for Bulgaria in distribution of
supplies of Czech arms and asked for some submarines.
Doc. No. Page
17
63
67
17
73
75
190
213
243
320
346
392
415
232
268
303
415
456
514
547
XVIII
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Date
Subject
IDoc.No. Page
1939
July 5
June
June
June
June 12
June 24
July-
July
July 12
The State Secretary to the Minister in Bulgaria
Refers to agreement reached with Ciano during letter's
recent visit to Berlin over trying to bring about rapproche-
ment between Bulgaria and the Axis. Discusses best
methods of pursuing this aim. Caution should be observed
over Bulgaria's territorial aspirations in view of Germany's
relations with Bulgaria's neighbours.
State Secretary Weizsacker to Minister Richthofen
Letter explaining German policy of giving active support
to Bulgaria s further rapprochement to Axis Powers, and
stating intention to invite Bulgarian Minister President to
visit Berlin.
The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry
Reports conversation with Bulgarian Minister President,
who feared he was mistrusted by Germany. Subject of
supplying Bulgaria with arms from Czech stocks also raised.
The State Secretary to the Legation in Bulgaria
Refers to document No. 480 and instructs Minister to
raise question of Bulgaria's services in return for the political
support implied in German delivery of arms. Enquiries
should be made as to Bulgaria's position on accession to
Anti-Comintern Pact.
The Minister in Bulgaria to ike Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 500 and reports conversation
with Minister President who stated that question of Bul-
garia's accession to Anti-Comintern Pact had never been
raised officially, but had been unofficially discouraged by
Mussolini. Minister unable to give a definite reply without
authority from the King.
German-Bulgarian Secret Protocol
German and Bulgarian Governments agree that Bulgaria
may place orders in Germany for aircraft material and war
material to prescribed value. Conditions of payment laid
down. Bulgarian Government to supply additional raw
materials in part payment, and to permit German industry
to exploit certain Bulgarian mineral deposits.
Memorandum by an Official of tJie Foreign Minister's Secretariat
Record of conversation between Hitler and Bulgarian
Minister President; Hitler's views on common lot of
Germany and Bulgaria as countries deprived of their rights ;
Kiosseivanov's request for accelerated arms deliveries;
fears of Turkish and Rumanian intentions; proposal by
Hitler for joint consultation to establish what aims Bulgaria
should pursue and what assistance she would require.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister'' s Secretariat
Record of conversation between Ribbentrop and the Bul-
garian Minister President ; review by Ribbentrop of Hitler's
foreign policy; statements by Kiosseivanov on Bulgarian
policy of friendship with Germany ; promises by Ribbentrop
to expedite arms deliveries and proposals for clarifying
points on Bulgaria's position as discussed with Hitler.
The Legation in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry
Conversation with King, who expressed satisfaction at out-
come of Minister President's visit to Berlin, and requested
favourable consideration for Bulgaria's requirements in war
material.
476
640
479
480
500
508
566
617
644
645
687
698
785
847
618
656
852
904
ANALYTICAL LIST OP DOCUMENTS
XIX
Date
Subject
Doc. Mo,
Page
1939
July 12
July 14
July 20
July 27
The Foreign Ministry to the Chief of the High Command of the
Wehrmacht
Refers to promise made by Fiihrer to Bulgarian Minister
President about Bulgarian requests for war material, and
asks for statement on what can be done to meet certain
requests.
Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy
Department
Reports conversation with King Boris on July 11, in
which King reviewed in detail Bulgaria's position and aims
of her foreign policy.
The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry
Reports conversation with Bulgarian Minister President,
who expressed pleasure at results of his Berlin visit ; Kios-
seivanov disappointed at outcome of his discussions with
Yugoslavs, and disquieted by reports of Turkish military
preparations on Thracian frontier.
The Foreign Ministry to the Chief of the High Command of the
Wehrmacht
Refers to document No. 659 and recommends acceding to
King of Bulgaria's request for loan of two small German
submarines until those ordered by Bulgaria are ready.
[See also under Europe: General.']
659
673
689
728
908
923
944
1005
Europe : General
Date
Subject
Doc. Mo. Page
1939
Mar. 16
Mar. 21
Mar. 24
Apr.
Apr. 3
Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Depart-
ment
Reviews repercussions of occupation of Czechia on
economic discussions with Britain and France. Visit of
British Ministers to Berlin cancelled. Negotiations due to
conclude on March 16, and British delegation returning to
Britain without visiting Berlin. Sudden departure of chief
French negotiator.
Circular of the State Secretary
Instructions to German Missions to discover what and to
which States British demarches have been made to bring
about an association of "peaceful States" against further
German expansion, and what replies have been given.
Circular of the Slate Secretary
Summarizes reports available on progress and results of
British diplomatic action towards the formation of united
front against Germany; concludes that final results of
British action will probably prove very meagre.
Editors' Note
Hitler's speech at Wilhelmshaven on April 1.
Circular of the State Secretary
Comments on British declaration of assistance to Poland
and states the attitude to be adopted towards it in con-
versations.
11
11
58
83
147
67
99
183
185
XX
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Date
Subject
Doc. No.
Page
1939
Apr. ■ 5
Circular of the Foreign Ministry
Informs Missions of information available on British
d&marche in Ankara and of Turkish reply.
160
195
Apr. 12
Circular of the Foreign Minister
Instructions to make no dimarahe on the British encircle-
ment policy, but to make clear, in conversations, what
would be the German attitude to any further States who
might participate in such a British combination.
186
22S
Apr. 1 7
Circular of the Foreign Minister
Instructions at onco to enquire orally of all Governments
mentioned by Roosevelt in his message (document No. 200
— see under United States) whether their countries feel
menaced by Germany, and whether they have authorized
Roosevelt to make his proposal.
213
264
Apr. 17
Unsigned Memorandum
Reviews information available on antecedents of French
and British guarantees to Greece and Rumania, and on
conversations held by Rumanian M.F.A. Istanbul.
221
270
Apr. 22
Circular of the State Secretary
Refers to report from London Embassy of a British pro-
posal to U.S.S.R. that the latter should offer a treatv of
assistance under certain terms to Finland, Estonia, Latvia,
Poland and Rumania, and gives instructions on what action
is to be taken with various Governments concerned.
246
305
Apr. 22
Memorandum by an Official of Political Division IX
Summarizes the reactions of the various countries to the
two German questions in document No. 213.
250
309
Apr. 28
Editors' Note
Speech by Hitler to the Reichstag.
355
Apr. 29
Circular from the Director of the Political Department
Informs Embassies in London, Paris and Moscow of
report by Papen on his first conversation with Turkish
M.F.A. Comments on Turkish attitude.
289
365
Apr. 30
Circular of the Foreign Ministry
Transmits a review of the course and results of the British
encirclement action to date, with instructions to report any
additions or amendments required.
299
382
May 21
Circular of the Foreign Ministry
Missions are requested to make known to official depart-
ments and to the press the truth about the incident at
Kalthof on the Danzig-Polish frontier, in contradiction to
the Polish version.
416
548
July 22
Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Depart-
ment
Encloses letter from the OKWgiving Hitler's new decisions
in respect of deliveries of war material to foreign countries,
and reviews present state of these deliveries to Bulgaria,
Yugoslavia, Italy, Rumania and Turkey.
703
958
July 22
Circular of the State Secretary
Instructions to Missions abroad to conduct more vigorous
propaganda and to submit detailed reports.
707
965
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
XXI
1939
July 29
Subject
Doc.No,
Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Depart-
ment
Supplements document No. 703 with further review of
position on war material deliveries to Bulgaria, Rumania,
Italy and Yugoslavia.
[See also under the separate countries.]
738
Page
1017
Fab East
Date
Subject Doc. No.
Page
1039
1
Mar. 23
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Has learned from Japanese press source that Japanese
Five-Minister Conference has decided to open diplomatic
negotiations with Germany for the purpose of concluding a
military alliance directed against Russia.
70
81
Mai'. 23
Editors' Note
Course of German-Japanese negotiations on a tripartite
pact.
81
Apr. 24
The Ambassador in Japan to the Fweign Ministry
Reports serious clashes in Japanese Cabinet over question
of strengthening Anti-Comintern Pact; Array attacking
Foreign Minister's conduct of these negotiations. Considers
prospects favourable for Germany.
254
317
Apr. 26
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 254 and reports that Japanese
press continues to exert pressure on Government to declare
themselves in favour of strengthening the Anti-Comintern
Fact. Has advised Vice M.F.A. that a public statement on
Japan's attitude to Anglo-Russian consultations on the Far
East would be desirable before the Fiihrer's speech.
266
334
Apr. 26
The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Japan
Informs the Ambassador personally of course of secret
discussions between Berlin, Rome and Tokyo for a defensive
alliance, and instructs him to take no action but to report
on developments.
270
337
Apr. 27
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 270, and reports has learned that
instructions have been sent to Japanese Ambassador in
Berlin that Japan agrees to military alliance with Germany
and Italy.
275
346
Apr. 2S
The State Secretary to the Embassy in Japan
Refers to document No. 275, and enquires whether
Japanese Government have dropped their reservation about
interpreting treaty to Western Powers.
285
360
Apr. 30
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 285, and reports differences in
the Cabinet over question of including reservation in the
alliance, and danger of Cabinet resigning.
298
381
XXII
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Date
Subject
Doc. No.
Pago
1939
May 1
May
May-
May
May
May 6
May 8
May 8
May 11
May 15
The Foreign- Minister to the Embassy in Japan,
Refers to document No. 298 and states that although the
Anti-Comintern thesis may be developed in the preamble to
the proposed tripartite pact, no anti-Russian tendency may
appear in the articles of the pact ; the nature and extent of
the assistance to be rendered are reserved for special secret
discussions after the conclusion of the pact.
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 298 and reports that Japanese
Cabinet continue divided on alliance question. The Army
hope that, in view of commitments in China, invocation of
alliance will be delayed as long as possible.
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan
Refers to document No. 306, and replies that both
Germany and Italy have greatest interest in long period of
peace.
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Has learned that further decisions by Japanese Cabinet
are not to be expected for- next few days. On basis of
reports from Europe, Japanese Foreign Ministry acting on
assumption that war will break out sometime between next
autumn and spring.
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Has been requested by M.F.A. to transmit text of a
declaration by the Japanese Minister President to Hitler:
whilst Japan is prepared to accept the principle of mili-
tary assistance to Germany and Italy even if U.S.S.R.
not involved, she is not at present able to render effective
assistance. Furthermore, Japan must exercise utmost
circumspection in giving explanations of the agreement on
publication.
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 326, and reports what he has
learned from various sources of the views of the Army on
the Japanese Minister President's statement (document No.
326), and what occasioned it.
Tht Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 339, and reports further details
regarding the present position of negotiations on the alliance.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Conversation with Japanese Ambassador, who enquired
whether projected German-Italian pact would be consistent
with Berlin- Rome-Tokyo draft treaty.
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 344 and reports information sup-
plied by War Minister about attitude of Japanese Navy to
alliance negotiations. Transmits message sent by Japanese
Minister President about latter's declaration (document
No. 326).
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan
Refers to document No. 363, and gives reasons already
advanced to Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, why, in the
German and Italian view, conclusion of their pact of
alliance cannot prejudice the trilateral negotiations for a,
three Power pact. Instructions to press Japanese Govern-
ment for speedy decision.
304
396
306
307
323
326
39S
399
416
420
339
344
345
363
382
442
454
455
473
494
ANALYTICAL LIST OP DOCUMENTS
XXIII
Data
Subject
Doc. No.
Page
1939
May 15
The State Secretary to the Embassy in. Japan
Transmits for the Ambassador personally (i) the draft
tripartite pact for joint consultation and mutual assistance
with secret protocol, as already agreed, (ii) draft of a new
article on relation of present pact to German-Italian pact,
(iii) a draft note on possible statements to be made by
Japanese Government, (iv) a draft formal statement to be
made orally by the Japanese Ambassador before signature
of pact.
333
496
May 10
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Has learned that the Japanese Government attach no
practical importance to assurances from the French Ambas-
sador that the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations are limited
to Europe.
388
509
May 1 7
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 382, and reports has used these
arguments with General Machijiri, who described Navy's
continuing misgivings over proposed tripartite pact.
Recommends that Hitler make friendly gesture of reply to
Japanese Minister President.
400
522
May 20
Tlie Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Transmits summary of statement for Ribbentrop from
Japanese War Minister, describing Japanese Cabinet
decision on military pact. Japanese Foreign Ministry to
inform German Government by May 21. Army anxious for
pact to be initialled secretly, simultaneously with the signa-
ture of the German-Italian pact.
410
541
May 20
Memorandum by the Director of the Legal Department
Conversation with Japanese Counsellor, who endeavoured
to obtain information about the forthcoming German-Italian
pact and requested that the text be communicated con-
fidentially to the Japanese as soon as possible.
412
543
May 22
The Japanese Ambassador to the Beicli Foreign Minister
Letter transmitting his Government's telegram of con-
gratulations on the conclusion of the German-Italian
Alliance.
425
561
May 23
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 410, and gives an account,
derived from officials in Japanese Foreign Ministry, of the
genesis of Cabinet decision of May 20,
427
564
May 27
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 427 and reports information from
Army sources on disagreements in Japanese Cabinet over
decision on pact reached on May 20.
444
594
May 28
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan
Refers to documents Nos. 410 and 427 and states that
promised communication of official decision by Japanese
Cabinet has not been received. Instructions to make clear
that non-arrival of communication is occasioning misgivings
about Japanese attitude.
447
599
May 31
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 447, and reports action taken;
describes varying accounts given him of reasons for failure
of Japanese Cabinet to reach a decision on alliance question.
457
614
XXIV
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Subject
Doc. Bo.
Page
1930
June 1
June
June
Juno
June
June 14
Juno 16
June 17
June 17
June 20
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to forthcoming visit of former German Naval
Attache to Tokyo, and possibilities of influencing Japanese
Navy in direction of support for German views about
alliance question.
The State Secretary to the Embassy in Japan
Refers to document No. 462 and gives Ambassador argu-
ments to use against Japan's fear of America in the economic
field.
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 462 and reports has been informed
that Navy have at last accepted the Army's proposal on
alliance question.
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Reports information from Army sources about instruc-
tions sent to Japanese Ambassador in Berlin that, m alliance
question, Japan would be prepared automatically to take
part in any war of Germany's, provided Russia were one of
Germany's adversaries.
The Ambassador in Great Britain to the, Foreign Ministry
Has learned through Japanese Embassy that Japanese
Government have warned Britain that conclusion of a
British-Soviet alliance would considerably increase diffi-
culties of reaching Anglo-Japanese settlement.
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Reports information from Japanese Foreign Ministry as
to reasons for Japanese attitude to Britain over Tientsin and
objectives of Japanese policy in China.
Memorandum by the Stale Secretary
Italian Ambassador, on basis of information from
Japanese Ambassador in Rome, has given present Japanese
version of alliance, namely open treaty with automatic
obligation of assistance in case of war, and secret protocol
with reservation that obligations not automatic unless
USA and U.S.S.R. are belligerents.
The State Secretary to the Embassy in Japan
Instructions that Admiral Foerster should make clear to
Japanese Navy that only a perfectly clear alliance with Axis
will ensure American neutrality.
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan
States was only informed officially by Japanese Ambas-
sador on June 14 of latest Japanese decisions on alliance
Oshima's interpretation of these decisions. Japanese still
held that statement about Japan's limited military capacities
must be recorded in writing, which unacceptable to Axis.
Discussion with Japanese Ambassador in Rome, who put
forward his own proposals; these also unacceptable to Axis.
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 538, and reports on his efforts to
clear up Japanese "mental reservations". A success for
Japanese Army in Tientsin proceedings important for
alliance.
462
466
467
487
493
526
623
628
629
656
725
734
537
538
737
737
548
750
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
XXV
Subject
Doc. No.
Pago
1939
June 21
June 30
July 1
July 5
July 19
July 22
July 24
July 25
July 28
July 28
July 29
fe*.
The State Secretary to the Embassy in Japan
Refers to document No. 548 and conveys Ribbentrop's
approval for Ambassador to continue talks, but he should
not press the question as to when treaty is to be concluded.
The State Secretary to the Embassy in Japan
Refers to document No. 553, and requests information on
results of deliberations of Five-Minister Conference referred
to in document No. 548.
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 591 and states has not been able
to obtain complete clarity regarding Japanese reservations
which are variously interpreted. Five-Minister Conference
not yet resumed.
Ambassador Ott to State Secretary Weizsacker
Letter describing Admiral Foerster's efforts to influence
Japanese Navy; review of differences between Army and
Navy on question of unconditional alliance.
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department,
Conversation with Japanese Counsellor, who supplied
information about latest events on Manchukuo-Outer
Mongolian frontier, and then endeavoured to obtain in-
formation about developments in German relations with
U.S.S.R. Counsellor expressed fear of Germany affording
U.S.S.R. more favourable economic treatment than Japan.
Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Depart-
ment
Refers to fears expressed by the Japanese Counsellor of
Embassy that Germany might grant more favourable
economic terms to U.S.S.R. than to Japan, and reviews
offers on supply of machine tools made respectively to
Japan and U.S.S.R.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Conversation with Japanese Ambassador, who knew nothing
of French press reports that Japanese Minister President had
held out prospect of Japanese neutrality in a European
conflict, but undertook to refer to his Government.
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Conversation with Japanese Counsellor who furnished
information on the Anglo-Japanese negotiations at present
in progress.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Conversation with Admiral Foerster, recently returned
from Japan, who gave views of German Ambassador there
that it would be expedient first to conclude a more modest
treaty with Japan.
Editors' Note
German-Japanese Economic Agreement initialled on
July 28.
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Reviews situation arising out of recent Anglo-Japanese
agreement as it affects Germany and transmits confidential
requests from Japanese supporters of alliance with Axis,
that Germany should hasten its conclusion. Recommends
favourable consideration for Japanese suggestions.
553
591
597
619
68S
755
815
821
858
942
704
961
713
719
732
974
992
1011
735
1013
XXVI
ANALYTICAL LIST OP DOCUMENTS
Date
Subject
Doc. No.
Page
1939
Aug. 2
Aug. 3
Memorandum by the Director of tlie Economic Policy Depart-
went
Conversation with Japanese Counsellor on question of
preferential treatment for German trade interests in North
China; Japanese concern about possible German deliveries
of war material under Hapro Treaty with Chinese Govern-
ment and about Russo -German economic negotiations and
possibility of U.S.S.R. obtaining more favourable treatment
than Japan.
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 735 and reports has learned that
Anglo-Japanese Tientsin negotiations likely to produce
agreement. Army concern at danger of this development
for prospects of alliance with Axis.
[See also under Italy. 1
756
762
1044
1052
Feance
Date
Subject
Doc. No,
Page
1939
Mar. IS
Mar. 18
Mar. 20
Mar. 22
Mar. 24
Apr. 10
Apr. 13
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Records that he has refused to accept from French
Ambassador (attached) Note of protest from hia Govern-
ment about German action in Czecho -Slovakia, on the
grounds that such a step is in contradiction to views
expressed to Ribbentrop by Bonnet and also to Franco-
German Declaration of December 6, 1938.
The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry
Reports introduction of bill giving French Government
full powers to take measures for national defence. Reviews
political situation in the light of debates on the bill.
The Charge a" Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry
Discusses French public opinion after promulgation of
special powers law ; notes emphasis on necessity of defend-
ing Rumania and attitude towards Franco-Italian relations.
The. Charge a" Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry
Submits a report on an agent's conversation with the
former French Minister President, Flandin, who discussed
repercussions of Germany's annexation of Czecho-Slovakia
on Franco-German understanding.
The Charge oV Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to reports in the Paris press that on the occasion
of the French President's visit to London, Chamberlain,
Halifax and Bonnet signed a protocol or exchanged aide'
m&moires, by which France and Britain undertook to assist
the Netherlands and Switzerland should they bo attacked.
The Charge a" Affaires in France to the Foreign, Ministry
Sends report from reliable source on views expressed by
French Minister of Marine Campinchi; Germany's present
policy renders war inevitable.
The Charge eV Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry
Comments on the implications of the French declaration
concerning support for Rumania and Greece and concerning
the Franco-Polish alliance.
20
20
22
49
69
84
177
188
23
51
77
101
212
230
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCtJMENTS
xxvti
Date
1939
Apr. 29
Subject
Doc. No.
Page
The Chargl d' Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry
Reports on reaction in France to Hitler'3 speech; con-
siders effect has been reassuring in spite of adverse attitude
of press.
May 9 Memorandum by the State Secretary
Conversation with French Ambassador, who enquired
about possibility of further German-Polish conversations;
in replying, Weizsacker tried to make clear to French
Ambassador that Beck's present attitude provided no point
of contact.
May 13 The- Ambassador in France- to the Foreign Ministry
Analyses the political situation in France in the light of
Daladier's speech on behalf of the Government on May 11.
May 17 The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry
Reports has learned that in consequence of visit to Paris
of Polish War Minister, Kasprzycki, a French military
delegation is shortly to leave for Poland.
May 20 The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry
Reports conversation with M.F.A., whose attention he ,
drew to the dangers for France of following the British |
policy of encirclement of Germany. Bonnet reaffirmed his j
own resolve to work for peace but stressed loss of confidence
resulting from German occupation of Prague.
May 23 The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry
Transmits memorandum from reliable informant about a
conversation with former French Minister President Flandin
on the European situation.
June 5 The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry
Discusses political mentality of the French which causes
them to have no understanding for basic political demands,
such as right to "living space".
June 6 The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry
Exports on conversation between an Embassy informant
and former French Minister President Flandin ; latter 's views
on international situation and French policy.
June 6 The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry
Transmits information obtained by an informant on
Anglo-Franco-Polish military conversations.
June 9 The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry
Transmits report on a conversation between an Embassy
informant and French Deputy, Marcel Deat, who believed
that Germany's aspirations in Eastern Europe could be
realized peacefully after a quiet period of waiting.
June 17 Memorandum by the State Secretary
Conversation with French Ambassador, who spoke in
similar terms to those used by British Ambassador, and said
that, Anglo-Franco-Russian pact once concluded, diplo-
matic conversations with Axis Powers could take place more
easily.
June 21 The State Secretary to the Embassy in France
Instructions to Ambassador to remain in Paris until
informed of date when he should visit Berlin for discussion
with Bibbentrop; meantime to avoid important political
conversations.
290
353
379
399
409
430
477
481
482
501
539
366
463
489'
522
539
569
641
647
648
688
740
754
XXVIII
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Dato
1939
June 29
Jniifi 30
June 30
July 1
July 2
July 9
July 12
July 13
July 13
July 14
July 15
Subject
Doc.Hb.
Page
Editors' 1 Note
Prolongation of Franco-German Trade and Payments 813
Agreement of July 10, 1937.
The State Secretary to the Embassy in France 592 810
Informs Ambassador that Ribbentrop has again denned
instructions given Welczeck orally on what he should say
in diplomatic conversations, particularly to French M.F.A.,
on problem of Poland.
Memorandum by the State Secretary 594 gjg
Conversation with French Ambassador on general political
situation; Weizsacker developed the same line of thought as
contained in latest instructions to German Ambassador in
Paris {document No. 592).
Note from the French Government 602 827
States that the Franco-German Declaration of December 6,
1938, does not affect the special relations of France to the
countries of Eastern Europe and stresses France's deter-
mination to fulfil her obligations under the Franco-Polish
alliance; states what circumstances would bring these
obligations into play.
The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry 603
Refers to document No. 592 and reports carrying out his
instructions in conversation with French M.F.A. on the
political situation. Bonnet replied by describing his own
policy and gave him a Note for transmission to Ribbentrop
(document No. 602).
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in France 640 886
Instructions to make energetic demarche to French
Minister President regarding the French Government's
action in denying Abetz entry into France and to obtain
requisite permission.
The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry 658 907
Refers to document No. 640 and reports representations
made to French Minister President about Abetz case.
The State Secretary to the Embassy in France 664 913
Conveys Ribbentrop's views that Ambassador has not
conducted d-marche on Abetz case firmly enough. States
Abetz will be returning to France shortly and instructs
Welczeck to report what steps taken to facilitate this.
Memorandum by the State Secretary 665 914
Conversation with French Ambassador, to whom he
represented harm done by British Prime Minister in his
latest speech.
The State Secretary to the Ambassador in France 669 917
Instructions to transmit enclosed letter from Ribbentrop
to Bonnet as soon as possible. Letter replies to document
No. 602, and describes German position on German -French
relations in general and on Danzig question in particular.
Ambassador Welczeck to State Secretary Weizsacker ' 676 928
Letter complaining of attempts to discredit him with
Buro Ribbentrop by representing him as opposed to Abetz
and latter's activities in France.
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
XXIX
Date
1939
July 20
Subject
Doe. No.
The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry
Reports demarche made to French Minister President on
Abetz affair. Daladier complained of discrepancies between
the two versions of what had occurred, and promised to
re-examine the case.
July 25 Foreign Minister Bonnet to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop
Letter in reply to document No. 669. States that at no
time, either before or after Franco -German Declaration of
December 6, 1938, has it been possible for the German
Government to think that France had decided to disinterest
herself in Eastern Europe ; France is eager for peace but will
fulfil her obligations under the Franco -Polish Treaty of
Alliance.
Julv 28 The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry
Reports information from well informed sources as to
reasons why Britain and France have agreed to enter into
military discussions with U.S.S.R. before reaching agree-
I ment on a- political treaty.
July 30 The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry
\ Reviews emergency decrees approved that day by French
Council of Ministers.
July 30
Aug.
Aug.
The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 731, and states that preparations
for the despatch of French and British military delegations
to Moscow are proceeding actively.
The State Secretary to the Embassy in France
Ambassador instructed to remain in Paris until Abetz
assured of unhindered stay there; Abetz to be given every
assistance in conducting his lawsuit against French
journalist Keriilis.
The State Secretary to the Embassy in France
Informs Ambassador that, though no valid expulsion order
exists against Abetz, he has been refused entry into Fraiice.
Conveys Ribbentrop's instructions to make a direct
approach forthwith either to Daladier or Bonnet.
[See also under TvrHy.J
690
946
90S
731
740
741
767
1010
1019
1021
1013
1062
Great Britain
Date
1939
Mar. 16
Mar. 17
liar. 18
Subject
Doc. No.
Circular of the Director of the Political Department
States that, on March 15, British Ambassador trans-
mitted a letter (document No. 234 in vol. IV) to Ribbentrop,
and summarizes contents.
Memorandum by ike State Secretary
Conversation with British Ambassador to whom he gave
the reasons for the German action in O-echo-SIovakia.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
In reply to British Ambassador's request for an interview
to deliver a Note of protest from his Government, has
informed him that such an interview would serve no useful
purpose.
Page
10
16
19
16
19
XXX
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Date
Subject
iDoc. No.
Page
1939
Mar. 18
Mar. 18
Mar. 18
Mar. 18
Mar. 18
Mar. 19
Mar. 20
Mar. 20
Mar. 28
Mar. 29
Mar. 31
The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
Discusses motives for Prime Minister's speech on March 1 7.
Refers to report in the press alleging attempted German
economic subjugation of Rumania in return for German
guarantee of Rumanian independence, and requests in-
structions. - -
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Instructions telephoned to Ambassador in London to ask
the British Government to explain what they intend by the
way they have announced the recall of their Ambassador
from Berlin.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Records receipt of (attached) Note from the British Ambas-
sador, which protests against the German action in Czecho--
Slovakia, characterizing it as complete repudiation of the
Munich Agreement.
The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
Reviews changes in the British attitude towards Germany
brought about by events in Czecho-Slovakia, and speculates
on probable future course of British foreign policy.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Adds to his record in document No. 16 that the British
Ambassador stated that, although Britain was not directly
interested in the Czecho-Slovak territory, Henderson feared
that Germany was now embarking on a policy of territorial
expansion, which would end by nullifying prospects of an
Anglo-German understanding.
The Charge" d' Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry i
Has learned that the Rumanian Minister in London, on
his own initiative, has told the Foreign Office of unreasonable
German economic demands on Rumania.
The Charge d' Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to statements by Prime Minister and Foreign
Secretary and reports what he has heard from reliable
informants respecting British intentions about guarantee
arrangements with certain States.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secre-
tariat
Records Ribbentrop's instructions that any fresh British
initiative for a later visit to Berlin by the British Ministers
is not to be agreed.
The Embassy in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
Reports statement by the British Government that they
do not intend to take any. economic measures against
Germany as "reprisal" for German measures in Bohemia
and Moravia.
The Chargi, d' Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
Reviews state of British negotiations on declaration
projects as revealed in speeches in British Parliament and
in press comment; considerations affecting these negotia-
tions, and the treaty systems which appear to be planned.
The Charge a" Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
Transmits text of Prime Minister's statement in House of
Commons on British Government's interim guarantee to
Poland.
23
26
35
36
26
27
36
40
42
48
54
116
121
136
46
145
150
171
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
XXXI
Date
Subject
Doc. No. Page
1939
Mar. 31
Apr.
Apr
II
The Chargi d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 136, and reports further state-
ments on British assistance by Foreign Office spokesman.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Enquiry by British Counsellor of Embassy as to whether
Hitler's speech (of April 1) should be taken as a denunciation
i of the Naval Agreement. Has replied that denunciation of
an agreement takes place through diplomatic channels.
The Charge d' Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
Reports information given by Italian Charge d'Affaires on
exchanges between Italy and Britain before and after
Italian occupation of Albania,.
Apr. 1 1 The Embassy in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
Reports on the visit of the British Secretary to the
Department of Overseas Trade to Warsaw, Moscow, Hel-
j sinki and Stockholm, and comments on possible significance
" of British negotiations for a new trade agreement with the
U.S.S.R. which are shortly to take place in London
Apr. 13
Apr. 17
Apr. 19
Apr. 21
.Apr. 26
Apr. 36
Apr. 27
The Charge d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
Transmits text of Prime Minister's announcement in the
House of Commons of the British guarantee to Greece and
Rumania.
Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Political Depart-
ment
Records visit from British Charge d'Affaires who spoke of
German complaints about British encirclement policy,
German policy on Danzig and the Czech question and the
possible retxirn of a British Ambassador to Berlin.
The Charge d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
Reports information from a reliable source as to proposals
submitted by Britain and France to Soviet Russia for the
so-called pact of mutual assistance and enquiry by Soviet
Government as to a quid pro quo.
The Charge d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 233 and reports the points con-
tained in the Soviet counter proposals to the British
proposals he has previously reported.
The Charge d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 239, and reports has learned that
British reply to Soviet proposals for Three Power Pact will
be tantamount to a rejection.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Conversation" with the British Ambassador, who came to
announce the British statement on conscription, and stated
that Chamberlain believed that best way to maintain peace
was for Britain to demonstrate her readiness to fight in case
of necessity, whilst remaining determined to seek peaceful
solutions.
The State Secretary to the Embassy in Great Britain
Instructs Charge d'Affaires to arrange for an interview at
the Foreign Office on April 28 to deliver a memorandum, at
a time to coincide with start of Hitler's speech.
137
172
156 I 193
182 219
183
189
220
233
239
269
220
232
269
289
299
336
344
273
345
XXXII
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Subject
1939
Apr. 27
Apr.
Apr. 28
Apr. 29
May
May 2
May 4
May
May 11
May 11
May 14
Note to the British Government
The German Government consider that, in view of recent
British policy, they must regard the British Government as
having unilaterally put out of force the German-British
Naval Agreement of 1935 and the Declaration and Part III
of the Naval Agreement of 1 93 7, but that the German Govern-
ment will continue to abide by the qualitative provisions of
the 1937 Agreement.
Counsellor of Embassy Kordt to State Secretary Weizscicker
Transmits a memorandum on a demarche alleged to have
been mode by Britain to Poland on April 19.
Circular of the State Secretary
States that the denunciation of the German-British Naval
Agreement does not apply to the "qualitative" provisions of
the 1937 Agreement; instructions to emphasize in conversa-
tions that German Government wish to avoid naval
armaments race.
The Embassy in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
Reports on British reactions to Hitler's speech.
The Charge a" Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
Reports information from a Japanese diplomat that no
headway is being made in the Anglo-Soviet negotiations on
account of Russian demands for an alliance and guarantee
of their Far Eastern frontiers.
Editors' Note
Interview between Ribbentrop and the British Ambas-
sador on May 2.
The Charge d' Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 269 and reports that British
Government continue to decline the Soviet proposal for a
pact of mutual assistance between Britain, France and
Russia.
The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign. Ministry
Refers to document No. 327 and reports information from
a reliable source on British counter proposals to the Soviet
proposal for an Anglo-Soviet pact of assistance.
The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
Discusses statement by Chamberlain in House of Com-
mons on Anglo -Russian negotiations. Considers that this
statement concealed continuing fundamental divergence of
views in negotiations.
Counsellor of Embassy Selzam to Ministerialdirelctor Wiehi
Letter announcing the impending visit to Berlin of Mr.
Henry Drummond-Wolff. The visit, although private, is
undertaken with the knowledge of the Prime Minister's
closest advisers.
Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Depart-
ment
Summarizes a confidential conversation on Anglo-
German economic relations with Mr. H. Drummond-Wolff
from London, who conveyed that he was in Berlin with the
knowledge of the close adviser of the British Cabinet.
277
27S
282
Page
351
353
357
291 36S
309 400
327
343
362
368
380
407
422
453
472
477
491
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
XXXIII
Date
1939
May 15
May
15
May
17
May
18
May
31
Jane
3
June
5
Undated
June
12
June
13
June
20
Subject
The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 343 and reports information from
a reliable source about the terms of the Soviet reply, pre-
sented that evening, to the British proposals previously
reported. Has learned that Lord Halifax intends to
negotiate directly with Potemkin in Geneva.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Conversation with the British Ambassador, who said that
Britain did not desire war, and wished to avoid it through a
German-Polish settlement, but was nevertheless deter-
mined to go to Poland's help if Germany tried to alter the
status of Danzig by force.
The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 381 and reports that British
intention of continuing negotiations at Geneva by talks
between Halifax and Potemkin has been frustrated by
Maisky's being sent to Geneva instead.
Editors' Note
Conversation between Halifax and Dirksen on Anglo-
German relations.
The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
Sends information from reliable source about what is
contained in a new British proposal presented in Moscow on
May 27.
The Ambassador in Oreat Britain to the Foreign Ministry
Reports disappointment in Britain over Soviet Union's
attitude in negotiations.
The Ambassador in Oreat Britain to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to_ document No. 458 and reports that new Soviet
note to Britain contains, in more conciliatory form, the
objections formulated by Molotov in his speech of May 31.
Editors' Note
Wohlthat's conversations in London on June 6-7.
Unsigned Memorandum
Impressions gained by Adam von Trott zu Solz from
conversations with British Foreign Secretary, Prime
Minister and other leading politicians and journalists during
a fact finding visit to Britain, on June 1-8.
The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 473 and reports has learned that
British answer to Soviet Note has been sent first to Paris
for approval; gives substance of British draft reply.
Memorandum by the Slate Secretary
Conversation with British Ambassador, who stated that,
the Russian pact once concluded, discussions with Berlin
should be possible, and spoke of London's willingness to
negotiate with Berlin on disarmament, economic relations
and the colonial question.
Memorandum by an Official of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop
Confidential report on statements by British journalist in
Berlin, who had just returned from London, about British
public opinion there.
Doc. No.
Page
381
385
401
458
46S
473
497
511
521
551
493
502
524
538
616
629
634
601
674
■70S
718
753
XXXIV
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
1939
June 24
Subject
Doc. No.
The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
Reviews factors underlying recent trends in British
foreign policy; detects disillusionment over consequences of
encirclement action. Discusses whether Chamberlain's
position is strong enough to enable him to make a construc-
tive move towards Germany.
June 27 Memorandum from the British Embassy in Germany
British Government's reply to the German Memorandum
of April 27 (document No. 277). Reasons why British
Government cannot agree that there has been any change
in their policy to justify action of German Government over
Anglo-German Naval Agreements, and request to know
meaning of German offer to enter into negotiations in
regard to future problems.
June 27 Memorandum by the State Secretary
Conversation with British Ambassador. Weizsacker con-
tested Ambassador's view that conclusion of British talks
in Moscow would be beneficial for initiation of German-
British talks.
June 28 State Secretary Weizsacker to Ambassador Dirksen
Letter commenting on certain indications of a British
inclination to enter into discussions with Germany on out-
standing questions.
June 29 The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
■ Beports terms of a British formula for negotiations with
the U.S.S.K sent to British Ambassador in Moscow. Con-
siders that British and French instructions admit of con-
clusion that Russian demands are to be met in full.
June 30 The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
Discusses Halifax's speech on foreign affairs made on
June 29 and its reception by the press.
July 3 The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No, 593 and describes campaign by
certain circles in Britain to create a war psychosis by
spreading false reports from Danzig.
July 7 The Auslandsorganisation to the Chief of the Reich Chancellery
Encloses a situation report by Press Director of Landes-
grappe for Great Britain dealing with public opinion,
military preparations, and organization of propaganda in
Britain.
July 10 The Ambassador in Great Britain to t}ie Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 606 and states that campaign of
incitement about coup in Danzig being imminent has col-
lapsed. Analyses British Government policy towards
Germany.
July 10 Editors' Note
Statement by British Prune Minister on recent events in
Danzig.
July 12 ! The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
Reports information received from reliable source_ about
disagreements in Anglo-Franco-Soviet pact negotiations
; over interpretation of term "internal aggression" and over
| military part question.
504
571
Page
780
791
572
577
581
593
006
630
645
797
802
807
817
832
874
891
S98
657 905
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
XXXV
Date
1939
July M
July 1*
July 14
July 17
July 17
July 21
July 22
July 24
July 24
July 24
July 25
Subject
Doc.No.j Page
Memorandum by the Stale Secretary
Conversation with the British Ambassador after latter's
short visit to London ; Henderson enquired about possibility
of a press truce, and criticized Commander King- Hall's pro-
paganda by news letters.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Conversation with the British Ambassador about German
failure to issue exequatur for British Consul General in
Trague, relation of this question to British non -recognition
of Protectorate, and Anglo -German negotiations on Czech
gold reserves in United Kingdom.
Counsellor Erich Kordt to State Secretary Weizsdcker
Letter conveying Ribbentrop's instructions that Ambas-
sador Dirksen should await special instructions before
returning to London from his normal leave.
The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 567 (see under Rumania) and
reports has learned from reliable source that British Ambas-
sador in Moscow instructed to make no further concessions
to Soviet wishes on indirect aggression and on a military
pact.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Conversation with the British Ambassador whom he
informed of substance of Bonnet-Ribbentrop correspond-
ence (documents Nos. 602 and 669 — see under France).
Subject of press truce further discussed.
The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 679 and reports that, in order to
break deadlock in negotiations with Moscow, France has
proposed to Britain dropping objections to simultaneous
conclusion of a political treaty and military convention.
The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that during Wohlthat's visit to London he was
invited to have discussions with Hudson and Sir H. Wilson ;
British press publishing fantastic reports about these dis-
cussions.
The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 698, and reports press publicity
given to alleged statements by Hudson on his conversations
with Wohlthat, which are being exploited by the opponents
of any understanding with Germany.
The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
Discusses possibilities of British Government turning to a
more constructive policy towards Germany.
Memorandum by an Official on the Staff of the Four Tear Plan
Account by Wohlthat of his conversations in London,
with Sir H. Wilson on July 18 and 21, with Sir J. Ball on
July 20, and with Mr. R. S. Hudson on July 20.
Ambassador Dirksen to State Secretary Weizsdcker
Letter enclosing a copy of document No. 710, and expres-
sing the view that distorted press versions of Wohlthat-
Hudson conversation may have advantage of keeping in
background more important conversations between Wohl-
that and Sir H. Wilson, thus affording possibility of con-
tinuing them.
671
672
674
079
921
022
926
930
682 932
695
69S
708
710
716
723
052
954
966
969
977
1001
XXXVI
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Bate
Subject
Doc. No.
1939
July 31
July 31
July 31
July 31
Aug, 1
Aug. 1
Aug. 3
Aug. 4
Aug. 4
Undated
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Great Britain
Instructions to report immediately on political conversa-
tions Wohlthat held in London, and in particular on his
conversation with Dirksen himself.
The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 743 and describes circumstances
which led Wohlthat to have discussions with Hudson and
Wilson. Reports on his own conversation with Wohlthat,
in which the conclusions to be drawn from Wilson's state-
ment were discussed.
The State Secretary to the Embassy in Great Britain.
Refers to document No. 743 and informs Ambassador that
Wohlthat's report on his conversation with Sir H. Wilson
has reached Ribbentrop through Goring. British appear
to regard Wilson's suggestions as official feeler. Requests
report about conversations and Dirksen's altitude to them.
The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
Discusses most suitable methods for enlightening British
public opinion on German foreign policy and Danzig
question ; describes the Embassy's activities in this respect.
The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 743 and gives his views on inter-
pretation to be put on Wohlthat-Wilson conversation.
The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
States that Webrmacht attaches report scepticism in
British military circles about the forthcoming military talks
with U.S.S.R. Discusses probable British intentions in
holding such talks.
Editors' Note
Conversation between German Ambassador in London
and Sir H. Wilson on August 3.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Conversation with British Ambassador, who gave four
reasons for his fear that 'war might arise, and spoke of
possibility of achieving a political truce between Germany
and Poland till following spring or summer.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Conversation with British Ambassador who expects to be
near Salzburg at end of August but hesitates to trouble
Ribbentrop by calling on him.
Editors' Note
Mission of the Swedish industrialist, Birger Dahlerus.
Unsigned Memorandum
Review of public opinion in Britain given to Goring by a
group of British industrialists at a meeting at Sonke Kissen
Koog, arranged by Swedish industrialist, Dahlerus.
[See also under France,
Rumania and U.S.S.R.]
Italy, Poland, Protectorate,
743
746
748
751
752
753
769
770
783
1022
1024
1026
1028
1033
1034
1062
1064
1065
1088
1088
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Greece
XXXVII
Date
193!)
Apr. 19
May-
June 20
Subject
Doc. No. Tage
The Minister in Greece to Ike Foreign Ministry
Beports conversation with Greek State Secretary, who
explained Greek attitude to Anglo-French guarantee.
The Minister in Greece to the Foreign Ministry
Enquires about reported decision to grant an armaments
credit to Greece and requests instructions.
Memorandum, by the Director of the Political Department
Conversation with Greek Minister on Greece's policy of
strict neutrality and interpretation to be put upon the
paragraph in Anglo-Turkish Declaration relating to the
Balkans. Minister renewed assurances that Greece did not
want to enter into any new commitments.
287
418
732
Holy See
Date
1939
Mar. 18
Mar.
Apr.
21
Apr. 24
May 10
May 12
May 12
Subject
Doc. So.
The Ambassador to the Holy See to the Foreign Ministry
Suggests that, in view of the friendly attitude shown by
the Vatican, the German press should continue to observe
an attitude of restrained objectivity towards Vatican
affairs.
The Ambassador to the Holy See to the Foreign Ministry
Has learned from good source that attempts to induce the
Pope to associate himself with the protests of the demo-
cratic States against the annexation of Bohemia and
Moravia have failed.
The Ambassador to the Holy See to the Foreign Ministry
Beports has learned that President Boosevelt's peace
appeal has been severely criticized in Vatican circles.
State Secretary Weizsacker to Ambassador Bergen
Letter requesting him to come to Berlin ostensibly on
private visit, but in reality to discuss relations with the
Vatican.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal
Staff
Beoords a conversation between Hitler and the Papal
Nuncio, who, on instructions from the Pope, put forward
proposal for a conference of five European Great Powers to
find a solution to the German-Polish and Franco-Italian
problems. Hitler replied he must first consult Mussolini,
and said he did not believe war imminent.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Conversation with the Nuncio to whom, in the absence of
Bibbentrop, he made a provisional reply to the Nuncio's
demarche on the question of peace made to Hitler on May 5.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Bemarfcs by the Nuncio in addition to those recorded in
document No. 372; Nuncio indicated that he would welcome
another conversation with Hitler.
28
65
240
258
331
Page
29
74
300
322
42G
372
373
481
483
XXXVIII
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Date
Subject
Doe. No.
Page
1939
Mav 16
Mnv 23
.Tune
July
Unsigned Memorandum
Suggestions by the German Ambassador to the Holy See
on the best methods of reaching a settlement with the Curia.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secre-
tariat
Reception "of the Apostolic Nuncio by Ribbentrop, who
gave official German reply to the Pope's proposal.
Ambassador Bergen to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop
Letter describing his audience with the Pope, at which
he was able, as instructed, to put forward proposals for
promoting a detente in German-Vatican relations.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Conversation with the Nuncio who stated that suggestion
previously made to him hy Weizsacker, that the clergy in
Western Poland could contribute to easing situation, was
being followed up in Rome, where it was hoped that
Germany was also working for peace.
393
396
502
623
516
531)
690
865
Hungary
Date
Subject
Doc. No.
Page
1939
Mar. 16
Mar. IS
Mar. 20
Mar. 23
Mar. 23
Mar. 24
The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry
Reports is informed by M.F.A. that Hungarian Army has
been ordered to eject Rumanians should they attempt to
invade the Carpatho -Ukraine, but, in return for concessions
elsewhere, Hungary is prepared to cede certain areas to
Rumania.
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Information from Hungarian Minister that his Govern-
ment had not notified any other Government in advance of
their intention to occupy the Carpatho-Ukraine, and about
the Hungarian attitude to Rumanian claims.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Hungarian Minister has presented a letter for Ribbentrop
concerning Hungarian occupation of, and assumption of
sovereignty over, the Carpatho-Ukraine, and stating that
Hungary intends to negotiate direct with Rumania and
Slovakia on frontier question.
Minute by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat
Note of telephone conversation in which Ribbentrop drew
attention of Hungarian Minister to reports that the Hun-
garians had advanced into eastern Slovakia; the latter
stated that only those areas had been occupied which
Hungary claimed as frontier rectification against Slovakia.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Hungarian Minister has mentioned a request made by
Ribbentrop that certain members of the Sic should not be
denied transit rights through the Carpatho-Ukraine.
The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry
Has learned from M.F.A. that latter intends to inform
Rumanian Minister that if Rumania will state officially that
she will commence demobilization, Hungary will immediate-
ly rescind measures adopted for the defence of Budapest.
39
53
76
77
S2
41
62
S9
99
ANALYTICAL LIST OP DOCUMENTS
XXXIX
Subject
Doc. No. Pago
1939
Mar. 25
Mar.
liar. 20
Mar. 20
Mar. 20
Mar. 30
Apr.
Apr.
Apr. 15
Memorandum by the State. Secretary
Encloses a letter from Horthy to Hitler taking note with
thanks of the German statement relating to Slovakia and
drawing attention to the need for a new frontier demarca-
tion between Slovakia and the Ruthenian territory.
Memorandum by the State. Secretary
Enquiry by Hungarian Minister about rumours that the
German Economic Treaty with Rumania had been linked
with political concessions.
TJte Director of the Political Department to the Legation in
Hungary
States Germany does not intend to intervene in the
Hungarian-Slovak frontier negotiations. Instructions to
evade discussion of, and if necessary, to contradict, allega-
tions that Hungary's invasion of Slovakia had Germany's
approval.
Memorandum by the Slate Secretary
Conversation with Hungarian Minister who believed that
rapid conclusion of German-Rumanian Economic Treaty
was due to Hungarian military measures. Hungary no
longer willing to cede a few villages in the Carpatho-
Ukraine to Rumania.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Enquiry by Hungarian Minister about German-Polish
conversations on Danzig ; Minister hinted that Csaky would
be willing to advise conciliatory attitude in Warsaw.
The State Secretary to the Legation in Hungary
Transmits report from Legation in Bucharest stating that
Hungary demands recognition of her now frontiers with
Rumania and proposes issuing declaration along lines of
hitherto unsigned Bled declaration. Instructions about the
German views on this proposal.
The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Minisby
Refers to document No. 132, and reports that Hungarian
M.F.A. denies having demanded Rumanian recognition of
the new frontiers, but has declared he is ready to negotiate
after a complete Rumanian demobilization.
The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry
Reports has been informed by Hungarian M.F.A. that
latter has denied to Rumanian Minister British press
roports about the return of parts of Rumanian territory to
Hungary and about an imminent Hungarian attack on
Rumania; Csaky likewise refused to put Bled Agreement
into effect but offered to negotiate entirely fresh agreement.
The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry
Reports has been informed by Hungarian M.F.A. that the
reasons for detente in Hungarian-Rumanian relations is a
Rumanian Note declaring that, in view of statements that
Hungary intends to respect Rumanian frontier, Rumania
will reduce mobilization.
Apr.
17
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Hungarian Minister has enquired about
German frontier guarantee for Rumania.
a possible
01}
120
122
123
132
140
163
11. "i
116
149
131
152
167
1S3
202
204
219
247
268
XL
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Date
Subject
Doc, No. Page
1939
Apr. 22
Apr, 30
Apr. 29
May
May 25
June 10
June 1 2
June 13
June IS
June 28
The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry
Reports account given him by M.F.A. of Jatter's con-
versations with Mussolini and Ciano: Csaky emphasized
that Hungary was prepared in principle to conclude a non-
aggression pact and a treaty of friendship with Yugoslavia.
Ciano intended to tell Yugoslav M.F.A. this, and to recom-
mend Yugoslav accession to Anti-Comintern Pact.
Memorandum by the Minister in Hungary
Records the reception of the Hungarian Minister President
and M.F.A. by Ribbentrop; latter's survey of the general
political situation. Discussion of Hungarian-Rumanian and
Hungarian- Yugoslav relations.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal
Staff
Conversation between Hitler and the Hungarian Minister
President and M.F.A. on the general political situation.
Memorandum by the Minister in Hungary
Records second conversation between Ribbentrop and
Hungarian Minister President and M.F.A. Discussion of
questions at issue between Germany, Hungary and Slovakia
arising from the partition of Czecho-Slovakia ; complaints of
anti-Hungarian propaganda in Slovakia; grievances of
minorities ; Hungarian offer of mediation in German- Polish
relations declined.
The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry
Reviews complaints by M.F.A. and other Hungarian
politicians of German support given to the Hungarian
Arrow Cross party, which is causing embarrassment to
Hungarian Government.
The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry
Reports M.F.A. has told him of a Yugoslav proposal for
concluding an agreement between Yugoslavia, Bulgaria,
Rumania and Hungary, with subsequent Turkish adherence.
Csaky, out of consideration for Axis Powers, will not enter-
tain this proposal.
The Slate Secretary to the Legation in Hungary
Refers to document No. 503 and requests that further
enquiries be made into meaning and purpose of Yugoslav
initiative for agreement between herself, Bulgaria, Rumania
and Hungary, with Turkey as mediator.
The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 510 and reports the result of
enquiries made of Hungarian Deputy M.F.A.
The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry
Reports has carried out instructions to raise with M.F.A.
question of Hungary attempting to use Turkish good offices
in territorial dispute between Hungary and Rumania.
Csaky explained reasons for this action.
The Hungarian Minister in Germany to State Secretary Weiz-
sticker
Letter transmittingmemorandum on proposals by Hungarian
Government for tripartite talks between Germany, Italy and
Hungary to concert measures in the field of war economy.
24S
307
295
296
300
372
376
3S3
436
503
510
519
542
578
583
692
715
745
S02
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Date
Subject
DOC. No. Page
1939
June 29
June 29
June 30
July 9
July 22
July 24
Aug.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Conversation with Hungarian Minister who stated, his
Government intended to Temonstrate -with British Govern-
ment about effect of British guarantee to Rumania on treat-
ment of Hungarian minority in Rumania.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Hungarian Minister has drawn attention to strengthening
of Rumanian Army which would result if Rumanian orders
for arms placed in Germany were fulfiiled, and proposed
some limitation on such supplies.
Minute by an Official of Political Division I
Decision reached in conference with Keitel on Hungarian
request to hold preparatory talks on war economy with the
Axis Powers.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
States Ribbentrop in favour of joint preparatory work
for war economy with Hungary, but this should not start
till after first meeting on this subject with the Italians.
Memorandum by Ambassador Hitter
Conversation with Hungarian Minister about the Hun-
garian proposal contained in document No. 578.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Conversation with Hungarian Minister who presented two
letters from his Minister President to the Fiihrer. In the
first letter Teleki states that, in event of general conflict,
Hungary will make her policy conform to that of the Axis,
and proposes tripartite discussions on war economy. In the
second Teleki states that Hungary would not on moral
grounds be in a position to take action against Poland.
Memorandum by the Minister in Hungary
Record of conversations between Hitler and Cs&ky in
presence of Ribbentrop and others. Hitler's displeasure at
letter from Count Teleki stating Hungary could not parti-
cipate in German-Polish conflict; reasons for believing
German success to be in Hungary's interests ; determination
to settle Polish question; views on attitude of other States
in case of conflict. Promise subsequently made by Cs6ky
to Ribbentrop to withdraw Teteki letters.
[See also under Italy, Poland, Rumania, Slovakia, Turkey
and Yugoslavia.}
584
583
595
641
706
712
810
811
820
888
963
972
84 1093
Italy
1 1
>
Bate
Subject
Doc. No.
Page
1939
Mar. 17
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that Ciano, on Mussolini's instructions, confirmed
Italy's approval of Germany's action in Czecho-Slovakia,
but drew attention to rumours of Croat intentions to
establish Croat autonomy under German protection; the
Duce could not show the same desinlirestement in the Croat
question as over Czecho-Slovakia.
15
15
U-
XLII
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Date
Subject
Doc. So.
Page
1939
Mar. 18
Mar. IS
Mar. 19
Mar. 20
Mar. 20
Mar. 20
Mar. 21
Mar. 21
Mar. 24
Mar. 24
Jtfemoconcfum % (Tie iStae Secretary
Has been told privately by Italian Ambassador of account
the latter had received from Rome on the mission of Prince
Philip of Hesse, and Mussolini's reply.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Italian Ambassador has enquired about documents,
alleged by British press to exist, showing that Germany's
march into Czecho-SSovakia was already settled several
weeks in advance.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Further representations made by the Italian Ambassador
regarding Germany's arrears of coal deliveries to Italy, and
the political aspects of this question.
The Ambassador in Italy to tlie Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. IS and reports conversation, with
Ciano, to whom he gave 'assurances about the German
attitude to the Croat question. Ciano stated that Italy
desired continuance of present Yugoslav State, but should
Croat autonomy movement develop, would expect complete
desintcressement from Germany,
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secre-
tariat
Note on a conversation between Hitler and the Italian
Ambassador, in Ribbentrop's presence. Hitler reviews the
prospects for the Axis Powers in the event of a European
war. Discussion of Italian claims against France.
Foreign Minister Bibbentrop to Foreign Minister Ciano
Letter expressing appreciation of Italy's attitude during
recent events in Czecho-Slovakia and assuring him of
Germany's desintiressement in Croat question.
The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy
States that General Keitel has been asked to inform the
Italian authorities that he is ready to open General Staff
talks with them.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Has made urgent representations to Reich Minister of
Economics about the political importance of coal deliveries
to Italy ; Funk referred to Germany's own shortage.
Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy
Has had sent by special courier to Berlin two memoranda
(attached) on the speech by Mussolini at the Fascist Grand
Council on March 21, concerning Axis solidarity.
Ambassador Mackensen to Counsellor Erich Kordt
Letter referring to further instructions from Ribbentrop
about the record of the Hitler-Attolico conversation (docu-
ment No. 52) and transmitting a memorandum on his
conversation with Attolico about this. According to
Attolico Mussolini seemed much annoyed at being con-
fronted with afait accompli over Czecho -Slovakia, but had
now accepted the course of events.
37
38
44
45
40
41
47
48
52
55
57
62
86
87
57
63
66
73
102
106
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
XLIII
1939
Mar. 25
Mar.
Mar. 26
liar.
Mar. 28
Mar. 31
Subject
Doc. NoJ Pago
Apr.
Apr.
Apr.
Apr.
Apr.
Circular of the Foreign Minister
States that Germany's relations with Italy m the Axis
require that Italian intentions should be decisive for
German policy in respect of the Mediterranean countries,
particularly in the case of policy towards minorities there.
No connections must in future be maintained with Croat
organizations.
The Fukrer and Chancellor to the Head of the Italian Govern-
ment
Letter of congratulations on the 20th anniversary of the
foundation of Fascism; assures Mussolini of Germany's
unchanging friendship.
Editors' Note
Mussolini's speech on March 26, 1939, the 20th anniversary
of the foundation of the Fascist Formations.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Enquiry by Italian Charge d' Affaires about Bulgarian
reactions to the German-Rumanian Economic Treaty.
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Reports explanation given him by Ciano of statement by
Mussolini in his speech on March 26 that he refused to take
any kind of initiative. Reason was a personal letter to
Mussolini from Chamberlain, begging the Duce to consider
whether he could not take action to relieve present tension.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Conversation with Italian Ambassador, who discussed
German-Italian relations and complained that recent
German treatment of Italy had been inconsiderate. He
desired clearer definition of German-Italian interests.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Has denied the Italian Ambassador's allegation that there
must still be irregular connections between Germany and
the South Tyrol through the Aussenpolitisches Amt.
Memorandum by the Stale Secretary
Has given Italian Ambassador a formal assurance about
contacts between the Croats and German authorities.
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Has learned that Italo-Albanian negotiations are in pro-
gress to establish Italian Protectorate over Albania. Has
enquired of M.F.A., who gave an account of Italo-Albanian
relations and Italian intentions.
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy
Instructions to inform Italian M.F.A. with regard to
Albanian question, that Germany welcomes any strengthen-
ing of Italian influence.
Memorandum by the Head of Folitical Division I Va
Records discussion of South Tyrol questions with Magi-
strati, who put forward, as only possible solution to the
problem, the resettlement of all South Tyrolese in Germany;
Mussolini would agree to this plan if proposed to him by
Hitler.
94
113
100
110
114
140
143
144
150
loS
163
110
123
137
142
174
179
ISO
187
194
19S
XLIV
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Sate
1039
Apr. 6
Apr. 7
Apr. 7
Apr. S
Apr, 11
Apr. 14
Apr. 14
Apr. 15
Apr. 15
Apr. 15
Apr. 15
Subject
Doc. No.
Page
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Has been informed by Italian Ambassador that Italian
troops will land in Albania on April 7, and will occupy the
country.
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 158, and reports hag carried out
instructions with M.F.A., who informed him of Italy's
decision to land troops in Albania and reasons for this.
Memorandum by the Stale Secretary
Italian Ambassador has made
German coal supplies to Italy.
urgent appeal about
The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to
the Embassy in Italy
States that special efforts are being made to increase
deliveries of coal to Italy.
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy
Transmits message for Goring, stating that was unaware
Goring was paying official state visit to Italy, and requesting
him to inform German Ambassador sn Rome of his pro-
gramme.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Has been informed by Italian Ambassador of conversation
latter had had with Reich Foreign Minister. Attelico has
since enquired of Ciano and been told that Mussolini attaches
no importance to British guarantee to Greece.
SS-Gruppenfiihrer Heydrich to Foreign Minister Ribbantrop
Letter transmitting report on the views expressed by
important Italian personage regarding the dissolution of
Czecho-SIovakia, and German -Italian relations: position of
Reich in Europe felt to be increasingly intolerable for Italy.
The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy
Informs Ambassador that the question of whether to ask
Rumanian and Greek Governments if they were parties to
British guarantee has been discussed with Attolico, who
stated Mussolini considered such action inexpedient at
present.
Unsigned Foreign Ministry Memorandum
Records conversation between Goring and Mussolini:
German satisfaction over Italy's action in Albania; the
situation in Yugoslavia; Germany to undertake no major
economic activities in South East Europe without con-
sulting Italy; economic and military advantages of dis-
solution of Czecho-SIovakia: strength of the military
position of the Axis.
State Secretary Weizsacker to Ambassador Mackensen
Letter informing him that Ciano has expressed wish for a
meeting with Ribbentrop ; discusses possible date for this.
State Secretary Weizsacker to Ambassador Mackensen
Letter supplementing document No. 208; states Hitler-
Mussolini meeting is in prospect and discusses value of such
exchange of views.
170
171
174
175
178
197
199
203
205
207
207
210
211
214
238
240
247
248
208
209
256
257
ratj
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
XLV
Date
1939
Apr. 18
Apr. 17
Subject
Apr.
19
Apr. 19
Apr.
22
Apr. 24
Apr. 28
Apr. 29
Apr. 29
May 1
May
Unsigned, Memorandum
Records conversation between Goring and Mussolini in
Rome on April 16: discussion of Roosevelt message; Anglo-
Italian relations; possibility of rapprochement with Russia
and Japanese attitude thereto; Axis prospects jn event of
general conflict ; significance of Tunisia and Malta ; relations
with Spain, Turkey, Egypt, the Arabs; economic questions.
Conclusions reached in discussions.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Records telephone conversation with German Ambassador
in Rome who had learned from Ciano Italian intentions
about reply to Roosevelt message.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Has informed the Italian Ambassador that Hitler will
probably include an answer to President Roosevelt in his
speech on April 2S. Attolieo considered German and
Italian replies should be in close accord.
Ambassador Mackensen to State Secretary Weizsacker
Letter in reply to document No. 209 : has no information
about, but would welcome possibility of, a further meeting
between Hitler and Mussolini.
Ambassador Maekensen to State Secretary Weizsacker
Letter transmitting report on Goring's visit to Italy.
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Reports a conversation with Ciano about the latter's
recent meeting with the Yugoslav M.F.A., who had sup-
ported increasing rapprochement of Yugoslav foreign policy
to that of Axis, but would not commit himself to definite
date for joining Anti -Comintern' Pact; Yugoslav with-
drawal from League not to be expected at present.
The, State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy
Quotes report from Ambassador in Ankara describing his
conversation with Turkish M.F.A. and recommending un-
equivocal statement by Mussolini to dispel Turkish distrust.
Instructions to inform Ciano.
The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Italy
Instructions to induce the Italian Government to
relinquish their claims to the crew of the Soviet ship Kom-
somol, held prisoner in Spain, in favour of the German
Government.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Italian Ambassador spoke of possibility of Italy exercising
influence on Poland. Weizsacker replied that this did not
seem opportune at present.
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 286 and reports conversation
with Ciano on Turkey's attitude and a possible declaration
by Mussolini.
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No, 305 {see under Turkey) and
reports action taken. Ciano stated that he had solemnly
declared to Turkish Minister that Italy was pursuing no
designs which could endanger Turkey.
216
236
267
296
237 296
256
280
293
297
303
311
318
361
370
380
395
317 411
XLVI
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Date
1939
May 3
Subject
Doc. No. Page
May 18
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry I 318
Reports complaint by Cia.no of statements attributed to j
the German Consul General in Milan about Hitler restoring
the South Tyrol to the Reich.
i
Editors'' Note . r I
Two memoranda, apparently prepared as briels lor
Ribbentrop's conversations with Ciano m Milan on May 6
and 7.
Unsigned Memorandum , .
Subjects discussed at Ribbentrop-Ciano meetmg in Milan
on May 6-7: decision to conclude a German-Italian alliance
immediately; Anglo-Italian and Franco-Italian relations;
Italy's relations with Spain and thB Balkans; Axis policy
towards Bulgaria and Turkey; Italian desinteressement in
Polish question; political relations of the Axis Powers with
USSR.' evacuation of former Austrians from the South
Tyrol; German coal supplies to Italy; German relations with
the Vatican.
May 10 The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Sends details of German coal deliveries to Italy, from
which it emerges that arrears amount to one million tons;
describes unpleasant surprise created in Italy by repeated
failure to maintain deliveries at agreed level.
May 12 The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Reports conversation with Ciano who enquired if he had
any news from Berlin on the results of the meetmg with
Ribbentrop in Milan. Ciano stated points for forthcoming
German-Italian Treaty to which ho attached decisive
importance.
Mav 12 Memorandum by the State Secretary
Conversation with Italian Ambassador who was anxious
to iiavo the German draft of the forthcoming German-
Italian treaty, as no draft had been drawn up in Rome.
May 12 Memorandum by the, Director of the Legal Department
Has handed Italian Ambassador German dratt tor a
German-Italian Pact. Ambassador raised two points: an
historical mention of the Brenner frontier, and an agreement
to respect each other's spheres of interest.
May 13 The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry _
Reports that Mussolini has caused him to be given text
of a telegram dated May 11, which British loreign Office
sent to British Embassy in Rome, containing message sent
to British Ambassador in Berlin. Transmits translation ot
this message.
Mav 13 Memorandum by the Director of the Legal Department
Records two amendments which, at Mussolini s request,
Attolico has proposed for the German draft of the German-
Italian Pact-
Undated Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy
Department
Reviews present position of German-Italian economic
negotiations and suggests replies to be made to Ciano,
should he raise questions about foil in Gorman supplies to
Jtaly liclow Agreed IovpI.
341
411
444
450
3G0 470
369 478
370 479
371
479
377 487
386
503
423 I 557
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
XLVII
Date
Subject
1939
May 22
May 23
May 31
May 31
May 31
May 31
June 8
June 10
June 10
Juno 1+
German-Italian Pact of Friendship and Alliance
Germany and Italy undertake to concert their foreign
policies and render each other full political and diplomatic
support in the event of a threat to the vital interests of
either, with full military support in the event of hostilities
■with other Powers. Secret Protocol making provision for
joint commissions for military questions and war economy.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secre-
tariat
Notes statements made by Ciano during his Berlin visit
on question of Yugoslavia's foreign policy and on Italy's
relations with Turkey.
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Transmits request from Ciano and Mussolini that, during
visit of Yugoslav Prince Regent and M.F.A. to Berlin, latter
should be pressed to state their policy towards Axis without
ambiguity.
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Conversation with Ciano, who gave detailed account of
Mussolini's first reception of new British Ambassador,
Count Ciano to Foreign Minister Bibbentrop
Letter introducing Count Cavallero, Under Secretary of
State for War, and director of military and economic com-
missions to be set up under the Pact of Friendship and
Alliance. Cavallero entrusted with memorandum prepared
by Mussolini for Hitler, Memorandum rehearses reasons
why present time would not be favourable for Italy to
embark on war, and recommends strategy to be adopted by
Axis Powers when inevitable war with Western Democracies
comes about.
State Secretary Weizsacker to Ambassador Mac/censen
Letter transmitting copy of document No. 451 (see under
U.S.S.E.) in order to inform him of recent outcome of dis-
cussions in Berlin about how to put a spoke in the Anglo-
Russian conversations; Attolico not yet acquainted with
these developments.
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Reports Mussolini's views on his conversation
Serrano Sufier in Rome.
with
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 456, and reports Ciano has
informed him of visit by British Ambassador, who brought
memorandum containing British reply to Mussolini's
question about British Government's attitude to Anglo-
Italian Agreement of April 1938. Has been furnished with
copy of memorandum and transmits summary
Ambassador Mackensen to State Secretary Weitsacker
Letter describing conversation with Ciano who attributed
to inadvertence failure by Serrano Sufier to mention in his
speech Germany's share in Franco's victory. Ciano sug-
gested that Sufier be invited to pay official visit to Germany.
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Conversation with Mussolini and Ciano regarding a report
from the Italian Ambassador in Moscow who had been
informed by his German colleague of proposals the latter
was making to Berlin. Mussolini approved these proposals.
Doc.JTo. Page
426 561
431
455
456
459
460
494
505
571
613
613
617
506
523
621
G65
694
695
721
XLVIII
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Date
Subject
Doc. No- Page
1939
Juno 14
Juno 14
June 14
Juno 16
June 19
June 19
June 20
June 23
Juno 24
June 26
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Continues document No. 523, and reports Mussolini s
views on significance attaching to present visit to Berlin of
Japanese Ambassador in Rome.
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Continues document No. 524 and reports Mussolini a
account of his conversations -with Serrano Suiier on Spain s
relations with the Axis and on German relations with the
Vatican.
The Stale Secretary to the Ambassador in Italy
Encloses a copy of document No. 459 and Ribbentrop s
reply, which is to be transmitted to Ciano. Reply welcomes
arrival of Count Cavallero to further Italo-German military
collaboration, and states that Hitler's views on Mussolini s
memorandum have been transmitted through Attohco.
Ambassador Mackensen to State Secretary Weizsdclcer
Letter, referring to document No. 523, giving Mussolini s
opinion of Soviet Charge d' Affaires in Rome and enclosing
memorandum on confidential statements made by the latter
as to Soviet view of present Anglo-Soviet negotiations: no
concessions to be made in Europe without guarantee of
Soviet interests against Japan ; Moscow aware of Japanese
decisions on alliance with Axis.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Has informed Italian Ambassador that Germany has no
concrete aims aa regards Spain beyond still unratified secret
Treaty of Friendship.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Conversation with Italian Ambassador who recently trans-
mitted to Rome German reply to Mussolini's letter to Hitler.
Ambassador stated Mussolini welcomed Hitler's suggestion
for meeting.
The Head of the Ausland&organisation to the Embassy in Italy
Instructions to all branches of the AO in Italy, especially
in former South Tyrol, that no friction or differences with
the Italians over South Tyrol question must be allowed to
arise. Unqualified support must be given to view that
renunciation is final.
Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy
Records telephone conversation with State Secretary m
Berlin on possibility of Mackensen intervening further in
favour of Ortsgruppenleiter Kauffmarm, who is charged
with offence against Italian authorities in South Tyrol.
The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in
Italy ,
Gives decisions taken at a meeting between the Reichs-
fiihrer-SS and Italian representatives on effecting transfer
and resettlement of the South Tyrolese.
Counsellor of Embassy Tippelshirch to Senior Counsellor
Schliep ,
Letter describing informal conversation with the Italian
| Ambassador, who had been informed that his Government
believed moment had arrived for thwarting Anglo-Franco-
Soviet negotiations. Since Rosso not clear how to proceed,
awaiting return of German Ambassador to Moscow.
524
525
527
536
722
723
726
545
546
549
560
562
569
749
740
751
775
77S
789
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
XLIX
Date
1939
June 27
July 1
July 6
July 7
July 7
July S
July 10
July 11
July 12
July 12
July 13
Subject
Boo. No.
State Secretary Weizsacker to Ambassador Mackensen
Letter acknowledging document No. 536 and stating that
position still not clear over resumption of German-Soviet
economic negotiations, or over probable outcome of Anglo-
Franco -Soviet negotiations.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Conversation with the Italian Ambassador, who gave Mm
a document from the Italian Consulate General in Danzig,
setting out Professor Burekhardt's views on the deteriora-
tion of the situation in Danzig.
Memorandum by an Official in the Office of the State Secretary
Records information from the Reichsfiihrer-SS, that latter
had submitted to Hitler a draft communique' on the re-
settlement of Reich Germans from the South Tyrol. Hitler
had forbidden publication, or any future press announce-
ments on the subject without his permission.
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Reports account received from Ciano of conversation
between Mussolini and British Ambassador, at which the
latter presented an aide-mimoire from Chamberlain warning
Mussolini of the dangers inherent in the Danzig situation.
Ambassador Attolico to Foreign Minister Hibbentrop
Letter requesting that further consideration be given to
question of a communique stressing voluntary character of
South Tyrol migration, as Italian Government desire.
Minute by the Foreign Minister
Information given to Italian Ambassador as to German
intentions respecting Danzig and Poland.
The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy and the Consulate
General at Milan
States that nothing will appear in German press about
South Tyrol resettlement operations, and gives instructions
on what may be said in conversations, where these are un-
avoidable.
Ambassador Mackensen to State Secretary Weizsacker
Letter sending copy of a letter from Mussolini to be
delivered to Franco by Ciano ; Mussolini warns of dangers of
monarchical restoration in Spain and of unreliability of
Britain and Prance.
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that Mussolini's order expelling all foreigners from
Province of Bolzano in South Tyrol, being applied to
German Air Attache. Is making representations to Italian
Government.
Ambassador Attolico to State Secretary Weizsacker
Letter recalling German undertaking to supply Italy with
anti-aircraft artillery, and asking that Italian request for
early delivery of 50 batteries be dealt with.
The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry
Reports arrival of Ciano in Spain, and latter's account of
his conversation with Franco.
Page
574
601
624
629
631
636
643
654
655
660
663
799
825
866
872
S7S
8S3
889
902
903
909
912
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Date
Subject
poc.Ko. 1 Page
1939
July 14
July 24
July 24
July 25
July 29
July 29
Aug.
The Director of ilie Political Department to the Embassy »n
Italy and the Co7isulate General in Milan
Explains reasons fox departing from policy previously
agreed with Italians on publicity over South Tyrolese
migration; distorted account in Temps required issue of
denial through DNB.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Has been informed by the Italian Ambassador in con-
fidence of certain basic principles which Mussolini will put
forward when he meets Hitler on August 4.
State Secretary Weinsacker to Ambassador Maekensen
Letter enclosing copies of documents Nos. 578, 706 (see
under Hungary) and related correspondence, and stating
that meeting of German and Italian commissions on military
policy and war economy now postponed until possibly mid-
August.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secre-
tariat
Conversation between Ribbentrop and Italian Ambas-
sador, who brought with him four memoranda containing
Mussolini's views about projected Hitler-Mussolini meeting.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Communication made by the Italian Ambassador, that
repeated telephone conversations with Ciano had shown
that Mussolini still favoured his idea of an international
conference. Attolico believed there would be no Italian
objection to postponing Hitler-Mussolini meeting, if German
Government accepted principle of peaceful development.
Ambassador Attolico to Stale Secretary Weizsdcker
Letter giving Ciano's views concerning reply to the two
letters from Count Teleki (document No. 712 — see under
Hungary).
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Italian Ambassador, on Ciano's instructions, has stated
that Mussolini feels meeting with Hitler might usefully be
postponed until outcome of Anglo -Soviet negotiations
known, but considers that Ciano and Ribbentrop should
meet as soon as possible.
[See also under Albania, Far East, Spain, Turkey and
U.S.S.B.]
668
711
717
718
737
917
971
983
984
1016
739 1018
777
1073
Latin America
Date
1939
June 12
Subject
Unsigned Memorandum . ,
Record of first meeting of conference on Latin America
held at Foreign Ministry between Heads of German Missions
and Party (AO) officials Discussion of division of spheres
of responsibility between Reich Missions and Party (AO)
organizations.
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Liechtenstein
LI
Date
Subject
Doc. No.
Page
1939
Mar. 31
The Head of the Volksdeutscke Mittelstelle to' the Foreign
Ministry
Keports on attempts to organize a putsch for forcible
union of Liechtenstein with the Reich, and on action taken
by Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle to prevent international
consequences.
141
176
Middle East
Date
Subject
Doc . No.
Page
1939
Mar. 31
The Foreign Ministry to the Legation in Afghanistan
General instructions on the attitude to be adopted in
social relations with members of the Soviet Russian Mission.
138
173
May 2
Minister Grobba to Under State Secretary Woermann
Letter again raising the question of German lack of interest
in establishing closer ties with King Ibn Saud, and giving
reasons for requesting that this attitude be reconsidered.
313
403
May 22
Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VII
Reviews German policy towards Saudi Arabia, and
recommends receiving a special envoy from King Ibn Saud
and granting King's request for economic cooperation.
422
555
June 20
Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VII
Conversation between Bibbentrop and King Ibn Baud's
special emissary, Khalid Al Hud, in which latter expressed
King's desire to enter into relations with Germany and
obtain German assistance in building up armed forces inde-
pendently of Britain.
498
685
June 20
Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VII
Records reception of King Ibn Saud's special envoy by
Hitler: conversation on German-Arab relations. German
economic assistance for purchase of arms to be given after
receipt of Italian views.
541
743
Militaey Directives
Date
Subject
Doe. No.
Page
$'
1939
Mar. 25
Apr. 3
Apr. 11
Directive from the FiXhrer to the Commander in Chief of the
Army on March 25, 1939
Policy concerning Danzig, Poland, the Slovak question,
the Czech Protectorate and the Balkans.
Directive by the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht
Instructions for "Operation White" (attack on Poland}
preparations should be made so that the operation can be
put into action by September 1; OKW to prepare precise
timetable and synchronize timing between the three
branches of the Wehrmacht.
Directive by the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht
The Wehrmacht to be prepared for "Operation White"
(attack on Poland) and possible surprise occupation of
Danzig independently of "Operation White".
149
185
117
186
223
R
Lir
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Date
Subject
Don, No.
Page
1939
May 23
Minutes of a Conference on May 23, 1939
Hitler's review, at a conference with senior officers of the
Wehrmacht, of the present situation in foreign policy and the
conclusions to be drawn from it.
433
574
Netherlands
Date
1939
Mar, 25
Subject
Mar. 29
Apr.
Apr. 13
Apr. 22
Apr. 25
May 6
The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that the Secretary General of the Netherlands
Foreign Ministry has denied any knowledge other than press
reports of a Franco-British agreement to defend the Nether-
lands frontier in the event of a German attack and has
stated that the Netherlands would never accede to such
agreements but would defend their neutrality in the event
of war.
The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry
Reports has been informed Krupps have refused delivery
of war material to the Netherlands Army. Requests that
Krupps be prevailed upon to fulfil this order.
The Minister m the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry
Reports has been told by Netherlands M.F.A. that latter
does not believe that an Anglo-French agreement on mutual
assistance in the event of an attack on the Netherlands has
been concluded.
Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy
Department
Has been informed by Netherlands Military Attache that
Netherlands still attach importance to placing orders for
field howitzers with Germany, but require these by specified
date.
Memorandum by an Official of the Dienststelle Mbbentrop
Reports visit from Mussert, the leader of the Dutch
National Socialist Party, who expressed his views on the
European political situation for communication to Ribben-
trop.
Memorandum by the Foreign Minister
Conversation with Netherlands Minister with whom Rib-
bentrop Taised question of rumours of German intentions
against Netherlands and of military measures taken by the
latter. Minister gave assurance of Netherlands' strict
neutrality. Gave Minister assurance of German respect for
Netherlands' neutrality in peace and war.
The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry
Reports conversation with M.F.A. who quoted statements
attributed to the Chief of.OKW that recent Netherlands
mobilization measures were primarily directed against
Germany, M.F.A. denied this and denied any military con-
nections whatever with Britain, but repeated assurances of
Netherlands' neutrality.
93
119
162
193
249
263
Page
112
338
14S
197
235
303
330
440
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
LIII
Date
Subject
Doc. No. Page
1939
Apr. (
July 12
Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department
Refers to negotiations between Krupps and Netherlands
Government regarding supply of howitzers, and states
Netherlands Government request formal German assurance
that contract will not be interrupted in the event of outbreak
of wax. Views of competent German authorities being
obtained.
Minute by an Official of the Economic Policy Department
States that Krupps have obtained contract from Nether-
lands Government for supply of howitzers . Wehrmacht has
approved.
[See also under Belgium.]
Addendum
1103 No. (a)
Addendum
1103 No. (b)
Northern States
Subject
Doc. No
Pago
1939
Mar. 29
[Undated]
Apr. 12
Apr. 17
Apr. IS
Apr. 19
. Apr. 21
Minister Blucher to Stale Secretary Weizscicker
Letter recommending early reply to Finno-Swedish Note
on Aaland Islands, since continued" non-arrival of a German
reply places Finnish M.F.A. at a. disadvantage, which is not
in Germany's interests.
Memorandum by the Director of the Legal Department
Reviews position under the Aaland Islands Convention of
1921 and the Finnish and Swedish Notes of January, 1939,
concerning alterations to the Convention; Germany's atti-
tude to a partial fortification of the islands.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Has informed Swedish Minister of German attitude to
Finno-Swedish proposals on the Aaland Islands and has
suggested a declaration by the Swedish Government to the
German Government that, in the event of war, Sweden
would ensure that normal exports to Germany would suffer
no prejudice.
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Reports views of Finnish M.F.A. on German-Swedish
negotiations on Aaland Islands question.
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Records that Swedish Minister has communicated orally
reply of his Government to German request, made on
April 12, for official Swedish statement, and has given expose
of Sweden's attitude to the Aaland Islands question and of
her foreign trade policy in the event of war.
The Director of the Political Department to tlte Legation in
Finland
Refers to document No. 212 and describes unsatisfactory
results of the German -Swedish conversations; Finnish
Minister has been similarly informed and told that Germany
has no objection to the fortification of Aaland Islands by
Finland.
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Has replied to Swedish Minister's statement on Aaland
Islands, made on April 18, by expressing disappointment.
Has suggested to Swedish Minister new formula for Swedish
statement on neutrality and the conduct of commercial
relations in the event of war.
127
156
145 ■ ISO
187
212
229
232
242
229
263
284
288
302
F-
LIV
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Subject
Doc. No. Page
1939
Apr. 25
Apr. 28
May
May
May
May
May 10
May 10
May 10
May 11
Minister Renlhe-Fink to Senior Counsellor Grundherr
Letter enclosing a report from the Consulate in Aabenraa
dealing with the recruiting of an SS Company from young
Volksdeutsche in North Schleswig; asks what is the official
view of this matter.
The State Secretary to the Legations in Sweden, Norway, Den-
mark and Finland
In connection with Hitler's speech, the Ministers of
Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Latvia, Finland and Estonia
are being informed by Ribbentrop that Germany is pre-
pared in principle to conclude non-aggression treaties with
their Governments.
Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to the Finnish Minister in Berlin
Note accepting the Finno-Swedish proposals .for the
amendment of the Aaland Islands Convention of 1921.
The Minister in Finland to tlie Foreign Ministry
Reports that M.F.A. has expressed his Government's
satisfaction over German Note (document No. 312) and that
his Government agree in principle to a non-aggression pact
with Germany, although possible repercussions on Finnish
policy of neutrality are being studied.
The State Secretary to the Legations in Norway, Sweden, Den-
mark, Finland, Latvia and Estonia
Refers to document No. 284 and transmits text of draft
treaty handed to Estonian Minister.
Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI
The Finnish Counsellor has given the Finnish Govern-
ment's views on the German offer of a non-aggression pact;
this question being considered in relation to Finnish
neutrality. Has given Counsellor informally German draft
for such a treaty.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Conversation with Swedish Minister, whose attention he
drew to the fact that the Swedish Government had still not
replied to Germany's offer of a non-aggression pact, and
whom he asked what attitude Swedish Government meant
to adopt.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Conversation with the Danish Minister, who personally
expected to receive shortly his Government's assent, in
principle,to projected German-Danish non-aggression pact.
German draft to be transmitted as soon as such assent
received.
The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry
Reports has learned that M.F.A. is disappointed at results
of Stockholm conversations, where opposition to proposed
non-aggression pacts with Germany, led by Swedish M.F.A.
proved unexpectedly strong. Denmark now faced with
question whether to accept German offer by herself.
The State Secretary to the Legation in Norway
Refers to report from confidential source that British
Minister in Oslo enquired of M.F.A. what the reply would
be, if, in the event of war, Germany should demand a base
in Norway. Recommends warning Norwegian M.F.A.
against British incitements.
265 333
284
359
312 402
314
316
330
356
40S
410
425
466
S
P
I
I
I
357 467
358
364
468
474
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
LV
Date
Subject
Dm. No,
Page
1939
May 11
May 11
May 16
May 16
May 17
May 18
May 20
May 22
!•■■ May
20
|: May 24
May 27
Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI
Telephone instructions given to Legations in Denmark
and Finland concerning replies to be made to objections
raised by Swedish M.F.A. to proposed non-aggression pacts
(document No. 358).
Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI
Record of telephone conversation with Minister in Copen-
hagen, who reported action taken on instructions in docu-
ment No. 365, and views of Danish Government.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Conversation with Finnish Minister, who Tead out an oral
reply from his Government declining the German offer of a
non-aggression pact.
Note by the Deputy Director of the Cultural Policy Department
Discussion with two officials of the Volksdeutsche Mittel-
stelle on the question of recruiting SS-men from the German
minority in North Schleswig and Estonia.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Conversation with the Danish Minister who brought his
Government's reply to the German offer of a non-aggression
pact and a communique to be published in Copenhagen on
May 19.
The State Secretary to the Legations in Denmark, Norway,
Sweden and Finland
Informs them of the replies from the Governments of the
four Northern States to Germany's offer of non-aggression
pacts.
Memorandum by an Official of the Dienstslelle RibbenXrop
Reports statements said to have been made to a journalist
by the Danish Minister in Berlin that, at the Stockholm
Conference, main opposition to acceptance by Northern
States of Germany's offer of non -aggression pacts came from
Swedish M.F.A.
The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports has learned from King of Sweden that difficulties
have arisen in Geneva over Aaiand Islands question, owing
to a change in Soviet policy. Swedo -Soviet negotiations to
take place.
Senior Counsellor Grundherr to Minister Renthe-Fink
Letter describing a conference with representatives of the
Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, and Moller, a leader of the
German minority in Denmark, on the policy to be followed
by Moller. Moderation urged on him.
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Reports Finnish reaction to latest Soviet proposal to
Britain to include Finland among the countries to be
guaranteed and to Soviet desire to become a guarantor of the
Aaiand Islands.
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that Finnish representative in Geneva has been
instructed to try to ensure that, in Aaiand Islands question,
League confines itself to taking note of consent of signatory
Powers and of any Russian protest.
365
366
391
393
404
407
411
419
432
434
443
475
476
513
513
533
537
542
552
571
581
593
LVI
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Date
1939
May 31
June 15
July 1
Subject
Doc.No. Page
July
July
July 11
July 26
July 27
German-Danish Treaty of Non-Aggression
Germany and Denmark undertake not to go to war or
resort to force against each other, not to lend support to a
third party taking such action against either State. Proto-
col of Signature defining terms in relation, to commercial
policy.
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Reports information from M.F.A. about Russian insistence
on being informed about Aaland Islands fortifications, and
about an assurance from Britain that she would not conclude
an Anglo-Soviet agreement guaranteeing Finland.
Minister jRenthe-Fink to Senior Counsellor Grundherr
Letter drawing attention to a speech by a leader of the
German national group in Denmark, which contained un-
desirable references to frontier question and to Hitler's
future plans.
The Director of the Political Department to the Legations in
Finland and Sweden
Transmits information obtained by German Ambassador
in Moscow from his Finnish colleague that the Soviet
Government claim equal rights with Sweden respecting
Aaland Islands, Instructions to inform Finnish (Swedish)
Government that Germany expects rejection of this claim.
The Acting Director of the Political Department to the Embassy
in the Soviet Union
Informs of instructions sent Helsinki and Stockholm in
document No. 612, and of reply from Helsinki that Finnish
M.F.A. refused Molotov's demand over Aaland Islands.
Counsellor Hensel to Senior Counsellor Grundherr
Letter referring to document No. 600; does not consider
Mo'Iler's explanation of his speech satisfactory.
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Reports M.F.A. has spoken to him about German-Russian
talks, repeating rumour that Germany intends to concede
Baltic States to Russia as a sphere of interest. Requests
instructions.
The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in
Finland
Refers to document No. 724 and states that this rumour
is a malicious invention ; German-Russian talks are confined
to the attempt to steer economic relations into more normal
channels.
[See also under Baltic States and Europe: General.]
461
528
600
612
626
021
727
825
811
867
653 901
724
726
1002
1003
Poland and Danzig
Date
1939
Mar. 16
Subject
The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry
Reports conversation with M.F.A. who complained about
incidents on the Polish frontier during the German march
into Czecho-Slovakia and failure to observe demarcation
line. Presented notification of the Hacha agreement.
Beck expressed satisfaction at Slovakia obtaining inde-
pendence.
Doc. Ho.
Page
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
LVII
Date
1939
Mar. 17
Mar. 18
Mar. 21
Mot. 21
Mar.
[undated]
Mar. 23
Mar. 24
Mar. 24
Subject
Doe. No.
The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that M.F.A. desires information on significance of
Germany's promise of protection to Slovakia. As the
announcement has caused considerable nervousness in
Poland, recommends that Beck be given information cal-
culated to allay fears of infringement of Slovak independence
and of military pressure on Poland from Slovakia.
The State Secretary to the Embassy in Poland
Refers to document No. 12 and states that import of the
promise of protection for Slovakia has not yet been settled,
but measures will not be so far-reaching as in the case of
Czechia.
Memorandum by the Foreign Minister
Records conversation with Polish Ambassador in Berlin,
to whom he explained reasons for Germany's action in
Czecho-Slovakia; stated that Protectorate over Slovakia
was not directed against Poland, and hinted that question
might later be made subject of German-Polish discussions;
drew Ambassador's attention to anti-German activities in
Poland; suggested that Polish M.F.A. should visit Berlin;
put forward proposals for German-Polish settlement, on
basis of return of Danzig to Reich, extra-territorial com-
munications between East Prussia and Reich and in return
German guarantee for Corridor. Asked Lipski to report
personally to his Government.
Counsellor of Embassy Wiihlisch to Senior Counsellor of
Legation Schliep
Letter commenting on unfavourable influence of American
Ambassador in "Warsaw; suggests tapping latter's telephone
conversations.
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Poland
Draft telegram, cancelled on Hitler's orders, of instruc-
tions to Ambassador to seek immediate interview with
M.F.A. and put before him German attitude to German-
Polish relations; points to be specially emphasized: settle-
ment of Danzig question, a German quid pro quo for Danzig,
and future attitude to Slovakia.
The Consul General in Danzig to the Foreign Ministry
Reports on conversation between President of the Danzig
Senate Greiser and Polish Diplomatic Representative
Chodacki on elections for Danzig Diet and Senate's proposal
to issue ordinance prolonging term of Diet.
The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 58 (see under Europe: General)
and reports that he has established that the British demarche
involved two separate moves. Regarding the demarche
about the threat to Rumania, Arciszewski has remarked that
Poland would fight only in defence of her own interests.
Has learned nothing definite about the other British sug-
gestions, but assumes Poland would be reluctant to join any
combination, unless it increased her security in the event of
a German attack.
Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V
Records telephone message from the Consul General in
Danzig on defensive measures taken by Poland in the
northern part of the Corridor.
12
Page
12
18
61
19
70
64
73
85
79
87
96
85
101
LVIII
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Date
Subject
1939
Mar. 24
Mar. 25
Mar. 26
Mar. 27
Mar. 27
Doc. So.
Pnge
Mar. 28
Mar. 29
Mar. 29
Mar. 29
Mar. 29
State Secretary Weizsdcker to Ambassador Moltke
Letter explaining circumstances which led to Ambassador
being asked to cancel arrangement for conversation with
Beck.
Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Political Depart-
ment
Information from Canaris about Polish military measures
in the North and the views of General Keitel on Polish
intentions.
Memorandum by the Foreign, Minister
Records conversation with Polish Ambassador on memo-
randum presented by the latter, setting forth the views of
the Polish Government on the German proposals respecting
the question of transit traffic between the German Reich and
East Prussia across the Polish Corridor, and about the future
of the Free City of Danzig.
The State Secretary to the Embassy in Poland
Transmits an account of Ribbentrop's interview with the
Polish Ambassador (see document No. 101).
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secre-
tariat
Records conversation between Ribbentrop and Polish
Ambassador. Ribbentrop accused Polish authorities of
condoning anti-German incidents and complained that the
Polish Government had given an evasive answer to the
generous German proposals.
The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry
Describes the reaction of Polish public opinion to the re-
incorporation of Memel in the Reich. Belief prevalent that
Danzig question may become acute at any moment.
Military measures taken by the Government have aggra-
vated the existing war psychosis.
The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry
Reports has been summoned by M.F.A., who stated that,
in view of Ribbentrop's statement to Polish Ambassador in
Berlin on March 26 (document No. 101) that a Polish coup
against Danzig would constitute casus belli for Germany, he,
Beck, was compelled to state that a German attempt to
alter status of Danzig would constitute casus belli for
Poland.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Records questions put by the President of the Danzig
Senate and Staatsrat Dr. Botteher on Danzig's future
attitude to Poland and to the League of Nations High
Commissioner in Danzig, and the advice given them.
The Minister of the Interior to the Head of the Reich Chancellery
Reviews German -Polish negotiations on questions concern-
ing national groups, and concludes that, in view of Polish
attitude, no constructive results could be achieved in these
discussions.
Senior Counsellor Schliep to Ambassador Moltke
Letter informing him of the advice regarding the attitude
Danzig should adopt to Poland given to President of Danzig
Senate by Woizsiickec and Ribbentrop.
90
101
109
110
121
103
108
127
135
115
118
144
147
124
125
126
152
153
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
MX
Date
Subject boc.No.! Page
1039
Apr. 3
Memorandum by an Official of the. Protocol Department
Describes interview -with Polish M.F.A. ■who was passing
through Berlin.
US
18C
Apr. i
The, Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry
Reviews the attitude of Polish press and public opinion
after Chamberlain's declaration on British assistance to
Poland.
154
190
Apr. 4
The Consul in Gdynia to the Foreign Ministry
Assesses attitude of Polish population in his district to an
incorporation of the Corridor in the Reich.
155
192
Apr. 5
The State Secretary to the Embassy in Poland
States that Lipski will be told that German offer to Poland
will not be repeated, and that Polish counter proposal has
been rejected. The Embassy should refrain from discussing
the matter.
159
195
Apr. 6
The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry
Reports remarks made by Polish M.F.A.'s Chef de Cabinet,
who said that Polish Government still desire a genuine under-
standing with Germany,
167
203
Apr, 6
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Conversation with Polish Ambassador on Beck's visit to
London. Lipski stated that Poland wished to abide by 1934
Agreement, and that Anglo-Polish Agreements were bilateral
and purely defensive.
169
205
Apr. 11
Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I
Reports assessment by the Intelligence Department of
OKW of the present military situation in Poland.
184
223
Apr. 18
The Embassy in Poland to the Foreign Ministry
Reports statements said to have been made by Beck to
foreign diplomats in Warsaw about the Anglo-Polish
declaration of guarantee and his London visit.
225
274
Apr. 22
The State Secretary to the Embassy in Poland
Instructions to maintain complete reserve in conversations
on the general political situation and on German-Polish
relations.
247
306
Apr. 25
The Embassy in Poland to the Foreign Ministry
Reviews public opinion in Poland; fear of Germany has
consolidated the various political elements, and the Army's
political influence has been strengthened.
261
324
Apr. 27
The State Secretary to the Embassy in Poland
Instructs Charge' d' Affaires to arrange for interview at
Foreign Ministry on April 28 to deliver a memorandum, at
a time to coincide with start of Hitler's speech.
274
346
Apr. 27
Note to the Polish Government
The German Government consider that, by entering into
treaty relations with Britain, Poland has unilaterally nul-
lified the German-Polish Declaration of 1934 and has
rejected the German proposals for a Danzig settlement.
276
347
LX
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Date
Subject
Doc, No. Page
1939
May I
May 6
May 9
May 10
May 10
May 11
May 13
May 15
May 1G
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Polish Charge d' Affaires has presented a memorandum
containing the Polish Government's reply to the German
Memorandum of April 28 (document No. 276). Polish reply
rejects German accusations regarding incompatibility of
Anglo-Polish' Mutual Guarantee with the 1934 Declaration,
but states that nevertheless the Polish Government would
be wilting to entertain suggestions for regulating Polish-
German relations on a good neighbourly basis by means of
a treaty.
Circular of the State Secretary
Instructions to German Missions on the line to be taken
on Beck's speech of May 5 and on the Polish Memorandum
(document No. 334).
The Foreign Ministry to the President of the Reich Labour and
Unemployment Insurance Institute and the Reichsfiihrer-
SS and Chief of the German Police
Enquiries whether there are any objections, on economic or
other grounds, to retaliatory measures against Poles in the
Reich, in view of growing oppression of German community
in Poland.
The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry
Reviews effect on Polish public opinion of Beck's speech
on May 5, and discusses certain economic developments,
which might in time affect Polish morale. Influence of
recent events in Moscow on Polish attitude.
Counsellor Bergmann to Consul General Janson
Letter giving State Secretary's views, expressed to Presi-
dent of Danzig Senate, that it would not be proper to
influence League High Commissioner, Professor Burckhardt,
over his return to Danzig, and stating present position over
visit of German warships to Danzig.
Circular of the Foreign Ministry
Refers to increasing oppression of German community in
Poland and to the attitude of the Polish Government, from
which can be concluded that they are neither able nor willing
to prevent it. Sends Missions reports of excesses for
appropriate use.
The Foreign Ministry to the Consulate General in Danzig
States that German cruiser KSnigsberg will visit Danzig in
August, and requests that Danzig Senate b© informed.
Instructions have been given to Warsaw Embassy to
announce visit formally to Polish Government.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secre-
tariat
Submits two memoranda on the question of taking
reprisals against the Polish minority in Germany for oppres-
sion of the German minority in Poland. First memorandum
deals with general questions; second with possible economic
reprisals.
The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry
Reports information from a reliable source about Potem-
kin's visit to Warsaw.
334 430
335
350
436
459
355
361
367
378
387
465
471
476
488
504
3S9
509
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
LXI
Date
Subject
Doc. No.
Page
1930
May 16
May 17
May 17
May 17
May 21
May
21
May
23
June
1
June
3
j'.Jnne
3
Ambassador Molike to State. Secretary Weizsdcker
Latter deprecating the activities of the Japanese Ambas-
sador in Warsaw in concerning himself 'with the improve-
ment of German-Polish relations.
The Consul General at Geneva to the Foreign Ministry
Reports views expressed by the League High Commis-
sioner, who did not expect a formal meeting of the Com-
mittee of Three in view of Polish desire that Danzig
questions be not now discussed by the Committee.
The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry
Has caused serious representations to be made to the
Polish Foreign Ministry about incidents in Tomaszow;
Polish authorities consider they have done everything pos-
sible to prevent recurrence of such incidents.
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Comments on information from the German Consul in
Lw6w on the attitude of the Ukrainians in Poland and
recommends that the Consul make no official statements
in support of the autonomy movement, but only personal
expressions of goodwill.
Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V
Gives an account of an incident at Kalthof, on the Danzig-
Polish frontier; of Note of protest sent by President of
Danzig Senate and of conversation between the latter and
Polish Diplomatic Representative Chodacki.
The Polish Diplomatic Representative in Danzig to the Presi-
dent of the Danzig Senate
Note describing the Kalthof incident, and complaining of
lack of security for Polish officials.
The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry
Reviews various indirect efforts made by the Poles to
resume conversations with Germany and suggestions made
by Japanese Ambassador in Warsaw for Italian mediation.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Conversation with league High Commissioner in Danzig,
following latter's conversation with Ribbentrop. Professor
Burckhardt's impressions from his recent talks with Beck
and Halifax.
The President of the Danzig^ Senate to the Polish Diplomatic
Representative in Danzig
Note stating that, having received no satisfactory reply to
various communications complaining of frontier incidents
and conduct of Polish officials, he has ordered Danzig
officials serving under Senate to break off contact with
Polish persons concerned in Kalthof incident.
The President of the Danzig Senate to the Polith Diplomatic
Representative in Danzig
Note protesting against increase m, and conduct of, Polish
Customs officials in Danzig. Danzig officials instructed to
accept no instructions from Polish officials. Previous under-
taking to abstain from administering oath of loyalty to
National Socialist leadership to Danzig Customs officials
now withdrawn.
394
397
402
405
417
418
429
464
470
515
520
525
534
549
550
566
620
630
471
631
LXII
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Date
1939
June 7
June 1 2
June 10
June 21
June 22
June 29
July 1
July 6
July 8
July 10
July 11
Subject
Doc. No.
Page
Staatsrat BSltcher to Consul General Janson
Transmits minute on a conversation between President of
Danzig Senate and League High Commissioner, in which
latter described his recent conversations in Berlin with
Weizsacker and Rfbbentrop and gave his own views on
situation.
The Consul General in Danzig to the Foreign Ministry
Summarizes and reports on Polish Note of June 10 in
reply to Danzig Note of June 3 (document No. 471), which
refused to permit any restrictions on the rights and numbers
of the Polish Customs Inspectors in Danzig.
The High Command of the Army to the Foreign Ministry _
States that certain officers have been granted permission
to travel through the Danzig Free State in civilian clothes.
Memorandum by the Head of Political Division I
Arrangements for a visit to Danzig in June by a German
naval contingent and for a visit in August by German cruiser
K&nigsberg for commemoration ceremony; proposed plans
for a visit this year by a German naval squadron await a
decision by Hitler.
Memorandum by an Official of Political Division 1
Gives information obtained from the High Command of
the Navy as to action so far taken about a German naval
visit to Danzig and Hitler's instructions.
The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in
Poland
Instructions to report on whether formal announcement
has been made to Polish Government of visit to Danzig by
German cruiser Kdnigsberg.
The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry
Reports on reaction of Government and press to events in
Danzig, notably formation of a volunteer defence corps and
arrival of guns from East Prussia.
The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry
Keviews attitude of Government and public to events in
Danzig; Government unlikely to adopt aggressive tactics;
general determination to fight if Poland's rights in Danzig
clearly violated.
The Office of the Wehrmacht Adjutants attached to the Fiihrer
and Chancellor to the High Command of the Navy and the
Foreign Ministry
States that Fiihrer has decided manner of announcing
German naval visit to Danzig and will later decide what ships
shall take part.
Minute by the Director of the Foreign Affairs Department of
the Danzig Senate
Conversations with League High Commissioner on latter s
return to Danzig. Professor Burckhardt's views on political
situation.
The Consul General in Danzig to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to sentence passed on a Danzig Customs official by
Polish authorities and possibility of arranging for an
exchange against a Polish Customs Inspector about to be
prosecuted by the Danzig authorities.
492
51(5
547
555
558
580
599
622
635
647
652
663
712
750
763
773
807
824
864
883
893
900
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
LXIU
Date
1939
July 14
July 17
July 18
July 19
July 20
July
July 22
July 25
July 31
Subject
Memorandum by the State Secretary
In reply to enquiry from Keitel about political advisability
of publicly displaying certain guns now in Danzig, OKW is
to be informed that it would be expedient to wait a little
longer before parading guns.
Minute by the Director of the Foreign Affairs Department of
the Danzig Senate
Conversation between President of Danzig Senate and
League High Commissioner; latter had been informed by
Gauleiter Forster that the Gauleiter was now sole ruler in
Danzig and was seeing Hitler to obtain approval of con-
versation with Polish representative Chodacki,
Memorandum by the President of the Danzig Senate
Describes informal conversations with Smogorzewski,
Berlin representative of Qazeta. Polsha, and with Polish
Diplomatic Representative, Chodacki, on Danzig situation.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
States has submitted to Ribbentrop view that a decision
on proposed naval visit to Danzig concerns the Foreign
Minister and that latter should submit matter to Fiihrer
before July 22.
Memorandum by the Director of the Foreign Affairs Depart-
ment of the Danzig Sen-ate
Conversation with League High Commissioner, who de-
scribed a recent conversation with Gauleiter Forster, in
which latter had told Professor Burckhardt that Germany
would not relinquish her demands over Danzig, but that
developments could still wait for another year or two.
The Consul General in Danzig to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No, 515 and reports about Polish
Note of July 19 to Danzig Senate which complains of Polish
Customs Inspectors being obstructed in the performance of
their duties and requires statement from Senate that con-
ditions for Polish officials to perform their duties freely will
be guaranteed. Note further announces economic counter
measures in form of withdrawal of Polish Customs control
from Danzig margarine factory "Amada-Unida" from
August 1,
Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I
Records information from the High Command of the
Navy as to Fiihrer's decisions in respect of German naval
visit to Danzig and points still outstanding.
Minute by the President of the Danzig Senate
Describes conduct of Gauleiter Forster, who had informed
League High Commissioner that Poles were setting up art
armed railway guard and told Professor Burckhardt he
should protest to Polish authorities. Deplores Gauleiter's
incorrect handling of this affair and failure to refer to proper
Danzig authorities.
The Consul General in Danzig to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that two Danzig Notes sent in reply to Polish
Notes of June 1 and July 19. First Danzig Note lists cases
of espionage by Polish Customs officials and rebuts Polish
contention as to number of officials. Second Danzig Note
declares Polish threat to withdraw customs supervision from
Danzig Amacla factory to be inadmissible action directe.
Doc.No.
670
681
Page
920
931
686 039
687
693
702
705
i21
749
941
950
937
962
093
1020
LXIV
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Bate
Subject
Doc.Ko.
1939
Aug. 1
Aug.
Aug.
Aug.
Aug.
Aug.
Aug.
Aug.
The A?nbassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry
Reviews state of Poland's moral and material powers of
resistance, on the basis of reports received from the various
German Consulates there. Concludes that previous report
from Poznan Consulate about decline in Polish morale is not
confirmed by other evidence.
The Consul at Dwcw to the Foreign Ministry
Describes feelings amongst Ukrainians in Poland since
German-Polish tension and discusses their probable attitude
should war come.
jTfte Polish Diplomatic Representative in Danzig to the Presi-
dent of the Daniig Senate
Note complaining of tone of Danzig Note of July 29 and
rebutting charges and claims made therein in respect of
Polish Customs Inspectors. Offer to conduct direct con-
versations to settle existing problems as soon as situation
has returned to normal in respect of activities of Danzig
Customs Board and Polish Inspectors.
Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V
Consul General in Danzig has telephoned information from
League High Commissioner about statements and requests
made by Gauleiter Forster. Action taken by Professor
Burckhardt with Polish Diplomatic Representative.
The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry
Reports reactions of Polish press and Government to
latest phase in controversy over Polish Customs Inspectors
in Danzig. Believes British Ambassador to have enquired
as to point beyond which Poland could not go.
Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V
Information telephoned by Vice-Consul, Danzig, con-
cerning new Polish Note. Text of Note of August 4
attached; this states that certain local Danzig Customs
authorities have announced intention of resisting Polish
Customs Inspectors in performance of their duties. Note
insists on cancellation of any such instructions and warns of
Polish counter measures should such obstruction take place.
The President of the Danzig Senate to the Polish Diplomatic
Representative in Danzig
Note denying contention in Polish Note of August 4
(document No. 774), and protesting at Polish threat of
reprisals.
Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V
Information from President of Danzig Senate, that
Gauleiter Forster was having conversations with Hitler at
Obersalzberg ; Polish Government believed to have decided
not to send further Note in reply to last Danzig Note.
[See also under France, Great Britain and Italy-I
754
763
765
1035
1053
1056
771
1066
773 1068
774
1070 -
780
785
1077
1100
WW'"
I'
1939
Mm. 16
Mar. 26
Mar. 27
July 18
analytical list of documents
Protectorate
Subject
LXV
Doc, No.
Page
Memorandum by the State Secretary '
Instructions given to German Legation in Prague that
Weizsaeker suggests Chvalkovsky instruct Czech Missions
abroad to notify to Governments cessation of their functions
as Czech representatives, and to ensure smooth transfer of
their Missions to German, diplomatic representatives.
The State Secretary to the Legation in the Protectorate
States that as certain former Czecho-Slovak Missions are
resisting instructions to transfer their affairs to German
representatives, counter measures must be taken. Instruc-
tions to inform Chvalkovsky of what general measures the
Prague Government should now take.
TJie Legation in the Protectorate to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 102 and reports on disciplinary
measures so far taken.
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Reviews position about granting the British, French and
U.S. Governments exequatur for Consul General in Prague
whilst these Governments still do not recognize the Protec-
torate.
102
106
684
125
129
935
Rumania
Date
1939
Mar. 15
Mar. 16
Mar. 16
i/Har. 17
Subject
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Reports M.F.A. has told him that Rumania would respect
the situation created by the Vienna Award but was prepared
to participate in a possible reorganization as regards the
Carpatho-Ukraine though was disinterested in Czechia and
Slovakia. Rumania would not tolerate occupation by
Hungary of Rumanian villages and railway lines in the
Carpatho -Ukraine .
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 2 and reports that Rumanian
Government have declined to follow, without German
approval, Poland's advice to occupy Rumanian villages and
railroads in the Carpatho-Ukraine, but do not wish their
claims overlooked should the Carpatho-Ukraine position be
revised owing to the Hungarian advance.
The State Secretary to the Legation in Rumania
Refers to document No. 2 and states that Rumanian
Government should be informed that the terms of the
Munich and Vienna agreements are now superseded.
Germany has not seen fit to protest against Hungarian
advance.
The Slate Secretary to the Legation in Rumania
Refers to document No. 6 and transmits text of document
No. 7 (see under Hungary) with instructions to inform
M.F.A. that although Germany is interested in a peaceful
settlement of the Carpatho-Ukraine question, she does not at
present intend to mediate, as she believes that direct settle-
ment between Rumania and Hungary is feasible.
Doc. No.
Page
13
13
LXVI
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Date
Subject
Doc. No. Page
1939
Mar. 18
Mar. IS
Mar. 18
Mar. 20
Mar. 22
Mar. 23
Mar. 24
Mar.
Mar. 25
Mar. 30
Mar. 31
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 13 and reports that M.F.A. stated
Rumania had no intention of marching into the Carpatho-
"Ukraine but hoped to obtain certain areas by diplomatic
means. Recommends that Hungary should agree to cede
them.
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that Crown Council have approved M.F.A. s
policy on not invading the Carpatho-Ukraine and the pro-
posed economic (Wohlthat) agreement with Germany.
Gafencu has denied reports of German economic pressure
on Rumania but fears consequences of Italian aims and
German colonial demands.
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Reports request from M.F.A. for release of war material
from a Czech firm, destined for Rumania, and held up by
Germany on the Polish frontier.
The State Secretary to the Legation in Rumania
Refers to documents Noa. 29 and 30 and states that
Germany still declines to act as intermediary in Hungarian-
Rumanian relations ; reports of German aggressive intentions
towards Rumania to be denied.
The State, Secretary to the Legation in Rumania
Instructions to enquire of Rumanian Government the
reason for certain military measures.
German-Rumanian Economic Treaty
Treaty for the promotion of economic relations between
Germany and Rumania, with Confidential Protocol of Signa-
ture.
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Has been informed by M.F.A. of the attitude of the
Rumanian Minister in London, and of latter's recall.
Gafencu complained of pressure on Rumania not to conclude
economic agreement with Germany and stated that he had
caused the King to deny to British Minister in Bucharest
allegations of an economic ultimatum from Germany.
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that Rumanian Government wish to propose that
the Hungarian troops be withdrawn from frontier, where-
upon both countries should demobilize.
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 58 (see under Europe: General)
and reports that Rumanian M.F.A. has asserted that no
British demarche has been made to Rumania for an associa-
tion of peaceful Powers.
Ministerialdirektor Wohlthat to State Secretary Weizsdcker
Letter transmitting report on his negotiations in Bucha-
rest, which resulted in the signature of the German-
Rumanian Economic Treaty.
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that M.F.A. intends, in the Hungarian-Rumanian
conversations being conducted in Budapest, to try to obtain
from Hungary a mutual declaration of non-aggression, to he
agreed upon with Yugoslavia also. Has expressed his
doubts to Gafencu as to this course.
29
30
30
31
31
47
68
78
80
:i
91
32
50
76
91
97 ;
111
92 112
131
135
160
170
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
LXVII
Date
1939
Apr. 4
Apr. i
Apr.
Apr. 11
Apr. 14
Apr. 14
t Apr. 18
Apr. 19
May 3
it' May
Subject
Doc. So.
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that Rumanian Air Ministry has placed orders for
aircraft and wishes to appoint commissions to handle orders
under Economic Treaty.
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Reports is informed by Rumanian M.F.A. that Rumania
will begin demobilization although Hungary refuses to make
declaration concerning the frontier or non-aggression.
Gafencu has affirmed his opposition to encirclement policy
and his intentions of extending politico-economic relations
with Germany.
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that Rumanian M.F.A. has told him of informa-
tion received from Beck about the latter's new attitude to
the mutual assistance pact -with Britain. Gafencu stated
that Rumania's attitude remained unchanged.
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Reports appeal from Rumanian M.F.A. to Reich Foreign
Minister to prevail upon Budapest to declare that Hungary
is prepared to respect the Hungarian-Rumanian frontier and
to negotiate with the Rumanian Government on frontier
demarcation.
The State Secretary to the Legation in Rumania
Refers to document No. 180, and states that instructions
to inform M.F.A. of Hungarian dementi are not intended as
German mediation between Hungary and Rumania.
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Reports explanation given by Rumanian M.F.A. about
the attitude of his Government towards British guarantee ;
Gafencu would welcome a German declaration of guarantee
also.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secre-
tariat
Records conversation between Ribbentrop and Gafencu ;
iatter questioned about Rumania's determination to carry
out Economic Treaty. Ribbentrop's views on British
opposition to Germany: Gafeneu's account of Rumania's
relations with other Powers, attitude to British proposals,
relations with U.S.S.R., Turkey, attitude to President
Roosevelt's message. Discussion of German-Rumanian
relations; Hungaro-Rumanian relations.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal
Staff
Record of conversation between Hitler and the Rumanian
M.F.A.; Gafeneu's views on the British guarantee; Hitler's
account of his political aims; German-Rumanian relations
assured as a result of mutual trade interests.
Note by the Deputy Director of the Cultural Policy Department
Has severely warned the leader of the German national
group in Transylvania against introducing militant organiza-
tions on the German model.
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that, at audience with King Carol, latter com-
plained of German refusal to supply Rumania with military
equipment from Protectorate, as being contrary to previous
promise. Recommends making at least a gesture over this.
152
Page
189
153 189
173
ISO
194
195
227
209
216
236
236
278
234
319
337
290
413
43S
LXVIIJ
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Subject
PocKo.
Page
1939
May 8
May
May 10
May 13
May 13
May 17
May 23
June 7
June 10
June 12
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Has learned that Gafencu, during his recent tour, stated
Rumania's policy to be no alliances against Germany and
no dealings with tF.S.S.R. Gafencu had told British states-
men he was.convinced Hitler did not want war, but wanted
understanding with Britain.
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Has learned that Deputy People's Commissar Potemkin,
during his visit to Bucharest, made no offer to Gafencu nor
was the question of a guarantee or of assistance broached.
The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the
Legation in Rumania
Refers to document No. 337 and contradicts statement
that none of the military equipment available from the
Protectorate can be given to Rumania; but deliveries are
likely to be on a small scale in view of German requirements.
The Minister in Rumania to the. Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 349 and reports that M.F.A.bas
read him an account of Potemkin's visit, according to which
Gafencu stated Rumania did not wish to enter into an
alliance with either TJ.S.S.R. or Axis Powers.
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry . _
Refers to document No. 354, and states has communicated
contents to Minister President, who expressed himself as
unable to understand German attitude over supplying
Rumania from Czech military stocks. Recommends adopt-
ing generous attitude towards Rumania.
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that King Carol has expressed the desire to have
Colonel Gerstenberg as Air Attache in Bucharest, to super-
vise Rumania's air rearmament and recommends adopting
the King's suggestion.
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Transmits information supplied by M.F.A. about latter s
recent conversation with Yugoslav M.F.A. Both agreed
that in order to maintain Balkan Pact Balkans must retnam
independent, and that Anglo-Turkish agreement must not
extend to Balkans.
The State Secretary to the Legation in Rumania
Instructions to see M.F.A. before latter's departure for
Ankara, and inform him that Germany expects him to make
absolutely clear to Turks that Balkan Pact States will not,
either directly or indirectly, become an object of Anglo -
Turkish agreements.
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 488 and reports action taken.
Gafencu said he adhered firmly to the view, as agreed with
Yugoslav M.F.A. , that Anglo-Turkish agreement must in no
way refer to the Balkans.
The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
Reports conversation with Rumanian M.F.A., who attri-
buted proposed Anglo-Turkish treaty to effect on Turkey of
Italian occupation of Albania. Gafencu believed his efforts
had been successful in excluding Balkans from final version
of this treaty.
342
349
354
452
459
464
375 484
376
398
428
488
504
513
485
521
565
657
693
710
1
ANALYTICAL LIST Or DOCUMENTS
LX1X
Date
1939
June 24
June 2;j
July 6
July 7
July 7
July
July 8
July
July 8
July 11
:july 13
Subject
Doc.No.
Pago
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry 001
Conversation with M.F.A. on latter's return from Ankara ;
Gafencu stated he had definite promises from Turks that
Balkans would not be mentioned in final treaty with Britain
Had warned Turkish M.F.A. against including Balkans in
Franco-Turkish Declaration.
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry 567
Refers to document No. 561 and transmits further account
of Gafencu' s conversations in Ankara, derived from protocol
on these negotiations which latter read out to him. Gafencu
further stated that he had again rejected Turkish proposal
for a Bla-ck Sea Pact.
The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry 621
Reports conclusion of negotiations with Rumanian
Ministers on war material questions, and gives details of
terms of payment agreed.
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry 625
Reports statements from German press published in
Rumanian papers that Germany is prepared to support
Bulgaria's revisionist claims against Rumania, and requests
instructions.
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry 627
Refers to document No. 625 and reports conversation with
M.F.A. who was unable to understand support given in
German and Italian press to Bulgarian claims against
Rumania.
The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry 032
Refers to document No. 621 and reports signature of Pro-
tocols on deliveries of war material and aircraft. Gives
details of further economic questions remaining for decision
by Government Committees.
The State Secretary to the Legation in Rumania 633
Refers to document No. 625 and denies that any comment
in German press has supported Bulgaria's revisionist claims
against Rumania.
German-Rumanian Secret Protocol ggg
Terms on which competent Rumanian authorities may
place orders for war material with firms in Germany.
The Rumanian Minister of Economics to Minister Clodius 639
Letter confirming that Rumanian Government agree that
payment for German deliveries of air armament material be
made by additional deliveries of Rumanian petroleum.
The State Secretary to the Legation in Rumania 651
Refers to document No. 627, and requests that M.F.A. be
promptly informed that there is no deviation in German
policy towards Rumania. Understanding for Bulgarian
aspirations shown in German press not at expense of
Rumania.
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry 662
Refers to documents Nos. 633 and 651 and reports has
communicated their substance to M.F.A. Has again dis-
cussed with Gafencu question of British and French agree-
ments with Turkey.
777
787
863
S67
879
881
885
SSG
899
012
LXX
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Dato
Subject
Doc. No,
1039
July 30
27ie Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the
Legation in Rumania
States that Air Ministry have now approved agreement of
July 8 for supplying German aircraft material to Rumania,
and requests urgent action to obtain additional Rumanian
petroleum.
[See also under France, Great Britain, Hungary, Turkey,
U.S.S.H. and Yugoslavia.]
742
Page
1
1021
Slovakia
Dato
Subject
Doc. No.
1939
Mar. 10
Mar. 18
Mar.
Mar. 25
Mar. 27
Mnr. 2S
Apr. 13
Apr. 19
Circular of tlie State Secretary
Sends text of Slovak Minister President's request to Hitler
for German protection and Hitler's reply.
German-Slovak Treaty of Protection
German-Slovak Treaty by which the German Reich
assumes protection of the political independence and terri-
torial integrity of the Slovak State and receives the right to
set up military installations in a certain zone, with Confi-
dential Protocol on economic and financial cooperation
between the German Reich and the Slovak State.
Editors' Note
German policy towards the Sid organization and the
Carpatho-TTkraine.
The Consul-General and Charge d : 'Affaires in Slovakia to the
Foreign Ministry
Transmits and comments on a note verbale from the
Slovak Foreign Ministry, and points out the prejudicial
effect produced by the removal of material by German
troops from the occupied area.
Minute by an Official of Political Division I
As instructed, has informed OKW that the Foreign
Ministry ■ attaches importance to Bpeedy evacuation _ of
occupied Slovak territory beyond the Treaty demarcation
line.
M emorandmn by the. Head of Political Division I Vb
Gives account of the Hungarian-Slovak frontier incident
on March 23, and subsequent developments.
Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IVb
Lists points made in a discussion in the General Staff, at
which Foreign Ministry was represented, on Slovak com-
plaints against German military authorities.
i Unsigned Foreign Ministry Memorandum
Lists requirements which OKW expects Slovak Govern-
ment to fulfil under the Treaty of Protection.
Unsigned Memorandum
Record of conference in the German Foreign Ministry with
the Slovak Ministers on questions arising from the Treaty of
. Protection,
10
40
Page
10
42
9o
98
111
117
90
114
im
137
146
206 254
235 294
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
LXXI
Date
1939
June 21
June 22
July 3
July 10
July IS
July 21
July 31
Aug. 4
Subject
The Charge d' Affaires in Slovakia to the Foreign Ministry
Transmits an aide-mfynoire from the Slovak Foreign
Ministry giving the Slovak view as to how the German-
Slovak Treaty should be interpreted, and complaining of
the conduct of the German military authorities in Slovakia,
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Conversation with Slovak Minister about German-Slovak
politico-military negotiations. Minister informed that
demands of German Military Delegation in Bratislava are
made in the name of the German Government.
Memorandum by the Slate Secretary
Conversation with Slovak Minister who raised objections
to way in which Treaty of Protection was being applied by
the German military delegation in Bratislava.
The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in
Slovakia
Instructions to ensure that Slovak Government grant all
necessary facilities for execution of certain German military
works, even when outside the zone of protection.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Has explained to Slovak Minister impossibility of Slovaks
seeing Ribbentrop or Hitler, and has stressed that German
negotiators in Bratislava were acting on instructions from
the Reich authorities.
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Information, telephoned by Consul General in Bratislava,
about the action taken by the Slovak Minister of War in
ordering a Slovak battalion to move into the protected zone,
protests by the German Military Mission, and the situation
resulting therefrom.
The Minister in Slovakia to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that negotiations on the German -Slovak treaty
on zones of protection now concluded ; some Slovak amend-
ments will require German political and military approval.
Slovak attitude about German restrictions on strength of
Slovak army.
The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Poland
States German demands made to Slovak Government to
stop any Slovak contacts with Poland contrary to German
interests.
[See also under Hungary.]
DocEo
554
~>5<)
611
644
667
696
747
768
Page
755
774
S40
890
016
952
1025
1063
Spain ajmd Portugal
Unto
Subject
Doc. No.
Page
1939
Apr. 18
The State Secretary to the Legation in Portugal
States is informed that Spanish Ambassador in Lisbon
has been instructed to sound Portuguese Government on
Portuguese accession to Anti-Comintern Pact. Results to
be awaited before taking further steps.
224
274
LXXII
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
¥
Date
Subject
Doc. No.
Page
1939
Apr. 21
June 1 1
Juno 13
July-
July 2
July 8
July 16
The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry
Has raised unobtrusively question of Portugal's accession
to Anti-Comintern Pact with Spanish Ambassador there;
latter considered this is out of the question for the time being.
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Reports conversation with Serrano Sufier, who explained
how welcome a German-Vatican detente would be to foreign
policy of Franco's Government in combating anti-Axis
propaganda in Spain ; Mussolini shared this view. -
Ambassador Mackensen to State Secretary Weizidcker
Letter reporting information from Ciano that Serrano
Sufier had referred to the remarks of a German liaison
officer attached to Franco'sH.Q., as conveying an unfortunate
impression of the Third Reich to Spaniards.
The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry
Has received assurance from Spanish M.F.A. that, con-
trary to press reports, no important negotiations will be
conducted with the Italians during Ciano's visit to Spain.
The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry
Reports has discussed with the Spanish authorities state-
ments attributed to two Spanish generals about Spain's
attitude in a future war.
The State Secretary to the Embassy in Spain
Instructions to state that a visit to Germany by General
Franco would be welcome as would also a visit by Serrano
Sufier.
The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry
Has been informed by Franco that latter recommended
to Ciano bringing pressure to bear on the Vatican to influence
American Catholics against Roosevelt's re-election as
President.
[See also under Italy.]
241
507
522
604
60S
634
301
G97
719
830
830
882
920
S v
Switzerland
Date
Subject
Doc. No. Page
1939
Mar. 27
Mar. 30
Apr
11
Memorandum by the Stat-e Secretary
Conversation with Swiss Minister about press reports that
Paris and London had been in touch with Berne over a
Franco-British agreement to protect Swiss neutrality.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
The Swiss Minister has stated that Swiss Government
were not involved either officially or semi-offieially in Anglo-
French discussions on protection of Switzerland, Belgium
and the Netherlands, and regard these discussions as res
inter alios acta.
The Minister in Switzerland to the Foreign Ministry
Reports reasons given by Federal Councillor Motta for
Swiss call-up and frontier defence measures on March 24;
latter also gave an account of conversation which the Swiss
Minister in Paris had had with French Foreign Ministry
concerning Anglo-French guarantee.
109
129
181
136
158
218
Wr
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
LXXIII
Date
Subject
Doc.Ifo.
Page
1939
May 2
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Has informed the Swiss Minister that the reactions of the
Swiss press to Hitler's speech were more hostile than those
of any other country.
310
401
May 15
The State Secretary to the Legation, in Switzerland
Refers to document No. 181 ; states that the reply on the
subject of Anglo-French guarantees of Swiss neutrality is
not satisfactory and sends instructions to raise the matter
again.
384
300
July 10
Memorandum by the State Secretary
In view of decision by Ribbentrop to stiffen attitude of
countries affected by British policy, proposes to make
representations to Swiss Minister on recent Swiss statements.
646
893
July 13
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Conversation with Swiss Minister, to whom he represented
that Swiss attitude to the Franco-British offer of a guarantee
was not beyond reproach.
666
915
July 20
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Conversation with Swiss Minister, who, in response to
previous remonstrances, presented a Note defining Swiss
attitude towards neutrality and towards promises of help by
other Powers.
692
048
TU&KEY
«■
I:
Date
Subject
Doc. No
Page
1939
i
Mar. 15
The Chargi d' 'Affaires in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
Reports has learned that French are negotiating with
Turks over uniting Hatay to Turkey in return for a pact of
mutual assistance.
3
5
Mar. IS
The Charge d' Affaires in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
Reports conversation with Secretary General of Turkish
Foreign Ministry, who stated Turkey was willing to co-
operate in making the Balkans an economic hinterland for
Germany, if the latter would refrain from pressing the
Balkans to take sides in the ideological struggle. Requests
instructions.
32
32
Mar. 21
The State Secretary to the Embassy in Turkey
Refers to document No. 3 and sends instructions to inform
the Turkish Government that Germany regards the proposed
Franco-Turkish mutual assistance pact as in contradiction
to previous Turkish assurances to Germany.
59
68
Mar, 23
The Charge a" Affaires in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 59 and reports has been told by
M.F.A. of tentative Franco-Turkish conversations on Hatay,
and of certain French proposals, but that, in accordance
with previous declarations, Turkey continues to decline to
conclude a general treaty of assistance with any Great Power.
72
84
Mac 31
The State Secretary to the Embassy in Turkey
Refers to document No, 32, and states that the Embassy
should let it be known that Germany welcomes Turkey's
attitude to new situation and her readiness to cooperate in
development of German economic relations with Balkans.
133
168
LXXIV
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Date
Subject
Doc.KoJ Page
1939
Mar. 31
Apr.
Apr. 18
Apr. 25
Apr. 28
Apr. 29
May
May-
May 3
Mav
The Charge d' Affaires in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 83 (see under Europe: General)
and gives precise terms of Turkish reply to British demarche
as ascertained from Numan Menemeneioglu who added that
Turkish policy had not changed from that repeatedly
explained to Ribbentrop.
Memorandum by the Foreign Minister
Has been assured by Turkish Ambassador that rumours of
Turkish Government adopting favourable attitude to British
encirclement plans without foundation.
The Charge aV Affaires in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
Reviews Turkish policy; considers Turkish Government
desire to adhere as long as possible to line of strictest
neutrality; stresses importance of Italian policy in deter-
mining Turkish attitude.
Circular of the State Secretary
Transmits confidential information that the Turkish
Government have apparently entered into conversations
with the British Government of a more far-reaching nature
than they care to admit to the Germans.
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey
Reviews available information on Anglo-Turkish and
Turco -Soviet negotiations, and requests report.
The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
Reports conversation with President, whom he reassured
about Polish question, Italian aspirations, and German
intentions towards Balkan Pact; Papen repeated that
Germany expected strictest neutrality from Turkey in event
of war in Mediterranean.
Circular of the State Secretary
According to reliable information, the Turkish Govern-
ment have replied to the British offer of a pact with certain
proposals which show that the conclusion of on Anglo-
Turkish pact depends on the result of negotiations with the
U.S.S.R. Italian counter action desired.
The Ambassador in Turlcey to the Foreign Ministry
Has again ascertained, in conversations with Turkish
Minister President and M.F.A., that deterioration in Turco-
Italian relations is causing Turkey to draw closer to Britain.
Recommends that Italy make some positive contribution
towards improvement.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Telephone conversation with Goring who, with Hitler's
agreement, does not wish Turkey to receive the heavy guns
she has ordered. Some excuse must be found for non-
delivery.
The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
Conversation with Secretary General of Turkish Foreign
Ministry has confirmed Papen s own view of the situation as-
previously reported. Ciano's assurance to Turkish Ambas-
sador insufficient to restore the situation. Papen promised
to ask Ribbentrop to discuss matters further in Italy.
134
151
226
259
169
276
323
2S1 355
288
305
315
321
324
364
397
408
416
418
-ssr
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
LXXV
Sate
1939
May 5
May 6
May 9
May 12
May 13
May 20
May 24
May 30
June
P.\ June 5
Subject
Doc. No.
Page
The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry 333 430
Refers to document No. 324, and expresses his conviction
that only a complete reorientation of Rome to the Balkan
Pact would make it possible to detach Turkey from her ties
with Britain. Recommends that Ribbentrop discuss this
question in Rome.
The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry 336 436
Regrets has failed in his endeavours to persuade Turkish
Government to await outcome of talks between Ribbentrop
and Ciano before announcing agreement with Britain.
The State Secretary to the Embassy in Turkey 347 457
Refers to documents Nos. 315, 324, 333 and 336, and
states that no information is yet available on conversations
between Ribbentrop and Ciano. Instructions not to allow
impression, to be created of any difference between German
and Italian views on Balkan Pact.
Editors'" Note
Anglo-Turkish Declaration on mutual assistance in the 483
event of war in the Mediterranean,
The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry 374 484
Reports has ascertained from conversation with M.F.A.
that conclusion of final Anglo-Turkish pact will take some
weeks. Considers this will allow of ascertaining whether
German- Turkish relations can be maintained. Believes
Turkish policy could be changed were Italian threat to dis-
appear.
Ambassador Papen to State Secretary Weizsdcker 413 544
Encloses a copy of a memorandum which he lias sent
Ribbentrop for his conversation with Ciano, putting the
case for Italian assurances to Turkey in order to try to
detach Turkey from British leading strings.
Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Depart- 435 581
ment
Record of an interdepartmental conference on deliveries
of war material under contract to Turkey, and on the policy
to be adopted with respect to various economic agreements
with Turkey.
Memorandum, by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy 454 610
Department
After discussions with relevant Ministries and with German
Ambassador to Turkey, submits proposals on policy to be
adopted towards Turkey over extension of economic agree-
ments and deliveries of war material.
Memorandum by the State Secretary 472 (533
Conversation with Turkish Ambassador on Germany
holding up deliveries of certain war materials, and on
alleged Turkish ban on chrome exports to Germany. Re-
assurances to Ambassador regarding Italian intentions
towards Turkey.
The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry 475 63S
Conversation with Turkish M.F.A., to whom he expressed,
as instructed, Reich Government's profound surprise at
political course taken by Turkey.
!
LXXVI
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
t'':
Bate
1939
June 6
June
June 8
June S
Subject
Doc.TSo. Page
June 12
June 13
June 16
June 22
June 23
June 24
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secre-
tariat
Ruling by Ribbentrop that Turkish representatives are
not to be received in the Foreign Ministry.
The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
Reports conversations with Turkish Secretary General
and President on whom he impressed that maintenance of
German friendship must be made dependent on extent and
duration of Turkish commitments to Britain.
The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to documents Nos. 475 and 489 and sends more
detailed account of conversations recorded therein.
Unsigned Memorandum
Conversation betwoen Ribbentrop and Turkish Ambas-
sador. Complaint that, in spite of Germany's friendly
conduct, Turkish policy on Anglo -Turkish Declaration
amounted to attempt to take part in encirclement of
Germany. Ambassador replied by giving Turkey's reasons
for anxiety regarding Axis policy.
The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
Reports conversation with M.F.A. who referred to recent
serious conversation between Ribbentrop and Turkish
Ambassador in Berlin and asked the reason; Papen replied
that intention was to make clear to Turkish Ambassador
gravity of situation that had arisen in consequence of
Turkish policy.
The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
Reports he has made clear to Turkish Secretary General
the need to leave the Balkan Powers out of forthcoming
Franco -Turkish declaration. Numan replied that Franco-
Turkish declaration would be similar to Anglo -Turkish one,
but gave assurance that Balkans would not be included in
final pact.
The State Secretary to the Embassy in Turkey
Refers to document No. 518, and expresses surprise that,
if Balkans not to be brought into final pact with Britain and
France, they should be included in Franco-Turkish declara-
tion : instructions to press that this paragraph of declaration
be omitted.
The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 533 and reports conversation
with Secretary General on forthcoming Franco -Turkish
declaration which Numan refused to modify in sense
desired by Germany. Numan's views on extent of Turkish
commitments in possible cases of conflict ; Turkish partici-
pation in a world war would be purely defensive.
Editors' Note .
Signature of Franco-Turkish Declaration of Mutual Assist-
ance and Agreement on cession of the Hatay to Turkey.
Circular of the Foreign Ministry
Transmits confidential information on recent discussions
in Ankara between Rumanian and Turkish M.F.A.'s.
Gafencu given assurance by Saracoglu that reference to
■ Balkans would not be included in final Anglo -Turkish treaty :
j policy towards Bulgaria also diwussed.
483
489
495
496
650
658
666
670
512
518
709
714
533
556
732
764
563
777
779
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
LXXVII
1939
June 24
Subject
Doc. No
Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy
Department
Conversation with Turkish Counsellor who requested reply-
to previous questions about start of German-Turkish
economic negotiations and about Germany withholding
delivery of certain war materials. No definite reply given
on either point.
The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
Has learned that British wish Turkey to guarantee
Rumania's non-Balkan frontiers, in return for British
guarantee of Thracian frontiers. Is making strong rep-
resentations about this and recommends similar action in
Bucharest.
The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
Reports conversation with Numan about terms of political
treaty under negotiation with Britain; signature expected
shortly.
The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
Believes that his efforts to persuade Human to limit extent
of fresh political commitments have resulted in Turkish
decision not to conclude bipartite pacts with Britain and
France, but a tripartite pact instead.
Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Depart-
ment
Has reviewed, with Reich Ministry of Economics, question
of countering Turkey's political change of course by
economic measures; proposes restricting economic relations
with_ Turkey to minimum compatible with Germany's
requirements of Turkish raw materials, particularly chrome.
[See also under Europe; General, France, Great Britain,
| Italy and Rumania.']
565
590
616
730
782
Page
784
814
846
1009.
1081
Usited States
Subject
The Charge d'AJJaires in the United States to the Foreign
Ministry
Reports has formally notified U.S. Government of the
establishment of the Protectorate. Has been informed that
U.S. Government have decided to impose "countervailing
duties" on imports from Germany.
Tlie Charge d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
Ministry
Refers to document No. 27 and suggests that, as reply to
imposition of "countervailing duties", German measures
against imports of U.S. cotton would be efficacious.
The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the
Embassy in the United Slates
Refers to document No. 14 and sends instructions to
protest to the U.S. Government against the imposition of
"countervailing tlutins".
Doc. No. Page
14
24
27
14
26
28
LXXVHI
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Sate
1939
Mar. 18
Subject
Doc. No.
Page
Mar. 18
Mar. 21
Mar. 22
Mar. 23
The Charge d'Ajfaires in the United States to the Foreign
Refers to document No. 27 and reports that U.S. Treasury
has announced decision to impose "countervailing duties
on all dutiable imports from Germany, and for what reasons.
The Charge, d'affaires in the United States to the Foreign
Ministry . ,
Reviews reactions of U.S. press and public opinion to
events in Czecho-Slovakia.
The Charge oV Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
Ministry .
Refers to document No. 33 ; reviews effects of the imposi-
tion of "countervailing duties" on German imports and
suggests German counter measures.
| The- Charge a" Affaires in the United States to the Foreign,
Ministry .
I Has learned from Japanese Counsellor of Embassy that
British soundings about American support in the event ot a
conflict between Britain and Japan over Hong Kong
received a negative reply.
The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the
Embassy in the United States
Instructions to represent to U.S. Government that, the
U S. Treasury order of March 18, suspending most favoured
treatment for products from Bohemia and Moravia, does not
take account of actual conditions, and to report whether the
U.S. Government are ready to rescind this order.
The Charge d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
Ministry
Refers to document No. 56 and reports efforts to obtain
release of certain German imports from the imposition of
provisional additional duties; recommends abolition of the
Inland Account Procedure.
The Charge d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
Ministry
Refers to document No. 71, and states has transmitted a
Note to U.S. Secretary of State.
The Charge d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
Ministry .
Reviews U.S. foreign policy with particular reierence to
the situation in Europe.
Consul General Wiedemann to State Secretary Weizsacker
Letter describing his reception in San Francisco ; discusses
the American attitude towards Germany, and his own plans.
Mar. 30 | Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Depart-
ment a ,
Reviews effect of economic measures taken by tlie uk>a
in consequence of the incorporation of Bohemia and
Moravia, and discusses possible German counter measures.
Apr. f. I The Charge d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
Ministry .. , .
Refers to document No. 89, and requests authority to liolU
informal discussions with U.S. Customs Bureau and to
promise abolition of Inland Account Procedure if removal
of the additional duties can thereby be obtained by AprU ZA.
33
Mar, 25
Mar. 27
Mar. 2*
Mar.
34
56
66
89
104
34
64
75
113
130
83
109
127
107 129
110
159
157 194
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
LXXIX
Date
ft." 1939
! Apr. 11
§: Apr. 15
Apr. 15
ft':' Apr. 17
Apr. 18
Apr. 20
It Apr. 22
Subject
Doe. No.
§, Apr.
24
1 ■ Af-
25
If. Apr.
26
&.■ .
Bi: Apr..
26
I: : /
The Charge d'Affaires in the United States to the. Foreign
Ministry
Reports on impression made in USA by Italian action
against Albania, and forecasts effect on U.S. policy.
President Roosevelt to the Fithrer and Chancellor
Message appealing to Hitler in interests of world peace, to
give assurance that he will not attack or invade certain
specified independent nations of Europe and Near East,
from which President will obtain reciprocal assurances.
On basis of these assurances President proposes prompt
discussion on general disarmament and on development of
international trade.
The Charge d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
Ministry
Has learned confidentially that President's appeal was
brought about by news of failure of Anglo-French alliance
policy.
Consul General Wiedemann to State Secretary Weizsdcker
Letter describing his efforts to influence U.S. opinion in
favour of Germany.
The, Charge d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
Ministry
Forecasts issue of fresh regulations on countervailing
duties and recommends waiting for them before starting
negotiations between German Embassy and U.S. Treasury.
The Charg6 d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
Ministry
Reports on the reaction of American press and public to
President Roosevelt's peace appeal.
The Charge d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
Ministry
Reports further on reaction of American press and public
to President Roosevelt's peace appeal; press agitation
against Germany continues unabated.
The Charge d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
Ministry
Reports on flood of suggestions reaching Embassy from
all sections of the population for Hitler's forthcoming
speech. Lists main arguments advanced against President's
peace appeal.
Note by Ambassador Dieckhoff (Berlin)
Proposes that Thomsen be consulted about President
Roosevelt's alleged declaration on sending an expeditionary
force to Europe. Expresses own fears of the likelihood of
this.
The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in the
United States
Refers to agency report that President Roosevelt has
stated that no American expeditionary force will be sent to
Europe during his tenure of office, and requests report.
The Charge d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
Ministry
Refers to document No. 267 and reports that despatch of
an American expeditionary force in the first six months of a
European war is unlikely.
179
200
Page
215
243
201
222
223
238
244
255
264
267
268
245
271
273
297
304
318
331
334
335
LXXX
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Subject
IDoc. Xo.j Page
1930
Apr. 28
Apr. 28
Apr. 29
May 1
May 2
May 6
May 9
Directive by the State Secretary fiharee
Prescribes formal statement to be made to TJ.Ss. Wiarge
d'lSs whenhandmghim, at noon, text of Hrtte* speech.
The Charged Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
ReS ^ first reactions to Hitler's speech; reply to
President's peace appeal has made great wnpress.on.
The Charge V Affaires in the United States to the Foreign j
Refers to document No. 283, and report, further reactions !
to Hitler's speech. i
The Charge $ Affaires in the United States to the Foreign \
Reports that American press is now devoting attention to I
that part £ 'Hitler's speech which answered Pres.dent
Roosevelt.
The Charge d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign j
Re^fp'rovisional situation arising on expiry of the |
"cash and carry " clause of the Neutrality Act. j
State Secretary Weizsacker to Consul General Wiedemann
T^tef mW>ly to two letters from Wiedemann; trusts
latter does noT^an he has sought political discussions with
Heait and Hoover; considers reception of Communist
delegates contrary to German diplomatic practice.
280 354
283 357
287
301
363
394
308 399
340 443
May 17
May 26
May 29
June 16
June 22
The Charge tf Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
ReS' American views on German-Italian military
alliance, and on fall of Litvinov.
The Charge d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
AnSTattitude of American public to neutrality, and
distusseTmXds employed by Roosevelt to overcome
isolationism in the event of a European war.
The Charge d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
RefSlrrest of Kuhn, leader of the German-American
Bund, for embezzlement, and speculates on the political
Ss which may influence proceedings agamst him.
The Charge d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
ReferftoVcument No. 308 and reviews Secretary of
SWs proposals for revision of the neutrality legislation.
The Charge d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
Petrifaction of public opinion to the Anglo-Japanese j
conflict in Tientsin, and forecasts probable course of U.S. j
policy. <
The Chargi d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
ReSpolioy of Roosevelt Government in the Far East I
an d conXdes tLt this will be to avoid as long as possible ,
driving Japan still closer to the totalitanan Powers. I
348 457
403
439
526
5SS
448 600
531 731
557 766
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
LXXXI
Date
1939
July 10
July 11
July 24
July 26
July 31
Subject
Doc. No.
Aug. 10
Consul General Wiedemann to State Secretary Weizsacker
Replies to document No. 340, and explains his conduct.
Describes attitude of public towards Germany, and com-
ments on impression made by various recent German
visitors.
The Charge d' 'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
Ministry
Reports that Senate Foreign Relations Committee have
adjourned discussion on neutrality question till next session,
and discusses present position.
The Charge d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
Ministry
Reports on use of press material supplied to the Embassy,
and submits proposals for improving German methods of
propaganda in the USA.
The Chargi d'Affaires in the Unit.ed States to the Foreign
Describes reaction of press and public to the Wohlthat-
Hudson conversation and to British concessions to Japan in
Anglo- Japanese negotiations.
The Chargi a" Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
Ministry
Refers to document No. 725 and reports has learned from
well-informed source that President anxious about possi-
bility of Soviet unwillingness to conclude alliance with
Britain and France. Assumes U.S. Ambassador in Moscow
has received special instructions.
Memorandum by an Official of the Press Department
Describes visit of American Postmaster General, Farley,
to Berlin ; attempts made to get him away from undesirable
influence of the American Embassy in Berlin.
649
650
709
725
750
781
Page
895
899
967
1002
1028
■i
l
1078
U.S.S.R.
Date
Subject
Doc. No.
Page
1939
Mar. 13
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Reviews Stalin's speech at the Congress of the Communist
Party on March 10.
1
1
Mar. 19
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Reports receipt of Soviet Note of protest about German
action over Czecho- Slovakia and conversation with Litvinov
as to the practical import of this Note.
43
47
.. * Mar. 20
The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Refers to document No. 43 and states that British and
French Ambassadors have been told that their protests over
Czecho-Slovak affair were unacceptable. Instructions that
discussions on the matter in Moscow are also to be declined.
46
49
i Mar. 20
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 43 and transmits text of Lit-
vinov's Note of March 18 in which the Soviet Government
state they cannot recognize incorporation of Czechia and
50
52
Slovakia into the German Reich on the grounds that this
has no legal validity and violates the principle of self-
determination of peoples.
LXXXII
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Subject
IDocKo. Page
1939
Mar. 20
Mar. 21
Mar. 23
Mar. 24
Mar. 27
Apr.
Apr. 17
Apr.
Counsellor of Embassy Tippelskirch to Senior Counsellor
Sckliep , . ,
Extract from a letter : discusses Soviet attitude, m wmcn
he detects certain signs of a change towards Germany;
points out economic importance to Germany of Soviet
Union, in view of breakdown in German economic negotia-
tions with Britain and France.
The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Reports information from the Finnish M.F.A. about
various Russian proposals, regarding the Finnish archi-
pelago between Hogland and Leningrad, which Finland has
rejected.
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 50 and transmits translation of
official Soviet communique on Soviet proposal for a con-
ference between Britain, France, Rumania, Poland, Turkey
and the Soviet Union.
The Charge aV Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign
Ministry
Has learned from Hudson that latter s trade discussions
in Moscow are only preliminary; if successful, economic
negotiations will be conducted in London. Has ascertained
nothing regarding a British invitation to Litvinov.
Counsellor of Embassy Tippelskirch to Senior Counsellor
Schliep . j _ ... ,
Extract from a letter: discusses Soviet attitude to British
enquiry concerning anti-aggression declaration, Soviet
foreign policy, and prospects of agreement m boviet-
Japanese fisheries dispute.
The Charge d' Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign
Ministry ,
Reports and comments on Tass dementi of alleged Soviet
undertaking to supply Poland with war material m the
event of war, and to close raw material market to Germany.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Records first official call on him by Russian Ambassador,
Merekalov, who enquired about certain contracts with
Skoda works; views of Ambassador on German-Russian
relations.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Records visit from Russian Ambassador who presented.
note verbale on Russian contracts with the Skoda works.
Ambassador regarded fulfilment of these contracts as touch-
stone of Russo-German economic relations.
Apr. 24 The Charge d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign
Ministry .
Reports that text of telegram from Roosevelt to ikalimn
was published in Moscow press and comments on treatment
of Roosevelt peace appeal in Moscow foreign language press.
May 4 1 The Charge d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign
' Ministry
Reports on method of announcing in press the replacement
of Litvinov by Molotov as Foreign Commissar, and specu-
lates on possible reasons for change.
51
55
60
75
81
112
161
215
217
69
98
138
196
266
267
257 320
325
419
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Lxxxm
Date
1939
May 5
May 9
May 17
May 21
May 22
May 22
May 25
May 26
May
May 26
Subject
Doc JTo.
Page
Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Depart-
ment
Conversation with Soviet Charge d'Affaires who was
informed that Soviet contracts placed with Skoda Works
would be fulfilled. Charge enquired about resumption of
economic negotiations, broken off in February, and further
tried to learn whether dismissal of Litvinov would cause
change in German attitude to U.S.S.R.
Minute by an Official of the Press Department
Conversation with Russian Counsellor of Embassy
Astakhov on question of reserve adopted by German press
towards U.S.S.R. not being reciprocated by Soviet press,
and significance of Litvinov's removal for Soviet foreign
policy.
Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Depart-
ment
Conversation with the Soviet Charge' d'Affaires who stated
that his Government desired to retain the Soviet Trade
Delegation in Prague, and proceeded to discuss German-
Soviet relations and prospects of improvement.
The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
States that, on basis of results of Ambassador's conversa-
tion with Molotov (document No. 424) a waiting policy must
be pursued to see if Soviets will speak more openly.
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Encloses memorandum of statements made to Italian
Ambassador in Moscow by Deputy Commissar for Foreign
Affaires, Potemkin, on latter's visits to Ankara, Sofia,
Bucharest and Warsaw,
Ambassador Schulenbitrg to State Secretary Weizsdcker
Letter transmitting a memorandum on his conversation
with Molotov ort May 20 about the resumption of German-
Soviet economic negotiations, and commenting on attitude
adopted by Molotov, who appears to want from Germany
proposals of a political nature.
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Reviews present stage reached in Anglo-Russian negotia-
tions, and possibilities of German action to prevent closer
relations being formed between Britain, France and the
Soviet Union.
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Reports information from his Swedish colleague about
refusal of Finnish Government to give Soviet Government
information regarding fortification of the Aaland Islands;
attitude of Soviet press.
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Cancelled draft telegram of instructions to Ambassador
to seek an interview with Molotov and to submit orally -to
him the German Government's views on German-Soviet
relations, in response to Molotov's statement making
economic relations dependent on a clarification of political
relations.
The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Refers to document No. 414 and sends Ambassador
instructions to continue to maintain an attitude of complete
reserve.
332
429
351
406
414
420
424
437
440
441
460
535
547
553
558
586
586
589
I
442
593
LXXXIV
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Date
Subject
Page
I
1939 „ . , ,
May 27 State Secretary Weizsacker to Ambassador Schulenburg
Letter explaining reasons for change of plans about a
German approach to the U.S.S.R., and referring to Hitler s
approval for fresh plans.
May 29 Editors' Note
Discussions between Ribbentrop and the Italian Ambas- i
sador on May 29 on possibilities of forestalling a successful
outcome of the Anglo-French negotiations with the TJ.S.S.R.
[May 29] Unsigned Memorandum I
Makes proposals about a statement to be made to the j
Soviet Charge d'Affaires by the State Secretary in response to
Soviet request to maintain their Trade Delegation in Prague. |
May 29 | Unsigned Memorandum I
Lists points to be made on the German attitude over j
Molotov's making the resumption of German-Soviet
economic negotiations subject to a clarification of political
I relations between Germany and the U.S.S.R. j
May 30 I Memorandum by the State Secretary
' Conversation with the Soviet Charge d'Affaires on way in
which Soviet request to maintain their Trade Delegation m |
Prague affected German-Soviet economic relations, and the j
connection between economic and political relations.
May 30 I The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union i
Informs Ambassador of change of tactics in Berlin on ;
question of making contact with U.S.S.R- and describes con- I
versation with Soviet Charge d'Affaires (document No. 451).
May 30 The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Refers to document No. 452 and states that there are no
objections to Hilger getting in touch with Mikoyan of his
own accord, but that he must confine himself to talking in
genera! terms only.
June 1 The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Reviews Molotov's speech to Supreme Soviet on May 31, (
from which can be inferred that, in spite of deep mistrust, |
Soviet Union still prepared to conclude a treaty with Britain
and France, though only on condition that all Soviet
demands are accepted.
June 2 The Atnbassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 453, and reports on a conversa-
tion between Hilger and Mikoyan. Hilger's attempts to
dispel Soviet doubts about German sincerity in desiring
resumption of economic negotiations. Enquiry by Mikoyan
as to modus procedendi proposed for such a resumption.
June 5 I Ambassador Schulenburg to State Secretary Weizsacker
Letter in reply to document No. 446, correcting impres- |
! sion gained in Berlin that Molotov, during interview of |
May 20, had rejected a German-Soviet arrangement. >
Believes Molotov almost invited political discussion.
Juno 7 | The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 463 and reports comment m
Pravda on views expressed in British and French press on
Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations, from which emerges
importance attached by Soviet Union to guarantee of
Estonia, Latvia and Finland.
446
449
450
451
452
453
601
602
603
601
608
610
ft'"-
463
465
478
4S6
624
627
642
655
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
LXXXV
Subject
Unsigned Memorandum from the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Refers to statement made by Molotov to Ambassador on
May 20, that, for any economic negotiations, a "political
basis" would have to be found, and proposes measures in
domestic, foreign and economic policy whereby such a basis
might be constructed.
Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Depart-
ment
Schnurre recommends, on basis of recent conversation
between Hilger and Mikoyan, that he himself should proceed
to Moscow to discuss directly with Mikoyan modus proce-
dendo for resumption of economic negotiations.
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 465 and states that the Soviet
Government agree to Schnurre's visit to Moscow, on certain
conditions. Considers further study required and proposes
that Hilger accompany him to Berlin for this purpose.
The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Draft telegram referring to document No. 499; instruc-
tions to inform Mikoyan that German Government prepared
to send fully empowered negotiator to Moscow for economic
negotiations and to accept Soviet counter proposals of
February last.
The Charge a" Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign
Ministry
Refers to document No. 486 and comments on Pravda
article dealing with the protection of Estonia, Latvia and
Finland against aggression.
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Conversation with Bulgarian Minister, who described a
conversation with Soviet Charge d' Affaires in Berlin, during
which latter said that if Germany would declare she would
not attack the U.S.S.R., or if she would conclude non-
aggression pact, the TJ.S.S.R. would probably refrain from
concluding a treaty with Britain.
Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Depart-
ment
Reviews previous course of German-Soviet economic
negotiations, and concludes that, on resumption of negotia-
tions, an attempt must first be made to improve upon latest
Soviet offer of raw material deliveries. Political considera-
tions may, however, dictate acceptance of existing Soviet
offer.
The Charge d' Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign
Ministry
Comments on unilateral official Soviet communique about
conversation which took place on June 15 between the Soviet
and British and French negotiators.
Memorandum by Ambassador Schulenburg
Conversation with Soviet Charge 1 d 1 Affaires in Berlin
on German-Soviet relations. Charge appeared to have
correctly understood and reported home statements recently
made to him by Weizsacker.
Doc. No.
Page
490
491
499
514
520
529
659
686
711
71?
72S
530
729
532
540
732
741
LXXXVI
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Date
Subject
Doc. So
Page
1939
June 18
June 25
June 27
June 23
June 29
June 29
June 29
June 30
June 30
The Chargt d 1 Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign
Ministry
Transmits Hiiger's account of his interview with Mikoyan
on June 17, at which he presented German offer to send
fully empowered negotiator to Moscow to resume economic
negotiations on basis of last Soviet offer. Mikoyan con-
tinued to consider German answer as "not entirely favour-
able".
The Charge d' 1 Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign
Ministry
Reports conversation between Hilger and Mikoyan ; latter
stated that before going into question of a German pleni-
potentiary coming to Moscow for economic negotiations, he
required to have specified those points on which, in German
view, differences of opinion still existed.
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Explains Mikoyan's tactics over resumption of economic
negotiations as based on suspicion that German offer at this
juncture dictated by political considerations. Proposes
dispelling suspicion by offering to conduct negotiations un-
obtrusively in Berlin or via Embassy in Moscow.
Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Depart-
ment
Minutes on document No. 570, contesting views of
German Ambassador in Moscow that economic negotiations
with the U.S.S.B. should be conducted either in Berlin or by
the Embassy in Moscow.
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Reports on interview with Molotov who took note of
statements that Germany would welcome a normalization
of relations with the U.S.S.R., and had furnished proofs of
her goodwill. Requests instructions on reply to be given
to Mikoyan's questions, endorsed by Molotov, respecting
resumption of economic negotiations.
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Comments on article by Zhdanov in Pravda, entitled
"British and French Governments do not want a treaty on
the basis of equality with the Soviet Union".
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal
Staff
Refers to document No. 570 and reports Hitler's decision
that the Russians are to be informed that, in view of their
attitude, Germany would not be interested in a resumption
of economic discussions at present.
The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Refers to document No, 579, and states that Ribbentrop
considers sufficient has now been said in the political field;
no further action should be taken until Fresh instructions.
Decision not yet reached on question of economic negotia-
tions, so instructions should be awaited.
Minute by an Official of the Economic Policy Department
Note on directive to Embassy in Moscow contained in
document No. 62S, reviewing recent conversations with
Mikoyan and Molotov, and suggesting that this directive
should now be despatched.
543
745
568
788
570
576
579
790
800
805
582
583
803
810
588 813 ■
596
820
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
LXXXVII
Subject
Doc.No.
Page
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Sends further details on his conversation with Molotov to
supplement document No. 579.
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Reports has been informed by Potemkin that Soviet
Government are prepared to meet German wishes respecting
release of crew of Komsomol and certain other Soviet
nationals.
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Reports information from his Italian colleague about
latter s interview with Potemkin, who appeared more
optimistic regarding Anglo-Soviet negotiations. On Rosso
referring to German desire to normalize relations with
U.b.b.K., Potemkin replied that Soviet-German agreement
would represent most effective guarantee of peace.
Herr Rudolf Nadolny to Ambassador Schuhnburg
Letter discussing validity of German-Soviet Treaty of
Berlin of 1926 and its applicability to the proposed Anelo-
Rusaian agreement.
The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Refers to documents Nos. 568, 570 and 579, and gives the
reply to be made to Mikoyan's question about points still
outstanding between Germany and U.S.S.R. in the economic
negotiations.
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 628 and reports action taken with
Mikoyan.
Ambassador Schulenburg to State Secretary Weizsacker
Letter expressing view that, whilst he agrees that no
further action should be taken with Molotov, a more friendly
treatment of Soviet officials in Berlin might prove German
good will.
Counsellor of Embassy Tippelskirch to Ambassador Schulen-
burg
Letter written from Berlin describing various conversa-
tions he has had in the Foreign Ministry on the future of
German-Soviet relations.
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No, 642 and reports communication
made to Hilger by Mikoyan that Soviet Deputy Trade
Representative Babarin has been instructed to discuss
directly in Berhn points still requiring clarification before
resumption of German-Soviet economic negotiations.
Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Depart-
ment r
Discussion with Soviet Trade Representatives on questions
still outstanding m German-Soviet economic negotiations
Soviet statement of views attached. Schnurre's comments
on these views.
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Transmits report published in Soviet press that German-
Soviet trade and credit negotiations have been resumed in
Berlin.
607
610
613
834
839
842
614
628
642
64S
661
677
685
699
843
870
889
894
910
928
936
955
LXXXVJII
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
1939
July. 22
July
July 24
July 27
July
Subject
I Doc. No.
Page
July 29
July 29
July 31
Aug.
The State Secretary to the- Embassy »» the Sonet Union
Refers to document No. 677 and states that Soviet Trade
Representative Babarin has now called on Schnurre;
German policy on the economic negotiations will be to act
in a markedly forthcoming manner. In respeet of political
conversations, the Ambassador is now empowered to pick
up the threads again.
Memorandum by the. State Sectary .
Conversation with the Russian Charge d Affaires, who
wished to discover German attitude to an invitation for two
German personages to visit Agricultural Exhibition m
Russia; this to be a modest start on resumption of cultural j
relations. ]
Memorandum by the Stale Secretary _ I
Conversation with Russian Charge d' Affaires who corn- :
mented on Anglo-Japanese negotiations on Tientsin, spoke
[ of Russian relations with Japan, and enquired about
I present German-Polish relations. i
i The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
| Refers to document No. 700, and describes conversation ,
! with Potemkin, who expressed pleasure about improved
| cultural contacts. Schulenburg took opportunity of again
describing a normalization of German-Soviet relations as
desirable.
j Memorandum by an Otfeial of the Economic Policy Depart-
i Describes an informal conversation held, in accordance
with instructions, with Head of Soviet Trade Delegation
and Soviet Charge d'Affaires. Discussion on advantages oi
a German-Soviet rapprochement-, and various stages m
which this might be achieved.
TM State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Refers to document No. 727 and instructs Ambassador to
await more detailed instructions before arranging further
interviews.
The State Secretary to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
Encloses copy of document No. 729, and requests that
Molotov be sounded on same lines. If Molotov abandons
his reserve, he may be told that Germany would be pre-
pared to come to an understanding with the U.S.b.K to
respect Soviet interests in Poland and m Baltic question
also.
The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Refers to document No. 736 and requests Ambassador to
report time of his next interview with Molotov. Instruc
tions in document No. 700 also apply to this interview.
Senior Counsellor Schnurre to Ambassador Schulenburg
Letter discussing difficulties in way of German business
visits to Russia, and steps taken about cultural exchanges.
Political background to latest instructions sent Ambassador ;
Ribbentrop's concern to obtain positive result m Russian
question.
700
955
714
975
715 976
727
729
1004
1006
734
736
1013
1015
744
757
1022
1046
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
LXXXIX
Date
1939
Aug. 3
Subject
'Doc.No.
Page
3
Aug. 3
Aug. 4
3
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Informs Ambassador briefly of a conversation with Soviet
Charge d'Affaires on August 2. Expressed German desire
for remoulding of German-Russian relations, stated readiness
for more concrete relations and requested to know whether
Soviet Government also desire German- Russian relations to
be placed on new basis.
The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Refers to document No. 758 and informs Ambassador that,
without prejudice to his conversation with Molotov, it is
intended to continue in Berlin, in more concrete terms,
conversation on harmonizing interests. Schnurre will
therefore see Astakhov.
The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Informs Ambassador more fully of conversation described
in document No. 758. Indicated to Astakhov two condi-
tions for remoulding of German-Soviet relations; stated
that Germany in no hurry; hinted at understanding with
Russia on fate of Poland. Indicated that more concrete
conversations depended on Soviet Government officially
communicating desire for remoulding relations.
Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department ■,
Conversation with Soviet Charge d'Affaires on August 3. '
Discussion of economic negotiations and interview between
Ribbentrop and Astakhov on preceding day. Schnurre
explained that, though Ribbentrop had indicated no
urgency, it would be expedient to continue conversations
within next few days.
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Transmits and comments on Tass communique about
statements reported to have been made by British Foreign
Under-Secretary on difference of opinion in negotiations
with Moscow about infringing independence of Baltic States.
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry ]
Refers to documents Nos. 736 and 744 and reports con- I
versation with Molotov, to whom he officially confirmed and
amplified statements on German policy made by Schnurre i
to Soviet representatives in Berlin. Molotov stated that i
Soviet Government also desired normalization and improve- j
ment of relations with Germany, but continued to evince |
mistrust of German intentions.
Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department I
Conversation with Soviet Charge d'Affaires, who stated :
that Soviet Government were desirous of continuing con- !
versations on improvement of Soviet-German relations, and I
regarded conclusion of a credit agreement as first stage. [
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry i
Refers to documents Nos. 760, 759 and 761 and reports I
statement by Potemkin that Astakhov has already been
given general instructions to continue conversations in
Berlin and will now receive wider instructions.
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Has been informed by M.F.A. of Molotov's statements to
Finnish Minister in Moscow that Russia has no designs on
Finland but must protect herself against lightning German
attack on Leningrad. Molotov further explained Russia's >
interest in Aaland Islands.
758
1048
750
760
104S
1049
701
1 05 1
J!
764
766
1055
1059
772
776
1067
1072
1072
xc
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Date
1939
Aug. 7
Aug. 7
Subject
Doc. No.
Page
State Secretary Weizsdcker to Ambassador Schulenburg
Letter discussing possibilities of relaxing restrictions on
social relations with Soviet Embassy, in order to ease
German-Soviet relations.
Ambassador Schulenburg to Senior Counsellor Schliep
Letter giving personal impressions of Anglo -French
negotiations in Moscow, and describing experiences of
various diplomatic colleagues in conversations with
Molotov.
[See also under Baltic States, Europe: General, France,
Great Britain and Northern States.]
778
779
1074
1075
Yugoslavia
Date
1939
Mar. 18
Mar. 19
Mar. 27
Subject
tooc. No.
Mar. 30
Apr.
Apr. 6
Apr. 10
The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry
German Air Attache has been informed by Berlin that
German aircraft firms have been authorized to submit
tenders to Yugoslavia under the credit ; Air Attache 1 believes
Yugoslavia is extremely interested in the speedy conclusion
of the armaments negotiations.
The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry
Has learned that recent events have aroused extreme
anxiety, also in highest quarters, and expresses the view
that should this continue it may lead to Yugoslavia turning
towards the Western Powers.
The Ministry in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 21, and proposes that, if ban on
submission of tenders to Yugoslavia by representatives of
German aircraft industry eannot be lifted at once, firms
concerned be authorized to submit tenders under the express
condition that total armaments credit is approved by the
competent Reich departments.
The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 105, and reports that high prices
demanded by German armaments firms are hampering
armaments negotiations.
The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation
in Yugoslavia
Refers to documents Nos. 105 and 128, and explains
reasons for delay in giving final decision about conclusion of
credit transaction.
The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry
Reports on difficulties encountered in negotiations over
the credit offered to Yugoslavia by Italy for financing State
contracts.
The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry
Reports on orders for aircraft to be expected from Yugo-
slavia when Credit Agreement is completed.
21
41
105
22
45
128
128
157
142 178
168
176
204
212
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
XCI
Date
1939
Apr. 13
Apr. 13
Apr. 14
Apr. IS
Apr. 16
Apr. 22
Apr. 22
Apr. 25
Apr.
Subject
Doc. No.
The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that Yugoslav M.F. A . has referred to Yugoslavia's
attitude during events in Albania as proving her loyalty to
policy of friendship towards the Axis Powers, and has asked
for authoritative statement of Germany's interest in a strong
and united Yugoslavia. * B
The. Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry
Reports fears expressed by Chief of the Yugoslav General
Staff to German Military Attache that agitation among
Volksdeutsche may prejudice German -Yugoslav relations.
Note by the Deputy Director of the Information and Press
Department
Has learned from Propaganda Ministry of request made by
Cincar-Markovid to Goebbels that Yugoslavia's recent atti.
tude receive special recognition in German press. Instruc-
tions as to press treatment.
Note by the Deputy Director of the Cultural Policy Department
Refers to document No. 192 and records action taken to
keep German national group in Yugoslavia completely
quiet.
Tlie Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the
Legation in Yugoslavia
States that delivery of bomber aircraft by required date
impossible. Nothing can be said about later delivery as
political prerequisites and credit conditions have not yet
been clarified.
The Legation in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry
Reports that War Minister raised subject of German
armament credit, referring to a promise of a 200 million RM
credit made by Goring. Minister emphasized urgency of
credit question.
Slate Secretary Weizsacker to Minister Heeren
Letter conveying Ribbentrop's annoyance at the way in
which the public announcement of Cinear-Markovic's visit
to Berlin has been made; states that the initiative came
from Yugoslavia.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secre-
tariat
Record of conversation between Ribbentrop and the
Yugoslav M.F.A.: Ribbentrop's account of German foreign
policy; views on German- Yugoslav relations; Cinear-
Markovic's account of his country's foreign policy; policy
towards accession to Anti-Comintern Pact. Discussion of
German-Yugoslav credit negotiations. Question of Yugo-
slavia's policy towards League of Nations.
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal
Staff
Record of conversation between Hitler and Yugoslav
M.F. A. : Hitler's review of Germany's position; his friendly
policy towards Yugoslavia ; views on Hungary and Rumania ;
policy towards Slovakia; weakness of British policy;
position of Japan; progress and military strength of Italy!
191
192
198
207
210
245
251
262
233
234
239
255
257
305
311
325
271
339
xcn
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Date
Subject
Doc Ho,
II
"y
June
Apr, 27 Memorandum by the Deputy Director of Ike Economic Policy
' Department
i Has learned from State Secretary for the Four Year Plan
of conversation between Goring and Yugoslav M.F.A. in
i which Goring confirmed that Germany was, in principle,
j prepared to grant Yugoslavia a credit.
25 j Memorandum by an Official of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop
• Confidential report on line taken by Yugoslav Legation
in Berlin as to the significance of the Prince Regent's visit
to Berlin and on German-Yugoslav relations.
Memorandum by the Foreign Minister
Conversation between Yugoslav Prince Regent, ^Hitler
and Ribbentrop on political situation; Ribbentrop's pro-
posal for Yugoslav withdrawal from League of Nations.
June 16 The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry
Reports has asked M.F.A. if an early decision on Yugo-
slavia withdrawing from League of Nations could be
expected. Cinear-Markovic replied that Rumania must
first be consulted, and that time was needed for preparation.
June 19 The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to instructions to enquire about a Yugoslav pro-
posal to Hungary for formation of a neutral bloc of four
States and reports has so far been unable to take action,
but can confirm Yugoslav desire for Hungarian-Rumanian
| and Bulgarian-Rumanian settlement.
June 27 I Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Depart-
ment
States agreement reached in negotiations on Protocol for
settling German credit for war materia! to Yugoslavia;
I recommends that the Protocol be now signed.
June 29 Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Polity Depart-
279
Page
354
438 587
ment
474
534
544
573
586
635
733
748
798
598
609
615
Considers that, in view of reports of French offers of
armaments credits to Yugoslavia, signature of the Protocol
on the German Armaments' Credit to Yugoslavia is a matter
of urgency.
July 1 The State Secretary to the Legation in Yugoslavia |
Refers to document No. 544, and sends instructions to I
approach Yugoslav Government about their plan for form-
ing a neutral four Power bloc consisting of Yugoslavia,
Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary.
July 3 1 The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry
j Refers to document No. 598 and reports conversation
i with M.F.A., about new line in Turkish foreign policy and
I Cincar-Markovic's desire to buttress Yugoslav policy of
i neutrality by a rapprochement to similarly oriented neigh-
bouring States.
July 5 The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry
Announces signature of Protocol on German arms credit
to Yugoslavia (document No. 620), and reports about
position on the Yugoslav oil concession to Germany. |
July 5 German- Yugoslav Secret Protocol 620
I Terms on which Yugoslavia is to be granted a credit for
j purchase of war material in Germany; amount of credit j
[ still unspecified.
811
822
838
845
860
ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS
XCI1I
Subject
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Has told Yugoslav Minister that Yugoslavia should dis-
sociate herself from the Balkan Entente.
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Conversation with Yugoslav Minister about views
expressed by Bibbentrop that Yugoslavia should dis-
sociate herself from Balkan Pact and League of Nations.
The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in
Yugoslavia
Refers to rumours, in connection with Prince Regent's
visit to London, about Yugoslavia breaking away to
Western Powers, accepting French and British arms credits,
and despatching gold reserves to London . Requests report.
Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Depart-
ment
Statement by Yugoslav Minister giving details about
Yugoslav request for arms. Minister's comments on the
political significance of the Yugoslav request.
The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry
Replies to document No. 680, that precise information on
Yugoslav gold transfers to Britain not available. Com-
ments on reasons underlying Prince Regent's visit to
London, and probable course of Yugoslav foreign policy.
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Conversation with Yugoslav Minister whom ho asked, as
instructed, when Yugoslavia would leave League of Nations.
Minister unable to reply, but described steps already taken
towards gradual withdrawal from League.
The State Secretary to the Legation in Yugoslavia
Minister instructed to renew pressure on Yugoslav M.F.A.
to withdraw from League of Nations; steps so far taken iri
this direction do not meet German expectations.
The Legation in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 733 and reports action taken with
M.F.A. Latter replied that Yugoslavia had already broken
away in spirit from League of Nations, but required formal
pretext for withdrawal. This he expected to find during
September Assembly.
[See also under Italy.}
Doc. No,
637
675
680
683
691
720
733
745
Page
884
927
931
933
947
994
1012
1023
S.O. Code No. 59-114-6*
MABCH. 1039 '
; No. 1
I'; Sa]/2025aO-3i
|; The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
N °' A 44? Moscow, March 13, 1939.1
Pol. V 2330.
Subject; Speech by Stalin at the Congress of the Communist Partv
Inthe first session of the eighteenth Party Congress of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union of March 10, Stalin gave an expose of the
domestic and foreign policy of the Communist Party
In that part of the speech devoted to foreign policy and in which was
mamfest unchanged adherence to the policy hitherto pursued, it was
noteworthy that Stalin's irony and criticism were directed in consider
ably sharper degree against Britain, i.e., against the reactionary forces
m power there, than against the so-called aggressor States, and in
particular Germany. Moreover this was also evident in Manuilski's*
report on the work of the Comintern.
Stalin's statements on foreign policy, as is usual here and in the
| ;; mannei ■familiar from the press, at first contrasted the prosperity of the
l/Soviet Union with the appearance of crises in the capitalist world in
border to demonstrate that the capitalist States were seeking a way out
|,tf their critical situation in "the second imperialist war" which had
| ;a lready been unleashed by the so-called "aggressor States "'from China
VM Spam. The struggle of the aggressor States was directed against the
^interests of Britain, France and the United States, who for their part
gmade concession after concession to the aggressors. The weakness of
fcifte democratic Powers, apart from their fears of a revolutionary de
Prelopment m the event of a new war, was evident in the first place
Ifrom the fact that they had abandoned the principle of collective
becurity and had turned to a policy of non-intervention and neutralitv
pnderiymg tins policy was the wish to divert the aggressor States to
"Hther victims.
j ; In this connection, Stalin also spoke of Germany and the Ukraine
ffesaid: Let us rake Germany, for example. Austria has been ceded
|q her, in spite of the obligation to protect the former's independence
|he.Sudetenland was abandoned to her, Czechoslovakia was left to her
foe, in violation of all obligations: then, however, the press began to
Kabtiah hes about the 'weakness of the Russian Army', about the
pi The date of receipt is not recorded.
^Dnutri Zakharovich Manuilski, a memb er of the Presidium of the Comintern,
2 DOCUMENTS COT GE&MAN FOREIGN POLICY
'disintegration of the Russian Air Force' and about 'disturbances 1 in
the Soviet Union, thus pushing the Germans further eastwards, promis-
ing them an easy prey and saying: 'Just start a war with the Bol-
sheviks, everything else will take care of itself.' It must be admitted
that this looks very like encouragement. The fuss made by the Anglo-
French and North American press about the Soviet Ukraine is charac-
teristic. The newspapermen of this press shouted themselves hoarse
that the Germans were taking action against the Soviet Ukraine, that
they already had possession of the so-called Carpatho-Ukraine with its
population of some 700,000, and that by the spring of this year at the
latest the Germans would add the Soviet Ukraine, which has over
30 million inhabitants, to the so-called Carpatho-Ukraine. It looks
as if the purpose of this suspicious uproar was to engender the
fury of the Soviet Union against Germany, to poison the atmo-
sphere and to provoke a conflict with Germany without apparent
reasons."
To these words Stalin added: "If there really are such lunatics who
would wish to unite the Soviet Union [sic ? Ukraine] with the Carpatho-
Ukraine, there need be no doubt that there will be enough strait-
jackets in the Soviet Union for such lunatics. . . Even more charac-
teristic is that some politicians and newspapermen in Europe and the
United States have lost their patience waiting for a 'campaign against
the Soviet Ukraine' and are now themselves beginning to reveal the
reasons behind the policy of non-intervention. They say frankly and
write in black and white that the Germans had bitterly disappointed
them, as, instead of advancing further to the east, against the Soviet
Union, they had turned westwards and demanded colonies. It can he
believed that the Germans were given parts of Czecho -Slovakia as a
reward for the undertaking to start a war with the Soviet Union, but
that the Germans now refuse to fulfil the bargain and send these people
packing."
On the attitude of the Soviet Union, Stalin said: "The Soviet Union
naturally cannot pass over these ominous happenings. Every war, :
even a small one, unleashed by the aggressor States in some remote ;
corner of the world constitutes a danger to the peace-loving States, j
How much greater a danger is presented by the new imperialist war, ;
which has already involved more than 500 millions in Asia, Africa and ;;
Europe. Therefore our country has continued unswervingly the policy J
of maintaining peace, but at the same time has done very serious work : ;
in the sphere of strengthening the preparedness of our Red Army and !
our Red Fleet."
As further measures towards strengthening her position, the Soviet
Union had entered the League of Nations which, "although a weak;
instrument of peace", might nevertheless restrain the unleashing of ■
war.
MARCH, 19S9
Stalin presented the following points as the principles of the foreign
,■'■ ■ policy of the Soviet Union:
"1) We stand for peace and the consolidation of economic relations
•with all countries and will abide by this if these countries adopt the
■ same attitude towards the Soviet Union and will not attempt to damage
£ the interests of our country.
jT 2) We stand for peaceful, close and good-neighbourly relations with
;;' ; ; all countries having a common frontier with the Soviet Union; we take
ii. this attitude and will continue to take it if these countries adopt the
;.■;■. same attitude to the Soviet Union and do not try either directly or in-
h. directly to injure the integrity and inviolability of the frontiers of the
&' Soviet State.
%■, 3) We stand for support of those peoples who have been the victims
I of aggression and who are fighting for the independence of their native
!■;. land.
| i) We do not fear the threats of the aggressors and we are ready to
|;;. return in double measure every blow struck by the warmongers in their
|; attempts to violate the integrity of the Soviet frontiers."
|: : ; In conclusion Stalin formulated the guiding principles of the foreign
policy of the Communist Party as follows :
" 1) Still to continue to pursue a policy of peace and consolidation of
economic relations with all countries.
2) To exercise caution and not to let our country be drawn into con-
flict by warmongers, whose custom it is to let others pull their chestnuts
out of the fire.
3) To strengthen in every way the fighting efficiency of our Red
Army and Fleet.
;v t) To strengthen the international bonds of friendship with the
I workers in all countries who are interested in peace and in friendship
" among the peoples."
The part of Stalin's speech dealing with domestic policy presented
..little new. It was characterized by a comparatively sober account of
I the economic and internal political situation. It would take ten to
f fifteen years "to catch up economically with the advanced capitalist
|. countries", expressly renouncing all "fantasies" and adhering to the
' guiding principles and methods hitherto pursued.
| I beg to reserve a report on the full course of the Congress. 3 The
jiext of Stalin's speech will be sent when a German text is available. 4
Count von dee Schulenbubg
'.'Not printed (493/233240-47). This report, No. A/643, is dated Apr. 3.
.* Not found.
4 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOBEIGN POLICY
No. 2
1969/437924-25
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
URGENT Buchabest, March 15, 1939—4:30 p.m.
No 79 of March 15 Received March 1 6—9 :30 p.m.
Pol. IV 1714.
Foreign Minister Gafencu told me the following:
1) Rumania intends to respect the situation created by the Vienna
Award. 1 The Rumanian Government have not taken and will not take
any steps to alter this situation.
2) If circumstances demand, Rumania is prepared to participate in a
possible reorganisation of the situation with all the interested States,
in particular the Vienna arbiters. This, however, applies only to the
Carpatho-Ukraine, and not to Czechia or Slovakia, in which Rumania
is disinterested.
The Foreign Minister asks the Reich Government to inform him of
their views regarding the maintenance or the possible alteration of the
present situation in the Carpatho-Ukraine.
The Foreign Minister said that he was having similar statements
made in Berlin by the Charge d* Affaires. 2 As his newspaper Timpul
had inadvertently mentioned participation in the reorganisation of
Czechoslovakia, he asks that this should be corrected, saying that only
the Carpatho-Ukraine was meant.
A few Rumanian units are concentrated on the frontier facing
Carpatho-Ukraine, but they are not to be given marching orders until
the situation has been clarified. Rumania, however, will not look on
idly if Rumanian villages and railway lines in the Carpatho-Ukraine
are occupied by Hungary and if Hungary possibly occupies positions
facing the new frontier.
So far no military regrouping had taken place on the Hungarian
frontier but men on leave had been recalled. The Foreign Minister
again asked for our cooperation with him; Poland had also promised
him this and would take no action, even though she had concentrated
troops on the frontier for security.
Fabricius
i See vol. iv of this Series, document No. 99.
2 Victor Erabetzianu, Counsellor of Legation.
MARCH, 1939 5
No. 3
7481/E540399
The Charge d' Affaires in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 47 of March 15 Ankara, March 15, 1939—6:48 p.m.
Received March 16 — 2:00 a.m.
Pol. VII 450.
I hear from competent authority that the French are negotiating
with the Turks over uniting Hatay i to Turkey. The French are alleged
to be demanding the conclusion of a pact of mutual assistance from the
Turks as a quid pro quo. The Turkish attitude to this matter has hither-
to been evasive. The French Ambassador, Massigli, stated to diplomats
here in this connection that the Reich Government had intimated to
the Turkish Government that they would support the alleged Italian
aspirations regarding Syria if Turkey deviated from her present policy
of strict neutrality towards the Great Powers.
Kroll
'-^t XI '&? t^M j r !"r' W t Kh had ac 1 ull ' e d » special regime of local auto-
.. nomy within the French Mandate for Syria. Various agreements between France and
Turkey concerning the Sanjak had previously been made, the most recent being in July
. 1938, when the new Franco-Turkish Treaty of Friendship was initialled. S« afso vol v
of this Series, document No. 539 and footnote 2 thereto.
No. 4
1W1/M5222-23
The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 31 of March 15 Warsaw, March 16, 1939—3:15 a.m.
Received March 16 — 8:30 a.m.
Pol. IV 1740.
P M. Beck, who had not reacted in any way to the appointment which
1 1 had already sought yesterday, asked me to call on him this evening to
itell me, with obvious displeasure, and referring to Lipski's lack of con-
j tact with the German Foreign Ministry, that unpleasant things had
|Jbeen observed along the Polish frontier i during the surprise march-in of
liGerman troops. Machine guns had been set up at various points im-
|iuediately on the frontier and trained on Polish territory. At one point
retrench had even been dug. On the Polish side these measures, which
|sppeared like a threat, had been regarded as misunderstood instructions
1 i.e. with Caeeho-Slovakia,
6 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
by subordinate authorities, and no counter-measures had been Uken.
He asked me, however, to acquaint my Government with this matter,
fnd eSreSed a hope that these measures would be rescmded. I pro-
m Sc d k °fu S r°t h e r pointed out that, during the m arch in th demarc,
tion line originally laid down had not been adhered to. As a result, an
£EaS?S«Lit impression had arisen. Fortunately, no incidents
had o"--d P Objectively speaking, the matter was a so -mpo^t
as the frontier established meanwhile had been accepted. However at
W communication might have been expected. I replied that*
demarcation line, of which I had no exact formation ha probab y
been regarded as settled by frontier delimitation.* In any case there
had certainly been no intention of putting Poland out of humour.
I thn presented the notification of the Hacha Agreement and in
accordance with oral instructions, explained the German Jiews on he
"erallTuation, emphasizing particularly the German .at ******
question of the Carpatho-Ukraine^ When I asked about consxderat.cn
^Rumanian wishes, the Foreign Minister replied that the matter was
at present being negotiated with Polish mediation; he assumed that
R„E woukfreceive both the areas settled by Rumamans and the
fxTeme eastern tip with the strategically important railway He
furS mentioned that Czech troops had asked to be transported back
"ESS ^ Sk question, Beck expressed satisfaction with the
independence obtained. On receipt of last night's notification « he had
immediately announced his recognition and had appointed a Charge
oVAffaires who was already on his way to Bratislava. Foreign press
reports, attributing to Poland specific designs on Slovakia were
false, and a that? dftnenfi had been ordered, ^contrast to the
Carpatho-Ukrainian frontier no troops were concentrated on the blovak
Conclusion M. Beck said he was grateful for. the detailed informa-
tion given, and expressed the hope that a settlement of he Carpatho-
Ukrainian question would also have a favourable effect on German-
Polish relations. Moltke
2 See vol. v of this Series, chapter I, Vassim.
iW^J^liriMAMiT) Moltke reported: "The Hungarian ■
269.
MARCH, 1930
No. 5
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Berlin, March 16, 1939.
The State Secretary gave the following instructions to the German
Legation in Prague by telephone at 1 : 12 p.m.
For Ministerialdirektor Gaus, or Counsellor Dr. Kordt.
I would like to suggest that Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky instruct
the former Czech Missions abroad:
1) to notify the Government to which they were previously accredited
that they have given up their function as Czech representatives.
2) to ensure the smooth transfer of the former Czech Missions] to the
German diplomatic representative on the spot. 1
Weizsackek
i On Mar. 16 in telegram No. 123 sent from Prague at 8:45 p.m. (2050/447285), Ritter
and Hencke reported: The Czech Missions abroad have been instructed by ChvalkovsW
by telegram today to place themselves under German Missions, to carry out our in
structions, and m particular to put all archives at our disposal. Czech Missions are
passing on similar instructions to Czech Consulates "
la telegram No. 125 of Mar 18 (not printed, 2819/548717), the Foreign Ministry in-
f ^f d i «• B ™ y W ?>v 1S t} ? at ,' ae far as was knt "™. th * °rder had been obeyed by
.11 Czech Missions except those in W ashington, London and Paris. The Prague Govern
ment were being asked to instruct these Missions also to conform to the order.
No. 6
1975/138323
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
UKGBNT Bucharest, March 16, 1939—2 p.m.
No. 82 of March 16 Received March 16—6:35 p.m.
Pol. IV 1753.
With reference to my telegram No. 79 of March 15. 1
Poland yesterday advised Rumania to occupy Rumanian villages
: and railroads in Carpatho -Ukraine. The Minister of the Courts and the
.foreign Ministers have told me that the Rumanian Government have
'declined, because they do not wish to do anything without German
consent. They request that their just claim to these territories be not
.overlooked if, owing to the Hungarian advance, the position in
|Carpatho-Ukraine is revised in contravention of the Vienna Award.
'Document No. 2.
2 Ernst Urdarianu.
' Grigore Gafencu.
8 DOCUMENTS ON GEKMAN FOR.B1UN TOLICY
As the Rumanian Government's attitude in the matter appears loyal
in every way, please consider whether the Foreign Minister can be given
an answer which will strengthen his position in the country and will
contribute towards pacification in the eastern tip of the Carpathians.
Request answer by telegram, if necessary by telephone.
Fabeicius
No. 7
1975/438324
The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
urgent Budapest, March 16, 1939 — 4:30 p.m.
No. 48 of March 16 Received March 16 — 8:25 p.m.
Pol. IV 1755.
The Foreign Minister told me that Rumania was mobilizing five
army corps in all. The Hungarian Army had received orders to eject
the Rumanians, should they invade Carpatho-Ukraine. He had re-
quested the Yugoslav and Polish Governments to exert a calming in-
fluence on the Rumanian Government so that incidents would be
avoided. Hungarian relations with Yugoslavia were at present very
friendly as a result of the Yugoslav Government's complete restraint in
the Carpatho-Ukraine question. On the other hand, he had rejected in
a friendly manner the Polish Foreign Minister's 1 advice to appease
Rumania by means of territorial concessions. He would not allow
himself to be blackmailed by Rumania. The Rumanian proposal re-
ported yesterday, 2 which meant that Hungary could only have occupied
a relatively small part of Carpatho-Ukraine, was unacceptable; but he
was ready of his own accord to cede to Rumania, in return for conces-
sions elsewhere, the eastern tip of Carpatho-Ukraine (east of the Theiss)
including the railway link from Poland to Rumania, which the Polish
Foreign Minister would like to see in Rumanian possession for the
purpose of a possible Polish -Rumanian advance against the Soviet
Union.
Count Csaky requested that this communication should for the present
1 Col. Beck.
2 In telegram No. 4 2 of Mar. 1 5 from Budapest (not printed, 1929/437929-30) Erdmanns-
dorff reported information from Csaky that the Rumanian Government had presented
a Note proposing that Hungarian troops should not move east of a line running north
from Huszt (Chust). Texts of the Rumanian proposals have not bean found in the
German archives. In despatch Ho. 1775 of Mar. 24 (not printed, 1975/438346-48)
Fabricius reported that the Hungarian Minister in Bucharest had told him that Gafencu's
first proposals had been that Carpatho-Ukraine should, as welt as by Hungary, also
be occupied by Poland and Rumania; only later had Gafencu spoken of Rumania occupy-
ing four villages and the railway connecting Sighet with Poland. See also document
No. 29.
MARCH, 1939 Q
be treated as confidential and he would also be (word missing) [ ?grateful]
to us for exerting a calming influence on the Rumanian Government.
He added that the Hungarian Army, which had a start of three days
as regards mobilization, was strong enough to meet a possible Rumanian
attack with success. 3
Ebdmannsd okff
In a further telegram, No 61 of Mar. 19 (not printed, 1973/438334-35) Erdmanns-
dorff reported that Csaky had mformed him that ho had instructed his MiSTn
Bucharest to ask the Rumanian Government to explain why they were takina such
extensive military measures despite the reassuring Hungarian statements. Should he
not obtain a satisfactory answer within 48 hours, Hungary would order general
No. 8
1B60/437926
The State Secretary to the Legation in Rumania
Telegram
Berlin, March 16, 1939—6 p.m.
zuPol. IV 1714.1
With reference to your telegram No. 79 of March 15. 1
Please point out to the Rumanian Government that all legal agree-
ments made at Munich and Vienna^ have been superseded by the latest
events, as these agreements were based on the concept that the entire
Czecho-Slovak territory was bounded by one common frontier. After
the centre section broke away through the Slovak declaration of in-
dependence^ an entirely new situation arose. What inferences are to
be drawn from this situation cannot as yet be assessed. We have not
seen fit to protest against the Hungarian advance.*
WBIZSACKER5
1 Document No. 2.
4 See vol n of this Series, document No. 675, and vol. iv, document No 99
3 See vol. iv of this Series, document No. 212. - '
* In the first draft of this telegram (1969/437928), a second paragraph read- "The
Reich Government do not intend to play an active part in the question of the future of
Carpatho-TJkraine They are rather of the opinion that it is for the States interested
in this territory to discuss the future of Carpatho-TJfkraine. " This was deleted and
the present two concluding sentences substituted in Heinburg's handwriting
i <■ A minute on this document states that copies of this telegram were sent to the Mis-
sions at London Paris, Rome, Warsaw, Moscow, Ankara, Tokyo, Washington, Buenos
Aires, Rio de Janeiro, Santiago, The Hague, Budapest, Belgrade, Stockholm and
Copenhagen, for guidance on language to be held.
10 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 9
7491/E540478
Circular of the Director of the Political Department l
Telegram
immediate Berlin, March 16, 1939 — 6:10 p.m.
zu PoJ. IV 1728.2
For information only.
On the instructions of his Government, the British Ambassador »
here transmitted on March 15 a written communication, in the form
of a private letter to the Foreign Minister, 2 in which it was explained
that the British Government did not wish to intervene more than was
necessary in a matter in which other Governments were more directly
involved than they themselves were. Nevertheless, as the German
Government would undoubtedly understand, they were very appre-
hensive as to whether all the efforts to re-establish confidence and to
bring about a detente would be successful. To these efforts the British
Government, as presumably the German Government also, attached
importance, in view of the commencement of the economic negotia-
tions. 4 From this point of view the British Government would deplore
any action in Central Europe which might cause a setback to the in-
creasing general confidence upon which any improvement of the econo-
mic position depended.
WoERMANN
i Addressees were the Missions at London, Paris, Rome, Warsaw, Moscow, Ankara,
Tokyo, Washington, Buenos Aires, Bio de Janeiro, Santiago, The Hague, Budapest,
Bucharest, Belgrade, Stockholm and Copenhagen.
2 Vol. IV of this Series, document No. 234. See also British Documents, Third Series,
vol. iv, document No. 247.
3 Sir Nevile Henderson.
4 Discussions were in progress at Diisseldorf between representatives of the Reichs-
gruppe Industrie and of the Federation of British Industries. See vol. iv of this Series
document No. 331.
No. 10
2002/442276
Circular of the State Secretary
Telegram (en elair)
Berlin, March 16, 1939 — 11:58 p.m.
Pol. IV 1750.
To all Diplomatic Missions.
The Slovak Minister President, Tiso, has transmitted the following
request to the Fuhrer by telegram:
"With full trust in you, the Fuhrer and Chancellor of the Greater
MAKCH, 193U 1 1
German Reich, the Slovak State places itself under your protection.
The Slovak State asks you to take over this protection. Signed: Tiso."
The Fiihrer has sent this reply:
"I acknowledge the receipt of your telegram of yesterday and hereby
take over the protection of the Slovak State. Signed: Adolf Hitler."
Further instructions in this connection, especially regarding notifica-
tion, are reserved.
Weizsackek
No. 11
74S2/E540403
Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department
Berlin, March 16, 1939.
e.o.W II 1756.
Subject: Repercussions of the occupation of Czechia on the economic
discussions with Britain and France.
On March 15, the British Government cancelled the visit to Berlin of
the Ministers Stanley and Hudson as being "inopportune in the present
circumstances". 1 The conversations between German and British in-
dustrial representatives in Diisseldorf are being continued until the
evening of March 16, by which time they were to have been concluded
in any case according to the intended programme. The British in-
dustrial representatives are then returning to England from Diissel-
dorf, without previously coming on to Berlin, as the dinner planned for
Minister Stanley in Berlin is not taking place. 2 The industrial conversa-
tions went off satisfactorily; agreements were not to be expected yet.
The conversations between the various industrial groups are to be
continued on dates yet to be fixed. The representatives of the two
controlling organisations will meet again in June, and for this the
British have issued invitations to go to London.
Alphand, the chief French negotiator, returned to Paris unexpectedly
this morning. The five members of his delegation are still here and are
awaiting instructions, but have declined to attend the negotiations set
for today. Alphand had intended to stay here until about the middle
of next week in order to continue the discussions on a travel agreement
and on the various plans for intensifying German-French economic
cooperation. Alphand sent his apologies to me through the French
1 See vol. iv of this Series, document No. 330.
2 See ibid., document No. 331.
12 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOKEIGN POLICY
Commercial Attache 3 here for having had to leave suddenly on in-
structions from Gentin, the Minister for Trade, -without having the
opportunity to say goodbye. The Commercial Attache gave no reason
for his departure. He thought that, as the delegation had remained
here, perhaps Alphand would also return in order to continue the
negotiations. 4
WlEHL
3 J. Lefeuvre.
* In a despatch of Mar. 20 (7482/E540405) the Foreign Ministry informed the Embassy
in France: "M. Aiphand made a surprise return to Paris on Mar. 16. At first^the delega-
tion remained in Berlin to await more detailed instructions from Paris. Negotiations
were however not continued. The last member of the French delegation finally left
Berlin during the evening of Mar. 17, so that negotiations have been broken off. More
detailed information regarding the reasons for departure has not reached us from the
French delegation."
In telegram No. 165 of Mar. 21 (not printed, 2467/517349-50), the Embassy in France
communicated the text of a statement in the French press in which the annexation of
Czecho -Slovakia was given as the reason for breaking off the negotiations. The
recently signed economic agreement between France and Czecho-Slovakia, which was to
have come into force on Apr. 1, was regarded as having lapsed.
No. 12
2002/442278
The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 36 of March 16 Warsaw, March 17, 1939 — 4:50 a.m.
Received March 17 — 9:55 a.m.
Pol. IV 1775.
The Under Secretary of State, Areiszewski, asked me to call on him
this evening and stated that M. Beck had unfortunately been prevented
from receiving me owing to a meeting of Ministers but that he wished
to tell me that he would be very grateful if information could be
obtained from Berlin as to the significance of the promise given for the
protection of Slovakia. 1 No clear picture could be formed here of the
genesis and import of this promise ; the less so, indeed, as the Polish side
had already unofficially signified their readiness for a frontier guarantee,
and from Hungary, too, no danger threatened.
I replied that it did not seem to me advisable to make enquiries in
Berlin at this stage. If the exchange of telegrams, which had only just
become known here, was confirmed, I would certainly receive instruc-
tions in the near future which would put me in a position to give a more
detailed explanation of the matter. Areiszewski again repeated his re-
quest, referring to the great interest which M. Beck took in the matter.
As was to be expected, the announcement of the exchange of tele-
grams has caused considerable nervousness here which has also found
1 See document No. 10.
MARCH, 1930 13
expression in renewed anti-German street demonstrations. In order
to bolster up the position of M. Beck, who is apparently under strong
pressure from the military element, it seems advisable that he should
be supplied with information calculated to lessen as far as possible
fears of a far-reaching infringement of Slovak independence and the
danger of military pressure on Poland from Slovakia.
Moltke
No. 13
1975/43S325
The State Secretary to the Legation in Rumania
Telegram
most urgent Berlin, March 17, 1939—3:45 p.m.
No - 86 zuPol. IV 1753, ' 1755.2
With reference to your telegram No. 82 of [March] 16. 1
Budapest Legation telegraphs:
[Here follows the full text of document No. 7]
End of telegram from Budapest.
Please conduct conversation with Foreign Minister on the following
lines: s
We consider the reserve hitherto maintained by Rumania to be
prudent and are of the opinion that Rumanian interests would best be
served by avoidance of violent measures . We continue to be interested in
a final peaceful settlement of the Carpatho -Ukrainian question between
Hungary and Rumania but do not intend, at any rate at the moment, to
adopt the role of mediator, as we are convinced that a direct settle-
ment is entirely feasible. Budapest has received the same instructions. 3
Please conduct conversation in such a way that it cannot be con-
strued as an encouragement of far-reaching Rumanian wishes.*
. Weizsacker
1 Document No. 6.
! Document No. 7.
3 On the same date the text of document No. G and of the instructions here printed
were telegraphed to Budapest as telegram No. 70 (1975/438326) F u
* In a memorandum of Mar. 17 (2050/447289), Woermann recorded: "I informed the
Hungarian Minister today about the instructions sent to Bucharest and Budapest on
the Carpatho-Ukrame question, and emphasized that we do not, at the moment wish
to accept the role of mediators or to encourage Rumania to make far-reaching demands
I mentioned that, accordmg to our information, the Hungarian Government were willing
to cede to Rumania the most eastern tip of the Carpatho.TJkraine, including the railwaf
line through the The.ss Valley and presumably also a few villages east of Chust in
return for concessions, and I asked M. Sztojay what concessions they had in mind The
Minister said Hungary had no interest in the eastern tip of the Ca^atho-Ukraine and
would propose the cession of predominantly Hungarian villages along the present
Hungaro-Rurnanian frontier instead. He assumed it was mainly a question of the
Satmar (Szatmarnemet.) area. As there were 1,700,000 Hungarian^ living in Rumania
the Hungarian Government had no cause to give up Carpatho-Ukraine territory to
Rumania without compensation. Woermann further enquired about reports of Hunea
rian troops crossing the Rumanian frontier, but Sztojay had no definite information
J 4 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY |:
No. 14 |.
6402/E474S83 |
The Charge 1 cT Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry |,
Telegram £,-
URGENT Washington, March 17, 1939— 8:28 p.m. |
No 87 of March 17 Received March 18—5:15 a.m. <
W VIII a 600.
With reference to your telegram No. 80 of March 17. 1
1. I have delivered to Welles the prescribed Note 2 in which the
United States Government are notified of the establishment of the Pro-
tectorate, and have in addition given the oral explanations as directed.
Welles received these without comment.
2. However, he took the opportunity of informing me that the United
States Government had determined, after a thorough examination of
the case, to impose "countervailing duties " 3 on imports from Germany
at the earliest possible moment, pursuant to Article 303 of the Tariff
Act, 4 and he asked me to transmit this information to my Government.
The American Government were in possession of proofs that German
exports were heavily subsidized, and therefore felt themselves justified
in imposing this measure. When I questioned him on the matter, Welles
stated that "countervailing duties" would be imposed within the next
48 hours. The repercussions of the events of the last few days have
thus led to removal of the State Department's opposition to the
measure proposed by the Treasury (see my telegram No. 75 of March
13). 5
Thomsen
i Not printed (2050/447306-07) ; this was a circular to all Missions stating that all
Czechoslovak consular duties had passed to Germany; only in extremely urgent cases
were reliable Czechoslovak officials to be engaged for the time being _
2 See vol. iv of this Series, document No. 242, and also document No. 50 in this volume,
footnote 5.
s In English in the original.
* Of 1930. Section 303 rendered liable to additional (countervailing) duties, dutiable
imports into the U.S.A. if their production or export was subsidized in their country of
° r * 8 Not printed (2000/442087-88) . In this telegram Thomsen reported that a party of
three experts from the Treasury and Justice Departments had left New York on Mar. 10
for Germany via France on a secret mission to investigate German currency measures,
commercial barter methods and handling of blocked accounts. It was believed that a
final decision as to the nature of American retaliatory measures— countervailing duties
or embareo on German imports— would be based on the report of this party. The
evidence gathered was allegedly to be used to overcome certain objections by the
Secretary of State to the retaliatory measures favoured by the Treasury and the Justice
Departments.
MAECH, 1939 15
No. 15
2050/447298-SO0
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most secret Rome, March 17, 1939—1 1 :30 p.m.
urgent Received March 18— 2 '20 a m
No. 100 of March 17
For the Foreign Minister.
Count Ciano asked me to call on him this evening in order to inform
me of the following on the instructions of the Duce, 1 with the request to
report it immediately to the Reich [Foreign] Minister and also to the
Fuhrer and Chancellor:
He wished to confirm once again 2 that our action over the liquidation
of Czecho-Slovakia had met with unreserved approval here as was also
shown by the press here, even though, as he hinted for the first time,
there had been no knowledge here of our latest intentions. The settle-
ment was natural and logical and he, personally, was in complete agree-
ment with it. Of course, it had resulted in profoundly agitating public
opinion throughout the world, and public opinion here had not been
unaffected, even though this was of itself insignificant as here the will
of the Duce alone was authoritative. However, the Duce felt himself
obliged to draw attention to certain rumours which were also to be
found in the press and which, without causing him disquiet, imposed
on him the duty, precisely because of his firmly established friendship
towards us— indeed, the Axis formed the basis of Italy's entire foreign
policy— and precisely because of the complete frankness advisable
between friends, to make a plain statement now, even though he did
not consider the rumours had any foundation.
With a prolixity and tortuousness not usual to him, Ciano explained
his long introduction by the fact that people were saying — and these
rumours also emanated from Zagreb — that Macek intended, under the
influence of the most recent events, to follow in the tracks of Hacha and
Tiso, and set up Croat autonomy under a German protectorate. It was
certain that the dissolution of Czechia had given the autonomy move-
ment in Croatia the most powerful impetus. In such a state of affairs
the Duce was anxious to allow no doubt to arise regarding the fact that,
1 For Ctano's account of this interview see Galeazzo Ciano: L'Europa verso la Catas-
trofe (Milan, 1948) pp. 418-419. See also the Ciano Diaries, entry of Mar. 17, 1939.
(These Diaries have been published in Italian as Galeazzo Ciano, Diario, 1939-1943
(2 vols., Milan and Rome, 1946); and Diario 1937-38 (Bologna, 1948); in French as
Comte Galeazzo Ciano, Journal Politique, 1939-43 (2 vols., Neuchatel and Paris, 1946)
sad Journal Politique, 1937-38 (Paris, 1949); in English as The Ciano Diaries, 1939-43,
W ed. Hugh Gibson (New York, 1946) and Ciano's Diary, 1939-1943, ed. Malcolm Mugge-
H ridge (London, 1947) and Ciano's^ Diary, 1937-1938 (London, 1952). As the texts of
'" these four publications differ considerably in places, reference is here made to entries by
dates rather than by page numbers.)
2 Sec vol. iv of this Series, document No. 4G3.
JQ DOCUMENTS ON GEKMAN FOREIGN POLICY
even though Italy's desinteressement in the fate of Czechia had been,
and remained complete, her attitude was completely ^different towards
the Croat question which affected vital interests of the country. Italy
herself had supported the Croat movement for autonomy before the
settlement with Yugoslavia; that was in the past Today, on the
contrary, her interest was in a strong Yugoslavia. The Croat question
affected the Adriatic, and hence the Mediterranean which the Duce
considered as much an Italian sea, as he regarded the Baltic as a purely
German sea, in which judgement, moreover, he was at one with the
Fuhrer and Chancellor who had expressed himself clearly m this sense.*
Nothing had changed in his attitude. An action which did not take
account of this attitude would oblige Italy to react accordingly. The
Duce was far from accepting the rumours in circulation as well founded.
However, he considered it right and proper-precisely because of his
close friendship with the Fuhrer and Chancellor-to leave no doubt
that the Croat question was for him a noli me tangere.
In answer to my precise question as to his sources and their value,
Ciano referred to certain unspecified reports and also to press reports.
I replied that, in accordance with his wishes, I would immediately
report the substance of his observations but that, for the rest, I did not
see the slightest indication that any Croat aspirations to the detriment
of a strong Yugoslavia which we also desired, had any prospects of
success with us. Moreover, he had himself already referred to the
Fuhrer and Chancellor's clear statements about the Mediterranean.
Ciano thereupon repeated once again that neither he nor the Duce took
it for granted that the rumours were true; the Duce, however, wished
to take the precaution of stating that Italy's attitude in the Czech
question did not warrant the assumption that a similar desinteressement
was conceivable with regard to. the Croat question also.
Ciano finally added that certain press reports regarding Italy s
alleged plans in respect of Albania were quite without foundation.
Piano made these statements in a markedly friendly and cordial manner.
Mackensen
3 See document No. 86, footnote 7.
No. 16
483/231356
Memorandum by the State Secretary
St S No. 234 Berlin, March 17, 1939.
The British Ambassador took leave of me today before going to
London tomorrow to reports H e informed me of the feeling which
i See British Documents, Third Series, vol. iv, No. 308, footnote 1.
MARCH, 1930 27
was developing in London as a result of the present solution of the
Czecho -Slovak question, and he sounded me for arguments which he
could give Chamberlain for use against the latter's political opposition
at home.
1 attempted to make it clear to Henderson, with reference to develop-
ments of the last six months, how we had been in a fair way towards
coming to an arrangement with Prague which would have satisfied the
requirements of both sides. The prerequisite for this, however the
disappearance of the Benes spirit — was lacking more and more as time
went on. On the contrary, Czech hopes, obviously encouraged from
outside and apparently from America in particular, of a European war
and of the resurgence of their country on a larger scale had increased.
This had finally created a situation in which the outward manifestation
that is, Tiso's dismissal by Prague, 2 had sufficed to set the ball rolling.
The present development was partly to be ascribed to the Czech people
themselves, and partly to their ill-advised friends abroad.
Wishes which Henderson expressed regarding certain persons who
had taken refuge in the British Legation in Prague are being dealt with
elsewhere. 3
Henderson could as yet make no statement regarding his return to
Berlin.
Weizsacker 4
2 See vol. iv of this Series, document No. 186.
a On Mar. 17, Woermann telegraphed to Bitter in Prague (not printed, 350/202316-17)
that the British Embassy in Berlin had semi -officially requested safe conduct for
certain British and non-British subjects who were being given asylum in the British
Legation in Prague. Weizsacker had suggested to Henderson that Newton, who could
no longer act officially as British Minister, should discuss the matter privately with
Bitter. On Mar. 18, the Legation in Prague reported, in telegram No. 132 (not printed
350/202286), that Bitter had promised Newton safe conduct for British subjects and
sympathetic consideration for the cases of non-British subjects.
* For an addition to this record made later by Weizsacker, see document No. 36,
No. 17
S55S/E3D59iS-I>'
Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department
Berlin, March 17, 1939.
W 409g.
Subject : Arms credit for Bulgaria. 1
I informed the Bulgarian Minister 2 today that the Reich Govern-
ment were prepared in principle to increase by about 20 million RM
the credit granted to Bulgaria for arms to the value of 30 million RM.3
1 See also vol. v of this Sencs, documents Nos. 314 anil 315.
2 Col. Parvan Draganov.
3 See vol. v of this Series, document No. 181.
2
1 8 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
It was not possible to increase it by 45 million as the Bulgarian Govern-
ment had requested, since our own capacity for delivery was not
sufficient for this. The increase by about 20 million RM was dependent
on two conditions:
a) the possibility of raising funds for effecting the repayment
instalments should, be clearly laid down in the Bulgarian budget,
for which we were awaiting more precise data from the Bulgarian
negotiators.
b) the possibility of transferring the repayment instalments by means
of the export of Bulgarian goods to Germany should be clearly laid
down, and in particular the possibility of delivering a sufficient per-
centage in goods representing [for Germany] foreign exchange, princip-
ally ores, should be guaranteed. If this is not possible from the mines
already in production, then a clause would have to be inserted to the
effect that the yield from new mines would also be used for the repay-
ment of deliveries up to an agreed percentage of the repayment instal-
ments.
The Minister described the two conditions as easy to comply
with; he thought that the Bulgarian delegation might arrive here
at the beginning of next week for the negotiations with Minister
Clodius.
He was very disappointed at the increase being limited to about
20 million RM. He described this as too little and strongly emphasized
that precisely in the present state of affairs it was important to bring
Bulgarian armaments up to the proposed maximum with the greatest
possible speed. He drew attention to the fact that our productive
capacity had been considerably increased by the annexation of the
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and would now without doubt
be adequate for supplying also- the further 45 million RM worth re-
quested by Bulgaria in even less time than the period envisaged
hitherto. In certain circumstances even immediate delivery to Bul-
garia from Czech Army stocks could be contemplated.
I replied that I was only authorized to promise him the increase of
20 million RM. This decision had indeed been made by the Reich
Government before the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was
taken over. It was in the light of the new situation created by this that
his. fresh suggestions based thereon would be studied. The Minister
requested that this should be done as quickly as possible so that its
result would be available in time for the negotiations with the Bulgarian
delegation. 4
WlEHL
4 This memorandum was sent to the Legation at Sofia under cover of a despatch of
Mar. 20 (not printed, 555 S/E39 5958) signed by Moraht, Senior Counsellor in the Econo-
mic Policy Department.
MARCH, 1939 J 9
No. 18
£002/442279
The State Secretary to the Embassy in Poland
Telegram
No. 60 of March 17 Berlin, March 18, 1939—12:10 a.m.
[Received March 18 — 3:43 a.m.]i
[zru] Pol. IV 1775.2
Instructions on language to be held. With reference to your telegram
No. 36 of March 16. 2 ■
During the few hours which have elapsed since the exchange of
telegrams between the Fiihrer and Tiso, 3 it has not been possible to
reach a settlement on the import of the promise made about the protec-
tion of Slovakia. It looks as if the status of Slovakia will be differen-
tiated from that of Czechia. The wording of the text itself indicates
that it is not intended to take such far-reaching measures as in the case of
Czechia. Further instructions follow.
Weizsacker
i Inserted from the copy filed in the Warsaw Embassy (2892/5655691
2 Document No. 12. ''
' See document No. 10.
No. 19
427/218204
Memorandum by the State Secretary
St.S. No. 237 Berlin, March 18, 1939.
The British Ambassador has just rung me up (1 p.m.) to ask for an
interview with me to deliver a Note of protest. He stated that the Note
would contain the assertion that our action in Czechoslovakia was
devoid of legal basis.
I told Henderson that, in such circumstances, I could expect no
result from his visit. A conversation between him and me on the matter
would undoubtedly achieve no improvement, for I could only advise
him to propose to his Government that they should reconsider the
matter, and make no representation to us at all.
As Henderson insisted on his visit, and maintained that he had strict
instructions l from his Government regarding the presentation of a
Note, I told him that what he intended doing was up to him. In my
opinion a conversation between him and me would serve no useful
purpose because my view of the matter was quite unequivocal.
i For the text of these instructions see British Documents, Third Series, vol. iv
Do. 308, and for Sir Nevile Henderson's account of their execution see ibid., No.401. '
20 DOCUMENTS ON GEKMAN FOREIGN POLICY
The Ambassador then postponed his decision as to whether he
would, after all, still see me this afternoon, or would communicate by
other means, i.e., in writing.
Weizsackee
No. 20
F12/40 1-397
Memorandum by the State Secretary
St.S. No. 238 Berlin, March 18, 1939.
At his request the French Ambassador called on me at one o'clock
this afternoon. 1 He immediately laid a Note on the table requesting
me to read it.
Without taking up the Note, I asked the Ambassador what it
concerned. M. Coulondre replied that the Note contained a protest
regarding our action against Czecho-Slovakia.
I immediately replaced the Note in its envelope and thrust it back at
the Ambassador with the remark that I categorically refused to accept
from him any protest regarding the Czecho-Slovak affair. Nor would
I take note of the communication and I would advise M. Coulondre
from the start to urge his Government to revise their draft once more.
The Ambassador immediately replied that his Government had
examined the matter most thoroughly and had decided on this step,
which had obviously been agreed upon with the British Government.
He was not in a position to urge his Government to revise their point of
view. When the Ambassador then wished to argue the matter in detail,
contesting the legal basis of our course of action, and characterizing it
as a breach of the Munich Agreement and also contrary to the Agree-
ment of December 6, I938, 2 I replied somewhat as follows:
I did not wish to enter into a discussion on this matter with the
Ambassador at all. From the legal point of view there existed a De-
claration which had come about between the Fuhrer and the President
of the Czecho-Slovak State. The Czech President had at his own wish
come to Berlin and had then immediately declared to the Reich Foreign
Minister that he wished to place the fate of his country in the Fiihrer's
hands. I could not imagine that the French Government were more
Catholic than the Pope and intended meddling in things which had been
duly settled between Berlin and Prague. Moreover, from the political
point of view, the territory in question was one regarding which M.
1 For M. Coulondre's account of the interview see Ministere des Affaires Strangles,
Documents Diplomatiques 1938-1939, Pieces relatives aux evenements et aux negotiations
qui ont pricidi Vouverture des kostilites entre V AUemagne d'une -part, la Pologne, la Grande-
Bretagne et la France d'autre part (Paris, 1 939) (hereinafter cited as the French Yellow Book),
No. 78.
* Vol. iv of this Series, document No. 369.
■5,-v
MARCH. 1930 21
Bonnet himself, as was well known, had stated his desinteressement to
the Reich Foreign Minister at the beginning of December. 3 But for
this step the Agreement of December 6, 1938 would not have taken
place at all. A d-marche such as the one contemplated by M. Coulondre,
would violate and render completely meaningless the Agreement of
December 6, for how could a protest based on it be delivered without
knowledge of the facts of the case. If the French Government were to
persist in the error which they apparently now intended to commit, I
must fear that the Agreement of December 6 would become null and
void. I therefore believed that the Ambassador was about to carry out
an instruction of his Government which the latter would subsequently
very much regret. To the end the Ambassador refused to take back
his Note, which was lying on my table, asking what would become of
German-French relations if we no longer accepted official Notes de-
livered by their representatives. I for my part stated that I refused to
take cognizance of this paper; if it remained lying between us I would
regard it as transmitted to us through the post.
The essential substance of the Note is :
a formal protest against our measures in Czecho-Slovakia;
the assertion that the letter and spirit of the Munich Agreement
have been flagrantly violated;
the assertion that the new state of affairs in Czecho-Slovakia has
been forced on its Government and finally,
the declaration that the French Government could not recognize the
new position in Czecho-Slovakia as legal.
Weizsackek
a The German account of the Bonnet^Ribbentrop conversation of Dee. 6 is printed in
vol. iv of this Series, document No. 370; this Memorandum is unsigned but the word
"Minister" appears at the foot. , Since the publication of vol. IV, a letter from Brauer,
Counsellor of the Embassy in Paris (7563/E 542308-09), has been found bearing on this
document. The letter reads as follows :
Paris, December 17, 1938.
Dear Heur Woermann:
The discussions which Reich Minister von Ribbentrop had on December 6 have been
made the subject of a memorandum by Minister Schmidt, which Count Welczeck and I
were able to glance through here. However, we have not been able to keep a copy of
the memorandum here because it had not yet been approved by Herr von Ribbentrop.
What I wanted to ask you now was whether you would let the Embassy have a copy of
the final version. This is all the more important as the discussions are mentioned now
and again by the French, so that the account of the discussions must be at hand for
reference.
I thank you very much in advance for your trouble, and take this opportunity of
sending you my most cordial wishes for Christmas and the New Year.
I remain, with best wishes, and Hei! Hitler,
Yours ever, Bbauer
This letterwas entered as Pol. II 30I9gonDec. 22, 1938. It bears Weizsaeker's initials
dated Dec. 19, and also a marginal note by Woermann of the same date: — "via St. S.
to Foreign Minister's Secretariat : this can presumably be done."
Ribbentrop agreed to Brauer's request (not printed, 7563/E542310), and a copy of
the documents printed in vol. iv of this Series as documents Nos. 370 and 372 was sent
toParis(7563/E5423Il).
For the account of this conversation given at the time by Bonnet to the British
Ambassador in Paris, see British Documents, Third Series, vol. in, Nos. 404, 405 and 407.
22 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
[Enclosure] 4
Berlin, March 18, 1939.
By a letter dated March 15, 1939, 5 His Excellency the German
Ambassador, acting on instructions from his Government, has handed
to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic the text of
an agreement reached during the night of March 14-15 between the
Fiihrer and Chancellor and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Reich
on the one side and the President and the Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Czeeho-Slovak Republic on the other side.
In the same communication, it was announced that German troops
crossed the Czech frontier at 6 o'clock in the' morning and that all
measures had been taken to avoid resistance and bloodshed and to
allow the occupation and pacification of the territory to take place in a
quiet and orderly way.
The French Ambassador has the honour to convey to the Minister for
Foreign Affairs of the Reich the formal protest made by the Govern-
ment of the Republic against the measure referred to in Count von
Welczeck's communication.
The Government of the Republic consider themselves, through the
action taken against Czecho-Slovakia by the German Government,
confronted with a flagrant violation of both the letter and the spirit of
the Agreement signed in Munich on September 29, 1938.
The circumstances in which the Treaty of March 15 was imposed on the
leaders of the Czeeho-Slovak Republic could not , in the view of the Govern-
ment of the French Republic, legalize the position laid down in this Treaty.
The French Ambassador has the honour to inform His Excellency the
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Reich that the Government of the
Republic cannot in the circumstances recognize the legality of the new
situation brought about in Czecho-Slovakia by the action of the Reich.
* Translated from the original French, for which see the French Yellow Book, No. 76.
5 The text of this letter of Mar. 15 is given in the French Yellow Book, No. 69. See
also vol. iv of this Series, document No. 245.
No. 21
5570/E3flS815
The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 53 of March 18 Belgrade, March 18, 1939—1:25 p.m.
Received March 18 — 4:35 p.m.
W 407 39 g.
With reference to your despatch W 290g of February 27. *
Regarding the present state of the negotiations concerning the big
armaments deal, von SchOnebeck, the Air Attache, who returned today,
1 See vol. v of this Series, document No . 307 .
MARCH, 1939 23
told me that, according to information telephoned to him from Berlin
by Consul-General Neuhausen, interested German aircraft firms have
now been authorized to submit tenders within the limits of the afore-
said credit to the competent Yugoslav authorities.
Herr Schonebeck has also got the definite impression that of late the
greatest importance is attached on the Yugoslav side to the speediest
possible conclusion.
Heeren
No. 22
2771/536874-75
The Ambassador in France, to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
togest Paris, March 18, 1939.1
No. 154 of March 18 Received March 18—1:45 p.m.
I. The French Government have reacted to the events in the former
Czecho-Slovakia by introducing a bill to give the Government full
powers to take all necessary measures for national defence by November
30, 1939. 2
The reasons given by Daladier for the bill in yesterday's session of
the Chamber underlined the gravity of the situation without any attack
on Germany. He emphasized the necessity of countering the totali-
tarian States, whose successes are achieved by speed and secrecy, with
similar weapons.
It is expected that the bill will be passed by the Chamber today and
by the Senate tomorrow.
. II. According to the debate in the Chamber— admittedly not yet
concluded — and to other information available here, the political
situation appears to be as follows:
1) France will, in effect, do nothing about the situation created by
German action in Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia.
2) German action has, however, caused indignation and acute
anxiety in the widest circles— even among "the men of Munich"
regarding the future development of European polities.
a) Indignation, because German measures are regarded as a
manifestation of desire for conquest. The Fiihrer is held to have
violated the right of self-determination of peoples which he re-
peatedly emphasized during the Anschluss of Austria and the
... l The hour of despatch is not recorded.
,'■' 2 A single-clause bill conferring special powers on the French Government was passed
by the Chamber of Deputies on Mar. 18 and by the Senate on Mar. 19, when it was
, promulgated as law by the President of the Republic. The terms of this law were:
"The Government are authorized, up to November 30, 1939, to take by decrees deli-
berated in the Council of Ministers the measures necessary for the defence of the country.
These decrees will be submitted for ratification to the Chambers before December 31,
1939." {See Journal Official de la Bipublique Franptise, Mar. 20, 1939, p. 3646.)
24 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Sudetenland in justification of the German claims; he is held to have
also disregarded his former declarations, especially that of Germany
having no more territorial claims in Europe, and to be ignoring the
Munich Agreement as well as the German-French Declaration of
December 6, 1938. In these circumstances it is impossible to
retain any confidence whatsoever in German policy.
b) Acute anxiety, because German war-potential has vastly in-
creased and further coups in East and Central Europe are feared, but
chiefly because it is to be expected that Italy — not to be always lagging
behind her German partner— will push her claims more insistently
than ever, and can reckon on German support in this connection.
3) The following demands are made for future French policy:
a) rearmament is to be promoted with the greatest energy and
by all available means,
b) Anglo-French military cooperation is to be still closer,
c) a re -examination of the Munich policy of understanding with
Germany is to be undertaken and possibly a re-assessment of the
alliances with Poland and Russia is to be aimed at,
d) but in no circumstances should resistance to the Italian claims
be abated.
III. The Government — particularly Daladier, but above all, Bonnet,
who are held responsible for the Munich Agreement — are exposed to
violent attacks. The Left is attacking the emergency powers, which they
regard as a threat to constitutional liberties and social achievements,
as well as a possible preliminary step towards an authoritarian regime.
A Government crisis, which in the present situation must entail extreme
danger and extensive weakening of French prestige throughout the world,
will, however, according to the view prevailing today, be avoided.
The ratio of votes by which the committee of the Chamber has
accepted the bill for emergency powers (26 votes for, 17 votes against}
probably corresponds to the attitude of the Chamber.
Welczeck
No. 23
1025/3S3361
The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
urgent London, March 18, 1939 — 1:47 p.m.
No. 75 of March 18 Received March 18 — 4:35 p.m.
Pol. II 801.
Chamberlain's speech of yesterday l is to be traced to a double motive:
1 At Birmingham on Mar. 17. For the text of this speech see Documents Concerning
German^Polish Relations and the Outbreak of Hostilities Between Great Britain and
Germany on September 3, 19,19, Cmd. 6106, (London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1939)
(hereinafter HtRtl as British Blue Bool:, Cmd. GlOfl), No. 9.
MARCH, 1939 25
1) to strengthen his own position which was being attacked on the
grounds that his policy had been shipwrecked,
2) to give expression to the very considerable exacerbation of feelings
here.
Objectively speaking, the speech means that though Chamberlain is
keeping to his former aim of the pacification of Europe by peaceful
means, he is adopting, for the achievement of this aim, the bolder front
proposed by Halifax: a stronger attitude towards Germany as well as
an attempt to form a bloc of Powers.
It should further be stressed that Chamberlain, in contrast to the
previous British attitude, emphasizes the continuance of British
interest in eastern Europe. This is said to have come about at the
instance of France.
During the week-end most Members of Parliament will go to then-
constituencies in order to ascertain the feelings of their electorate. The
result of these impressions will have an important bearing on the future
attitude of political public opinion here.
In today's press a report, alleged to have originated from government
circles in Bucharest, is given great prominence and is being exploited
for propaganda purposes. According to this report, the German Govern-
ment have asked Rumania to cease building up her own industry, and
to direct the whole of her exports to Germany in return for a guarantee
of Rumania's independence. Please telegraph instructions.
DlRKSEN
No. 24
4992/E2S1723
The Charge d. Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 90 of March IS Washington, March 18, 1939—2:45 p.m.
Received March 18 — 1 1 :30 p.m.
W VIII a 609.
With reference to your telegram No. 84 of March 18. 1
In considering the German counter-measures to the American
"countervailing duties ", 2 it seems worthy of note that the Secretary of
Agriculture, speaking in confidence to a delegate of the Cotton Standard
Conference, characterized the cotton situation in the United States as
a threat to internal political and economic stability and admitted that
i Document No. 27. 2 In English in the original.
26 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
the Government were helpless when confronted with the problem of
disposing of the eleven million bales of cotton held as collateral.
German measures against imports of American cotton would there-
fore strike American economy at a very sensitive spot.
Thomsen
No. 25
2050/447321
Memorandum by the State Secretary
Berlin, March 18, 1939.
Telephoned instruction (3:00 p.m.)
to Ambassador von Dirksen, London.
The German Government have heard that Henderson, the British Am-
bassador here, has been summoned to London to report. According to
the speculations made about this fact by the press and among the public
generally, there obviously exists a significant connection between these
instructions to Henderson and the present German action in Czechia.
Please ask the British Government for an explanation as to their inten-
tions in announcing Henderson's summons to London in this manner.
The form of the announcement! i s felt by us to be unfriendly. 2
Weizsackeb
i On Mar. 18 the British press reported that the Ambassador in Berlin had been
called home "to report" by the British Government as a s>gn of their displeasure and
^r/^mo^dr^SMnot printed. 2050/447322) Weizsacker recorded that
Dirksen had telephoned the result of his talk with Halifax, who had informed him that
th duration of Henderson's stay in London would depend on the effect of h» report to
the Garnet and on the subsequent course of events (See abo BnHsh Dements, Third
Series vol IV No. 417.) In a further memorandum of Mar. IS (not printed, 2050/
447323) Weizsacker recorded that he had telephoned Dirksen agam that evening, con-
veying to him Ribbentrop's instructions to return to Berlin to report either that same
day or the day after. In a memorandum, St.S. No. 249 of Mar. 20 (not printed, 2050/
447335) Weizsacker recorded that in consequence of the recall of the French Ambassador
for consultations, he had, on Ribbentrop's instructions, telephoned requesting Welczeck
to return for consultations.
MARCH, 1939 27
No. 26
485/231331-62
Memorandum by the- State Secretary
St.S. No. 243 Berlin, March 18, 1939.
At 4:30 this afternoon, the British Ambassador had the enclosed
Note transmitted, ' the content of which is similar to the French Note
of this morning, 2 but is formulated in terms slightly less precise. It
lacks the express statement that the British Government could not
recognize the newly created status in Czechia as legal. Rather, this
status is characterized as having no legal basis and is made the subject
of a protest.
The text of the note is appended.
Weizsackee
i See also British Documents, Third Series, vol. iv, No. 401.
2 See document No. 20, enclosure.
[Enclosure]
Copy British Embassy, Berlin— March 18, 1939.
Youk Excellency: I have the honour to inform Your Excellency,
under instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom
desire to make it plain to the German Government that they cannot
but regard the events of the past few days as a complete repudiation of
the Munich Agreement and as a denial of the spirit in which the
negotiators of that Agreement bound themselves to cooperate for a
peaceful settlement. 3
I am instructed to add that His Majesty's Government must also
take this occasion to protest against the changes effected in Czecho-
slovakia by German military actions which are in their view devoid of
any basis of legality.
I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the
assurance of my highest consideration.
Nevile Henderson
; Si. e . the Munich Agreement on Sept. 29, 1938 (vol. n of this Series, document No.
675), and the Anglo-German Declaration (ibid., No. 67fi) referred to by Chamberlain in
; his Birmingham speech (see British Blue. Book, Cmd. 6106, No. 9) on Mar 17 1939
';: when he said: '
• "Surely, as a, joint signatory of the Munich Agreement, I was entitled, if Heir Hitler
., thought it ought to be undone, to that consultation which is provided for in the Munich
;. Declaration. Instead of that he has taken the law into his own hands "
;; On Mar. 24, Selssam, in despatch No. A 1209 (1625/388420) from London, reported-
'" " In . £t USS ComInons sittin g ° n Mar. 23, the momber Henderson asked the Prime
':. Minister: What representations have been made by the British Ambassador in Berlin
2g DOCUMENTS ON GEBMAN FOBEICN POLICY
No. 27
4992,'IS281722
The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the
■Embassy in the United States
Telegram
Berlin, March 18, 1939—6:15 p.m.
TOGEaT zu W VIII a 600.1
No. 84
Drafting Officer: Senior Counsellor Davidsen.
With reference to your telegram 87. l
You should energetically protest to the United States ^ernment
orally against the measure planned. It .not correct that Gennan
exports are subsidized within the meamng of Article m We Wore
request information as to what evadenee is ?^ to .^J^^
Government for their assertion to the contrary so that we, too can
See detailed proof in reply. Request them * f^^*^
the proposed measure until this issue is cleared up. Report by tele
gram on what you have done and reception there of steps t«W ^
I Margmafnot "Text agreed with the Ministry of Economics. D[avid S en]."
on behalf of Hi. Majesty's Government to th ^^^ff^^S^ ££
failure of the German Governme^ to consuH ^^J^^V, Hitler in the Anglo-
^■SSSSftW -Secrete «^*££&^ *SM££
original-] tsWram No 92 (1625/388399), commented as follows:
On the same day Kordt. in ^egram jso. w ( ^ referen ce to Butler's statement
"Following upon report A 1209 of MMCtifi, »™ ™ N n ooluran U 76[«« .
in the House of Commons, see Ha ^°{f^ x ^ interpreted as meaning that the
Butler's reply to Henderson's .^StoS^ act ioninTheCzeeho-Slovak question
^htw^r^^^
Kordt was not in fact given to Arthur H^dCTSonsqu e^ '^ £ 6ri House of
to the Anglo-German declaration (see Parham««a^^et»^ ^ ^
MARCH, 19311 29
No. 28
533/239012
The Ambassador to ike Holy See to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 35 of March 17 Rome (Vatican), March 18, 1939.1
Received March 18 — 6:25 p.m.
For the State Secretary personally.
With reference to my telegram No. 29 of March ll. 2
The Pope has intimated to me that the Fiihrer was the first Head
of State whom he notified of his election as Pope; he had also broken
with the usual protocol when he not only signed, as was customary, the
letter drawn up in Latin, but also the German draft, which was not
to be considered as a mere translation. 3 He had also wished by these
means to intimate his sympathetic attitude to Germany and his
desire for peace.
The new Cardinal Secretary of State, Maglione, to whom I paid my
first visit only today, received me with marked cordiality. Without
going into details he said, in allusion to German- Vatican relations, that
I knew his wishes, and that he only hoped they would be realized in the
not too distant future, in spite of the existing difficulties of which he was
well aware.
Osservatore Romano has again received instructions to desist from
attacks against the German Government. 4 In effect, reproduction of
anti-German press comments has recently been refrained from.
In view of the unmistakably forthcoming attitude of the Curia, I
leave it to your discretion whether the press be recommended to
continue a restrained objectivity towards Vatican affairs, the more so
as this attitude has met with appreciation here, especially in Italian
circles as well. For the time being there is no question of our taking
other measures. 5
Bergen
i The hour of despatch is not recorded.
■;. s Not printed (533/239010). In this telegram, Bergen reported his views of the pos-
■. aible attitude of the newly appointed Cardinal Secretary of State, Luigi Maglione,
towards Germany.
3 See also vol. iv of this Series, document No. 475.
* See also ibid., document No. 473.
. ,5 Marginal notes: (i) "Minister Asehmann: Will this suggestion be met? Wfeiz-
. Backer]. 20 [/3]." (ii) "Herr Zeileisen: Letter to R[eich] Propaganda] Ministry],
. ATscbmann]. " (iii) "State Secretary : Bequest to this effect made to R[eiehl Prror>affanda1
fcMinlistry]. Asehmann. 21/111." L J L F^onaaj
30 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGH POLICY
No. 29
■7493/E540488-S9
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 98 of March 18 - Bucharest, March 18, 1939— [7:30 p.m.] 1
Received March 19 — 1:15 a.m.
Pol. IV 1836.
With reference to your telegram No. 86 of March 17. 2
1 have spoken to the Foreign Minister, Gafencu, on the lines desired
by the Hungarian Foreign Minister. 3 Gafencu declared that Rumanian
troops would remain on the frontier. His earlier proposal* for occupy-
ing Carpatho-Ukraine had been due to military advice, had Poland also
marched in . . - . {group mutilated) Hungary would have occupied
two-thirds of Carpatho-Ukraine; Rumania and Poland would have
shared in the occupation of the western third.* This would not have
had the import and significance of a definite occupation, but only of a
military safeguard for her frontier. Rumania, who wanted no terri-
torial aggrandizement, had wished to withdraw subsequently to the
Rumanian villages and the railroads along the Black Theiss [Czarna
Tisza]. , , - t> -
After having duly stated that she did not wish to march in, Rumania
had abandoned this action and hoped that she would be awarded the
following places by diplomatic means: Aspa de Jos-Aspa de Mijloc,
Biserica, Alba and Slatinaocna, which all lie north of Sighet and have
almost purely Rumanian populations, as well as the railway line from
Rumania to Poland. She renounced her claim to further places bearing
Rumanian names but which had already become Ruthenianized.
Hungary should declare herself in agreement with the occupation of
this territory in the interests of improving Rumanian-Hungarian re-
lations. If Hungary did not do this voluntarily, Rumania would
abandon her claims altogether as she desired no increase of territory.
In this event, however, the spirit of Rumanian -Hungarian relations
would suffer greatly. 6
In my opinion, Hungary should quickly agree to the cession of this
strip of territory, since the railway — whose only connecting link lies
l Inserted from the draft filed in the Bucharest Legation (7486/E540442-45).
a Document No. 13.
3 Count Csaky.
* See document No. 7, footnote 2. ,,.,,, ± ■ j
5 This passage "hadPoland . . . occupation of the western third was corrupt as received.
The text in the Bucharest draft reads at this point "... due to military advice m the
event that the Poles had also invaded. Thereupon Hungary would have occupied two
thirds of Carpatho-Ukraine; Rumania and Poland would have shared the occupation
° « Th^substance of this telegram was repeated to Budapest by Weizsiicker in telegram
No. 79 of Mar. 20 (not printed, 1975/438332-33).
MARCH, 1939
31
across Rumania— is quite useless to her. It would be to our advantage
if Rumania, by the occupation, were to participate in the liquidation of
Czecho-Slovakia.
Fabricius
No. 30
1975/138330
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 99 of March 18 Bucharest, March 18, 1939—9:30 p.m.
Received March 19 — 1:15 a.m.
Pol. IV 1835!
1) At yesterday's Crown Council presided over by the King Gafen-
cu's policy was unanimously approved. The military measures are
confined to safeguarding the frontiers. There is to be no marching in
until matters are clarified with Hungary. The policy of rapprochement
with Germany was also approved, in particular the proposed Wohlthat
agreement. 1
2) Foreign Minister Gafencu today corrected a Times report 2
according to which Germany was making unilateral demands on
Rumania through Wohlthat, by stating to press representatives that
Wohlthat was only conducting normal economic negotiations which
conformed with the interests of both parties.
3) Feeling towards us here is generally favourable, though there is
no lack of rumours that German policy must lead to warlike complica-
tions. Thus Georges Bratianu 3 called on me today to state— at least on
behalf of Maniu* and Bratianu *— that they were extremely anxious
and feared that m the event of a conflict we would advance into the
Rumanian raw material area with help from Hungary. 1 reassured him
by stating that the Western Powers would not let it come to offensive
action and that it was open to the Rumanian Government to cooperate
with us on a large scale in the economic field so that such action would
be unnecessary. Foreign Minister Gafencu also expressed his anxiety
about the future, as Italian desires and our colonial demands probablv
could now hardly be realized by peaceful negotiations. I replied
that our experience had shown that only in this way could the Western
Powers be brought to the conference table. 6
Fabricius
1 Wohlthat had been sent to represent the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan in
d^entNo. ?8 agr6ement with R ™»«^, which was concluded on M™ 23 See
2 Of Mar. IS.
I Georges Bratianu, leader of the dissident National Liberal Partv
\ *, ulm M a ™"' L |f d .f. of the National Peasant Party and former Minister President
s Possibly Dmu Bratianu, leader of the National Liberal Party "esraent.
e See also vol. v of this Series, documents Nos. 300 and 309.
32 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 31
74S7/E5i0449
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
Mo 100 of March 18 ~ Bucharest, March 18, 1939-9:30 p.m.
No. 100 ol March Received March 18 [19] -1:15 p.m.
W III 2099.
The Rumanian Foreign Minister requests that 50 waggon-loads of
Jr material which had been despatched from the Czech arms and
munitions factory at Pulinovska for Rumania and held up by the
SmaS on the Polish frontier near Moravska-Ostrava be released as
Rumanian armament production [Rmungsherstellungen «c ! orders-
Bustungsbestellungen] in Czechia. List is to follow.
Please telegraph instructions. Fabricitjs
i The list «. forwarded as ^^^J^^^^^^^«^
printed, 7487/B 540452-5 ).' ta *^ n ^^; t ^C Reich Government agree
Fabricius to Gafencu offi « al, y ^^S^nia in Czechia, shall be carried out by the
that delivery of armaments, ordered by *™ST£ held back." Fabricius added that
factories and that del ™,f*Xf aWy been leased. .This action was taken at
(not printed, 2448/D515012).
No. 32
7634/15545334 .
The Charge cV Affaires in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
„ .... , 1Q Ankara, March 18, 1939J
No. .3 of March 18 ^.^ ^^ ig _ 9:25 p m
W III 2150.
During yesterday evening's reception in honour of the Bulgarian
Minister President,* Numan* drew me aside so as to expound in a
detailed conversation the Turkish Government's views on the new
Sua on. In the opinion of Turkey, Greater Germany's relations with
the Balkans had now entered upon a new phase. Turkey was ready
to cooperate actively in order that the Balkans, as an entUe geogra-
thi^eet economy might become more than ever an eeonomre
i The hour of despatch is not recorded.
t SES Secretary General of the Turkish Fore.gn Mm.stry.
MARCH, 193!) 33
hinterland of Germany and alao be at her disposal in times of political
crisis as a reliable and largest possible source of supplies. As a result
of this there would gradually arise a still stronger cohesion politique if
Germany were to refrain from insisting on a unilateral and manifestly
partisan attitude by the Balkan States in the ideological struggle.
As it is to be assumed that leading Turkish personalities will soon
reopen this subject in conversations with me, I should be grateful for
instructions by telegram as to the language I should hold.
Kkoll
No. 33
6J02/E474834-85
The Charge d' Affairs in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
urgent Washington, March 18, 1939. l
No. 92 of March IS Received March 18 [19]— 5:15 a.m.
W VIII a 607.
With reference to your telegram No. 84 of [March] 18. 2
The Treasury announced at midday today that it had been decided
at yesterday's Cabinet meeting to impose "countervailing duties " 3 on
all dutiable imports from Germany. The Treasury's decision is based
as regards form on the opinion given by the Attorney-General* today
who, with a reference to the normal ease of the Cotton Inland Accounts
arrangement, 5 described the German premium on cotton of 33J per
cent over the world market price, and all similar premiums, as a subsidy
within the meaning of section 303 of the Tariff Act. The fact that the
approval of the Attorney-General and the decision of the Treasury rest
on the basic principles of the Inland Accounts procedure 6 which were
specifically sanctioned by the Treasury over two years ago, and against
which no objections were raised a short time ago during the preliminary
discussions on the inclusion of lard, clearly proves that a purely political
decision, connected with the present political events, is involved which
can, therefore, no longer be met by factual arguments. I therefore
regard telegram No. 84 as superseded by events and no longer practic-
able. From what has been hitherto announced, the idea of selective
promotion of exports plays no part in the opinion. The copper arrange-
ment is merely quoted as a further case of the same nature.
1 The hour of despatch is not recorded.
2 Document No. 27.
. 3 In English in the original.
* Frank Murphy.
6 See also document No. 56, footnote 6.
• The Iiilandskontenverfakren, commonly called Inho, was a system of so-called "in-
land accounts" for compensation trade with the United States, set up under regulations
3
34 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOKEIGN POLICY
Contrary to the Under Secretary of State's announcement of yester-
day' the additional duties do not enter into force at once but on April
23 In general they are provisionally fixed at 25 per cent of the invoice
value and are to be paid by the importer in all eases of dutiable imports
with reservations as to a final computation according to the merits of
the individual case, -the fixing of higher or lower additional duties and
also their possible refund if it is established beyond doubt that no
subsidy is present.
The statements of the Treasury and Justice Departments to the press
follow in the original text en dair* Thomsen
I KwSSrl™ No. 91 of Ma, . 8 (0402/E474880-S8).
No. 34
6564JE490348-50
The CMrge d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
w -of. Washington, March 18, 1939.
JN0, MU Received— March 29.
P. 3326.
Subject: Attitude of the American press and public opinion to the
New Order in Czecho-Slovakia.
With reference to my telegrams Nos. 81 and 94 of March 16 and 20.1
If the American press and public opinion displayed reserve at the
beginning of this week in assessing the events in former Czecho -Slovakia,
this picture has altered substantially in the course of the last few days
after the full significance of the German measures had been recognized
and the British and French attitude had become known. The press
which first characterized the dissolution of Czecho-Slovakia as a natural
^t^KS^^^^Mar.lSbutnot^tuntatatar^d that the rrfer^
{i.e., Mar. 16 and 20) were added before despatch.
1" lo'iS Z *PPl cat Irf ofcouXvailinl duties to dutiable German imports into the
t? ^T^eT These" Mand accounts" were opened in various German banks for
United s ^: Ji 6 ™ \™ p0 rters only, not for banks. In March 1939, the Attorney-
SeneraTo the Uni^Sta Xbmitted^o the Secretary of the Treasury an opinio^ that
Sn^
raeanmgof section 303 .™^^.t™ from Apr \ 2 3, countervailing duties be
D r r ted e on dXIble^ E snorted from G^rrXy if 'this had been Icquired by
°° wth tSe of other goods on a premium basis. See F ortign- Trade and ■toxto**
M G fi m«4 Report No. 150 P Second Series 19*2, published by the United
StetefTariff Commission (Washington, Government Printing Office).
MAKCH, 1939 35
consequence of the Munich Agreement, and for the most part advocated
United States d4sinUressement as regards this development, has now
rapidly changed over to spiteful attacks on Germany. The leading
articles of the main newspapers emphasize, in the most varied forms,
that the capitulation of Czecho-Slovakia was not voluntary, but that it
had rather been systematically prepared in the various parts of the
country by German propaganda and subversive activity, and was
finally achieved at Hitler's dictation. Use is also frequently made of a
report that the Fiihrer had, during the negotiations with the Czecho-
slovak Government, threatened an aerial bombardment of Prague if
his wishes were not complied with.
The occupation of Czech territory and the setting up of the Pro-
tectorate of Bohemia and Moravia is said to be a breach of the Munich
Agreement. By this action Hitler had not only violated an inter-
national treaty but had also contravened the spirit of the Munich
Agreement which lay in the peaceful settlement of all European ques-
tions in cooperation with the Governments of the Western Powers.
From this, and in view of former declarations by the Fiihrer that
Germany had, beyond the Sudeten-German territories, no further
territorial claims in Europe, it appears to these newspaper writers that
there is clear proof of the unreliability of the German Government and
their promises. In this respect, Chamberlain's statements at Birming-
ham 2 have naturally helped to strengthen these views, and to give still
greater impetus to the campaign of hate directed against us. The
speech, which was broadcast over the North American radio, com-
manded great attention here, and has been welcomed, in conjunction
with Sumner Welles' statement, 3 as the joint expression of Anglo-
American disapproval.
In view of the attitude here, it is not surprising that the press is
shedding bitter tears over the former Czecho-Slovak State and its
Government. After the collapse of Red Spain the last true democracy
had now disappeared from Central Europe also. Descriptions abound
of the reign of terror which the Secret Police have allegedly inaugurated
for rooting out the last resistance, and to which 12,000 people in con-
centration camps are said to have already fallen victim.
The newspapers have published, under large headlines, reports of the
immediate transport of the Czech gold reserve from Prague, to the
amount of 80 million dollars; and they cannot resist seeing in this act
the true reason for the dissolution of Czecho-Slovakia.
In the flood of commentaries, the question constantly comes up as to
whether, with the establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and
J See document No. 23, footnote 1.
s On Mar. 17. See Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy 1931-1941 (U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, 1943) (hereinafter cited as Peace and War)
No. 126.
36 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
™ •■ *h» Cerman hunger for expansion is sated; and the conclusion
MMa "w ^TSmK Should be entertained about it. Arthur
l^elTorkTZs) enlarges upon this question in an exposition
two possibilities with which the world , mus ^ re ^ ^ rt
Mediterranean in the very near ^'£™££2J *> him mora
*T rS££S fhetntdlttsCS development, view, „.
the individual happens t , be mor •^^ / Qub however) that , by
"^^jSS^S." the S S P-t of the press is advocating
There is also practical unanimity of opinion today that as a result
tf£ new lotion, America i. more than ever obhged to make the
Western Hemisphere safe against the totalitarian Powers _
i Section of correspondents' reports, commentary of the Amencan
press and cartoons is forwarded herewith.* Thomsin
* Not found.
No. 35
1625/3SS364-70 .
The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreu,n Mimstry
A „. London, March 18, 1939.
No - A lo3b Received March 21.
Pol. II 827.
Political Report
Subject- The British attitude to the events in former Czechoslovakia.
The development and present state of the political crisis which has
come about in German-British relations as a result of the course of
events in former Czecho-Slovakia may be summed up as follows:
I
As long as the public here was merely concerned with the conflict
between Czechia and Slovakia, it showed-in- press articles m speeches.
and S private statements-a pronounced tendency to affirm w lt h a
feeling of relief, its complete aloofness from these events. The ex-
perience of the September crisis and the unpopularity enjoyed by
Secho Slovakia since that time because-accordmg to convictions
MABCH, 1930 37
here— of her completely drifting into the wake of Germany, further
tended to strengthen these feelings.
This attitude was only modified when the incorporation of Czechia
into the German Reich came about and German troops began their
advance. The first reaction to this news — the declarations by Cham-
berlain and Halifax in the Commons and the House of Lords i —
allowed of no doubt as to the markedly disapproving attitude of the
British Government, but it was reserved and moderate. The reasons
for this reserve were as follows: a certain slowness of the British in
taking decisions, the lack of complete information, and the desire to
preclude from the start any doubt that the British Government might
possibly intend allowing things to result in a new September crisis on
account of Czechia.
Consonant with the attitude of the Government, the press, too, was
for the most part reserved and impartial on the first day; only the
traditionally anti-German papers took up their hostile campaign.
From Wednesday, March 15, onwards, the mood stiffened per-
ceptibly : the politically-minded public awakened from the unexpected
shock they had received ; the news of the extent of the invasion and the
thorough preparations necessary for it became known. The sharper
line taken within the Cabinet, especially by Lord Halifax, who has
yielded completely to the influence of the Foreign Office, asserted itself.
False reports, for instance, that the German troops had commenced
marching in during the negotiations between the Fiihrer and President
Hacha, that misleading information was given to the British and
French Ambassadors until the last moment, and that the German-
Czech agreement had been extorted from Hacha by threats, are addi-
tional irritants.
Above all, however, it became clear both to the adherents and to the
enemies of Chamberlain that the position of the Prime Minister him-
self had also suffered seriously. He had been looked upon as the
representative of the Munich policy and as the supporter of a settlement
with Germany by means of frank discussion. He had, a few days
previously, made optimistic statements to the press regarding the
, : tranquillization of the international situation and the improvement 01
the economic outlook. Great hopes had been attached by the public
to Stanley's projected visit to Berlin. 2
.;.: This structure had now, it was thought, collapsed. Chamberlain's
fe statement in the Commons was criticized as being rather weak. His
|; : antagonists raised their heads anew. Hence the sharp tone of his
lyBirmingham speech. 3
i On Mar. 15. See Pari. Deb., B. of C, vol. 345, cols. 435-440, and House of Lords
|; (hereinafter cited as H. of L.), vol. 112, cols. 214-218.
8 See document No. 1 1 .
" s See document Jvfo. 23, footnote 1 .
38 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
II
It is improbable that the incorporation of Czechia into GwJJ
result in German-British relations becoming increasingly strained to .a
pit at which there is a danger of war It is Just as ^^
that the present crisis will have deep and lasting repercussions deeper
n any case, than those resulting from the Austnan Ansc^s the
September crisis and the anti-Jewish movement m November 1938
X politS circles in Britain, including the Prime ^ *£*
the picture formed of National Socialist Germany has £«£*£?
altered. The following circumstances have contributed towards this.
1) The Fiihrer's statement that he had no further ^™f^™
to put forward in Europe had been interpreted m toe , dra. rt« -H-
pohtical a manner. Those who-like Chamberlain-ha d^don^J
felt that thev had been misled in their confidence m the Fuhrer a word.
2) It had^een concluded from the National Socialist ^logy and
the words of the Fuhrer that Germany was only aspiring t the an-
nexation of Germans and not to that of members of alien races. The
"cC atkm of seven million Czechs has exploded this idea espec^
as tS press had purposely minimized the significance and extent of the
TlTharWassumed that the "Munich policy" would prepare
the way for, and bring about, an arrangement and a delimitation of
spheres of interest with Germany by means of friendly discussions.
Germany s course of action in Czechia has been understood as a funda-
^ iThaTfheTaf Stance of the incorporation of Czechia been
understood. In Britain, this State had, in any case, been looked upon
smce Munich as a vassal of Germany, and one win oh m case, ^emer-
gency, was exposed to the latter'* military attack without the chance
fo relist Why therefore, the "annexation" and the military invasion
with" its atWant political risks abroad 1 Merely-so it was further
concluded-because Germany had reverted purely to power politics.
From the fulness of these disappointments and shattered hopes, there
has arisen complete uncertainty regarding the aims of Germany and
the policy to be adopted towards her. Does Germany aspire to world
dominion", or at least to the hegemony of Europe 1 Will her nex
undertaking be the overpowering of Rumania or an attack on Poland
What policj can be adopted towards so incalculable a State 1 These and
similar questions are discussed here in London today by people who
wish to be taken seriously.
Ill
It is not yet clear what practical conclusions the British Government
will draw in respect of Germany from the events in Czechia. The dis-
lussion of this matter within the Cabinet and in consultation with
MARCH, 1939 39
friendly Governments is in full swing. The differences between the
moderate and radical trends are becoming more distinct. Feelings in
the country are being investigated by Members of Parliament who are
visiting their constituencies over the week-end. Opinions are still
fluid and have not crystallized into hard and fast decisions. The
following facts and considerations may give certain pointers to the
attitude to be expected from the British Government:
Chamberlain's position has been strengthened by his speech in
Birmingham, even though the Eden-Churchill opposition, which now
makes a show of loyalty, has gained considerably in influence. As long
as Chamberlain is at the helm, a relatively moderate course is assured.
However, even if it is assumed that Chamberlain's ultimate objective
is still a peaceful settlement with Germany, the means for the attain-
ment of this objective will change. As it is believed in Britain that the
method of friendly negotiation can be regarded as having broken down,
the attempt will now be made to " bring Germany to reason" by adopt-
ing a strong line, by creating obstacles, and by refusing— perhaps in
the economic field — to meet us in any way.
Increased international activity in this respect is already shown by
the feelers put out to France, the*United States, the Soviet Union, and
the Balkan States. It is not yet clear whether the object of these
conversations is the creation of a new, strong coalition against Germany,
or only an agreement upon measures in the event of further German
attacks on other States, for instance, Rumania or Poland. At present
the second eventuality is the more probable. The idea of contracting
new obligations towards distant countries will never be to the liking of
the British Government.
A definite objective which the British Government will have in mind
will be to prevent, as far as possible without undertaking commitments,
further unilateral actions and increases of territory on the part of
Germany by creating the greatest possible reserves of strength (in the
shape of agreements for an emergency with other States).
A settlement with Germany has, after being a primary objective of
British policy, now become a secondary one. If this question is again
to become a live issue, it must be preceded by the establishment of a
basis of confidence which is at present completely lacking. It would
be wrong to cherish any illusions that a fundamental change has taken
place in Britain's attitude to Germany.
V. DlEKSBN
4Q DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 36
2050/147305
Meinorandum by the State, Secretary
StS No 236 Berlin, March 18, 1939.
The following is to be added to yesterday's record of my conversation
of the 17th instant with the British Ambassador: 1 „ _ _. , ,
Henderson again explained that there was no direct British interest
in the Czechoslovak territory. His-Henderson s-anxietaes were
more for the future. German policy had started a new chapter What
had now happened could no longer be brought under the beading of
"the self-determination of peoples". We were on the road to tern-
torial expansion of power. After the elimination of Czecho-Slovakia
everyone was asking: "What next?"* This anxious question was
reflected in the British attitude. In turn, the German answer to the
British attitude would not be long delayed. Germany felt hersetf to
be under pressure from a general counter-action m British policy.
This exchange would grow more intense and would finally nullify the
propitious first beginnings of a German-British understanding which
the now seventy year old Chamberlain had so sedulously and patiently
brought about. At the end of it all there would again be a German-
Britilh collision if the policy represented by Chamberlain were not
adhered to. ,.
In this connection, Henderson then asked me to give the reasons
which had in the last few days inevitably led to the dissolution of
Czecho-Slovakia. Weizsacker
1 Document No. 16.
2 In English in the original.
No. 37
3723/532731
Memorandum by the State Secretary
confidential Berlin, March 18, 1939.
St.S. No. 244
The Italian Ambassador told me privately, and not to go further
that he had received a telegram of information from Rome which
describes the recent mission of Prince Philip of Hesse. According to
this telegram the Prince was given the following reply :
1) The Head of the Italian Government took note of the communica-
tion regarding the events in Czecho-Slovakia.
2) In the' event of a war between Italy and France, Italy would not
MARCH, 1 931) 4J
need the assistance of German manpower, but would probably need
support in the form of war and raw materials. l
Attolico added that the Prince would, on his return, render direct the
complete and detailed report 2 on his conversation in Rome.
Submitted to the Foreign Minister. 3
Weizsacker
1 'jjTT'r' St - S - No - 250 of Mar - 20 < not Panted, F19/453-52) Weizsacker
recorded that Attolico parf him a visit before leaving for Rome and pressed for an
cts^ m™ Statem6nt ° n the SUbi6Ct ° f P ° int 2 above - WeizsaX^d £ an
Js voCe, do P cu m e„ a : %?&"*' ** ~ ^ " ° f ^ ^ d °— nt ^ «* «*
* Typewritten marginal note: "Copies to the Under State Secretary and the Director
loi this " " 11 ' ° l0y D6 P artment with the «*»»* to refrain fro^ making further
No. 38
350/202291
Memorandum by the State Secretary
St.S. No. 246 Berlin, March 18, 1939.
Prompted by British press reports,' the Italian Ambassador has now
again spoken to me regarding certain documents which are alleged to
exist, according to which the German march into Czechoslovakia was
already settled three or four weeks ago. In this connection, Attolico
also remarked that this could hardly be correct as he had, in fact, only
been informed at the last minute.
Weizsacker
» The Daily Express of Mar. 16 had stated that "Long secret reports from British
diploma em Europe were before the Cabinet yesterday, and Ministers were perturbed by
the revelations they made of German methods in 'engineering' the situation in^eeh^
No. 39
196S/13795S
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Berlin. March 18, 1939.
Pol. IV 1964.
The Hungarian Minister called on me today and informed me, in
|y. reply to a question directed to him in the middle of the week by the
,: : ; State Secretary, 1 that the Hungarian Government, right up to the
■beginning of the march into the Carpatho-Ukraine, had notified neither
: ' ' See vol. iv of this Series, document No. 238.
42 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
the Polish, nor the Rumanian, nor any other Government of their in-
tentions Only after this entry had certain diplomats conversations
Sen place. In particular, Poland, as we would certainly be aware
had offered to play the part of a sort of mediator between Hungary and
Rumania and had transmitted the Rumanian desire for the cession of
fhe most easterly tip of the Car patho -Ukraine, including the mlwaj ^ line
which crossed it, and the aforesaid villages with a Rumanian popula-
tlon Hungary had replied to Poland as follows: Rumania had no fe
.rounds at all for presenting Hungary with demands of any nature r
Nevertheless, the Hungarian Government were prepared-in direct
negotiations with Rumania-to take the tatter", local interest , m o »
consideration in some way or other. However, should Rumama adopt
any course designed to exert pressure, this would be unsuccessful
Should Rumania march in, the Hungarian Army would throw the
Rumanian troops out again. „,,.,,. a A „„ ;„
In continuation of this conversation, M. bztojay expressed on in-
structions from Count Csaky, the Hungarian Government s most warm
and sincere thanks to the German Government and, m particular, to
the Foreign Minister and the State Secretary for the interest shown m
this question, and for the German attitude. This expression of thanks
also applies particularly to the attitude adopted by Germany towards
Rumania - Woebmasn
No. 40
2871/563856-5»;Se3-BT
Treaty of Protection between Germany and Slovakia *
The German Government and the Slovak Government have, since the
Slovak State placed itself under the protection of the German Reich,*
agreed to regulate by means of a treaty the situation resulting there-
from For this purpose the undersigned plenipotentiaries of the two
Governments have agreed on the following provisions:
Article 1
The German Reich assumes the protection of the political indepen-
dence of the Slovak State and the integrity of its territory.
££«&•*? ^ fi de:tfrp1otrol SS The featy was published withoo* this
Protocol (see Reichsgesetiblatt, 1939, Part u, p. 600).
2 See document No. 10.
MARCH, 1939 43
Article 2
In order to carry out the protection assumed by the German Reich,
the German Wehrmacht shall at all times have the right to set up
military installations in a zone, bounded on the west by the frontier of
the Slovak State and on the east by the general line of the eastern edge
of the Little Carpathians, the eastern edge of the White Carpathians,
and the eastern edge of the Javornik Mountains, and to man these
installations with such forces as the German Wehrmacht consider
necessary. The Slovak Government will arrange for the requisite land
for these installations to be placed at the disposal of the German
Wehrmacht. Furthermore, the Slovak Government will agree to an
arrangement which is necessary for supplying the German troops and
servicing the military installations from the Reich duty free.
Military sovereign rights will be exercised by the German Wehrmacht
in the zone specified in the foregoing paragraph 1 .
Persons of German nationality who are engaged by virtue of a
private contract in the setting up of military installations in the zone
thus designated are to that extent subject to German jurisdiction.
Article 3
[In order better to defend the Slovak State against any possible
external attacks] 3 the Slovak Government will organise their own
military forces in close consultation with the German Wehrmacht.
Article 4
In accordance with the agreed relations of protection, the Slovak
Government will always conduct their foreign policy in close con-
sultation with the German Government.
Article 5
This Treaty enters into force immediately upon signature and is valid
for a period of 25 years. The two Governments will consult about an
extension of the Treaty in good time before the expiry of this period.
In witness whereof the plenipotentiaries on both sides have signed
two copies of this Treaty.
Vienna, March 18, 1939.
Berlin, March 23, 1939.
For the German Government : For the Slovak Government :
V. RlBBENTROF P R , J 0Z EF TlSO
VOJTECH TUKA
Be. F. Dtjb.6ansk'£
s The passage in square brackets is deleted in the final text. This deletion is the sub-
ject of a further protocol {not printed, 2871/563861-62) which specifies that the new,
' contracted Article 3 is the only valid one and that the necessary amendments are to be
■ made by hand before publication.
44 UOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Con™tia L Protocol on Economic and Financ ■^o°pebation
BETWEEN THE GERMAN REICH AND THE STATE OF SLOVAKIA
The undersigned plenipotentiaries of the German Reich Government
and the Slovak Government have today agreed that the German Reich
and Se Slovak State shall cooperate in the closest possib e manner in
the spheres of economy and finance according to the following pro-
visions.
Article I
Cooperation shall extend in particular to:
I) The increase and direction of Slovak agricultural production with
a view to market possibilities in Germany, e.g., increasing the breedmg
of pias and raising milk production.
2) Development of the Slovak timber industry and forestry by
drawing up long term economic plans with a view to market, possibi-
Ut ST S^yTnropemng up and exploiting Slovak mineral resource.
It i a g re.ed y th£ the mineral resources, insofar as they are not required
by Slovakia herself, will be made available to Germany in the first
instance. The « Reichsstelle fur Bodenforschung will be entrusted
with the entire survey for mineral resources. As soon as possible the
Slovak State Government will investigate whether the prospecting
rights and titles are being used by the present owners m accordance
wlh their legal obligations, and in cases where these obligations have
been neglected, will terminate these prospecting rightsand titles.
4) Development and direction in industrial production with a view
to German and Slovak vital interests and market conditions and co-
operation in the sphere of exporting industrial and other goods.
5) Development of the means of communication and transport in
Slovakia.
Article II
Slovakia will introduce a currency of her own and will establish a
Slovak National Bank as the central bank of issue.
Germany will give Slovakia her support in establishing a Slovak
National Bank and in legislating for and administrating foreign
exchange control. , ... ,
The German Reichsbank will participate in due form m the establish-
ment of the Slovak National Bank and will delegate to the board of
Directors of this bank an adviser who will take part in all important
decisions. The Slovak Government will also consult this adviser in
Sawing up and carrying out the State Budget and wul not raise any
loans without his consent.
The German currency taken into Slovakia ^^f^^^
tions in March 1938 will be bought back at the rate of 1 Kc= 10 pfennig.
MARCH, 1939 45
It is envisaged that in order to relieve the shortage of currency in
Slovakia the National Bank in Prague will be induced to transfer at
once to Bratislava currency to the amount of 350 million Ke\
Article III
Both Governments will in due course enter into negotiations on
trade and payments agreements. These agreements will in particular
be concluded on the basis that Germany will purchase Slovakia's
agricultural produce, forestry products and other goods, including
minerals, and will supply in return finished goods, semi-finished pro-
ducts and capital goods.
Slovakia will not conduct economic negotiations with other States
until after the conclusion of the agreements with Germany and will
keep Germany , constantly informed about these negotiations. A
Customs Union between the German Reich and Slovakia is not en-
visaged. During the period of transition, however, exemption from
customs will be granted until further notice between Slovakia on the
one hand and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and the
Sudeten German territories on the other.
Article IV
This Protocol will enter into force on the day of signature. Both
parties will treat the Protocol as strictly confidential and will divulge
its contents only by mutual consent.
Berlin, March 23, 1939.
For the German Reich Government: For the Slovak Government:
V. RlBBENTROP VOJTECH TlJKA
Dr. F. Dur6akskv
No. 41
2050/447323
The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 55 of March 19 Belgrade, March 19, 1939 — 1:10 p.m.
Received March 19 — 4:45 p.m.
As I learn from a reliable source, the events of the last week have
aroused extreme anxiety also in authoritative circles here, including
the very highest quarter. Besides the fear of a recurring exacerbation
of the European crisis, anxiety for their own security in the face of the
dynamic force of the Axis Powers and uncertainty as to the further
development of the Croat problem contribute to this. Even if, as I
have been able to ascertain, the rumours circulating here that Stojadi-
novic has again been received by the Prince Regent and has been asked
46 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
t „ take over the foreign Mmistry are not »™ct ™h a development
SSrErr«SSSS
Axis. Hberen
No- 42
2767/535325
The Charge 1 d> Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign M^n^stry
Telegram
London, March 19, 1939—3:25 p.m.
urgent Received March 19-7 :45 p.m.
No. 79 of March 19 ^ Pol. II 798.
i Tn this morning's press, too, speculations about alleged German
il^to^r^rZni, are the most prominent features, although
Usteported t ha t Bucharest, Berlin, and also the Rumanian Legion
here deny that Germany had presented an economic ultxmatum to
R 7lTarn the following from a reliable informant on this: On March
' 17 Mea the Rumanian Minister here, on his own nntiative told the
Forekn Office i of unreasonable German economic demands on Rumania
because To ording to his information, German-Rumaman economic
I^wSe coming in of accelerated German troop movements
ZTClZS:;Zlly direction. Reports and constant action
in tVif> British press are thus explained.
^IndTp ndently of this, King Carol has apparently suggested an
exchange of views regarding a guarantee of the Rumanian fronts by
the Western Powers. KoKDT
i See also British Documents, Third Series, vol. it, No
395.
MARCH, 1939 47
No. 43
2050/447333
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 34 of March 19 Moscow, March 19, 1939—6:28 p.m.
Received March 19 — 9:30 p.m.
Yesterday towards midnight a Note arrived signed by Litvinov, 1 the
text of which is being telegraphed by the DNB representative, and in
which the Soviet Government state that, in order to avoid conveying a
false impression of indifference, they do not consider it possible to pass
over in silence our notification regarding the Czecho-Slovak affair. The
crux of the three-page Note is the statement that the Soviet Government
cannot recognize the constitutional alterations in Czecho-Slovakia as
legal, since they were carried out without consulting the people.
Before the arrival of the Note, I met Litvinov at a reception given
by the Italian Ambassador. 2 Litvinov asked whether I had received
his Note; when I replied in the negative and asked what the Note con-
tained he answered: Since the British and French Governments had
protested about the Czecho-Slovak events and the President of the
United States had issued a "statement", 3 the Soviet Government
considered that they, too, had to clarify their position, which was that
the Soviet Government could not recognize the alterations in the
constitutional structure of Czeeho-Slovakia.
After the Note had meanwhile been delivered to me in the Italian
Embassy, I again talked with Litvinov and asked him what was the
practical import of his Note. Litvinov merely replied that the Soviet
Government had simply wished to make their point of view clear. My
impression, based on Litvinov's manner and the second paragraph of
the Soviet Note, is that the Soviet Government will also from now on
not act independently but will be guided by the attitude of Great
Britain, France, and the United States.
SCHULENBURG
i Document No. 50.
B Augusto Rosso.
3 In English in the original. Presumably the statement by Sumner Welles, on Mar.
17. See document No. 34, footnote 3.
No. 44
181S/4210S9
Memorandum by the State Secretary
; St.S. No. 247 Berlin, March 19, 1939.
;.; The Italian Ambassador has again spoken to me on the subject
of Germany's deliveries of coal to Italy. He said that Ciano had
48 DOCUMENTS OK GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
telegraphed to him that at the very moment when we were in arrears
with out deliveries to Italy we were sending such supplies to France and
Belgium. The matter had a political aspect, and exceptional measures
would have to be taken to tide over the present disastrous situation.
I answered Attolico that I had already yesterday taken an interest
in the matter myself L and would do so again.
Weizsacker
No. 45
583/242039-40
The, Ambassador in Italy to the, Foreign Ministry
Telegram
top secret Rome (Quirinal), March 20, 1939—9:40 p.m.
No. 102 of March 20 Received March 21, 1939—1 :00 a.m.
For the State Secretary.
With reference to my telegram No. 100 of the 17th, 1 and to our tele-
phone conversation of today. 2
Today, when delivering to Ciano the Note already promised to him
orally on' March 17 (your telegram No. 11 3 of March 17) referring to his
observations of March 17 and with reference to the preliminary con-
versation between the State Secretary and Attolico on the same subject,
I told him that, according to information received today from the
State Secretary, the anxiety which he had expressed to me on the pre-
ceding Friday evening regarding our attitude to the development of
the Croat question was without foundation. What I had already told
him on March 17 was therefore confirmed.
Ciano took note of my observations and formulated the Italian view-
point by saying that Italy primarily desired the continued existence of
the present Yugoslav State; but that Italy, should those events ever
occur which today no longer seemed to him impossible in view of the
growth of the Croat autonomy movement under the influence of the
developments in the Czecho-Slovak question, expected from the Ger-
man side the same desintdressement in this area, which today directly
concerned her interests there, as she herself had shown towards us with
regard to the development of the Czecho-Slovak question. What
2 According to a memorandum by Mackensen of Mar. 20 {not prated, 2130/465304-
051 he had that morning telephoned Weizsacker with reference to document No. 15 and
asked for further information. He had been told that Weizsacker had already had a
brief preliminary conversation with Attolico and that Ribbentrop was considering a
personal letter to Ciano (see document No. 55); meantime Weizsacker could already
state definitely that the fears Ciano had expressed were entirely without foundation
3 T his number is evidently an error . From references on the Rome draft ( 2 1 30/465306-
08) of this document it would appear that the telegram under reference was the circular
of Mar. 17 cited in document No. 14, footnote 1.
MARCH, 1930 49
happened on the shores of the Adriatic was an Italian family affair just
as the new order in the area of former Czechoslovakia had been treated
by Italy as a German family affair. I replied that this view did indeed
coincide with the Fiihrer's words, which he himself had quoted re-
garding the delimitation of the living space of both parties nor did I
put any other construction on the State Secretary's observations of
today. I would, however, immediately inform Berlin of the Italian
point 01 view as formulated by him.
When I asked whether he could give me any closer details regarding
the sources of the rumours communicated to me on Friday as I still
had no concrete data about them, he talked of reports which had told
of activity of German agents in Croatia.
Ciano finally mentioned that he was expecting Attolico's visit to
morrow, and he concluded with the remark that he would report on
our conversation' immediately to the Duce, who apparently had been
more concerned about these rumours than Ciano had intimated on
Friday. 4
Mackensen 5
6
S. 4 i.e. Mar. 17
I -- - '
u£% C tTl le % Td n 0t th ^P°»versation see Ciano: UEuropa verso la Catastrofe pp
419-420; see also the Ciano Diaries, entry of Mar. 20. u»«»i"i/t, pp.
No. 46
414/21s963
The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Telegram
No. 43 of March 20 Berlin, March 20, 1939—10:05 p.m.
Received March 21 — 3:35 a.m.
With reference to your telegram No. 34. l
■■ The British and French Ambassadors, who in consequence of recent
events have handed in somewhat sharp Notes here on the Czecho-Slovak
; affair, have been informed by us that we could not accept the protests
We have completely rebuffed them and their demarches here. 3 Accord-
r ingly, please decline further discussions on the matter in Moscow also.
Weizsacker
;■;:■■ I Document No. 43.
.'■ 2 See documents Nos. 20 and 26.
I *
50
1075/43S331
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 47
The State Secretary to the Legation in Rumania
Telegram
XT Q , - Berlin, March 20, 1939—10:45 p.m.
iN0 - . ' zu Pol. IV 1835 and 1836.1
With reference to your telegrams Nos. 98 and 99.1 , L ,.
1 In so far as we are concerned, we still do not intend undertaking
the 'role of intermediary in Hungarian-Rumanian relations, are await-
ing rather the direct settlement about to be reached between the two
°T AlTinformation about Germany's alleged aggressive intentions in
respect of Rumania is-like the rumour, already demed,3 D f an ulti-
matum presented by us to the Rumanian Government during the
economic negotiations-pure invention and deliberate misciurf-
making * On this account please speak to Georges Bratianu again
and assure him, on the strength of your enquiries, that his fears are
completely unfounded. Weizsackee '
i Documents Nos. 29 and 30.
2 See also document No. 13.
I K nte"X° sent to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union in tol.gr an. No. 42
of Mar. 20 (not printed, 215/146822} as instructions on language to be held.
No. 48
1625i3S8370-77
The Charge d' Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No 81 of March 20 London, March 20, 1939-10:46 p.m.
iN0 ' Received March 21—3:00 a.m.
Pol. II 835. ■{
Statements which Chamberlain and Halifax have just made in the
House of Commons [sic] 1 still do not clarify the intentions of the
British Government. Lord Halifax limited himself to a sometimes
bitter presentation of the events of the last few days. He spoke of the
expediency of "far-reaching mutual guarantees". According to in-
formation from reliable informants something like the followmg
picture emerges regarding the present position : The British Government ;|
now firmly hold the initiative for discussions. They hope to take the J
' ~i See Pari. Deb., H. of C, vol. 345, cols. 8S5-888 and H. of L., vol. 112, cols. 308-319.
MAKCH, 1939 51
lead in laying down the policy to be followed so as to avoid statements
of conditions being made by the other States which, in the British view,
would not achieve their object. The British manifestly think of laying
down a demarcation line which, in particular, includes Rumania, and the
infringement of which by an aggressor would constitute a casus belli.
The following States are said to have been asked to take part in the
guarantee:— Russia, Poland, Turkey and Yugoslavia. It is unques-
tionably established that Hungary has not been approached. It has
been left to Poland to make contact with Lithuania, Estonia and
Latvia; the same applies to Turkey in respect of Greece. There is
still doubt regarding Bulgaria.
It is asserted at the Turkish Embassy that Turkey would be ready to
guarantee the Rumanian frontier if Britain took the lead. Poland and
Russia have allegedly declared that the only form of assistance con-
templated was the delivery of war material and the provision of air
forces. Kennedy, the United States Ambassador here, is playing a
leading part. He is said to be in personal contact with the Missions of
all the States involved, and to be attempting to encourage them to
adopt a firm attitude by promising that the United States of America
would support them by all means ("short of war" 2 ).
The French are cooperating extremely closely with the British.
A Soviet Russian proposal for calling a Nine-Power-Conference
is said to have been rejected by Britain in order that the initiative in
the whole aSair should on no account be allowed to pass over to the
Soviets. As I learn further, there is said to have been a sharp difference
of opinion between Lord Halifax and Henderson, the British Ambas-
sador in Berlin, when Henderson reported on his Berlin impressions.
Kobdt
4 In English hi the original.
No. 49
| : H7I/5MS7Ji
The Charge, cT Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
|jfo. 163 of March 20 Paris, March 20, 1939.1
Received March 20 — 11:30 p.m.
m After the promulgation of the law regarding special powers, 2 atten-
paon is focused — beside the unanimously emphasized desire for all-out
K, l The hour of despatch is not recorded.
1 * See document No. 22, footnote 2.
g2 DOCUMENTS ON GEE.MAH FOREIGN POLICY
rearmament-on the question of how a protective barrier may be
erected against the German drive for expansion. First and foremost
the necessity of defending Rumania is emphasized, chiefly for military
reasons, as Rumanian petroleum and grain would make it possible for
Germany to carry on even a long war, and would thereby remove the
weakness she still suffers in this respect. In this connection the entire
press records with approval Britain's leading part in the endeavour to
bring about an association of "peaceful" Great Powers, as well as of the
States in East and South-East Europe threatened by Germany. _ A
further part is played by the fear that, as a result of Germany s action
Italy's claims will be strengthened, and that Germany's increase of
power will place her [Italy) in a position to push these claims through
As regards Italy, however, hope is gaining ground since the Czech
events that that country may be detached from the Axis. I learn
from several quarters that Laval in particular is said to be planning a
move for clearing up Franco-Italian relations, and to be employing Ins
contacts with Italian circles towards this end.
Any of Laval's endeavours will, however, for a time be running
counter to the still general rejection of Italian claims, especially those
of a territorial character, such as has also received expression in
Daladier's speech before the Senate. And in this there will probably
be no alteration as long as the circles advocating a Franco-Italian settle-
' ment are unable to produce proofs of Italian willingness to conclude a
settlement and thus loosen the solidarity of Axis policy.
Brauee
No. 50
2002/442287-SS
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
A .„„ Moscow, March 20, 1939.
A50b Pol. IV 1993.
Subject: Litvinov's Note on the Czecho-Slovak affair.
With reference to my telegram No. 34 of March 19. l
I beg to enclose a copy 2 and a German translation of the Note from
Foreign Commissar Litvinov of March 18, 1939, on the Czechoslovak-'
The Note was transmitted by Tass and the Moscow Radio on March |
19 and has been published today by the Soviet press.
The Note represents an expression of the views of the Soviet Govern-
ment and contains no protest. The reason underlying this step is tfaat.l
i Document No. 43.
2 Not printed (Russian text), (2002/442289-91).
MARCH, 1939 PJ3
it is not possible for the Soviet Government to pass over in silence our
Notes on the Czecho-Slovak affair,* thus creating the false impression
that the Soviet Government are indifferent to the Czecho-Slovak
events. After setting forth the Soviet point of view the Note concludes
by stating that the Soviet Government cannot recognize as legal the
incorporation of Czechia and, in one or other form, of Slovakia into the
body of the German Reich.
Supplementing my previous report i on my conversation with
Litvinov, I beg to add, that even the Head of the Press Section of the
Foreign Commissariat* could give no answer to the question put by
foreign journalists as to what practical effect the Note of the Soviet
Government would have. In response to further questions as to how
the attitude of the Soviet Government would affect the personal affairs
of the Czechs resident here, for example over passports, etc. the Head
of the Press Section said that agreement would certainly be reached on
this.
Count von der Schulenburg
3 i.e., Notes of Mar. 16 and 17. See footnotes o and 6
* E. A, Gnedin,
8002/442202-05
[Enclosure]
Translation Moscow, March 18, 1939.
Me. Ambassador: I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your
'l Note of the 16ths and the Note of the 17th,« informing the Soviet
: Government of the incorporation of Czechia into the body of the German
Reich and of the establishment of a German protectorate over it.
As the Soviet Government do not deem it possible to pass over the
above Notes in silence and so give the false impression that they are
|; indifferent to Czecho-Slovak events, they consider it necessary in reply
| to these Notes to record their true position on the events in question
| 1. Political and historical considerations mentioned in the intro-
|, u uctory section of the German decree as the reasons and justification
| for it-in particular the references to the Czecho-Slovak State as a hot-
l-befl of constant unrest and a threat to European peace, the non-
liability of the Czecho-Slovak State and the consequent necessity for
£■* N« printed (414/215916-18); this Note repeated the text of the Declaration of Mar
S Mn tof ^vT" 1 ^°" 229> ex °' udin g enclosures) and of the stated
.MOteined in vol. iv of this Series, document No. 242. Document No. 229 had been
te™nU479« w^i M ™ s >" Europe and the Embassies at Washington «S
-Jdryc (2050/447223-24); document No. 242 had, in addition to.the Missions there listed
•^circularized to the remaining Missions in Europe and to Washington, Rio de Janeiro
|Bnanoa Aires, Santiago and Geneva (2050/447229) '
|M i Not printed (414/215933-38); this Note gives the text of the Proclamation by the
ri(^" n the Protectorate of Bohemm and Moravia (see vol. iv of this Series, document
Sg JKh ZIP/.
54 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
special anxieties on the part of the German Reich— cannot be accepted
as correct or as corresponding to the facts known to the whole world.
In point of fact, of all the European countries, the Czechoslovak
Republic after the first world war was one of the few States where
internal peace and a peace-loving foreign policy were really guaranteed.
2 The Soviet Government know of no constitution in any State
which gives the right to the Head of the State to terminate the indepen-
dent existence of the State without the agreement of its people. It is
hard to admit that any people will voluntarily declare themselves in
agreement with the destruction of their independence and with their
incorporation into the body of another State, much less such a people
who for centuries have fought for their independence and already for
twenty years have preserved their independent existence. When he
signed the Berlin Declaration of the 15th, the Czechoslovak President,
Dr Hacha, had no authority whatever from his people to do so, and
was acting in obvious contradiction to Articles 64 and 65 of the Czecho-
slovak constitution and to the will of his people. Consequently, the
above-mentioned Declaration can possess no legal validity.
3. The principle of the self-determination of peoples, to which the
German Government not infrequently make appeal, stipulates a free
expression of the people's will, which cannot be replaced by the signa-
ture of one or of two persons, however high may be the positions which
they occupy. In the case under consideration, there was no expression
whatever of the will of the Czech people, not even in the form of such
plebiscites as for instance took place when the fate of Upper Silesia and
the Saar Territory was decided.
4. In the absence of any kind of expression of the will of the Czech
people, the occupation of Czechia by German troops and the subsequent
actions of the German Government must be regarded as arbitrary,
violent, and aggressive.
5. The above observations apply also in their entirety to the altera-
tion of the status of Slovakia brought about by subjecting that country
to the German Reich, an alteration which has not been justified by any
sort of expression of the will of the Slovak people.
6. The actions of the German Government served as the signal for
a rude invasion into Carpatho -Russia by Hungarian troops and the
violation of the elementary rights of its people.
7. In view of these considerations, the Soviet Government cannot
recognize the incorporation of Czechia, nor that— in one form or
another— of Slovakia, into the body of the German Reich as being legal,
consonant with the generally acknowledged standards of international
law and justice or with the principle of the self-determination of
peoples.
8. In the opinion of the Soviet Government, the actions of the German
Government have not only not removed any danger there may have
MARCH, 1939 55
been to general peace but have, on the contrary, created and increased
such danger, damaged the political stability of Central Europe, increased
the elements of a state of unrest which had already previously been created
in Europe, and dealt a new blow to the feeling of security of peoples.
I have the honour to request you, Mr. Ambassador, to bring the
above to the notice of your Government, and to accept the assurance
of my highest consideration.
M. Litvinov
No. 51
2092/4S260S-10
Counsellor of Embassy Tippelskirch to Senior Counsellor Schliep
Copy of an Extract i from a Letter of March 20, 1939
Litvinov answered the Ambassador's Notes 2 on the 1 9th. The
Soviet Notes was broadcast yesterday by Tass and the radio, and has
only today appeared in the press. Its content is limited to an expression
of opinion to the effect that the Soviet Government cannot recognize
the Czechoslovak events. Obviously, the main reason for the Note is
that the Soviet Government wish to show that they associate them-
selves with the course of action adopted by Prance and Britain. The
Note gives the impression, moreover, that the method, more than the
result, is criticized— a criticism which the Soviets have the least reason
of all for making, if one remembers Georgia. 4
After the Austrian Anschluss, Litvinov proposed an international
conference but transmitted no Note. This time the Soviet Government
express their point of view by means of a Note, but in a manner which
relieves them of [the necessity for] further moves (for instance, the re-
call of the Soviet Ambassador to report).
The present attitude of the Soviet Government must in any case
merit our attention. It has already struck us with what reserve Stalin
' 8poke on Germany in his speech at the Party Congress. 3 I consider as
']■ still more striking certain remarks of Litvinov's to Madame Togo, the
Japanese Ambassador's wife, of which she informed me in the strictest
confidence. Litvinov told Madame Togo, to begin with, that he had
J full information that the negotiations of the Japanese Ambassador in
-£ iThe complete document has not been found. This extract bears the typewritten
m note: "Herewith to the Deputy Director of the Political Department and the Under
p. State Secretary for information. Berlin, Mar. 22, 1939 (sgd.) Schliep."
% : .' 2 Not printed. See document No. 50, footnotes 5 and 6.
K-. 3 Document No. 50, enclosure.
W. * The independent Republic of Georgia had been recognized by the Soviet Union in a
| ; Treaty signed on May 7, 1920. In February 1921, Soviet forces had invaded Georera
t- which was subsequently incorporated into the Soviet Union.
'See document No. I.
56 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Berlin for a Gerrnan-Itaban-Japanese military alliance had broken
down owing to the attitude of Germany and Italy. In reference to this,
Litvinov said that Germany and Italy were about to set their relation-
ship with the Soviet Union in order. I assume that these remarks were
essentially intended as pressure on Japan and as a counter to threats
uttered by the Japanese during the fishery negotiations. In spite of
this I cannot pass over such observations. In view of the attitude of
Britain and France, who have broken off their economic negotiations
with us,6 the Soviet Union in particular, in addition to the countries of ■
the South-East, again assumes considerable economic importance for
Germany. I do not know whether, under these altered circumstances,
our economic negotiations with the Soviet Government will not receive
a new fillip.
Moreover, the Soviet Government appear to be giving no further
thought to the practical effects of Litvinov's Note. We have reported
on the matter in detail by telegram 7 and despatch.* Perhaps you
would also care to look at Hilger's reports on the present state of the
Japanese-Soviet fishery negotiations. My Japanese colleague told me
only the day before yesterday that the negotiations were being con-
tinued, and that there was still some hope that they might be brought
to a successful conclusion.
The British Commercial Attache 10 assured me that Hudson, the
Under Secretarv of State, would arrive in Moscow on March 23 as
previously arranged. When I asked whether there was any intention
on the British side of granting the Soviet Government another credit,
the Commercial Attache twice replied that a British credit to the
Soviet Government was not out of the question.
Furthermore, I must not forget to mention that, when the Ambas-
sador informed him of the events in Czecho-Slovakia, Litvinov openly
showed his satisfaction regarding the annexation of Carpatho-Ukraine
by Hungary.
The Poles appear to be rather annoyed over the events in Czecho-
slovakia.
The British here are making a particular display of ill humour, a fact
which reminds me strongly of my war-time experiences. The British have
always taken the political successes of others as a personal affront.
The Ambassador will leave for Berlin on Thursday, March 23, as he
wishes to settle various matters before he is sent to Teheran. > ! He will
arrive in Berlin on Saturday.
TlPPELSKIRCH
* See document No. 11.
' Document No. 43.
8 Document No. 50.
» Not found. , „ . . , _ ,
1° Frank Todd, Commercial Secretary at the British Embassy.
ii To attend the wedding of the Iranian Crown Prince; see document ko . 32S, footnote*.
MAKCH, 1930 157
No. 52
60/40717-23
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*
Berlin, March 20, 1939.
Note on a Conversation between the Fuhrer and the Italian
Ambassador in the Presence or the German Foreign Minister
The Italian Ambassador gave a short summary of the interview
between the Duce and the Prince of Hesse, [recapitulating the various
reasons put forward by the latter to explain Germany's action in
Bohemia and Moravia, and concluding with the statement that the
German divisions which had been set free by this action "would be
available on any other front of the axis even tomorrow " The Prince
of Hesse had added, however, that if Italy contemplated any large scale
operations, it might be useful to postpone these for 18 months or
two years, because at such a time Germany would have an additional
100 divi S1 ons. The Duce had replied that he was taking cognisance of
the communication made by the Prince of Hesse, and that as regards
military assistance, Italy intended even in the case of a conflict with
France, to fight alone, expecting from Germany only supplies of
munitions and raw material but no man power.] 2
The Fiihrer replied that as regards her armed forces, Germany was
now in a position to face all eventualities. He also thought that Italy
was in a positions to carry through certain operations without France
being able to prevent her from doing so.
He, the Fiihrer, was asking himself, however, to what extent Great
Britain might intervene in any conflict. He thought that Great Britain
would almost certainly* assist France, and for these reasons he believed
. l This memorandum Is in English in the original and the conversation appears to have
ten partly held mthat language, probably because of Attolico's limitation^ airman
The id.osyncra S1 es of spelling and punctuation have been preserved. A German v^sfon
Eft«£i™ ? som l what '"drafting and sequence of topics fromThe S
£19/470-484); major differences between the two versions are footnoted below On
Mar. 21, bchmidt sent an urgent te egram. No 124 (100/fi'ifi5>7\ t n m—L™ ■
, .^instructions from the Foreign Minister 1^ B^^VeW^T^IS^i
arrive in Rome at 3 p.m. tomorrow at the latest* a memorandum on the FuCr-
; Attohco conversation; after the tatter's arrival in Rome on the evening of Mar 21 he
"- SS Z^ ^^. you about th JS matter. The Foreign Minister requests that you
.0*11 on no account give Attohco a wntten memorandum, but only oral assisCe Hn
^making a comparison with the document prepared by himself and that only by mtan S of
eitracts We first promised Attohco a written copy, but, on account of theT e Uca?e
natoeof the matter its delivery was cancelled, reference being made to the tectafcaJ
■-difficulties of sufficiently early transmittal and of the availability of your help "The
,«py sent to Mackensen was the German version of this document (1932/440187-93)
It wis marked Second Corrected Memorandum". See also document No 87
• * The passage here enclosed in square brackets has been struck out of the English ver-
; men and does not appear in the German. *j«js"<hi v B r
;;.■'■' * The German version here adds: "under favourable circumstances"
; *The German version has "certainly and in all circumstances if France were to be-
: come involved m serious difficulties inserted here.
58 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
that 5 a delay of IS months or two years might be advisable,
during which time Germany could further strengthen not only her
land* forces, but, above all, her naval forces. He (the Fiihrer) had had
an opportunity of admiring Italy's naval strength during his recent
visit 7 and he must admit with regret that Germany had comparatively
little to show in the way of naval forces. Her position in that respect
would be considerably improved a in the winter 1940/41, when two
35,000 t battle ships would be put into commission (the last of these
two ships would be launched on April 1st next and could not be put into
commission earlier than November or December 1940). Furthermore
new cruisers, new submarines, and other vessels would be added to
Germany's present naval strength.
He, the Fiihrer, repeated, that the question was, whether in any
conflict which involved France, Great Britain would assist the latter,
and he thought that that would be the case. The Fiihrer concluded by
saying that there was not the slightest doubt in his own mind that he
would always unconditionally take Italy's side whenever the latter
needed Germany's support. 9
Japan's assistance would also be stronger in one or two years' time.
The position of the two European Axis powers would, the Fiihrer added,
be immensely facilitated by the end of the Chinese war. He believed that
once that war had come to an end, Japan, if only for selfish reasons
would always join Italy and Germany in a general conflict. But as
long as the Chinese war lasted, Japan would always be reluctant to
establish any closer relations with the two other Axis Powers, a hesi-
tation, which had manifested itself rather clearly only in recent
times
The Fiihrer said, that it was difficult to prophesy, but it seemed to
him not to be impossible that the French might ultimately make
certain concessions rather than face the extreme consequence of
war
If Great Britain assisted France in a general conflict, Germany s
position would be aggravated by the fact that the British navy was
s The German version has "before such a conflict, which would in any ease involve
Germany" inserted here.
e The German version adds "and air" here. „ . ....
' Hitler and Mussolini had reviewed the Italian Fleet at Naples on May 5, 1938.
s The German version has "in favour of the Axis Powers" inserted here.
» In the German version this paragraph reads: "In case of a conflict into which France
was drawn, it seemed very probable to us at present that precisely for these reasons (not
indeed unknown to England) Great Britain would support France. Naturally the reverse
is also the case, for the Fiihrer wishes to leave no doubt at all about one thing. He
would always and unconditionally take Italy's side whenever the latter needed Ger-
manv's support. Only, the effect of such assistance would be very different if, owing to
her own fleet, Germany could force England to split her naval forces, thus preventing
England from supporting France in the Mediterranean with her entire naval force, and
thus, above all, cutting Italian communications with North Africa.
io The German version makes this phrase plainer by rendering it: which had mani-
fested itself clearly, particularly of late".
MAKCH, 1939 gg
strong enough to cut Germany's oversea's communications » thus
forcing the latter to undertake large scale military operations in order
to secure her supplies Furthermore Great Britain was also in a position
to cut off Italy from her North African possessions. Within a few years
the position would be more favourable because of the fact that Ger
many's naval strength had increased in the meantime, thus forcine
Great Britain to divide her fleet." Moreover, Poland's position must
also be considered. Germany had an official friendship with Poland
but nevertheless she had to be careful. Since the destruction of Czecho-
Slowakia, it is true, Poland's intervention against Germany, if the latter
found herself m conflict with the Western Powers, was less probable
but not altogether impossible." This uncertainty forced Germany to
reserve a certain number of divisions for an emergency. She had to
keep all her troops in East Prussia, and furthermore, a certain number
of divisions along the German-Polish frontier, which, by the way was
now being heavily fortified by Germany. >* The Polish Government
was not an authoritarian government like the Italian or the German
government, it was really a government without the support of the
people and countercurrents could at any moment come to the surface is
It must also be noted in this connection that there were almost' 4
million jews m that country, which could in these circumstances one
day influence Poland's policy in a certain direction.! 6 The Fuhrer
thought that, if Great Britain intervened in a general conflict Poland
might quite possibly be found among Germany's enemies and therefore
certain precautions must be taken." There was no danger on land
but Germany s naval forces were not great enough to attack the British
fleet either at home or on the high seas. 1 ^
The Fiihrer then emphasised that he wished by no means to appear
pretentious when he expressed the opinion that it would be a good
thmg^that larger conflicts took place only in a few years, adding
Ji The German version here reads; "that at present not only would the British N.w
be » rang enough to out Germany's overseas communications, but there wouL d *™vitaWv
rnonth^to two yea"' tfme^ : ^ SItUatl ° n t0 ° WOuld be ^^ ea ^ » eighteen
, ; ^The German version here adds: "for the purpose of thwarting Polish foreign
16 In place of this phrase, the German version ha«- "wh;^ ™.=i u . j ■ ,
: permanently detrimental iAfluence on theTZh "altitude" """' * ^"^ mth M a
: » In the German version this phrase is expanded into: " which not only made German
..Plenary measures necessary, but made a little more time deSeT. bS^g
■■■ > « This sentence is not included in the German version.
00 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
however, that Germany would always be found at Italy's side if the
latter needed her. 19 , ,
The Italian Ambassador then referred to the possibility of obtaining
French concessions in certain circumstances. He, the Ambassador,
thought that, at the present moment France would make no concessions
at all, not even on very reasonable demands. On the other hand, he
believed that the Duce was almost 20 forced "to get something". But
when he would be confronted with an obstinate France resisting all his
demands a hundred percent he might lose patience. France's will to
resist even the most reasonable demands, was clearly reflected m M.
Daladier's full powers 21 and his observation that the situation was
"grave and might become dramatic" to-morrow. Such words clearly
indicated a stiffening of resistance also in the diplomatic field. 22
The Fiihrer replied that he thought M. Daladier's powers would not
produce a consolidation of France's internal situation. While the
parties of the Left had supported Daladier's full powers m the hope
that they might mean greater support to the Bolshevist warmongers,
the parties of the Right had given their support to the bill hoping that
the full powers would ultimately be used against the parties of the Left.
Within a few months" Daladier would be forced to use his full powers
for very unpopular measures in France, new taxes, lengthening of
the hours of work, abolition of certain social institutions, like holidays
with pay, etc.
The Italian Ambassador, who said that he was speaking only oil
his own personal account and in no way under instruction, said that
Mussolini was forced to put forward his demands to-morrow and to put
his cards on the table. He did not want to and could not wait until
France's internal position had deteriorated. He must put forward his
demands now and would thus meet with the maximum of resistance
which would put him in a very embarras[s]ing situation.
Upon a question of the Fiihrer as to the exact nature of those de-
mands, the Italian Ambassador replied that these demands were not
known to him, nor, as far as he was aware, to any other person. 2 * He
had only heard from Count Ciano that these demands were of no
i» In the German version this paragraph reads: "For these reasons *® ^ihrer
emphasized that in his view, it would be a good thing for larger conflicts only to occur ia
Hew years' time. He did not wish this to appear pretentious, but he was merely ex-
pressing this opinion because the Italian Ambassador had himself raised the question,
and asked for an answer."
*» The German version here has "now in place ol almost .
21 See document No. 22.
"This sentence is not included in the German version. »Tv.i«,r„ •„
" From this point onwards in the German version the sentence reads: Daladwr, m
the FUtor's opinion, would be compelled to use his full powers for so many unpopular
measures thatfnstead of achieving internal consolidation, a new domestic crisis was more
lik « y in the e German version this and the first part of the next passage js condensed to
read "When asked about the Duce's demands, Attohco replied that he had heard from
Count Ciano that they were not of a territorial character.
MAHCH ; 1939 QJ
territorial character, including the neutralization but not the session
[«c] of Corsica. As regards Tunis, Italy merely demanded the restaura-
tion [sic] of the pre-war statute of Italians residing in Tunis The de
mands connected with Suez and Djibuti were quite obvious
At this juncture both the German Foreign Minister and the Fiihrer
observed that they thought it quite possible that France accepted these
demands^ The Italian Ambassador emphasised that, if these very
reasonable Italian claims were rejected, the Duce might lose
patience. &
The Fiihrer replied that in similar cases he had laid down a very
simple rule for himself. Whenever reasonable and wellfounded claims
which he had put forward in the past, had been rejected, he had not
acted immediately, but had merely said to himself that all the normal
methods of procedure to realize these demands were exhausted and
that it was useless to handle the respective problem any longer through
the diplomatic channels. He (the Fiihrer) then awaited his moment
when, without further discussion, he could quickly carry throueh his
intentions. 6
^ ^l 11 ! i^ n 0l \ U \ ChvaIkovsk y> **en he saw him first in Novem-
ber^that the Czechoslovak Army must be demobilized and drastically
reduced m number, that German minorities must be well treated and
that all partisans of the Benesch policy must disappear. He had repeated
these same demands in January during Chvalkovsky's second visit »
but the Czech seemed to take no notice. So he decided to await the
moment when he could take the laws into his own hands ™ If the Duce
were now to put forward very precise (concrete) demands it would be a
requirement of wisdom to await the moment when these demands
could be realized with a minimum of effort and risk, and that moment
would certainly come.
The German foreign Minister underlined the fact that Germany's
weight would go [on] increasing during all that time ^
At the end of the interview the Fiihrer explained the military im-
portance which Czechoslovakia had preserved until the end by giving
the Italian Ambassador the following figures: 30
1900000 rifles
44000 machine guns (of which 24000 had been recovered)
2400 big guns (of which 1200 had been recovered)
1000 aeroplanes.
and 120000 t of ammunition [sic].
' ," B ?hSr. " erSi ° n C ° ndenSeS tWs ■»"«• to - ! " ^e Fuhrer gave Czechoslovakia
■ t This paragraph is not included in the German version.
. » The German vers.on here adds: " of weapons already in part confiscated ".
62 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
In a general war, owing to the strategic position, these vast arme-
ments [sic]'would have been pointed to Germany's heart. These figures
also proved that Czechoslowakia held the record of the per capita arma-
ment of its population.
Dr. Schmidt
No. 53
1969,'43'066
Memorandum by the State Secretary
St S No 251 Berlin, March 20, 1939.
Pol. IV 2040.
The Hungarian Minister 1 today handed me the enclosed letter 2 for
the Foreign Minister concerning the occupation of and assumption
of sovereignty over the Carpatho-Ukraine. The letter states that
Hungary intends to negotiate direct with Rumania and Slovakia on the
frontier question.
The letter is attached. 3
Weizsacker
2 Notprinted (1969/437967); the substance of the letter is given in the memorandum
he 3 6 MareSai notes- (i) " U.St.S. It seems to me that an acknowledgement of receipt is
indicated. W[eizsacker] 20/[3]." (ii) "L.R. Siegfried. Is an answer necessary?
E. K[ordt] 21/3."
No. 54
2791/547008
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat
Berlin, March 20, 1939.
zu W VI 1046.1
Submitted to Herr Dir. Wiehl through the State Secretary.
The Reich Foreign Minister asks us not to agree for the time being
to any fresh British initiative for a later visit by Oliver Stanley and
Hudson 3 and to notify the Reich Ministry of Economics as well as the
Embassy in London accordingly.
Erich Kordt
i Not printed (2791/547901-07).
2 See document No. 11.
MARCH, 1930 yg
No. 55
100/65629-33
Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to Foreign Minister Ciano i
peksonal Berlin, March 20, 1939.
My Dear Ciano: I should like to take advantage of the first moment
of leisure I have had since my return from Prague and Vienna to thank
you first of all most sincerely for the sympathetic and friendly attitude
which your Government have adopted towards recent events. I am
firmly convinced that our action, which has finally established tran
quillity and order on the South-East frontier of the Reich, constitutes
a substantial strengthening of the Rome-Berlin Axis and that this
effect will be more and more clearly revealed in the course of further
developments. I can quite understand that the rapid progress of the
action and its result came to a certain extent as a surprise to you as
you recently hinted to Herr von Mackensen.* When, to the surprise
even of ourselves, matters came to a head in recent weeks, the Fuhrer's
decisions had to be made very quickly and without the opportunity
for lengthy preparations. However, I kept Ambassador Attolico con-
stantly informed, in so far as this was possible under the pressure of
stormy events, and was also glad to be able to give detailed information
to your former Minister in Prague. 3
Furthermore, I am anxious today to give you clear and definite in-
formation as to our attitude towards the Croat question which you
mentioned to Herr von Mackensen. You are acquainted with the
Fuhrer's decision that in all Mediterranean questions the policy of the
Axis is to be determined by Rome and that therefore Germany would
never pursue a policy independent of that of Italy in the Mediterranean
countries. This decision of the Fuhrer's will always be an immutable
law of our foreign policy. Just as the Duce declared his dtsinteresse-
Mtntin Czechia, we ourselves are disinterested in the Croat question and
if we acted at all in this matter, it would only be in the closest coopera-
: tion with Italian wishes. It came therefore as a complete surprise to
me that, according to information from Herr von Mackensen, rumours
l i In a top secret and urgent telegram, No. 103 of Mar. 21 (583/242045), Mackensen
if , reported with reference to instructions transmitted by Senior Counselor Kordt hT TJl?
i( "At l:30p.m I handed Ciano the text of the letter transmitted ?to me % te Shone ti
» his knowledge of German , s not sufficient, I translated the letter orally sentenced v
wntence. The way m winch Ciano expressed his thanks, made his satisfaction wfth the
contents of the letter clearly apparent. In accordance with instructions AttoHcc Twill
.... receive copies on his arrival here. " Iu) wu »
|: ■■. "With reference to my suggestion to Senior Counsellor Kordt over the telephone I
£ wwto. teve it to your discretion to instruct the Belgrade Legation to p^SSt.
k, most restraint in dealing with the Croat question, with reference to their report forwarded
|, to me with your despatch of March 17— Pol. IV 1611." [vol. v of this Series rin^™*
J. No. 310, which was forwarded to Rome under a cover note by He £bSTof th* "£™
|: date (not printed, 2130/465309-10).] y " emDur « ° J «"> same
'"■ s See document No. 15.
3 Francesco Fransoni.
64 DOCUMENTS ON GEBMAN FOREIGN POLICY
to the contrary concerning this have reached your ears and I at once
made an investigation personally to discover what the basis for these
rumours might be. I thus ascertained that about a month ago some
Croat personalities had called at an unofficial agency here in Berlin *
and had endeavoured to obtain detailed information about Germany's
attitude. This unofficial agency left the Croat visitors in no doubt at
all that independent German activity in this matter was absolutely out
of the question and that, on the contrary, Germany would always let
her attitude be guided by Italy's intentions and wishes. I communi-
cated these and other details to Attolico orally today before his de-
parture. It may have been that, as often happens in the case of visits
by such politicians, the Croats sought contact with other non -respon-
sible agencies as well. I will investigate this and put a stop once and
for all to anything which might possibly give rise to false rumours about
Germany's intentions, or to misunderstandings.
Incidentally, I again gave Attolico detailed information about ail
topical questions today and have just been with him to the Fuhrer, 3
who in turn gave his views for the Duce and yourself on the questions
which principally concern Italy.
I should be grateful if you would bring the contents of this letter to
the notice of the Duce also and convey my most sincere greetings to him.
With best wishes I am, my dear Ciano,
Yours etc.;
RlBBENTROP 6
4 This may refer to a Croat approach reported to the Foreign Ministry by a member of
the staff of the Fuhrer's Deputy in a letter of Feb. 14, Pol. IV 1286 (not printed, 2481/
517725-28).
5 See document No. 52.
6 See also Ciano: VEuropa verso la CaUmtroje, pp. 420-2-.
No. 56
6102/E474S92-93
The Charge $ Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 96 of March 21 Washington, March 21, 1939—3:41 p.m.
Received March 22—12:45 a.m.
W VIII a 639.
With reference to my telegram No. 92 of March 18. 1
1) From discussions with New York banks and with exporters and
importers interested in trade with Germany, no effective protests are
i Document No. 33. A further report, No. 535/W, on the same subject was sent by
Thomson on Mar. 21 (not printed, 2422/511733-34). In this he attributes the imposition
of countervailing duties to direct instructions from the President.
MARCH, 1939 gg
to be expected from these circles against the imposition of "counter-
vailing duties", 2 on account of the political nature of this measure and
anti-German public opinion. Importers will attempt to bring in as
many goods as possible before April 23 and will then if necessary turn
to other sources of supply. The National Importers' Council also
Teached a decision yesterday to this effect.
2) German counter-measures should, for reasons of expediency, be
unobtrusively applied since the American Government might possibly
retaliate with penalty duties and an embargo pursuant to section 338
It would be desirable, however, that the utmost publicity should be
given to the fact that the contraction of German exports caused by
the American measures will of necessity lead to a considerable decline
in the German import of American products, particularly of agricultural
ones.
3) The Treasury decision practically puts an end to the Inland
Account procedure 3 in any form, as it regards the payment of any
premium on American products as a subsidy and, in view of the control
of German imports and exports, no longer recognizes the German in-
ternal market price as a "current fair open market price". 2 The con-
tinuance of Inland Account is therefore useless as the additional
duty would render the German premium illusory; as, furthermore, the
present 25 per cent additional duty on all dutiable German goods' has
been imposed regardless of whether the transaction has been carried
out by means of Inland Account or provides for a purely foreign ex-
change settlement. Since two thirds of the total imports from Germany
has, to begin with, a charge of at least an additional 25 per cent imposed
upon it, I recommend complete abolition of Inland Account procedure
and cancellation of all relevant circulars (excepting in the case of those
shipments of goods which have been declared to customs authorities in
U.S. ports before April 23, and also in as far as payment is to be made
only later). The importer cannot reckon on repayment of the addi-
tional duty when making price calculations, as it is completely uncertain
when such repayment will take place and how much he will have to
expend on adducing proofs. The attempt should then be made to
bring about the removal of the present 25 per cent additional duty
p; before April 23 through import circles here on the basis of documentary
proof that Inland Account procedure had been discontinued. The
Schroder Bank's customs attorney is already negotiating on their
behalf in order to free from the present additional duty transactions
'unquestionably put through against dollars or free reiehsmarks.
.;■: 4) As the only immediate possibilities for the promotion of exports
! there remain pure barter transactions without premiums, and payment
* In English in the original.
! See document No. 33, footnote 6.
QQ DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
from originally owned blocked accounts (original and continuous
ownerships).* With regard to the latter, it may well be in the first place
a question of large balances accumulated from [American] deliveries of
goods and [German payment of] dividends, such as those of American
motor manufacturers (General Motors). Such transactions must be
entered into and carried out with the greatest circumspection in view
of the United States Attorney General's opimon of June 2, 1936 * now
again cited. For this purpose the employment of reliable agents well
acauainted with the relevant conditions here appears expedient (Con-
tinental).* Concrete proposals are being drafted here by customs
attorneys For final decisions I request that the commercial experts at
the Embassy should he summoned to Berlin to report and that in no
circumstances should special sanction be granted beforehand. _
5) The Embassy will for the present make no use of the authoriza-
tion in telegram No. 79. 6
6) Carpatho-Ukraine is being treated as de facto Hungarian territory
according to the Treasury order of March 18, and, with Hungary,
enjoys most-favoured-nation status including tariff concessions under
the Czech-American Trade Agreement of 1938. Th0 msen
~* m this opinion the Aperioan Attorney ^
by Germany for promoting ex ports ( s °; c ,^ s C »P .^position P f countervailing
m arks" and ■•, «»mpm»t on procedu* ^f**" ™ printed 6416/E47S54MI).
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
countervailing dut.es on certam ^P^^^f^fXnment that, with effect froi
to the U.S.A. (not printed > 6^522280-8^ Economics to the Foreign
* According to a ^^^^^^^sSbSmoS-W), the Continental Export
Ministry dated Aug 27 1937 (not printed ^J*^ * m? ^ h ital of S30 0,0<KU
and Import Corporation .had been found* ,<» ™? " 17 ' ^Banking Corporation of New
^r^co™^^ ffi^>S3t«»4^ management.
% Not ^^6402^4879-80). This telegram of Mar. 17 gave detailed instructs
regarding desirable German purchases in the United States.
No. 57
ioo/fi50io
The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy
Telegram
No. 125 of March 21 Beblin, March 21 1939-9:10 p.m. |
Received March— 9:30 p.m. m
For the Ambassador. Secret. , ;
We have requested Colonel General Keitel to state, through an in- J
struction to the Military Attache in Rome,! tha t he is ready for the f
1 Col. Enno von Rintelen.
MAKCH, 1939 gy
immediate opening of the General Staff discussions already mentioned*
and to enqmre what date would suit the Italian General X Word
missing) an approach to the Italian General. Staff is desirable as a
moment S ** ^^ "^ ^ ^^^ ^ ^ print
Please report progress by telegram.
Weizsackek
2 See vol. rv of this Series, documents "NTnc i«i „„j jcn *
the German-Italian Staff taiks were selec ted f™ m tT » u ' A I V 1 T b Sf of d ^*™»ts on
after editorial work on this vSC^SMS 1 ?' °- f the German Admiralty
to this volume. a started. This selection is printed as Appendix I
No. 58
1825/388372-73
Circular of the State Secretary i
Telegram
UEGENT Berlin, March 21, 1939-9:30 p.m.
e.o. Pol. II 833.
According to information to hand here, the British Government have
undertaken demarches jn a number of capitals so as to bring about an
assertion of peaceful Powers " against further German expansion
KSi fl^i Goveraraent ^ -id to have approached aU
the States adjacent to Rumania and to several other Powers in order
to ascertam how far these are prepared to take measures against an
attack on Rumania.* The present reports do not indicate cleariy
S£T, Zr r P C \ d67mrclm are here »™lved. Chamberlain and
Hah ax stated in Parhament on March 20 3 that, on account of recent
events, Britain has entered into consultation with other Powers (among
whom Hahfax also mentioned the Dominions). Furthermore, accord
.nig to press reports, the Soviet Union has replied by proposing a con-
ference to which the Soviet Union, Britain, France, Poland. Rumania
and other Balkan States would be invited
I toConsSates^eneral^ffi^a^dnet ' *" Consu,ate at Geneva, and
K- * See also British Documents, Third Series, vol. iv, chapter v
s See document No. 48, footnote 1.
gg DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Powers. In conversation please refer to press reports and do not allow
it to be seen that you are acting on official instructions. 4
W EIZS A.CKJEB.
4Th B textof this teleeram was repeated on Mar. 21 as telegram No. 90 (1625/388374)
at your end."
No. 59
1S93/38423S-39
The State Secretary to the Embassy in Turkey
Telegram
immediate Berlin, March 21, 1939-9:45 p^
No . 50 zu PoL VI1 450 - 1
With reference to your telegram No. 47 of March 15.1
Please inform the Turkish Government: We have heard that the
conclusion of a Franco -Turkish mutual assistance pact is being dis-
cussed in connection with the question of the union of Hatay with
Turkey. This news is extremely displeasing to us, as negotiations of
that type sharply contradict the express assurances repeatedly given
to us by Turkey that she would pursue a policy of strict neutrality
towards all Great Powers.
Please refer in particular to the various unequivocal statements made
by Human, the Secretary General, to the Reich Foreign Minister {July 1
and 7 1938) « and to the State Secretary {July 6, 1938 and February 10,
1939)' 3 In the conversation of July 1, 1938, Numan had, in the pre-
sence of Ambassador Hamdi, given an assurance that Turkey had always
evaded France's efforts for the conclusion of an assistance mutuelle and
would also reject it in the future. Turkey would take no part in any
combination directed against Germany. In the further conversations
referred to this assurance was renewed and confirmed.
We expect that Turkey will also in future adhere to these solemn
assurances.
Report by telegram.
Weizsacker
1 Document No. 3. , , , . , ,. .
2 See vol. v of this Series, document No. 548 and footnote 1 thereto,
a See ibid., document No. 548, footnote 2, and document No. 560.
MARCH, 1939 69
No. 60
429/218675-76
The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Berlin, March 21, 1939.
Pol. VI 672 g.
The following is for your strictly confidential information:
Recently the Finnish Foreign Minister i told Minister von Blucher in
strict confidence that Soviet Russia was showing remarkable interest
in the Finnish archipelago between Hogland (Suursaari) and Leningrad.
Litvinov had suggested to the Finnish Minister in Moscow^ the exchange
of this archipelago for territories in East Carelia. The Finnish Govern-
ment had refused, whereupon Litvinov had further proposed that
Finland should lease the archipelago to Russia. At the same time,
Litvinov promised renewed agreement to the fortification of Hogland!
This proposal Finland also rejected. Litvinov thereupon replied that
he would not regard this answer as final.
In the meantime, the Soviet Russian Ambassador in Rome, Stein,
had arrived in Helsinki, and wanted to speak to the Finnish Foreign
Minister. The Finnish Government would not consider the Russian
offers concerning the archipelago. If Russia occupied these islands in
time of war, Finland would hardly be able to prevent this, but a
voluntary cession of Finnish territory in peace time was out of the
question. There was a possibility, however, that Finland would reach
an agreement with the Soviet Government by means of an exchange
of Notes, that in the event of a general war, Finland would remain
neutral.
Herr von Blucher concluded this conversation with the remark that
if the Russians established themselves on the islands in peace time,
this would mean military control of Finland by the Soviet Union, but
that Finnish neutrality in case of war seemed to him the expedient
policy. 3
We are in agreement with the language held by Herr von Blucher.
By order:
Grttntiherr
i Eljaa Erkko.
8 Baron Aarno Yijd-Koskinen.
p a Ina farther despatch, Pol. VI 797g of Apr. 1, signed by Grundherr (429/218674), the
'.Embassy at Moscow were informed as foilows: "According to what Minister von Bliicher
..iae heard from the Finnish Foreign Minister, the reason for the recall of the Finnish
Kmde delegation from Moscow ia that the Russians tried to secure, simultaneously with
£-.'&• trade agreement, the cession of the Finnish islands between Hogland and Leningrad
'and a 20 year lease of the island of Hogland to Russia."
70 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 61
F8/0052-57
Memorandum by the Foreign Minister l
rjj 17 Beelin, March 21, 1939.
I invited Lipski, the Polish Ambassador, to call on me at noon today.
I began by describing to M. Lipski the development of the Czecho-
slovak question and explained to him that, in view of the rush of
events, it had not been possible for me to keep foreign representatives
here informed as 1 would have liked to do. I had, however, given
Ambassador von Moltke, who happened to be in Berlin, detailed in-
formation and instructed him for his part to put Foreign Minister Beck
in the picture. I then described in detail the events which had induced
the Fiihrer to intervene.
It had struck us that the Benes spirit had again stirred in Rump
Czecho-Slovakia. All the Piihrer's warnings to Chvalkovsky had fallen
on deaf ears. Recently the Prague Government had tried to adopt
dictatorial methods in Carpatho -Ukraine and in Slovakia. The oppres-
sion of the Germans in the linguistic enclaves had begun again. I
assumed that the settlement which had in the meantime been achieved
in the Carpatho-Ukraine question had caused the greatest satisfaction
in Poland. The establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and
Moravia meant a final pacification of this area which was compatible
with historical principles and would benefit everybody in the end.
Ambassador Lipski then expressed anxiety at the fact that Germany
had assumed the protection of Slovakia. This news had hit Poland
hard, for the man in the street could only regard such a step as being
primarily directed against Poland. The Slovaks were a people lin-
guistically related [to Poland]. History also played a part in determin-
ing Polish interests in this area and from a purely realistic political
standpoint it must be admitted that the declaration of protection could
only be regarded as a blow against Poland.
I referred Ambassador Lipski to the fact that the independent
Slovak Government had appealed to Germany for protection. The
declaration of protection was certainly not directed against Poland.
At this point I gave a slight hint that the question could perhaps at
some time be the subject of joint discussions if German-Polish relations
in general developed satisfactorily . Unfortunately , however, I could not
but note that a gradual stiffening in German-Polish relations was be-
coming apparent. This trend had already begun several months ago.
It had struck us here what a peculiar attitude Poland had adopted in
i See also the Republic of Poland, Ministry for Foreign Affairs; Official Documents con-
cerning Polish-German and Polish-Soviet Relations, 1933-1939. (Published by authority
of the Polish Government, London, [1940]) hereinafter cited as the Polish WMte Book),
No. 61.
MABCH, 1930 71
the Minorities Commission. 2 The incidents in Danzig, provoked hy
Polish students, had also given us food for thought. 3 Ambassador
Lipski denied most energetically that such incidents had been caused
by Polish students. When I observed that in the Fiihrer's opinion the
banners which had led to the clashes had been displayed by Polish
students, M. Lipski disputed this most vigorously and maintained that
Polish students had. been in no way implicated.
I further drew the Polish Ambassador's attention to the continuous
press attacks, to the anti-German demonstrations on the occasion of
the Ciano visit 4 and to the open press feud which existed at present.
This press feud seemed to me entirely unwarranted. The Fuhrer had
always worked for a settlement and an understanding with Poland.
Even now the Fuhrer was still pursuing this aim. However, the
Puhrer was becoming increasingly amazed at Poland's attitude.
Hitherto I had restrained the German press on the question of Poland,
as the Polish Ambassador could ascertain for himself by glancing at the
German newspapers. However, it would not be possible for me to
continue to let such attacks pass unanswered. From such a mutual
press feud a state of affairs might soon develop in which our relations
would be reduced to nil. It seemed to me essential that a fresh attempt
should be made to bring German-Polish policy on to the right lines,
and it seemed to me right and fitting that there should be a personal
discussion between German and Polish statesmen in the near future.
I would be glad if Foreign Minister Beck would pay an early visit to
Berlin. The Fuhrer had told me that he too would warmly welcome
such a discussion. As to details of the possible subjects of discussion, I
toldM. Lipski first of all that he must admit that Germany was not with-
: out her share in the creation and the present existence of Poland. If
at Brest Litovsk, for example, Germany had pursued a different policy
with Russia, there would be no Poland, today. Under the Schleicher
.■Government 5 too, there had been the possibility that a Marxist Ger-
f- many would ally herself with the So viet Union . In that case too Poland
Jf would hardly exist today. The basis on which German-Polish under-
|| standing could rest would only be provided by German and Polish
; nationalists. Poland must realize clearly that she could not take a
^middle course. Either Poland would remain a national State, working
K; for a reasonable relationship with Germany and her Fuhrer, or one day
Sphere would arise a Marxist Polish Government, which would then be
^absorbed by Bolshevist Russia. We most honestly desired that
^■Poland should retain a strong National Government, as represented by
Marshal Pilsudski's group of Colonels.
j. - See document No. 125 and also vol. v of this Series, documents Nos. 132 and 134.
|L'S See also vol. v of this Series, document No. 131.
J- : * Gano visited Poland Feb. 25-Mar. 1, 1939. Sec vol. v of this Series, document No.
jI'lSU, and also the Ciano Diaries, entry of Feb. 25.
6 Gen. Kurt von Schleicher was Chancellor of the Reich, Dec. 5, 1932-Jan. 29, 1933.
72 DOCUMENTS ON GEEMAN FOREIGN POLICY
The best chance of reaching understanding with Poland lay with this
group. For her present geographical position Poland was indebted to
the major disaster of Germany's having lost the war. The geographical
solution so favourable to Poland also derived from this fact.
The Corridor settlement was generally felt to be the heaviest burden
of the Versailles Treaty for Germany. No previous Government had
been in a position to renounce German revisionist claims without being
swept away by the Reichstag within forty-eight hours. The Fiihrer
had other ideas about the problem of the Corridor. He recognized the
justification of the Polish claim to free access to the sea. He was the
only German statesman who could pronounce a final renunciation of
the Corridor. The condition for this, however, was the return of the
purely German Danzig to the Reich as well as the establishment of
extra-territorial rail and road connections between the Reich and
East Prussia. Only this would remove the thorn in the flesh which the
existence of the Corridor represented for the German people. If Polish
statesmen would calmly take into account the real facts, a solution
could be found on the following basis:
The return of Danzig to the Reich, extra-territorial rail and road
connections between East Prussia and the Reich and, in return, a
German guarantee for the Corridor. I could well imagine that in such
circumstances it would be possible to deal with the Slovak question to
the satisfaction of all.
Ambassador Lipski had little to say in reply to this. However, he
once again expressed his anxiety over the German declaration of pro-
tection for Slovakia. I told Ambassador Lipski once again that Danzig
would certainly return to the Reich sooner or later. A common
German-Polish policy could also prove very fruitful in- future. The
treatment which we had accorded to the Ukraine question showed how
loyal Germany's attitude was. From the disappointment expressed by
the Ukrainians he could see how straightforward was our policy. As
I had once assured Foreign Minister Beck in Warsaw 6 we were prepared
to regard the Ukrainian question from a purely Polish angle.
Ambassador Lipski promised to inform Foreign Minister Beck and
to report immediately.
I suggested that Ambassador Lipski should go to Warsaw and make
a personal report. I again repeated how advantageous a final settle-
ment between Germany and Poland seemed to me, particularly at the
present juncture. This was also important because hitherto the Fiihrer
had felt nothing but amazement over Poland's strange attitude on a
number of questions; it was important that he should not form the
impression that Poland simply was not willing.
R[iebentrop]
6 See vol. v of this Series, document No. 126.
MARCH, 1039 73
No. 62
IS43/4Z1060
Memorandum by the. State Secretary
St.S. No. 254 Berlin, March 21, 1939.
I have today again urgently pointed out to Reich Minister Funk
by telephone the political importance of a friendly gesture to Italy as
regards delivery of coke and coal.i Herr Funk complained vehemently
of our own deficit and of the expected drop in steel supplies— particu-
larly of such steel as we required for Italy-^ince the delivery of coke
to Lorraine had been reduced. However, he promised to review the
matter and will do his best. 2
. Weizsacker
1 See document No. 44.
5 A marginal note reads: "Cf. [St.S.] No. 201 [vol. iv of this Series No 4^71 ar ,A
I8t8 J^W 6 [n M VT 'T$ lf*p/*SI0e2]". In tU latter melrlndu^ WeS c Zr
recorded that on Mar. 22 he had explained to Magistral the reasons for the defieitto
dafc and declared that both the Foreign Minister tnd the Minister^? Economics were
determined to make every effort to meet the Italian needs. In a teleeram to RmlZ!
«^, 2058/447913-14) on the same day, the following deiiv^rylgu^XX,™-
January— 415,000 tons of coal, February— 535,000 tons, March (up to 21atl— *ffi ftnfi
tons The Coal Syndicate expected to deliver a total of 590,000 to 000 000 tons in
13&££££^££ Apr " l <n0t ^^ ™WW). Wieh^tated that
No. 63
2804/365 5S5-S6
Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department
Berlin, March 21, 1939.
t Pol. VI 868.
| The Bulgarian Minister called on me today and first of all congra-
| tulated me on the events of the last few days. He then asked me for
|information on the general situation, especially in the Balkans.
I I gave him as much information as was possible today. He received
gTrith visible regret my intimation that the news of German aggressive
lintentions on Rumania was a pure invention. He then again expressed,
|even though only in very general terms, Bulgaria's desire to keep in
|.contact with us so as not to miss the right moment for the realization
|of her own national desires.
"(: M. Draganov then asked me to interest myself in the question of the
s aims credit. 1 It was his conviction that the increase in the amount of
|;the credit from 20 to 45 million was perfectly feasible, especially in
t ^sonsequence of the augmentation which we had received from the
;Bohemian-Moravian war industry.
l See document No. 17.
74 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
I told him that though I would willingly interest myself in the
question, I must leave it to Ministerialdirektor Wiehl and the negotiat-
ing T t le Minter did not know whether a British te^U had been
undertaken in Sofia regarding participation in a combination Erected
ag StTL took up the question of Kernel.* He had gained
the impression from his conversations with the Lithuanian Minister
treE Lithuania was ready to hand over the Memel territory if she
received for her investments in the port of Memel a considerable sum
of monly with which she could build a new harbour further to ttonorfr.
2 See Editors' Note on p. 80.
No. 64
Counsellor of Embassy Wuklisch to Senior Counsellor Schhep
Warsaw, March 21, 1939.
Bear Schliep: We have-the impression here more and more that
Biddte the American Ambassador here, exercises an unfavourable
fnfluence on PcSn policy. Mr. Biddle has the ear of Beck to a very
coSerab e extent ^nd is a tool of Bullitt, the well-known American
Ambassador in Paris, who is causing quite enough harm in any case^
i*E telephones Bullitt daily. As the telephone passes through
Berlin it might be possible to listen in to these conversations.
Regards and Heil Hitler ! W[0hlisch]
Yours,
No. 65
533)230013
The Ambassador to the Holy See to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
v. S7 nf M-ireh 2* Rome, March 22, 1939-10:35 a.m. ■]
>,o. 3- of Maich 2. Received March 22-1:15 p.m. •
For confidential information. I learn from a well-informed source J
that urgent attempts have been made, especially on the French side, .1
to prevfil upon tta Pope to associate himself with the protests ofthe
democratic States against the annexation of Bohemia and Morav a .*
the Reich The Pope has declined these requests very firmly. He ha*
Sen those around him to understand that he sees no reason to in-
Sere in historic processes in which, from the political point of v.ew,
the Church is not interested. ■ Bergen
MARCH, 1930 75
No. 66
2989/584695
The Charge d' Affaires in the U?iiied States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 98 of March 22 Washington, March 22, 1939—12:59 p.m.
Eeceived March 22 — 9:25 p.m.
Mr. Suma, the Japanese Counsellor of Embassy, told me in confidence
that he had been reliably informed that the British have sounded the
"State" and "Navy Departments" 1 as to whether they could reckon
on American support, and if so, as to what extent in the event of an
acute conflict developing between Britain and Japan over Hongkong.
The British had stated in this connection that they were determined
not to give up Hongkong without a struggle. The American answer
had been completely negative.
This coincides with my own observations, according to which the
American Government will avoid everything which would bring them
: into open conflict with Japan. The extent and importance of any
military activity by America centred on Europe will be determined by
: - the latent threat to her western flank by Japan, in other words, the
clanger that while engaged in a European conflict, she might behind
;: her back be cut off by Japan from supplies of the most important raw
materials and have her Pacific possessions overrun.
Thomsen
1 In English in the original.
No. 67
;.. : S771/53687S
The Charge d' Affaires in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
|No. 56 of March 22 Ankaea, March 22, 1939—2:30 p.m.
Received March 22 — 6:05 p.m.
The Bulgarian Minister President 1 received me yesterday before his
|journey home in order to acquaint me with the results of the conversa-
|tions held during his visit here. The salient points may be summarized
j follows:
1. The Minister President had informed the Turks in unambiguous
as that Bulgaria was ready to guarantee the existing Turco-
garian, and Yugoslav-Bulgarian frontiers, but not Bulgaria's present
I&i! Gheorghi Kiosseivanov.
76 DOCUMENTS ON GEHMAN FOREIGN POLICY
frontiers with Rumania and Greece. Bulgaria declined now as before
to enter the Balkan Pact 2 without previous frontier revision. He had,
moreover, frankly informed Ismet, the Turkish President, that ui his
view the Balkan Pact would break up at the first test.
2. Bulgaria regarded the Dobruja question 3 as urgent and admitting
of little further delay. K[iosseivanov] had asked the Turks what they
would do if Bulgaria took steps against Rumania; whether, in particular,
obligations under the Balkan Pact (defence obligations) had priority
over obligations under the Turco -Bulgarian Friendship Pact* (non-
aggression obligations). The Turks had on the first day acknowledged
these obligations under the Balkan Pact; on the following day, obviously
after consultation with the British Ambassador," this view had been
modified to the extent that the question of Turkey's attitude remained
open The Turkish Governmentrequested.however.that, shouldBulga-
ria intend to intervene in Rumania, she should previously consult them.
3. The Minister President told me that he had received news that
Germany had offered Rumania a guarantee of her present frontiers in
return for the fulfilment of her [Germany's] petroleum demands. He
could not believe this news was correct. For Bulgaria well knew that
without German help she must abandon her national aspirations.
Bulgaria, on the other hand, was ready to cooperate with Germany in
political and economic fields still more closely that heretofore, if that
were possible. The Minister President requested me with emotion to
transmit to the Reich Government the Bulgarian plea for support in
their national demands.
Kkoll
? : .:
2 The Pact between Greece, Kumania, Turkey and Yugoslavia constituting a, Balkan
Entente, signed at Athens, Feb. 9. 1934. For the text »^;™ i /«ff?»
Tap™s (London, H.M. Stationery Office, in progress) (hereinafter cited as B.F.S.P.), vol. .
"^JSiSkSd claim to the Southern Dobruja ceded to Rumania after the Second
Balkan War by the Treaty of Bucharest in 1913, re-ceded to Bulgaria when Ruman*
included a separate peac£ in 1918, and re-ceded to Bumania by the Treaty of Neudly
m * The Treaty of Friendship between Bulgaria and Turkey, signed at Ankara, Oct. 18,
1925. For the text see B.F.S.P., vol. 122, pp. 213-217.
& Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen.
No. 68
169/82508
The State Secretary to the Legation in Rumania
Telegram
^ n , n , Berlin, March 22, 1939—10:25 p.mJ:
JN ° 1 e.o.Pol. IV696g.v
Reports constantly coming in convey the impression here that?
Rumanian military measures have more than a purely security character ■
MARCH, 1939 77
and appear to amount to a total mobilization of the Rumanian Army.
The reason for this is not apparent. We therefore request that the
Rumanian Government be asked, without any particularly urgent
interest being displayed, about the cause and significance of these
measures. 1
Weizsackee
i Marginal note: ' : N.B. this telegram is based on information received from Political
Department] I Military Questions]."
No. 69
6J1/250750-54
The Charge' d' Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry
confidential Paris, March 22, 1939.
A 1197 Received March 23.
Pol. II 875.
I have the honour to submit herewith a German confidential agent's
memorandum on a conversation which he had on March 20 with
flandin, the former Minister President. Flandin's statements cor-
respond by and large with the views, heard elsewhere also, of those
French circles which have hitherto championed a settlement with Ger-
many and which, especially during the Czech crisis of September 1938,
intervened energetically for the maintenance of peace.
There definitely exists a desire in these circles to overcome the
crisis in German-French relations — as is also expressed in Flandin's
■ statements — even though at present the hope of doing so is small.
Beauee
[Enclosure]
Copy
CONVERSATION WITH PiERBE-EtIENNE FLANDIN
Flandin, the former Minister President, displayed considerable
|: pessimism regarding German-French future prospects during our conver-
psation which lasted about an hour. He said, by way of introduction,
pthat he did not understand the action against former Czecho -Slovakia.
M"Hy political friends and I have sought in vain to find a logical ex-
Eplanation for Hitler's motives. I find this political action the less
Incomprehensible since it was carried out just at a moment when the
^efforts of the advocates of a German-French understanding began to
Ishow concrete results. In my opinion the German authority over
Jthe Czech State was so strong and undisputed that the protec-
ittorate of Slovakia appears to be as superfluous as the annexation of
^Czechia. In any case the gain is in no wise proportionate to the
78 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
loss which Germany has suffered through the interruption of the
economic negotiations, 1 and through the complete abandonment of all
projects of international cooperation."
Flandin then quoted the general moral arguments which were being
brought forward by most Frenchmen at the present time. The new-
crisis through loss- of -confidence was, in his opinion, no temporary
manifestation, but was decidedly serious, deep-seated and lasting.
Flandin received with considerable scepticism my plea that, after a
few months, public opinion would calm down, and the plans for
German-French cooperation could surely be resumed . " I do not believe
that we are faced with a mere setback which, after some months, as you
say, may be overcome. I have rather the impression that something
is broken which can hardly be repaired. And this is particularly dis-
tressing to me. Certainly I am no prophet. Perhaps something will
happen in the future which will give us new points of contact, but it
will have to be something 'big'. For the moment the bridges are
broken and our public opinion will have nothing to do with Germany.
Even if the Reich Chancellor, Hitler, were to give an assurance to-
morrow that he had no intentions of annexing, or of taking under his
protection, other eastern or southeastern States of Europe, there
would be hardly anyone among us who would believe these words.
The seizure of former Czecho-Slovakia has produced the conviction in
France — as it has in British public opinion — that the Germans are
just a people striving for the hegemony of Europe, and that the brutal
urge of conquest is in their blood. Believe me, the blow against
Czecho-Slovakia has simply reduced twenty years' work for under-
standing to absurdity."
If the newly created situation were looked at soberly and objectively,
and all those trends were considered which, at the moment, were
agitating Europe anew, then in the last analysis, there was no way out
to be seen except war — even though it is not fitting to describe war as a
' ' way out ' ' . Certainly there could at the present time be no thought of
becoming involved in war; but were not the crisis through loss of con-
fidence, the shock to public opinion and the measures which the
Governments felt obliged to take, calculated to hasten a "recourse to
arms"?
I here objected that Germany's strategic position in respect of France
and Great Britain was very favourable. I referred to Britain's man-
power and war material, her limited possibilities, etc., and made no
secret of the fact that, in the view of my German acquaintances, all
measures against the German Reich, such as the recall of Ambassadors, 2
etc., were regarded as wasted efforts, and that in general it was ob-
1 See document No. 1 1 .
2 See document No. 25.
MAKCH, 1939 79
served with regret that France, and. Britain as well, would achieve
nothing by these methods, and merely ran the danger of suffering a loss
of prestige.
Fiandin replied to this as follows: "I fear that Germany is indulging
in an illusion in this respect. The democracies, especially the British
democracy, react very slowly, but if once the British have decided to
act, then nothing can hold them back. I do not regard the British
plan of calling something like a reduced League of Nations into being
as a qmntite negligeable. I also believe that economic warfare directed
against Germany may inflict very considerable damage on the Reich, "
Fiandin pointed out to me, in a lengthy exposition, the psychological
repercussions of the annexation in London and in Paris, and he re-
peatedly laid particular stress on the positive work done by the advo-
cates of a rapprochement during recent months. If people in France —
as also in Britain — had been prepared to forget the past, the pre-war
period and the war years, this had resulted from the conviction that in
Germany a new generation with a new and healthier mentality had
grown up. The blow against Czecho-Slovakia had destroyed this good
will with lightning rapidity. All the things which had outraged the
British sense of justice such as, for instance, the violation of Belgian
neutrality, etc., re-emerged from the past, and were used as proofs
that the mentality of the Germans had in no wise changed; that, in
attaining their aims of hegemony, they had no scruples, and that the
assurances of Germans must not be believed because they do not keep
their word: the new generation no more than their fathers did.
I expressed the view to M. Fiandin that it would appear to me more
rational if the newly-created situation, which was after all unalterable,
were regarded less from the psychological angle than from that of
political realism. Fundamentally, Munich had been a division of
spheres of interest; hence it was hardly comprehensible to a German
that su°h a clamour should be raised in Britain and France over the
German action.
Fiandin: "Pardon me, that is a great mistake. There is not one
word in the Munich Agreement to the effect that a division of spheres
of interest was intended, Germany has never declared herself ready
to renounce her colonial demands in Africa. On the contrary: Herr
|: Hitler is still vigorously supporting Italy's African claims! And the
annexation of Czecho-Slovakia has, in my opinion, by no means
secured for the Reich that economic equilibrium which could enable
her to base herself successfully on autarky in the future. Perhaps I
am wrong, but I hardly think so. The former Czecho-Slovakia has a
highly developed industry which depends upon sources of raw materials.
Germany will have to hunt for markets with increased energy, and the
| food problem may well involve the Reich in new difficulties. I am
^therefore — as I have said — convinced that Herr Hitler cannot think of
30 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
renouncing his colonial claims; rather it can be assumed that they will
continue to be urged even more vigorously. In view of this, therefore,
the opinion expressed by some journalists and politicians without re-
sponsibility that Munich was intended to give the Germans a free hand
in the East, while France was left to concentrate on her Empire, cannot
be maintained. " -Flandin emphasized in this connection that it had
always appeared to him normal and supportable that a Germany, re-
newed in strength, should turn economically towards the East and
South-East. He had always been in favour of this tendency although
he was conscious of the fact that this economic advance must naturally
displace the non-German Powers, and injure French and British in-
dustry . ' ' Today, however, we are confronted with a changed situation.
It is no longer a problem of economic penetration but manifestly of
political hegemony also. The British will attempt to save what they
can in the economic field; this will damage Germany and will, over and
above it, nurture fresh political tension. For this reason, and also for
otheT considerations, the success of the annexation seems to me to be
more than problematic for the German Reich. "
Once more the former Minister President began to speak of psycho-
logical matters: In his view the situation would not have been so grave
by far if the German Reich Chancellor had notified the French and
British Governments two days before the annexation; if he had at
least attempted to explain his motives and to give expression to the
fact that he had found himself obliged to take action. Certainly,
objections would have been raised and there would have been no lack
of protests, but the psychological shock would not have been so great.
One would not have had the impression of having been struck in the
face. Flandin countered my remark that there was, in the German-
French Declaration, 3 no provision for consultation in such an eventu-
ality, by saying that the Reich would indubitably have intervened
immediately if France had, in answer to the wishes of Catalonia,
assumed a protectorate over this Spanish province. If Paris had
presented the Reich with a fait accompli, on the plea that this matter
did not concern Germany, Berlin would not only have felt injured,
but would have replied with an intervention of its own.
Only something really "big " could overcome the present crisis.
. 3 Of Dec. 6, 193S. See vol. IV of this Series, document No. 369.
[Editors' Note. On March 23, Hitler landed in Memel. Docu-
ments dealing with the events which led to the German-Lithuanian
Treaty of March 22, 1939, and the cession of Memel will be found in
volume V of this Series, chapter III.]
MAKCH, 1939 81
No. 70
1 74/135900
The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
secret Tokyo, March 23, 1939—7:00 p.m.
No. 121 of March 23 Received March 23—6:10 p.m.
For the State Secretary.
I hear from a well-informed Japanese press source that, after de-
liberating for several hours, the Japanese Five Minister Conference, 1
under the chairmanship of the Minister President, decided at two
o'clock this morning to open diplomatic negotiations with Germany for
the purpose of concluding a military alliance directed against Russia.
Sections of the Army had recommended a more far-reaching military
pact also against third Powers. The Italian Government have demanded
the same. The Navy advised limiting it to Russia. Ambassador
Oshima is said to have forwarded an enquiry from the German Govern-
ment whether Japan wished to conclude a military alliance. 2 Al-
legedly, Germany had also heen agreeable to a purely anti-Russian
pact and had requested a reply by April 3. 3 Despite the alliance, the
Government here do not intend to destroy the bridge with America
and Britain, and are said to be considering concessions in China to this
end. The morning edition of the newspaper Asahi today also mentions
a secret conference of Ministers and announces that "an important
question of Japanese foreign policy will he decided in a few days' time ".
Ott
i Consisting of the Minister President, Baron Hiranuma, the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Arita, the Minister of War, General Itagaki, the Minister of Marine, Admiral
Yonai, and the Minister of Finance, Ishiwata.
i See Editors' Note below.
* No record of such a request has been found.
[Editors' Note. No evidence as to the precise nature of the
German-Japanese negotiations at this time has been found in the Ger-
man Foreign Ministry archives. The Foreign Ministry film of the
Buro RAM files on Japan contains none of the drafts listed below and
§ it is clear from volume IV of this Series, document No. 548, and from
document No. 270 in this volume, that special secrecy was observed in
their case. References to the negotiations will be found in volume IV
?of this Series, documents Nos. 400, 421, 422, 426, 542, 543 and 546. Some
(judication as to the nature of the proposals under discussion can be
s found in the Italian diplomatic documents, as quoted textually in
jjMario Toscano, Le Origini del Patto d'Acciaio (Florence, 1948).
The following drafts are there quoted verbatim:
(a) German draft of Tripartite Pact (original text in English, but
g2 DOCUMENTS ON GEKMAN FOREIGN POLICY
quoted by Toscano in Italian) given to Ciano by Ribbentrop at Munich
on September 29-30, 1938 (Toscano, op. cit., pp. 19-20). An English
translation from the Italian is printed in: Royal Institute of Inter-
national Affairs, Documents on International Affairs 1939-46, vol. I
(London 1951) pp. 145-146.
(6) German draft of Tripartite Treaty. Text m French, submitted
to Oshima, Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, late October 1938 (Toscano,
op cit pp. 24-26). This is not identical with draft (a) above. Ciano .
saw this draft on October 27, 1938 ; see The Ciano Diaries, entry of
October 27, 1938, and also volume IV of this Series, document No. 400
and Galeazzo Ciano: L'Europa verso la Catastrofe (Milan, 1948) pp.
373-378 (English translation in Ciano's Diplomatic Papers (London,
1948) pp 242-246). See also volume IV of this Series, document
No 421, for the letter of January 2, 1939, from Ciano to Ribbentrop
announcing Mussolini's withdrawal of his reservation on Ribbentrop's ■
plan to transform the Anti-Comintern Pact into a pact of military aid.
(c) Draft of Tripartite Pact of Alliance agreed to between Ribbentrop
and Oshima, and transmitted by Attolico to Ciano in a personal letter
on January 6, 1939 (Toscano, op. cit., pp. 52-56; an English translation
of the letter and Secret Protocol is printed in Documents on Inter-
national Affairs, op. cit., pp. 152-155).
The Japanese reply to this draft arrived in Berlin on February 1,
1939, accepting in principle but requesting that modification of details
of the draft should be discussed in Berlin, after the arrival of a special
commission composed of members of the Japanese Foreign and Navy ;
Ministries (Attolico telegram No. 53 of February 2, 1939, cited in .
Toscano, op. cit., p. 60). _ :
This commission, consisting of Consul General Ito, ot the foreign
Ministry, Lt. Col. Tatsumi, of the General Staff, and Rear Admiral Abe, ;
of the Navy Ministry, arrived in Berlin, via Rome, at the end of ;
February 1939. (See document No. 254, also volume IV of this Series, ;
document No. 547.) For the activities of this commission the following ■:
sources in the documents of the International Military Tribunal, Far
East (hereinafter cited as IMT FE) may be consulted. Evidence of^
General Kawabe, Japanese Military Attache, Berlin, October 1938- ;:
February 1940 (IMT FE Transcript of Proceedings on November 21, a
1947 pp. 33760 ff.), interrogation record on Hiroshi Oshima, Japanese )
Military Attache, Berlin, 1934-38, Japanese Ambassador, Bering
October 1938-October 1939 (IMT FE document 2156 D, pp. 7-11),
Affidavit of Oshima (IMT FE Defence document 2862, Exhibit No.
3508), Affidavit of Uzuhiko Usami, Counsellor to Japanese Embassy,
Berlin, November 1938-May 1940 (IMT FE Defence document 2630-
Exhibit No. 3494). According to the Affidavit by Usami, the Ito'|
commission brought with them a fourth draft, of which he gives a|
paraphrase. The purpose of the commission was, according to Oshima^
MAKCH, 1939 83
(IMT FE document 2156 D, Interrogation of Oshima, pp. 10-11), to
instruct Oshima and Shiratori, Japanese Ambassador in Rome, in the
views of the Japanese Government, and not to negotiate directly (see
also volume IV of this Series, document No. 547). Lt. Col. Tatsumi
however, seems to have had contact with Ribbentrop (Attolico report
No. 1864 of April 4, 1939, cited in Toscano, op. tit., p. 72), but no
evidence of this has been found in the. German Foreign Ministry
archives.]
No. 71
7485/E540436-37
The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy
in the United States
Telegram
No. 94 of March 23 Berlin, March 23, 1939—9:30 p.m.
W Villa 601 II.
With reference to your telegrams Nos. 89 l and 95.2
I. In accordance with the ordinance of the Minister of the Interior
of March 21 , 2 based on article 13 of the Fiihrer's decree of March 16,3
the existing Czecho -Slovak customs duties in the Protectorate of Bohe-
mia and Moravia, and the existing customs frontier between the Reich
and the Protectorate, will remain in operation until further notice.
; The date on which the incorporation of the Protectorate in the German
customs area will take place, as envisaged in article 9 of the decree, will
- be determined later.
Under this ordinance the principles and agreements by which econo-
mic relations have been carried on up to the present between Czecho-
; Slovakia and thu-d States will, for the time being, continue to be
.applied accordingly to economic relations between the Protectorate
I and third countries, not only in respect of customs duties but in
| general, in as far as such countries are prepared to reciprocate. 4
| Thus the American Treasury order of March 18, suspending most-
| favoured treatment for products from Bohemia and Moravia, does not
" take account of actual conditions.
?,V l Not printed (350/202306). On Mar. 17, Thomsen telegraphed that the Treasury had
|.»Bnounced that, as from Mar. 18, most-favoured-nation treatment would be withdrawn
J&om Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia.
|v s Sot printed (350/202259); in this telegram of Mar.. 20, Thomson sent the text of the
fiStete Department s .Note in answer to the German Note of Mar. 17. See also docu-
EfflBBt No. 14.
Si', s See vol. iv of this Series, document No. 246.
I'* Telegrams of instructions on a similar declaration to be made by German Missions
|»ccredited to Governments having trade relations with Czecho-Slovakia, were despatched
loaMar. 22 (not printed, 8467/E595885-86 and 8S8-905); excluding Washington and
KMoscow where special circumstances prevailed, according to information supplied by
Ipaodius on Mar. 23 to certain Reich Ministries (not printed, 8467/E59588'7). The
jpocument here printed is the telegram sent to Washington, but no record of any similar
BiCoBimunication to Moscow has been found.
g^ DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Please inform the [American] Government of ^e above eit her
orally or in writing, without requesting a reply, so that we shall not
be exposed to another refusal, especially after what occurred at the
tune of the reunion with Austria.a Should the American Government
themselves declare their readiness to rescind the order of ^March
American imports will be dealt with as heretofore, until the Protec-
torate is finally incorporated in the German customs territory or other
agreements concluded with the American Government.
Please report by telegram on the execution of your ddmarche and,
if pertinent, how it is received.
II. For information only.
(a) We shall wait for about another week for a possible declaration
of such readiness, and then, if nothing happens, we shall ourselves put
new arrangements into effect and, in particular, shall no longer provide
foreign exchange for American imports to the Protectorate, winch
WO uld practically amount to a complete stoppage of imports.
(61 Suspension of most-favoured nation treatment for Slovak goods
is completely unjustified, as Slovakia is an independent State which has
not even a customs or currency union with Germany We leave it to
the Slovak Government to make representations on this matter. Un
the other hand, there are no objections to drawing attention to the
facts of the case in conversation.
6 On Apr. 6, 1938, in a letter to the Secret at y ^^^^^^ZSyt
No. 72
1593/3S4240
The Charge d' Affaires in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 63 of March 23 Ankara, March 23, 1939-10:38 p.m.
Received March 24—5:00 a,m.g
Pol. VII 503. |
With reference to your telegram No. 50 of March 21. 1 M
Saracoglu, the Foreign Minister, has confirmed to me that the *rencfc|
Ambassador here had initially proposed, in the form of a personal|
l Document No. 09. '.'
MARCH, 1939 85
suggestion, conversations concerning the union of Hatay with Turkey,
and that such conversations had even begun. In this connection, the
French had suggested as advantageous the conclusion, in place of the
Turco-French agreement signed at the time of the Hatay settlement
guaranteeing territorial inviolability in the Hatay area, of a similar
treaty of assistance guaranteeing the new Tureo -Syrian frontier as
constituted heretofore by Hatay. Conversations had not yet progressed
very far and their outcome was uncertain. In accordance with de-
clarations repeatedly made to us, Turkey continued to decline the
conclusion of a general treaty of assistance with any Great Power
whatsoever. I have expressed in all seriousness to the Foreign Minister
the confident expectation of the Reich Government that Turkey will
■ continue to pursue also in the future a policy of the strictest neutrality
towards the Great Powers and will outwardly avoid even the semblance
of a different attitude.
Kroll
No. 73
116/66409-14
The Foreign Minister to the. Embassy in Poland
Draft Telegram 1
No. Berlin, March. . ., 1939.
Tor Ambassador personally.
Now that M. Lipski, in accordance with my proposal, has left last
night for Warsaw to report orally, please request an interview with M.
Beck at once, to put before him again for your part also, in earnest and
emphatic terms, our attitude to the present state and future develop-
ment of German-Polish relations, and to do this in my name and on the
lines of my conversation of March 21 with M. Lipski 2 with which you
: are abeady acquainted. In doing so please lay particular emphasis on
the following points:
1) The Fiihrer considers it of decisive importance that the Danzig
H question should be solved soon. The development of the general
B political situation as well as the development of conditions in Danzig
! itself demand a speedy settlement. We are convinced that a further
l Marginal note: "Draft. Cancelled, by order of the Fiihrer." This draft is undated,
forat evidently relates to Mar. 23 as appears from a note by Weizsacker of Mar. 24
BJ97/108S11) which reads as follows! "On the evening of March 23 I asked Ambassador
bvod Moltke by telephone provisionally to request an interview with Minister Beck.
pfairvonMoltke would probably receive detailed instructions in the course of the follow,
ffigday (March 24). These would be along the lines of the conversation held on March 21,
Sletween the Reich Foreign Minister and Ambassador Lipski, and in consequence of
jptluch Lipski is at present in Warsaw."
* See document No. 61.
86 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
postponement of the question might very easily lead to a situation
which -would render at least difficult if not impossible a friendly settle-
ment on the lines of the far-reaching development and intensification of
German-Polish relations desired by us.
2) The basic principles of a settlement of the Danzig question en-
visaged by us have .been repeatedly stated to the Polish Government
by the Fiihrer as well as by me: Return of Danzig to the Reich, extra-
territorial rail and road communications between East Prussia and the
Reich, also linking up Danzig; in return, a binding recognition for
25 years, to be laid down by treaty, of the Polish Corridor and the whole
of Poland's western frontier. In addition, insofar as the reincorpora-
tion of Danzig into the Reich causes economic or technical transport
difficulties for Poland, in spite of the development of Gdynia, we are
prepared to treat these with consideration.
3) Our quid pro quo for Danzig, however, would not be limited to these
concrete promises but beyond this, after the removal of this obstacle,
it would lie in the really great possibilities of a common German-Polish
policy. The strengthening of Germany would then react in full measure
in favour of Poland's international position, as there would no longer
be any rivalry or conflicting interests between the two countries. Above
all Germany could then pursue a common Eastern policy with Poland
in which the identical interests of both countries in warding off Bol-
shevism could also effectively be realized. We are also prepared, as we
have already proved in the treatment of Carpatho -Ukraine, to concede
to Poland the leading role in the future development of the whole
Ukraine problem.
4) Our future attitude to Slovakia is also to be judged from the same
standpoint. After the proclamation of the Protectorate of Bohemia
and Moravia, the Fiihrer could not simply ignore the appeal for protec-
tion addressed to him by Slovakia. Following the assurance of German
protection we had now also concluded a concrete Treaty with Slovakia, 3
as it would have been impossible just to leave in suspense Germany's
relationship with this remaining element of the former Czecho -Slovakia.
Such a vacuum on the eastern frontier of the Reich would have been
intolerable for us. It is obvious, however, that the treaty concluded
with Slovakia allows of extremely wide scope 'in the extent to which
it takes effect. The measure of this effectiveness will naturally be
governed primarily by the future development of Germany's relation-
ship to Poland. If this development is in accordance with our wishes,
the possibility of a common treatment of the Slovak problem by
Germany, Poland and Hungary would also be opened up.
5) In weighing up correctly all these points of view it would be com-
pletely erroneous to say that by the reincorporation of Danzig into the
3 See document No. 40.
MARCH, 1930 87
Reich, Poland was exchanging something really concrete for merely-
abstract or vague assurances. The Polish. Government could certainly
be in no doubt that, however the separate policies of both Govern-
ments developed, Danzig could in no case be permanently prevented
from reunion with the Reich. Poland should therefore not commit the
serious mistake of clinging obstinately to a position which in the long
run must prove untenable. Now that we had already repeatedly
offered the Polish Government a solution on the above-mentioned basis,
without receiving any positive response, we naturally could not repeat
this offer ad infinitum. Indeed, if the Polish Government still adopt
a purely passive or evasive attitude, the Fiihrer is resolved to withdraw
his offer once and for all, as we could only interpret such an attitude on
the part of Poland as a direct rejection of our intentions and as an
attitude directed in principle against the Third Reich.
6) I therefore once again urgently request M. Beck through you to pay
a visit to Berlin in the near future to discuss very thoroughly and frankly,
first with me and then also with the Fiihrer himself, all these political
questions. The Fiihrer, as well as I personally, would greatly welcome
it if in this way we might succeed in bringing German-Polish relations
out of the now clearly increasing stagnation into a fruitful course.
This would be quite in keeping with the broad lines of the Fuhrer's
policy and he would only allow himself to be dissuaded from such a
positive formulation of the relationship to Poland, if, to his own regret,
he became convinced that Poland did not wish to heed his intentions
but to follow other paths.
Please report at once in detail by telegram on the result of your
conversation witn M. Beck. I may then decide to summon you to
Berlin to give an oral report.
RlBBENTROP
No. 74
The Consul General at Danzig to the Foreign Ministry
No. 454 Danzig, March 23, 1939.
Received March 25.
Pol. V 2704.
Subject: Danzig Diet.
ha the course of a recent conversation between Greiser, the President
|; of the Senate, and Minister Chodacki, the Polish diplomatic representa-
tive, the question of the new elections for the Danzig Diet was also raised.
In this connection, and following consultation with Foreign Minister
: !Beck, Minister Chodacki gave the view of the Polish Government,
1; which was that the Polish Government were not interested in whether
gg DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
an election for the Diet took place or whether and in what way the
term of office of the present Diet was extended. On the basis of this
statement, Greiser, the President of the Senate, informed Minister
Chodacki that, by virtue of the Enabling Act, the Senate proposed to
prolong the present term of the Diet by a Senate ordinance until
further notice. 1 -
1 have the honour to transmit in the annex 2 a minute ot the con-
versation which was placed at my disposal.
Janson
i On Mar 24 Janson reported that the Senate had, on Mar. 21, issued an ordinance for
the prolongation of the existing Diet's term of office for a further period of four years
(not printed, 2389/499882). , vr.i-
2 Not printed (2389/499881). The conversation took place on Mar. 1 1.
No. 75
2770/536811-12
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
No A538 Moscow, March 23, 1939.
Pol. II 917.
Subject: Official Soviet communique on the Soviet proposal for a
conference.
With reference to my report No. A506 of March 20 l and telegram
No. 37 of March 22.2
1 enclose a translation of the communique by the Soviet Government
published on March 22 concerning the Soviet proposal for a conference
of representatives of Great Britain, France, Rumania, Poland, Turkey
and the Soviet Union. 3
Count von der Schulenburg
i Document No. 50. , .
2 Not printed (258/169445). This telegram replied to the enquiry contained m docu-
ment No 58 by referring briefly to the Soviet communique transmitted in full in the
document here printed on the subject of the British enquiry and the Soviet reply.
a See also British Documents, Third Series, vol. iv, Nos. 461 and 462.
[Enclosure]
Tass Communique Published in the Moscow Press on
March 22, 1939
Pol. II 917.
The foreign press is circulating rumours to the effect that the Soviet
Government recently offered Poland and Rumania their assistance in
the event of their becoming the victims of aggression. Tass is autho-
rized to state that this does not correspond to the facts. Neither
Poland nor Rumania has approached the Soviet Government for assis-
MARCH, 193A 39
tance or informed the Soviet Government of any danger threatening
them. Correct is only that the British Government notified the Soviet
Government on the 18th of this month that there were serious reasons
for fearing an act of aggression against Rumania, and enquired as to
the possible attitude of the Soviet Government to such an eventuality.
In reply to this enquiry, the Soviet Government proposed that a con-
ference be called of representatives from the States most interested,
that is, Great Britain, France, Rumania, Poland, Turkey and the Soviet
Union. Such a conference would, in the opinion of the Soviet Govern-
ment, offer the greatest possibility of clarifying the actual situation and
the attitude of all participants of the conference. The British Govern-
ment, however, considered this proposal premature.
No. 76
SS1S/4S4508
Minute by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat
Berlin, March 23, 1939.
The Foreign Minister, in the course of a telephone conversation today,
drew the attention of the Hungarian Minister to reports that the
Hungarians had advanced from Kosice to Presov and had already
encircled Michalovce in eastern Slovakia. The Reich Foreign Minister
further pointed out to the Hungarian Minister that such action could
in no way be approved. The Hungarian Minister emphatically denied
that any action had been undertaken from Kosice and stated that,
according to his information, Hungarian troops had merely occupied
such territory which they claimed — as discussed with us l — as a frontier
rectification against Slovakia.
The Hungarian Minister promised to obtain information in Budapest.
KORDT
l In a memorandum of Mar. 17 (not printed, 350/202329), Woermann recorded that
Gen. von Tippelskireh had told Weizsacker that the boundary line west of Ungvar as
drawn on the map by the Hungarians went further than was justified by military re-
■ quirementa. Woermann had telephoned to the Hungarian Minister, Sztoiay askins
that military operations should not extend further west.
No. 77
;.'KW32"30
fl Memorandum by the State Secretary
St.S. No. 261 Berlin, March 23, 1939.
The Hungarian Minister 1 today mentioned to me a request made to
|^him by the Reich Foreign Minister about sparing the somewhat
1 DSme Sztujay,
90 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
radically minded Sitzleute [sic] 2 . The Hungarian Government should
not deny transit rights through the Carpatho-Ukraine to the people of
this category who had connections with Admiral Canaris.
The Minister added that he had taken the necessary steps in this
matter in Budapest.
Wbizsackek
2 Evidently the Sic, the armed and uniformed Ukrainian nationalist organization in
Ruthenia. See also vol. iv of this Series, documents Kos. 210 and 215. In telegram
No. 40 from Chust of Mar. 14 (not printed, 2381/499056-57), Hofmann, who was in
charge of the German Consulate there, had reported clashes between the Czech gendar-
merie and the Sid, and transmitted a further appeal to the Reich from Volosin for pro-
tection against the invading Hungarians. In a subsequent telegram, No. 48 of Mar. 16
(not printed, 1969/437937), Hofmann reported that the Hungarians had suffered con-
siderable losses in fighting against the Sid. See also Editors' Note below.
[Editors' Note. Evidence in the German Foreign Ministry archives
indicates that the official German attitude towards the Sic and towards
the Carpatho-Ukraine question generally had been extremely reserved.
In response to enquiries from the Czecho -Slovak Government in
February, 1939, as to German views on the Carpatho-Ukraine, reported
by the Prague Legation under A III 2.h.5 of February 16 (not printed,
2381/499099-100), Altenburg had recommended in a minute of Feb-
ruary 22 (not printed, 2381/499105) that the Carpatho-Ukraine question
be not discussed with Prague, at least for the present. In a minute of
March 7 (not printed, 2381/499115-16), on a conversation on that date
with Oldofredi, leader of the Volksdeutsche, who referred to statements
by State Secretary Keppler that Germany would not tolerate injustice
towards the Carpatho-Ukraine by Prague, Altenburg recorded that he
had made it clear that the Reich was not to be committed to active
support. Following reports, in telegram No. 28 of March 7 from Chust
(not printed, 2381/4991 10), of disagreements between the central
Government in Prague and the Volosin Government in Chust, Weiz-
sacker had instructed the German Consulate there (in telegram No. 13
of March 8, not printed, 2381/499111) to avoid any political conversa-
tions with Volosin or other personages. On receipt of the message from
the Carpatho-Ukraine Government declaring their independence under
German protection, transmitted in Chust telegram No. 37 of March 14
(printed in volume IV of this Series, document No. 210), Altenburg
minuted on March 14 (7587/E543255): "Herr Hewel, obtaining in-
structions from the Reich Foreign Minister, telephoned that no action
is to be taken [on this telegram], " Hungarian forces began marching
into the Carpatho-Ukraine on March 15 (see volume IV of this Series,
documents Nos. 236 jf.) On March 22 Ribbentrop sent Csaky a tele-
gram of congratulation on the reunion of the Carpatho-Ukraine with
Hungary (not printed, 1969/437963}.]
MARCH, 1939 Q\
No. 78
2104/455770-75; 764-69
German- Rumanian Economic Treaty
Treaty
for the Promotion op Economic Relations Between
the German Reich and the Kingdom of Rumania i
The German Reich and the Kingdom of Rumania, desirous of in-
tensifying the constantly expanding economic relations between the
two countries and of cooperating in their mutual interests on a broad
and planned basis in the economic field, have in pursuance of their
peaceful aims agreed to conclude a treaty to this effect.
For this purpose there have been nominated as their plenipoten-
tiaries,
by the Chancellor of the German Reich :
the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in
Bucharest, Dr. Wilhelm Fabricius,
and the Ministerialdirektor to the Commissioner for the Four
Year Plan, Herr Helmuth Wohlthat,
by His Majesty the King of Rumania:
The Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Grigore Gafencu,
and the Minister of Economics, M. loan E. Bujoiu,
who having examined their powers and found them in good and proper
form have agreed on the following:
Article I
An economic plan providing for cooperation for several years between
: the contracting parties will be drawn up to supplement the existing
German-Rumanian economic relations under which the balance of
mutual trade shall be maintained in principle.
The economic plan shall take into account on the one hand German
import requirements and on the other hand development possibilities
, for Rumanian production and Rumanian domestic requirements as
well as the necessity for Rumania to maintain economic relations with
other countries.
| The economic plan shall include in particular:
la. The development and direction of Rumanian agricultural pro-
duction. After a previous exchange of information by the depart-
ments concerned on both sides a start will be made both on the
cultivation of new agricultural products and an increase in those
. l The text of this Treaty, but not the confidential Protocol of Signature, was published
|vm BiutegutlzUatt, 1939, Part II, pp. 779-781. For Wohlthat's account of the negotia-
| tons which led to the conclusion of the Treaty, see vol. v of this Series, document No
W>- 306, and this volume, document No. 131.
92 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
already cultivated, in particular, feeding stuffs, oil seeds and fibrous
plants.
6. The development of existing and the starting of fresh agricultural
industries and processing concerns.
2a. The development of the Rumanian timber trade and forestry.
b. The establishment of timber trade concerns and industries in so
far as this appears necessary in view of 2a.
3a. The delivery of machinery and installations for mining in
Rumania.
b. The formation of mixed German-Rumanian companies for pros-
pecting and exploiting copper pyrites in the Dobruja, chromium in
the Banat, manganese ores in the neighbourhood of Vatra Dornei-
Brosteni. Likewise, the possibility will be studied of utilizing
bauxite deposits and, if need be, of developing an aluminium
industry.
4. The formation of a mixed German-Rumanian company, the object
of which shall be to prospect for petroleum and carry out a programme
of boring and refining.
5. Cooperation in the industrial field.
6. The establishment of free zones in which industrial and com-
mercial undertakings may be formed, and the provision of storage and
transshipment facilities for German shipping in these free zones.
7. The delivery of war material and equipment for the Rumanian
Army, Navy and Air Force and the armaments industry.
8. The development of the communications and transport systems,
the network of roads and waterways.
9. The setting-up of publicly owned undertakings.
10. Collaboration between German and Rumanian banks in the
interest of both countries and especially with a view to financing
individual projects.
Article II
The Government Committees, set up under Article 32 of the Treaty of
March 23, 1935 2 between the German Reich and the Kingdom of
Rumania, relating to Establishment, Commerce and Navigation, will
be entrusted with the execution of this Treaty.
Article III
The Government Committees will as occasion arises inform one
another of their intentions which come within the meaning of this
Treaty. They will decide regarding the execution of individual projects.
The two Governments will afford the necessary assistance to economic
organizations and firms engaged in the preparatory work on and the
carrying out of the projects specified in Article I and will, by granting
2 For the text of this treaty see Reicksgesetzblatt, 1935, Part II, pp. 311-338.
MARCH, 1939 93
such licences as are required by law, facilitate the execution of the
projects approved by the Government Committees.
Article IV
The payments to be made by Germany to Rumania and vice versa
consequent on the implementation of this Treaty will be effected in
accordance with the regulations generally in force for German-Rumanian
payments. The Government Committees may agree that a percentage
of the proceeds of those deliveries of goods provided for in Article I
Nos. 7-9, or other such deliveries be used for capital investment and
financing the projects specified in Article I.
Article V
This Treaty shall be ratified. It will come into force one month after
the instruments of ratification have been exchanged, which shall be
done in Berlin as soon as possible. The contracting parties will apply
the treaty provisionally as from the day of signature.
This Treaty shall remain in force until March 31,1944. Should it not
be denounced a year before this date, it shall be regarded as having
been extended for an unspecified period. It may then be denounced
at any time subject to one year's notice at the end of any calendar
quarter.
Done in duplicate at Bucharest in the German and Rumanian lan-
guages, both texts having equal authenticity, on March 23, 1939.
WlLHELM FaBRICIUS GrIGORE GaFENCU
Helmuth Wohlthat I. e. Bujoiu
confidential
Protocol of Signature
to the Treaty for the Promotion of Economic Relations
BETWEEN THE GERMAN REICH AND THE KINGDOM OF RUMANIA
■ On signature of the Treaty for the Promotion of Economic Relations
I between the German Reich and the Kingdom of Rumania of March
1 23rd, 1939, the concurrence of the Contracting Parties on the inter-
| pretation and implementation of the agreements reached has been
i. placed on record in respect of the following points:
I With reference to Article I, Section 1.
|; Desirous of developing Rumania's agriculture, the German Govern-
|ment are agreeable to the necessary experts being placed at the disposal
|pf the Rumanian authorities. They will, furthermore, promote the
reapply of the necessary machinery and plant by German firms.
j}; The Royal Rumanian Government will set up suitable organizations
94 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
for promoting the production and processing of agricultural produce
and, as far as may appear necessary, will facilitate the establishment of
mixed German-Rumanian companies to deal with the conclusion of
cultivation contracts, to engage in trading in, and the processing of,
agricultural produce and to arrange for the financing thereof.
With reference to Article I, Section 2.
The German-Rumanian timber and forestry committee will, over a
period of years, make a survey of the quantities of coniferous and
beech sawn timber, coniferous logs and coniferous wood pulp available
in Rumania for export to Germany and will agree upon the grading of
each type. They will submit to the Government Committees proposals
for the exploitation of forests and for reafforestation. The Government .
Committees will, as and when necessary, decide upon the despatch of
timber and forestry experts.
With reference to Article I, Section 4.
As soon as data are available, the projected German-Rumanian
company will draw up a minimum programme of boring and, where
advisable, of refining, to be approved by the Royal Rumanian Govern-
ment. The Royal Rumanian Government will take the necessary
steps to facilitate the execution of a large scale petroleum pro-
gramme.
With reference to Article I, Section 5.
In order to facilitate cooperation between German and Rumanian
industry, a mixed industrial sub-committee of the Government Com-
mittees will be formed which will submit the requisite proposals to the
Government Committees.
With reference to Article I, Section 6.
The Royal Rumanian Government agree to the formation in the '
Tree Zone, of mixed German-Rumanian companies which will engage
in manufacture and export. The Government Committees will take
decisions from case to case on the setting up and the details of the
technical organizations, the equipping, financing and so on.
With reference to Article I, Sections 7-9.
The total commercial credit will be in the order of about 200-250
million RM.
With reference to Article I, Section 8.
German supplies are contemplated inter alia for the Rumanian tele-
communications network, the Rumanian railways, merchant shipping.
and civil aviation in as far as Rumanian requirements cannot be met;
by Rumanian industry.
MAECH, 1939 95
With reference to Article, I, Section 9.
Orders for public monopolies also come under this provision. The
construction of electrical, gas and water works, of hospitals, fire stations,
abattoirs and cold storage is contemplated inter alia.
With reference to Article I, Section 10.
The Royal Rumanian Government will permit German banks to
have an interest in Rumanian banking institutions.
In order to promote the development of Rumanian production as
envisaged by the agreements reached, the German Government will
encourage German banks to afford German suppliers adequate support
to enable them to grant commercial credits for investments, economic-
ally sound or approved by the Government Committees.
With reference to Article II.
The terms of reference of the Government Committees shall be to
achieve the uniform, orderly and central implementation of the Treaty.
The Government Committees are to ensure that the programme of
deliveries and purchases contemplated under this Treaty does not
disturb the balance of payments and that any considerable fluctuations
which may occur may be rectified by measures in the field of commodity
exchange or, should this provide no relief, by suitable financial
measures.
The Rumanian Government Committee will submit proposals for the
representation of German firms in Rumania to the German Govern-
ment Committee from case to case.
With reference to Article III.
With regard to the grant of residence permits, express reference is
made to Article I, paragraph 3, of the Treaty of Establishment, Com-
merce and Navigation of March 23, 1935, between the German' Reich
and the Kingdom of Rumania. 2
Wtih reference to Article I V.
The present rule that goods paid for under the German -Rumanian
Gearing Agreement are for consumption within the Customs Territory
of either country and not for export to third countries also holds good
for transactions effected under the present Treaty.
In the execution of the projects to be approved under the present
; Treaty, care must be taken to ensure that financial measures (invest-
j;ments, credits) are kept within limits which do not disturb the course
|f of commodity exchange.
H TPiiA reference to Article V.
||;., Both Governments will treat the Protocol of Signature as confidential
ijand will, without prior consultation, neither publish details therefrom
For the text of this Treaty see Seic}isgesUzblatt, 1935 Part II, pp. 311-338.
96 DOCUMENTS ON GEBMAN FOREIGN POLICY
nor bring them to the knowledge of third Governments or persons or
firms whom they do not concern.
Done in duplicate at Bucharest in the German and Rumanian
languages, both texts having equal authenticity, on March 23, 1939.
WlLHELM FABEICIUS GkIGOBE GaFENCU
Helmuts; Wohlthat I. E. Bujonx
No. 79
1625/388391-92
The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 44 of March 23 Warsaw, March 24, 1939 — 3:30 a.m.
Received March 24 — 8:10 a.m.
Pol. II 905.
With reference to your telegram No. 65 of March 21. x
Upon investigation here it has been established that in regard to the
British demarches two separate moves were involved.
Concerning the Polish attitude towards the demarche about the
threat to Rumania, a remark passed by Under State Secretary Arci-
szewski to some diplomats here is of interest. Coupled with disparaging
remarks about Britain and France, who always want to misuse Poland
for extraneous ends without incurring any risk to themselves, he de-
clared that Poland would at all times take up arms in her own interests
and would wage even a hopeless struggle, but never would she fight
merely in the interests of other Powers. One would probably not go
far wrong in assuming that the reply to the British demarche on the
Rumanian question was given somewhat along these lines.
It has not been possible so far to learn anything definite regarding
the other British suggestions, in connection with which the British
Ambassador 2 has paid repeated visits to the Polish Foreign Ministry.
From the general trend of Beck's policy it is, however, safe to assume
that Poland — emulating her attitude in the question of the Comintern
Pact — would be prepared only with reluctance to join any combination,
or allow herself to become involved in moves which would force her to
declare her position prematurely and openly. That of course does not
imply that Poland would not act if, in the course of these negotiations,
the opportunity were to occur of obtaining definite British assurances
which would increase her security in the event of a German attack.
Beck, however, would decide to associate himself with an overt move,
only if he were forced to do so by the increasingly noticeable wave of
i Document No. 5S, which was sent to Warsaw as telegram No. C5.
2 Sir Howard Kennard.
MARCH, 1930 97
nationalism which threatens his position. Meanwhile, the arrest of the
prominent editor, Mackiewicz.s who although an adherent of Pilsudski
is a bitter opponent of Beck, might be an indication that the Foreign
Minister's position is still strong. e
Agitation among the Polish population has increased considerably
since the return of Memel to the Reich.* The main reason for this is
that it is generally feared that now it will be the turn of Danzig and the
Corridor. The Government appear to assess the Memel question with
considerably greater calm. Under State Secretary Arciszewski it is
true, spoke to me of a "very unpleasant surprise", but remarked in
passing that it was essentially a concern of the signatory Powers Still
the call-up of reservists, which has been observed in isolated cases for
some days, but which has been intensified since yesterday, shows that
the Government consider it advisable to make it known abroad but
particularly at home, that Poland will not submit to any interference
with her vital interests. 5
Moltke
3 Editor of Stovoo.
* See Editors' Note on p. 80.
6 Marginal note: "Settled by Pol. II 906 [see document No. 83]. R[intelen]. 25/3."
No. 80
2767/585330
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram (by courier)
No. 122 of March 24 Bucharest, March 24, 1939.1
Received March 27 — 2:35 p.m.
Pol. II 944.
With reference to your telegram No. 95 of March 21 (Pol. II 798) 2
I. Foreign Minister Gafencu had already informed me of Minister
Tilea's attitude as described by telegram from London. It seemed to
me unbelievable, as up to now Tilea has always been loyal to us here
and, although President of the Anglo -Rumanian Cultural Association,'
he was considered to be pro -German from conviction.
The Foreign Minister explains his attitude as due to excessive zeal
in following his own economic policy. But this should not have de-
viated from the economic policy of the Government. For this reason
. . 1 The hour of despatch is not recorded
■f *Not p^ted (5453/E366628). This telegram repeated to Bucharest the text of
' &SST& N -°' 4 t a £ d ^ teIegra j n 2°- 60 of Mar " 19 from Budapest (not printed, 2767/
S f 5826-27) in which Erdmannsdorff reported that he had been told in strict confidence
w - bjr CsAky that the Hungarian Minister in London had been asked by Sir Orme Sargent
y (Assistant Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office) what would be the Him-
>v ganan attitude m the event of a German attack on Rumania
* 7
98
DOCUMENTS ON GEBMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Tilea had been recalled. It would be decided here whether he would
return to London at all.
II. The Foreign Minister re -affirmed to me that he had requested
the British not to come here for the discussion of concrete business until
the German-Rumanian negotiations were concluded. He complained
of the enormous pressure which up to the last moment had been exerted
on the Government from abroad, in order to prevent the conclusion of
the Wohlthat Treaty. 3 For example, the British Minister* had called
on him concerning an alleged German economic ultimatum which he
had denied. The Minister again called because his denial was not
believed in London. Gafencu without further ado then took the
Minister to the King, who repeated this to him and explained to him
what was being negotiated with Germany.
III. Gafencu also complained of the incredible rumours which had
been circulated in order to overthrow him.
IV. There is nothing to report regarding the alleged suggestion by
King Carol for an exchange of views on the guarantee of Rumania's
frontiers by the Western Powers.
Fabbicfus
s i.e., the Treaty printed as document No. 78.
* Sir Reginald Hoa.re. See also British Documents, Third Series, vol. iv, No. 443.
No. 81
2770/536313
The Charge d' Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 39 of March 24 Moscow, March 24, 1939—8:24 p.m.
Received March 24 — 9:5 p.m.
Pol. II 922.
With reference to your telegram No. 44 (Pol. II 825) of March 21.i
Hudson arrived yesterday. In the afternoon he visited Litvinov and
Potemkin and also had a discussion with Mikoyan. I had an oppor-
tunity of speaking to Hudson and Ashton-Gwatkin afterwards at a I
reception by the British Commercial Attache 2 here, and learned that
Hudson only intends to conduct preliminary trade discussions here.
If the results are favourable the negotiations proper would take place . |
i Not printed (2770/536808). This telegram contained an enquiry, based on a report
from Helsinki, and addressed to the Embassies at Moscow and London, as to whether it
was true that Hudson was empowered to invito Litvinov to London, In telegram ;
No. 86 of Mar. 23 from London (not printed, 2770/536809), Kordt replied that nothing ,|
was known of this. It was, however, thought that Litvinov had himself offered to come. |
to London in connection with the Russian proposal for a conference.
2 Frank Todd, Commercial Secretary at the British Embassy.
Northwestern
University
Library
MAEOH, 1939 Qg
in London with a Soviet delegation, preferably led by Mikoyan. Mean-
while, nothing can be ascertained regarding the alleged invitation for
Litvinov to go to London. I leave it to you to inform Helsinki in
accordance with telegram quoted.
TlPPELSKIECH
No. 82
1975/438343
The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 79 of March 24 Budapest, March 24, 1939—1 1 : 10 p.m.
Received March 25—4:10 a.m.
Pol. IV 2109.
The Foreign Minister informed me that he would receive the Ru-
manian Minister i tomorrow and make the following statement to him:
In the event of the Minister being able to declare officially that Rumania
would commence demobilization within 24 hours, the Hungarian
Government would immediately rescind the measures adopted for the
defence of Budapest and would reduce the 6th Army Corps in Debreczen
to peace strength.
Erdmannsdoref
i Raoul Bossy.
No. 83
1625/S8S393-90
Circular of the State Secretary i
Telegram
immediate Berlin, March 24, 1939.
zu Pol. II 906. 2
Reports so far to hand here on progress and results of diplomatic
faction by the British Government towards the formation of a united
% faint against Germany 3 give the following picture:
f On March 18 the British Government approached a large number of
!■ foreign Governments to find out their attitude towards the German
|| action, as well as to the— according to Britain— supposedly imminent
g .'.: 1 Addressees were all Missions in. Europe (excepting those at San Sebastian Tallinn
|Riga,Kovno and Luxembourg), the Embassy at Washington and the Consulates General
g'at Ottawa and oydney.
It: ■' Not printed (7492/E540482). In this telegram, No. 16 of Mar. 23 from Oslo, Sahm
Ereported that no British or French approach had been made to Norway.
W- .' See document No. 58.
100 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
German attack on Rumania. This enquiry was made by Britain,
partly as a mere ballon d'essai, partly in more precise form, apart from
Paris, in Warsaw, Moscow, the Balkans, Hungary, and also Portugal.
In Europe, the Baltic and Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands,
Belgium and Switzerland were not asked. Furthermore, Britain had
circulated this enquiry to the Dominions. The result of this move was
obviously only moderately satisfactory, as the majority of the Govern-
ments asked apparently replied in the negative or evasively, and even
the Dominions did not show any inclination to be drawn into a
European conflict so long as Britain herself was not attacked. Moscow
replied with the counter proposal to call a conference. 4
In view of this result, London turned to closer consideration of the
idea of a joint declaration by Britain, France, Russia and Poland, 6
whereby these Powers were to enter into consultation regarding
joint resistance in the event of a renewed threat by Germany.
This proposal, however, encountered strong suspicion in Warsaw,
whilst Moscow, according to an unconfirmed Reuter report, is said to
have assented. Poland obviously fears to appear openly in an anti-
German combination by associating herself with the declaration, the
consequences of which she would be the first to have to take in any
given case, without having thereby obtained reliable guarantees for her
security. Moreover, Poland would look on Russia as a dubious
partner.**
These difficulties appear then to have led London to consider falling
back on the Russian proposal for a conference. Furthermore, according
to information as yet not fully confirmed, a dual declaration is now
contemplated in London: first, a guarantee to Belgium, the Nether-
lands, and Switzerland by France and Britain, and secondly, a declara-
tion for the protection of the eastern European countries against
German attack. This much, however, may be taken for certain, that
in comparison with the initial announcement in the London and Paris
press, the final result of the British action will prove to be very meagre.
Moreover, this action mainly denotes a wooing of Moscow by Britain,
through which she makes herself less attractive to other countries and
repeats the French mistake of 1935. 7 This aspect of the matter is
especially to be emphasized in conversations.
Should essential additions or corrections to this picture be established
by you, please report by telegram. 8
Weizsacker
1 See document No. 75.
6 See British Documents, Third Series, vol. iv, No. 446.
6 In telegrams No. 85 of Mar. 22 {not printed, 1625/388387) and No. 90 of Mar, 23 (not
printed, 1625/388389-90), Kordt had sent similar information from London.
7 i.e., the Franco-Bussian Pact of Mutual Assistance, which ■was signed on May 2,
1935.
8 Marginal note: "Supplement for Berne, Brussels, The Hague: Further instructions
reserved. Weizsacker."
MARCH, 1939 101
No. 84
1625/3S8402
The Charge, d' Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 186 of March 24 Paris, March 24, 1939. 1
Received March 25 — 12:30 a.m.
Pol. II 920.
A considerable section of the Paris press publishes reports which in
the main agree that on the occasion of the French President's visit to
London, Chamberlain, Halifax and Bonnet had signed a protocol or
exchanged aide-mimoires in which France and Britain undertook, in
the event of an attack on Holland or Switzerland, automatically to
render armed assistance to these countries and to defend their frontiers. 2
The agreement thus concluded confirmed the oral arrangement said to
have been reached on January 29 in Paris between Bonnet and the
British Ambassador here. 3 The obligations thus assumed are the same
or similar to those existing vis-a-vis Belgium. As regards the January
agreements, V Europe Nouvelle reports in its issue of March 18
(p. 301) that Britain had desired commitments over Holland, and
France over Switzerland.
Bratjee
1 The hour of despatch is not recorded.
2 The French President and Mme. Lebrun, accompanied by the Foreign Minister, M,
Bonnet, paid a state visit to Britain on Mar. 21—24, during which time a series of informal
talks took place. For an account of these conversations, see British Documents, Third
Series, vol. iv, Nos. 458, 484 and 507.
3 Sir Eric Phipps. See also ibid,, Nos. 40, 50, 51 and 52.
No. 85
238«/499810-Il
Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V
immediate Berlin, March 24, 1939.
Pol. V 2677.
Consul General von Janson, Danzig, has just telephoned the following
'information:
According to reliable reports reaching the Consulate-General at
'Danzig, measures of a purely defensive nature have for some days past
heen taken by Poland in the northern part of the Corridor. The details
of the measures involved are as follows:
V 1) Empty rolling stock was being withdrawn from Gdynia as during
; ; the crisis of September 1938.
2) The bridge over the Vistula at Dirschau had not, contrary to
|!,:' custom, been illuminated during the previous night. Machine guns
I'.-: protected by sandbags had been mounted on the bridge.
102 DOCUMENTS ON GEBMAN FOREIGN POLICY
3) In Toruri reservists of the 1912-16 age groups had been called up
and transferred to Bromberg.
4) In widely different districts of the Corridor, horses and taxicabs
had been requisitioned by the military authorities.
5) General cancellation of leave had been ordered in the garrisons.
6) 300 goods waggons, 120 passenger coaches and 16 locomotives
had been despatched to Poland from the Free City of Danzig (where
the railway belongs to the Poles) on March 23, 1939.
Submitted to the State Secretary for information through Senior
Counsellor Schliep, the Deputy Director of the Political Department
and the Under State Secretary.
Political Department] 1 Military Questions] has received a copy direct.
Bergmann
No. 86
100/64127; 422-26; 429
Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy
Rome, March 24, 1939.
I gave Attache Freiherr von Schroeder, who came here as special
courier, two copies of the enclosed memorandum l today to take with
him to Berlin and submit direct to the Foreign Minister and the State
Secretary respectively.
1 added the remark that, from information reaching me from the
same source, during the day on the evening of which the Fascist Grand
Council was held, the Duce still intended to add to his unequivocal
statement concerning the Axis the words between blue brackets in the
enclosure marked in green. 2 I had the impression that if, as can be seen
from the memorandum on the course of the meeting, he abandoned
this intention, that might well be due to the fact that in the meantime
he had seen the Reich Foreign Minister's letter to Count Ciano. 3
v. Mackensek
* Enclosure 1.
2 Enclosure 2, passage between asterisks.
3 Document No. 55.
[Enclosure 1]'
Rome, March 22, 1939.
At the Fascist Grand Council on March 21, the Foreign Minister, |
Ciano , first gave a brief description of the international situation based on ■'; |
the diplomatic reports received, without presenting any unusual details. :?i
* The State Secretary's copy of this memorandum (1848/421063-67) bears the follow-,
ing marginal note: "State Secretary: Brought from Rome today by the Courier Attach*
von Schroeder. Si[egfried] 24/3."
MARCH, 1039
103
Mussolini, on the other hand, spoke for -well over an hour, and gave
a historical sketch of the irresistible process of revision, which, with
compelling logic, had led to the unequivocal continuance of the policy of
the Rome-Berlin Axis. He took as his starting point the tremendous
mistakes made by France and Britain under Clemenceau's influence
during and after Versailles. Clemenceau had always been the greatest
and most violent hater not only of Germany but of Italy too, and had
never forgiven Napoleon III for favouring the unification of Italy, and
still less for not having prevented and made impossible the unification
of the German Empire while there was still time. Imbued with this
fanatical attitude, Clemenceau at Versailles forcibly carved up Germany
and robbed her beyond all reason, and at the same time he also refused
Italy the colonial compensation which had been promised, and in
addition tried to build up, by every available means and by offers of
assistance, a barrier of anti-German States to the east of Germany.
The whole post-war period was dominated by the ruinous consequences
of these blunders and injustices at Versailles, which as time went on
had only been made worse still at Geneva. Italy, resurrected under
the Lictors' Fasces, renewed by Fascism, and led on to a new position
of power, had from the beginning tried to give a new direction to
European policy, and as far as possible to set it free from Clemenceau's
mistakes. She had therefore opposed the territorial occupation of the
Ruhr, requested cancellation of war debts, and made efforts to bring
-Germany back, with equal rights, into the concert of the great European
,. Powers. The policy of Fascist Italy had aimed at producing at least
, some understanding and cooperation among the Great Powers, and that
had also been the intention behind his proposal to conclude a Four-
Power Pact, 5 which was to have initiated a peaceful revision of Ver-
sailles. This attempt had failed, chiefly because of France's intran-
sigence and lack of understanding of politics and history. Nevertheless,
in the end the Peace Treaties were revised from necessity. Had the
revision, of course, been carried out at the right time, and in the way
suggested by Mussolini, it would have gradually brought about an
.easing of the international tension and have put Europe in a position
to resume the role of leadership in the world which is her due. Instead,
.revision took place in a series of severe eruptions which progressively
! ; : exacerbated the international situation.
The Versailles injustices, however, had become especially harsh
lichen Italy was preparing her expedition to Ethiopia. Britain and
llrance at that time allowed themselves to be guided by their old feelings
lof jealousy and hegemony, and considered that the moment had come
par dealing the decisive blow against Italy who had become trouble-
iBome. During that phase, agreement between the interests of Germany
!!; 8 In March, 1933.
104 DOCUMENTS ON GEEMAN FOREIGN POLICY
and Italy in opposition to the intolerable imperialism of the two
Western Powers began clearly to show itself. Germany refused to take
part in sanctions against Italy, and immediately seized the opportunity
to reassert her right to defend herself, and fortified the Rhineland. It
was consonant with the logical sequence of events that in the future
also Italy and Germany should march side by side to an increasing
degree, and that neither of the two Powers should oppose the just
demands of the other partner. Therefore, Italy had not opposed the
Anschluss of Austria with Germany. As regards Czecho-Slovakia, a
country made up of several national groups and artificially invented
at Versailles as a tool for war against Germany, the wish of the Sudeten
Germans to follow the Austrians into the Reich could not be rejected
or combated. After the Peace of Munich, Czecho-Slovakia could have
achieved new life, under two conditions : complete loyalty to the Reich,
and thus also the full guarantee of the rights of her minorities. But
Prague was not equal to the situation or the task, and did not free
herself from the influence of Jews, Freemasons, Democrats and Bol-
shevists. Instead of this she relied on the false hope of getting her
own back on Germany once the great democracies had carried out their
mighty rearmament programme. Looking at the situation from that
point of view, Germany could not have acted differently from the way
she did, for reasons of geography, history and politics. Italy would
have done just the same under similar circumstances, and thus Italy
remained " perfettamente solidale" [in complete solidarity] with the
Reich, especially now, when the Western Powers were threatening her
with a new policy of encirclement.
As regards Italy's natural aspirations, it was true that she had no
Mgr. Tiso to make her a present of her demands. "Ma anche la nostra
ora verra" [But our time will come too]. The events of the last few
days had created some disturbances here and there in Italian public
opinion, which by and large was not in a position to assess the reasons
of the Reich. But enlightenment would follow.
Mussolini concluded by referring to the tremendous increase of power
achieved in the last few weeks by Germany, and thus also by the Rome-
Berlin Axis, through the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia, particu-
larly in view of the munition factories and industrial plant, and de-
clared with great emphasis that Italian policy "andra tlno in fondo,
basandosi sull'asse e sulle amieizie che vanno consolidandosi intorno
aH'asse" [would go to the limit, basing itself on the Axis and on the
friendships being consolidated around the Axis].
Of the members of the Grand Council who spoke, only Grandi's and
Balbo's 6 statements are of interest. Grandi said that the Duee's policy
Count Gvandi, Italian Ambassador in Groat Britain, and Marshal Balbo, Governor.
General of Libvn.
MABCH, 1939 105
was the policy dictated to Italy by history, and that absolute loyalty
to this policy gave to Italy great moral strength as regards Britain.
Balbo dealt briefly with the military situation in Libya and Tunis.
The forces gathered in Libya were sufficient for present needs and for
defence. The French had only weak advance posts near the frontier.
The real defence positions lay 100 kilometres behind the frontier,
beyond the desert area. At present there were no signs of immediate
danger. In any case Libya was prepared, and in case of emergency
could at once take further necessary measures.
Summing up, it can be stated that no differences of opinion emerged
in the Fascist Grand Council, and that the statements and views of the
Duee were unanimously accepted. Upon special enquiry, it was empha-
sized that the discontent expressed in the Palazzo Chigi about Berlin's
delay in keeping Rome informed was not mentioned at all . Neither was
anything said about Spain in yesterday's meeting of the Grand Council.
This discontent concerns the practice— observed again and again —
of presenting Italy with a fait accompli, though it is sometimes admitted
that events follow each other extremely fast. But then people are
wondering, with some anxiety, where and how far Germany really in-
tends to go. As Austria, the Sudetenland, Bohemia, Moravia and
Slovakia are in German hands, and as Germany also has a dominating
influence in Hungary, while Hungary now holds Buthenia and is per-
haps counting sooner or later on Croatia, to which of course Dalmatia
also belongs, people are saying that in the end the old Hapsburg
Empire, this time under the swastika flag, will reappear on the Adriatic,
"una cosa che l'ltalia difficilmente potrebbe tollerare" [something
which Italy would find difficult to tolerate]. Moreover, Mussolini could
not expose himself to the reproach from his own country that he was
.rebuilding the old Hapsburg Empire, or at least restoring the status quo
, of power which existed before the war and before the destruction of the
Hapsburg Monarchy. Mussolini and Ciano do not share these appre-
; hensions, basing themselves, as they stressed, on secret agreements
^ made in October, 1936 7 , in Berlin, by which the Adriatic zone is expressly
.reserved to the Italian sphere of influence, while Italy at that time
allowed Germany to expand in the east and south east.
iv 'The confidential Protocol signed in Berlin by JNeurath and Ciano on Oct. 23, 1936
*t,(not printed, 2871/563579-88) does not refer to the Adriatic zone or to the Mediterranean
On Sept. 23, 1936, Dr. Hans Frank, then Minister without portfolio, had a conversa-
!'; tion with Mussolmi, his notes of which (not printed, 1231/335829-35) record that
W Mussolini, with reference to the British, said: "The Mediterranean is ours." The
K;; Italian version of this conversation given in Ciano : UEuropa verso la Catastrofe,
'f; : PP- '4^76 (English translation in Giano's Diplomatic Papers, pp. 43-4-8), under
g. the date Sept. 23, 1936, records Frank as saying that Hitler regarded the Mediterranean
r; as an Italian sphere; there is an Italian record of a conversation between Hitler and
feGano on Oct. 24, 1936, (loc. cit., pp. 93-99 ; English edition, pp. 56-60) in which Hitler
g. repeated this declaration. No German record of this latter conversation has been
j|.found. The official communique issued after the meeting contains no mention of the
] Mediterranean.
106 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
[Enclosure 2]
100/64429
March 21, 1939.
Bergmann 8 has just told me, at 9.40 p.m., that Ciano and Mussolini
will speak in detail on the international situation in today's meeting of
the Fascist Grand Council. The gist of their statements wiU be that
"anche dopo gli ultimi avvenimenti rimarra al franco della Germama
*sebbene si avrebbe preferito di essere stato preavvertito* " [even after
recent events, Italy will remain at Germany's side *although she would
have preferred to be informed in advance*]. This addition, however,
will not be included in the official communique of the meeting, though
this reservation is generally very strongly emphasized in the Palazzo
Chigi It is stressed that even without an alliance, Italy remains loyal
to Germany, even should war threaten (which is not expected in the
present case), and for that very reason can expect to be prepared and
informed in good time. . ,
B[ergmann] declares that his information is absolutely certain, buu
emphasizes that, in a possible communication by telephone to Berlin,
it could only be very guardedly reported that Italy, as was always
assumed, still "rimane in linea" [keeps in line]. B[ergmann] em-
phasizes that for special reasons it is extremely important for him that
we should only speak very cautiously of "good news" which would
come during the night concerning Italy's attitude to Germany.
a The reference is uncertain.
No. 87
F19/473-71
Ambassador Mackensen to Counsellor Erich Kordt
Rome, March 24, 1939.
Dear Herr Kordt: As you will know, the Reich Foreign Minister
telephoned to me again yesterday at midday on the matter of the
memorandum of the Fiihrer-Attolico conversation, 1 of which you are
aware, and instructed me to give Attolico, should he so desire, more .
detailed information from this memorandum. I have written the en-
closed memorandum of my conversation today with Attolico, which I
request you to submit to the Reich Foreign Minister. I hope to hear
more from Attolico after his report to the Duce. Incidentally, he
appeared to be much impressed by the mood he found prevailing here
in Rome The Duce seems to have been much annoyed by the fact
that in the final phases of the Czechoslovak dissolution we just con-
J See document No. 52.
MAKCH, 1939 107
fronted him with a fait accompli. Attolico explained this by the
circumstance that, in contrast with the course of events which came to
a conclusion in Vienna, the Duce had this time had no opportunity
whatever to prepare public opinion. He felt this all the more as, in his
view, our present procedure ran counter to the policy hitherto adhered
to by us in principle, not to incorporate non-Germans, a policy which
he had defended in a personal letter to Runciman 2 and in his speech
at Verona. 3 Attolico added that the Duce was, however, not the man
to brood for long over the past, and so, this time — and this must be
regarded as an immense service on his part — he had, without a moment's
hesitation, accepted the course of events, and had most energetically
supported the decision of which we are aware, in the Fascist Grand
Council — as indeed Ciano did also, a point on which Attolico laid
particular stress. Here Attolico hinted that at the Fascist Grand
Council, where complete frankness of expression was allowed, keen
criticism had been voiced.
With cordial greetings and Heil Hitler !
Yours,
Mackensen
2 Vol. H of this Series, document No. 488.
, » On Sept. 26, 1938. See ibid., document No. 611 .
[Enclosure]
100/65615-17
Memorandum
Rome, March 24, 1939.
In accordance with yesterday's telephoned instructions from the
\ Reich Foreign Minister,* I took immediate steps to get into touch with
: Attolico, but it was only towards 11 o'clock at night that I received a
| telephone call from him. He thanked me for suggesting seeing him
'>again about the substance of his conversation with the Fiihrer in the
slight of the fresh material which had reached me in the interval. He
Iregretted that he had not been able to reply to my telephone message
||go6ner, but the sudden serious illness of his brother-in-law had claimed
Sail his attention. He would, however, call on me in the course of the
|jBiorning.
He arrived shortly after 12 o'clock today and I told him that I had
anwhile received further instructions from the Reich Foreign
ster and, in a "cipher telegram", a memorandum 5 on our version
* A memorandum by Mackensen dated Mar. 23 (not printed, 100/65621-22) notes
bese instructions which Ribbentrop telephoned himself.
■ 'As is evident from document No. 52 and footnote 1 thereto, and as emerges from a
jdegram from Mackensen, No. 106 of Mar. 22 (not printed, 100/65625-26), the memo-
Siandum was sent by special courier and not in a "cipher telegram".
108 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
of the conversation. I placed myself at his disposal to compare this
memorandum with his own and to answer any questions he might put.
Attolieo thanked me and asked that, in making this comparison, we
should proceed as follows. I would mention each individual point of
the conversation in turn, he would then say first what he remembered
about it, and I would then complete this. This method of comparison
showed that his version tallied almost completely, in parts nearly
word for word, with the text of the so-called second amended memo-
randum before me. A deviation, in itself perhaps not negligible, was
detected only at one point. In the passage on page 3 6 of -the memo-
randum in question, that concerning the significance of the British
Navy in relation to the maintenance of German sea-routes and German
trade, Attolieo was somewhat fuller than the memorandum, in that lie
expatiated on the objectives of possible German measures for securing
supplies through more extensive military operations.
Referring to page 5 of the memorandum, I asked him on what
he based the view that the Duce "must now get something";"
Attolieo replied that this opinion was based on the view, widely
shared here, that the time had come for Italy also, with her well-
known claims against France, to get some advantage out of the Axis.
At this point it transpired that the impression I gathered yesterday,
that Attolieo had already made a report to the Duce personally yester-
day morning, was incorrect. On the contrary, he is not seeing him
until this afternoon. I told Attolieo that I did not share his view on
this point, but that on the contrary I had observed a whole series of
things which led to the conclusion that Mussolini had no intention of
letting himself be carried away by the current of public opinion, or of
forcing the pace. I then pointed out to him also that, from all I had ;|
heard here about Mussolini's intentions, the actual programme (not a "
programme which he expected to materialize overnight, but one for the
realization of which he had— if I were correctly informed— even re-
served the right of fixing the date himself) was confined to Suez,
Jibuti and Tunis. Corsica, as far as I knew, together with Nice and ;ji
Savoy, came under what Mussolini described as Italy's so-called
"historic" claims, the attainment of which was only to be expected J
within the framework of major general events. Attolieo replied—
according to the memorandum — that when he mentioned Corsica it was|
not a demand for cession that was meant, but for neutralization. I
replied that, to my mind, that did not greatly alter the matter.
Attolieo promised to call here again before his return journey, which
would probably take place the day after tomorrow.
v. Mackensek 3
I
« See document No. 52, passage quoted in footnote 11.
" See ibid., sentence following footnote 20.
MARCH, 1039 J 09
No. 88
290S/5S6O63-64
State Secretary Weizsacker to Ambassador Molike
steictly personal Berlin, March 24, 1939.
Dear Moltke; I owe you a word in addition to the telephone con-
versation we have just had, in which you were asked to cancel your
conversation arranged with M. Beck to supplement the Lipski-
v. Ribbentrop conversation of March 21. i
| The Reich Foreign Minister instructed me to do this after he had
| submitted the draft of the instructions to you to the Fuhrer. 2 I realize
! : - that the procedure now adopted is somewhat embarrassing for you
and might even give rise to certain political conjectures. However
that cannot be helped.
In actual fact the substance of the instructions to be addressed to you
did not differ greatly from the conversation of March 21, only it
was more sharply worded and, as it were, presented the Poles with the
option: friend or foe. They would have had to pay for our friendship
in the way of which you are aware, but at the same time would also
have received the gift of which you know, frontier recognition lasting
for twenty -five years. B
As it is late I refrain from further explanations, but I assume that
M. Beck will try to evade as far as he can the option mentioned. On the
| results of such an evasion I can only draw conclusions of which Herr
|v von SchelihaS w ill inform you orally.
Best wishes and Heil Hitler !
Yours ever, Weizsacker
i Document No. 61.
* Document No. 73.
! Counsellor at the Warsaw Embassy. No indication of his report has been found.
No. 89
?M0!/E474 900-01
TU Charge d' 'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Minister
Telegram
jjfo. 103 of March 25 Washington, March 25, 1939—5:48 a.m.
Received March 26 — 3:35 a.m.
W Villa 686.
With reference to my telegram No. 96 of March 21. 1
|l) Accompanied by delegates of the German-American Chamber of
*" anmerce, Customs Attorney Pickerel, who fully agrees with the views
H Document No. 56,
J JO DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
of the Embassy as set forth in paragraph 3 of telegram Ho. 96, today
negotiated with the Customs Bureau (Johnson) to secure the release
from the provisional additional 25 per cent customs duty of imports
undertaken against dollars or free Reichsmarks. Johnson asked for
proposals in writing, which he will examine with the Customs autho-
rities in New York_at the end of next week. Pickerel's proposal pro-
vided for a sworn declaration by American importers, and perhaps also
German exporters, on the method of payment and also proof of pay-
ment in cash or time draft at the time of the customs declaration. The
prospects of the proposal are uncertain. At the same time Pickerel
considers the cancellation of the Inland Account Procedure [Inkover-
fahreri] before April 23 as essential, especially as the application of
arbitrary penalty duties under section 338 is to be feared if the pro-
cedure is continued. Pickerel thinks that the Treasury must cancel the
imposition of the additional duties if the Inland Account Procedure is
abolished, as the opinion of the Attorney-General on which they were
based relates exclusively to the Inland Account Procedure. In reply
to representations to that effect by Pickerel in his talk with Johnson
today, the latter said without committing himself in any way that the
Treasury would in that case abolish the additional duties.
2) Customs Attorney Laylin, Schroder Bank, Chase Bank and cotton
exporters are conducting negotiations with the Treasury along the same
lines with the object of securing the gradual release from the provisional
25 per cent additional duty also for transactions in blocked marks
[Sperrmark] as well (paragraph 4 of telegram No. 96). On the other
hand, they recommend the retention for the time being of the Inland
Account Procedure, in order if necessary to give importers the oppor-
tunity after April 23 of settling the additional duty by payment from
Inland Accounts. _
3) I am more than ever convinced , especially on the basis of P[ickerel]'s
report, that the Inland Account Procedure should be abolished and I
recommend that all necessary measures for this should be prepared but
that we delay putting them into effect until more details of the
Treasury's attitude are ascertained in further negotiations next week.
I will report on this by telegram.
Thomses
No. 90
52/34590
Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Political Department
immediate Berlin, March 25, 1939.
Admiral Canaris telephoned me today at 11 o'clock and told me the
following about Polish mobilization measures:
MARCH, 1930 HI
1) Some 4,000 Polish troops are concentrated at Gdynia.
2) The troops of a garrison previously stationed in the southern part
of the Corridor have been transferred to the immediate vicinity of the
Danzig frontier.
3) Poland has mobilized three age-groups.
All these measures concern only the northern part of Poland; in the
other districts of the country there is nothing to report militarily.
_ General Keitel does not believe in any aggressive intentions on the
part of the Poles, neither, therefore, does he believe that Poland wishes
rather to forestall us by a military occupation of Danzig, but attributes
these measures to the generally noticeable nervousness of the Poles.
In the General Staff, on the other hand, the tendency is to take a some-
what more serious view of the situation. 1
Bismarck
i Marginal note: "To the Foreign Minister: A warning to the Poles not to let matters
come to a ' 21st May ' with a. subsequent ' 28th May' might be advisable. Wfeizsacker],
25/111." Reference is here made to the Czechoslovak crisis of May J938. See vol. n of
this Series, chapter III.
No. 91
1975/438344
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 124 of March 24 Bucharest, March 25, 1939 — 12:30 p.m.
Received March 25 — 5 : 30 p.m .
Pol. IV 2125.
The Rumanian Minister in Budapest 1 was to speak to Csaky on
: behalf of his Government in order to make proposals for reciprocal de-
mobilization. 2 Csaky refused to receive the Minister personally on the
grounds that he did not negotiate at the point of the bayonet. Rumania
■wishes to make the following proposal; that the Hungarian troops be
withdrawn 20 to 30 kilometres from the frontier, as had already been
done with the Rumanian troops. Rumania would then at once start
to demobilize, and Hungary would immediately follow suit, which was
: possible since the military action in Carpatho-Ukraine had in any case
; come to an end.
While Hungary remained fully armed on the frontier there could be
no tranquillization in the South-East, especially as the incursion of
^Hungarian troops into Slovak territory, reported in the press today,
I had shown her neighbours the danger which threatened from Hungary.
Fabrichjs
.' l Raoul Bossy.
2 See also document No. 82.
112 DOCUMENTS ON GEEMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 92
1620/3SS4H
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram 1
No. 125 of March 2.4 Bucharest, March 25, 1939 — 12:30 p.m.
Received March 25 — 4:00 p.m.
Pol. II 926.
With reference to your telegram No. 97 of March 21 (Pol. II 833). 2
Gafencu, the Foreign Minister, asserts that no demarche has been
made to him by the British Government for an association of "peaceful
Powers". He has forestalled an enquiry by Britain, such as had been
circulated to other States, by declaring from the outset to London and
Paris that Rumania would in no circumstances join any group of
powers which was directed against another. He had jettisoned all
collective security plans. On the other hand, he had explained quite
clearly to London and Paris why a rapprochement with Germany was
necessary for Rumania and, despite warnings from many quarters, he
had adhered firmly to this, as was proved by the Economic Treaty. 3
He did not know whether an enquiry had been circulated by Britain
regarding the protection of Rumania, this probably referred to the
above-mentioned action.
All press reports about a conference to which Russia had also invited
Rumania were pure invention. Similarly, he could assure me that
neither had the King suggested any exchange of views about a guarantee
of Rumania's frontiers by the Western Powers.
Fabeicius
i This telegram was circulated to Missions in Europe for information on Mar. 27 '}
(1625/388415). ' ™
2 Document No. 58.
3 Document No. 78.
No. 93
1825/388412
The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 17 of March 25 The Hague, March 25, 1939—2:12 p.m.
Received March- 25 — 4:00 p.m.
Pol. II 925.
I spoke to the Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry l today re-
garding a report in the Paris newspapers that France and Britain have
1 Jonkheer A. M. Sinouck Hurgronjp.
MARCH, 1939 113
pledged themselves in London to defend the Netherlands frontier in
the event of a German attack. The Secretary-General said he had
knowledge of the matter only through the Netherlands press. If the
Western Great Powers made such agreements, the Netherlands could
not prevent them from doing so. True to their policy of independence,
the Netherlands themselves, however, would never in any circum-
stances accede to such agreements. Should war break out, the Nether-
lands would defend their neutrality to the utmost and, if necessary,
resist by all possible means any armed invasion irrespective of whence
it came. 2
Zech
2 A draft telegram (not printed, 1625/388408-11) addressed to the Legations in
Brussels, The Hague and Berne, dated Mar. 25 and marked by Ribbentrop; "not to be
sent", stated that reports to hand indicated that the British and French Governments
had concluded an agreement for mutual and unconditional support should Germany
attack Belgium, the Netherlands or Switzerland. All press reports that Germany in-
tended to attack these countries were malicious calumny. Appropriate demarches were
to be made in Brussels, Berne and The Hague, in milder form in the last in view of the
assurances contained in the document here printed.
No. 94
2446/5J4BS6-97
Circular of the Foreign Minister l
Express Letter
I confidential Berlin, March 25, 1939.
Kult. A 1368 g.
Germany's relationship with Italy in the Berlin-Rome Axis requires
that, in political questions in the Mediterranean countries and particu-
larly in the case of national community and minority problems in these
countries, Italy's intentions should exert a decisive influence on
Germany's attitude. Only in the Foreign Ministry is it possible to make
a complete survey and decide in what instances relations with the
aforementioned national and minority groups are appropriate and, if so,
how these are to be developed. I would therefore request you to observe
the following principles in future :
1) Our attitude regarding all national community and minority
I problems in the Mediterranean countries must be adjusted to meet the
1 wishes of the Italian Government.
2) Any relations with national community and minority organiza-
tions in these countries may only be maintained if the assent of the
i Typewritten marginal note : "The departments are requested to specify those bodies
i-yrhe should be acquainted with this letter or its contents by this office (the Auslands-
^'iastitut in Stuttgart, the V.D.A., etc.}." The letter was, in fact, circulated to all Minis-
: tries, and the Cultural Policy Department communicated the instructions contained
■ therein to eighteen bodies (2446/514898-908).
It.
f
114 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Foreign Ministry thereto has been obtained in writing. In this event
permission will be granted and the necessary guiding principles for
developing relations of this kind will then be laid down by the Foreign
Ministry or alternatively by the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle.
3) In the interests of German-Italian relations, connections with |
Croat organizations- 2 must on no account be maintained in the future.
I would request you to bring the above at once to the notice of those
of your subordinate authorities, official departments, organizations,
etc., which are concerned, and make it incumbent on them to con-
form unconditionally to the same.
RlBBENTROP
2 See also document No. 55.
No. 95
2002/442301-05
The Consul General and Charge d' Affaires in Slovakia to
the Foreign Ministry
Report No. 132 Bratislava, March 25, 1939.
Received March 26.
Pol. IV 2134.
I transmit herewith a note verbale from the Slovak Foreign Ministry!
which reached me today.
I am not making any alteration to the wording and would beg to
suggest that no great offence be taken at it. The Slovak Foreign
Ministry is composed of a few young people with little experience who,
however, do their best to write to us in German. The Ministry functions
in three modest rooms of the Government building.
If I may comment on the note verbale, it aims at determining more
closely the probable duration and character in international law of the
German occupation of Slovak territory.
I can imagine that we, on our part, do not think it worth while to
commit ourselves further.
Irrespective, however, of what decision is taken, I may perhaps
be permitted to point out the prejudicial effect produced when our
troops in the occupied area exercise sovereign rights beyond those of
military necessity, and beyond the provisions of article 6 [sic % 2] of the
Treaty of Protection 2 and remove material. The material we need
will not be lost to us, and there is therefore no necessity for simply
carrying it off.
i Not printed (2002/442300-QS). The contents were as indicated above.
2 Document No. 40.
MARCH, 1939 JJg
The second question which the Note apparently aims at clearing up
is that of examining questions of legal succession relating to State
property arising from the secession of Slovakia.
In this respect, too, we could, in my humble opinion, get our way and
achieve our objective otherwise than by simply removing disputed
State property.
I am assuming that it is our intention to create, in respect of Slovakia
a classic example of our conception of a protective relationship with a
South-Eastern European Slav State. 3
v. Drtjstel
•Marginal note: "Settled in oral discussion with Consul General von Druffel at
Colonel Wagner s. Alltenburg] 28/3." See document No. 117.
No. 96
4S5/231692
Memorandum by the State Secretary
St.S. No. 262 Berlin, March 25, 1939.
The Hungarian Minister today handed me the enclosed letter from
the Hungarian Regent to the Eiihrer.
For submission to the Reich Foreign Minister. 1
■:. i Marginal notes: (i) "Herr Siegfried: Please ascertain that the letter has reached the
Foreign Minister and consequently the Fuhrer. W[eizsacker] 27/r3] " (ii) "llHerr
' g^J b ^ a * e " *»»£«« ™«> Mm to Munich. 2) Bring up in 3 days' time. Siegfried]
, 27/3." (.u) Herr Hewel states that the Fuhrer has had the letter, which dois not
■ S^gfricdfae/f" ' ° reign Ministr T> where i4 h ^ been filed (Biiro
[Enclosure]
S0O6/442999-7O
Budapest, March 24, 1939.
Pol. IV 2281.
J: Yora Excellency: I have with genuine pleasure and heartfelt
.thanks taken cognizance of the statement relating to Slovakia, which
J, Your Excellency caused to be transmitted to me by my Minister in
: Berlin.^ i waa particularly gratified that Your Excellency appro-
priated so exactly the interests both of the Hungarian people and of
f those peoples who have lived with us on common soil for a thousand
Ijesxs. At the same time it is beyond doubt that the proposed solution
|best covers Germany's interests.
«, '.This statement has not been found, but in St.S. No. 258 of Mar. 23 (7488/E540465)
feTVeizsicker recorded: The Hungarian Minister, who was received by the Fuhrer a few
fe days ago and who was in Budapest for a day with a message to the Regent, returned
|; bringing an expression of very great gratitude from the latter. The Fiihrer's attitude
iv to the problems at issue, which was m accord with Hungary's historical ideas had made
I a decisive impression on the Regent and had given him very great satisfaction "
116
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
In order to ensure completely harmonious cooperation between our
Governments, I would ask Your Excellency to allow my Minister in
Berlin to submit the reasons necessitating a new frontier demarcation-
in place of the frontier determined by Benes— between the so-called
Ruthenian [russinischen] territory and Slovakia.
As the Ruthenian territory has been united with Hungary, we desire
to accord this area appropriate territorial autonomy and— in order at
once to provide work for the population— to proceed immediately with
the construction of dams for the exploitation of the water-power. My
Government have begun preparatory work on this.
In expressing once more my warmest and most heartfelt thanks tor
the friendship and understanding shown towards Hungary,
T . f HORTHY*
I remain etc.,
* This letter is stamped, "Seen by the Fuhrer March 25, 1939 ".f R i^ r t ^ r 1 ",^
ginalnote; "The Fuhrer wishes this Setter to be filed .n the Foreign Muustry. H[e]w[el].
169/82515
No. 97
Memorandum by the State Secretary
St S Ho. 264 Berlin, March 25, 1939.
The Hungarian Minister asked me today, obviously on instructions |
from Budapest, about rumours that the German economic Treaty
with Rumania i had been linked with some political concession or other ■
to Rumania. Rumanian sources indicated, in fact, that we had given
the Rumanians a frontier guarantee against Hungary.
I flatly denied this rumour, to the Hungarian Minister.
WeizsIckeb
i- See document No. 78.
350/202230
No. 98
Minute by an Official of Political Division I
Berlin, March 25, 1939.
zuPol. IMllOlg 1 Ang.IH!
In accordance with instructions, I have informed OKW that thai
Foreign Ministry attaches great importance to the speediest possible?;
evacuation of occupied Slovak territory extending beyond the de-|
marcation line laid down by Treaty. Should the completion of the|
i Not found.
MARCH, 1989 117
evacuation not be possible forthwith, the Foreign Ministry considers it
desirable that a beginning at least be made as soon as possible by-
measures which will also be obvious to the Slovak Government.
OKW undertook to transmit this request to the competent authorities.
v. Nostitz
No. 99
Harembere document 100-E.
Eihibit USA— 121
Directive from the Fuhrer to the Commander in Chief of the Army
on March 25, 1939 *
Danzig question
L[ipski] is returning from Warsaw on Sunday, March 26. His mission
was to enquire there whether Poland was ready to make an arrange-
ment about Danzig. The Fuhrer left Berlin on the evening of March 25
and does not wish to be here when L[ipski] returns. For the present
R[ibbentrop] is to conduct the negotiations. The Fuhrer does not
wish to solve the Danzig question by force however. He does not wish
to drive Poland into the arms of Britain by this.
A possible military occupation of Danzig could be contemplated
; only if L[ipski] gave an indication that the Polish Government could
not justify voluntary cession of Danzig to their own people and that a
fait accompli would make a solution easier to them.
; Polish question
' For the present the Fuhrer does not intend to solve the Polish ques-
n tion. However, it should now be worked upon. A solution in the near
future would have to be based on especially favourable political pre-
conditions. In such a case Poland would have to be so beaten down
that, during the next few decades, she need not be taken into account
as a political factor. In a solution of this kind the Fuhrer envisaged
am advanced frontier, extending from the eastern border of East
i 'Prussia to the eastern tip of Silesia. The questions of evacuation and
resettlement still remain open. The Fuhrer does not wish to enter the
■ Ukraine. Possibly a Ukrainian State might be established. But these
K questions too still remain open.
fcSJwofc question
li How long the Fuhrer will adhere to the Treaty concluded with
fSlovakia 2 is doubtful. The High Command of the Army has the
pi The German text of this document is printed in Trial of the Major War Criminals
PWere tht, International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg, 1947-49) (hereinafter cited as
%:prial of the Major War Criminals), vol. xxxvm, pp. 274-276.
''■'■• See document No. 40.
■ I
118 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
impression that when the time comes the Fiihrer will rid himself of this,
and. will use Slovakia as a political bargaining counter between himself,
Poland and Hungary. For the time being, however, Hungary is to be
kept in check.
The Fiihrer agrees with the proposed frontier delimitation (line of the
Waag). Should Slovakia be partitioned, the eastern frontier (Nitra
line) is to become the frontier and Bratislava is to be included. There
may be a plebiscite in Bratislava, but the Fiihrer believes there will be
no difficulties, as the town has no leanings towards Hungary.
Engerau is intended to become a permanent Garrison
Col. General Keitel is to notify the Slovak Government, through the
Foreign Ministry, that no armed Slovak units (Hlinka guards) may be
maintained or garrisoned this side of the Waag frontier. They are to be
sent to the new Slovak territory. The Hlinka guards are to be disarmed.
A demand shall be addressed to the Slovaks through the Foreign
Ministry that all weapons we want and which are still in Slovakia shall
be surrendered to us against payment on the basis of the agreement
between our Army and the Czech troops. The millions which we intend
to sink in Slovakia in any case are to be used for this purpose.
Czech Protectorate
The Army Groups are to be asked again if the demand for the sur-
render of all arms within a limited time and under threat of severe
penalties should be repeated once more.
We shall take on all the war material of the former Czechia without
payment. On the other hand, the guns bought by contract before
February 15 will be paid for.
Officers of the Czech Army will be provided for in accordance with
the discussions between General Reinecke, Colonel Wagner and Burgs-
dorf of the High Command of the Army. Their pensions shall assure
them a good standard of living in order to prevent discontent. We may
take over payment of the pensions or a part thereof — as it were in
payment of the captured war material. Pensions — no lump sums — to
keep a hold on these people. That is how we should negotiate.
Questions should be settled in principle before executive power is
handed over. Supreme Headquarters of the Army has suggested
April 6 as the final date for handing over executive power. The
Fiihrer agrees,
H[acha] shall be directed to change his residence to some place where
he can do no harm. The request, however, must come from Hacha.
Should the Czechs wish to set up a labour service, the matter is to
be dealt with in a dilatory manner. The Czechs must not be consoli-
dated by concentrations of this kind. The settlement of this question
falls within Germany's competence.
MARCH, 1989 119
Czechia is to be granted a certain measure of sovereignty in financial
matters: somewhat on the lines of that formerly accorded to Bavaria.
On the debt settlement, the Fiihrer is not yet clear. The change over
to the mark will be made at a suitable opportunity.
Bohemia and Moravia are to make annual contributions to the
German exchequer. The extent of these shall be determined on the
basis of the sums formerly budgeted for the Czech Army.
The Fiihrer has no objection to the withdrawal of troops once dis-
armament has been carried out. However, he does not wish to preju-
dice the Polish situation, which has not yet been cleared up.
He is to be asked again about this on Monday.
When Neurath takes over there will be rather more troops in the
Protectorate than will remain permanently. Movements are therefore
agreed to.
Before Neurath takes over, the Fiihrer wishes to have another talk
with the High Command of the Army, Friderici ?, etc.
Britain — France
Relations have apparently slightly cooled, because France realizes
that Britain is trying to harness her to her waggon.
Britain is said to have told France that she must satisfy Italy's
wishes in the Mediterranean.
Balkans
The Fiihrer wants to have armaments deals with the Balkan coun-
tries. But only against payment in foreign currency or goods represent-
ing foreign currency. Becker is to report orally on standardization of
calibres and Skoda.
(Original written by hand by Lt. Col. Siewirt,
1st Officer of the General Staff.)
Certified correct.
[signature illegible]
Colonel of the General Staff
No. 100
j|t817/E69443i-37
Tke Fiihrer and Chancellor to the Bead of the Italian Government 1
Berlin, March 25, 1939.
I" Duce: You have lived to see the 20th anniversary 2 of the day on
§which the foundation stone of Fascism was laid. Since 1920 the new
i:i Translated from the Italian. No German text of this letter or indication of the
1 of delivery has been found in the German Foreign Ministry archives. For the
i text see Mario Toscano, Le Oriffini del Potto d'Acciaio, p. 95, note 110.
SI*' Mussolini founded his first Fascia di combattimento in Milan on Mar. 2G, 1919,
120
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOBEIGN POLICY
history of your people and of your country, which found ite j crowning
success in the rebuilding of the Roman Empire, is inseparably associ-
ated with your name and the name of your movement. But apart
from that, I am aware of this: that from that day the evolution of
Europe and, with it, the evolution of mankind, has been directed into a
new channel. One cannot imagine what consequences for the Wert
would have followed in the train of a bolshevization of Italy. There is
no doubt that, but for your historic action in founding Fascism Italy
would have been wedded to this bolshevization. Even if in the life
of a nation it is for the most part difficult to decide what component
parts make up the knowledge of the individual or what contributions
are made by and large by the national attitude and actions, neverthe-
less Duce, your own contribution and the example of Fascism can be
established on the basis of many positive results. The regeneration in
the 20th century not only of Italy but also of Europe wJl be linked for
ever with your name. I have pondered deeply on these prob ems.
But I think I can assure you in all sincerity, Duce, that, apart from those
of your own people, you can receive from no one more heartfelt good-
wishes for your work, now twenty years old, than those of us Germans
and of myself. There is, moreover, so much similarity m the develop-
ment of our two ideologies and in our two revolutions, that one a
tempted to believe in a single decision on the part of Providence Yet
in my eyes, nothing can link the destinies of the German and Italian
peoples more than the hellish hatred which is poured out on them by
the rest of the world, although we have done it no harm. You, .Duce,
had knowledge and experience of the attitude of these adversaries
when you were creating your Empire. We Germans have experienced
it during the past twelve months, when we were putting an end to a
situation unbearable from the national and military point of view.
By means of this letter, I wish to assure you once more that during
the last twelve months the German people, my movement and above
all myself have experienced not only the enmity of these foreign
countries-if indeed we did not already know of it— but we have also,
all of us, taken an unalterable decision: whatever may be the path you
tread, Duce, you shall see in me and in us Germans your unchanging
friends. And you shall see in this friendship not only a symbol of an
attachment which is purely platonic, but you may regard it as the
immutable decision to bear, if necessary, even at the most difficult
times, the direst consequences of this solidarity.
Let me therefore express once more to you and to the Italian people,
in my name and especially in the name of my movement, my good:
wishes for the return of a day to which not only Italy but also Germany
owes so much.
With undying friendship, „ mmi
Yours, Adolf Hitob
MARCH, 1939 121
No. 101
52/31501-03
Memorandum by the Foreign Minister x
RM 20 Berlin, March 26, 1939.
I received Lipski, the Polish Ambassador, at 12:30 today.
Ambassador Lipski handed me the attached memorandum by the
Polish Government, which I read through in his presence.
After I had taken note of the contents, I replied to Ambassador
Lipski that in my personal opinion the Polish viewpoint could not
form the basis for a German-Polish solution. The sole possible solution
of the problem could only be the reincorporation of Danzig in the
German Reich and the creation of an extraterritorial road and rail
link between the Reich and East Prussia.
In this connection, I referred Ambassador Lipski to the reports 2
to hand on Polish troop concentrations and warned him of possible
consequences. The events seemed to me to be a strange answer to my
recent offer of a final settlement of the German-Polish relationship. If
things went on in this way a serious situation might soon arise. I
could inform Ambassador Lipski that for example a violation of the
sovereignty of Danzig territory by Polish troops would be regarded by
Germany in the same way as a violation of the Reich frontiers.
Ambassador Lipski energetically denied that Poland had any military
intentions towards Danzig. The troop movements undertaken by
Poland merely represented precautionary measures.
I then put the question to- Ambassador Lipski whether, as soon as
; the situation had calmed down somewhat, the Polish Government
■ would not again consider the German proposal so that a solution might
be arrived at on the basis proposed by us of the reunion of Danzig and
V the extraterritorial rail and Autobahn link.
Ambassador Lipski answered that Poland would certainly study the
I'., 1 question further and was willing to do everything to reach agreement.
I told Ambassador Lipski that I would report to the Fiihrer at once.
In my view the main thing was that the Fiihrer should not get the im-
| pression that Poland was simply unwilling.
Ambassador Lipski asked me to have the questions studied again
|Cby Germany from every point of view and he wondered if there was not
■a prospect of perhaps reaching an acceptable solution on the basis of
■ Polish ideas.
When I put the definite question whether in his view the Polish
'.Government might state that they disagreed with the solution proposed
I" by Germany, Ambassador Lipski gave an evasive answer.
i See also document No. 103,
b See document No. 90.
122 DOCUMENTS ON GEBMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Ambassador Lipski stated that Foreign Minister Beck would
gladly come to Berlin in accordance with our suggestion,* but it
seemed to him advisable that the questions should have been suitably
prepared from the diplomatic angle beforehand.
At the close of our conversation, I left Ambassador Lipski in no
doubt that in my view the Polish proposals could not be regarded by
the Fiihrer as satisfactory; only the definite re-incorporation of Danzig,
an extraterritorial link with East Prussia, and a 25 year non-aggression
treaty with frontier guarantees, and cooperation in the Slovak question
could, in the German view, lead to a final settlement.
I have the impression : .
1) that the military measures taken by Poland are of a defensive
nature. Intentions to intervene in Danzig by force of arms probably
do not exist at present. .,,.,,
2) Poland would like to get off as cheaply as possible in the present
discussions. , ^ ,. ,
3) Poland's compromise proposal might not represent the Polish
Government's last word.
On the basis of these impressions I should like to propose the follow-
ing procedure to the Fiihrer: .
1) The Polish press attacks should be answered gradually in the
German press, without, however, bringing things to a head
2) In a short time the Polish Ambassador should be told by me that
the Polish proposals do not represent a basis for negotiations. Only an
acceptance of the basis for negotiations proposed by Germany could
lead to a solution.
3) If after allowing an interval to watch developments, the Polish
military measures were not gradually reduced, M. Lipski's attention
would again have to be drawn to the difficult situation arising there-
from and it would have to be' pointed out that, if things went on in
this way, they would end badly.* RlBBENTRW
a See document No. 61.
* I" S~acco°unt of this conversation see the Polish WkUe Boole, No. 63.
[Enclosure]
908/294052-55
As in the past, so today, the Polish Government ascribe full im-
portance to the maintenance of good-neighbourly relations with tne :
German Reich to the utmost extent.
The Polish Government have given clear proof of this attitude by being ;
one of the first foreign Governments to initiate friendly relations with;|
the German Reich already in 1933 and to enter into negotiations which, J
MARCH, 1939 J 23
led to the conclusion of the Polish-German Declaration of January 26
1934. 3 J '
Here may also be mentioned the friendly attitude adopted by Poland
to the National Socialist Senate in Danzig.
During the following five years, the Polish Government in their
political activity in the international sphere have always avoided
participating in actions directed against the German Reich.
Finally, it is well known that in the autumn of 1938, Poland's
resolute attitude contributed in considerable degree to the avoidance
of an armed conflict in connection with the accomplishment of the
German demands. 6
II
[n the question of transit traffic between the German Reich and
East Prussia as well as in the question of the Free City of Danzig,
questions where hitherto understanding between the two Governments
has always been achieved, and on which the German Government have
now put forward new suggestions, the Polish Government take the
following view:
a) The Polish Government have no interest in creating any diffi-
culties in traffic between East Prussia and the rest of the Reich. For
that reason, despite many changes which have occurred in the last
few years by comparison with previous times (e.g., in the question of
transfer of payments), the Polish Government have not only not raised
any difficulties in the privileged rail transit traffic but have undertaken
the financial clearing for this transit traffic with due consideration for
German interests.
This being their attitude, the Polish Government are prepared
jointly with the German Government to study means of further
; amplifying and facilitating rail and road traffic between East Prussia
!«nd the rest of the Reich so that German travellers may be saved in-
|convenience when using these ways of communication. Technical
jpxperts could begin working out proposals for realizing this aim.
P But all concessions could, however, only be granted on the Polish side
Imthinthe limits of Polish sovereignty— therefore there can be no ques-
tion of extraterritorial status for the ways of communication. While
pairing this reservation, the Polish Government intend to meet
jjjGerman wishes very liberally.
m b) As far as the Free City of Danzig is concerned, it may be recalled
"at for some time now the Polish Government, recognizing the need
|.« By this Declaration of Non- Aggression and Understanding, signed at Berlin, which
Ftae to be valid for ten years, both Governments decided to base their mutual relations on
^tePact of Pans (Kellogg-Bmnd Pact), of Aug. 27, 1928. For the text of the Declara-
iouase B.F.S.P., vol. 137, pp. 495-496.
f • In the instructions by Beck to Lipski, printed as No. 62 in the Polish White Book
Hub paragraph is not meluded. '
124 DOCUMENTS ON GEBMAN FOREIGN POLICY
for a settlement of this question by way of an understanding between
Wars w and Berlin, have put forward correspond*^ -ggest.o-
This seemed to them particularly approbate given the g-^^
League of Nations, which is no longer fully able to fulfil the obligations
it has undertaken towards the Free City of Danzxg.
As appeared from the previous Polish-German «f™^ <* T
existed no difference of opinion on the basic approach, namely ^ that the
Polish Government do not aim at hindering the German population of
the Free City in their own way of life, that on the other hand the
GimaTGo/ernment respect Polish rights as well as the economic,
m the Tree City. As these two questions are both fundamental the
Ponsh Government believe that it should be possible to find a solution
J dona joint Polish-German guarantee for the Free City of Danzig
S guarantee would, on the one hand, satisfy the free development
of the German national community and its political way of hfe, and on
Jhe other hand, would safeguard Polish rights and ***^™*
interests, moreover, coincide with the economic mtere sU • * ^WPJ*
tion of the Free City, as for centuries the prosperity of the latter has
deoended on Polish overseas trade.
In contrast to the above-mentioned problem of facilitating com-
munications which, in the view of the Polish Government, » primarily
£ a technical nature and a matter for experts, the political^ pnnciple
in the question of the Free City must first be discussed between the
Polish and German Governments, and to the end that in tins organism,
fn accordance with the words used by the Reich Chancellor m February
1938, Poland should respect the national character of the Free City and
the Free City and Germany should respect the rights and interests of
P0 The d Polish Government would consider it desirable, in order to
stabilize conditions in this part of Europe, that an exchange of™
on both the problems referred to above, which should be dealt w*h
iointly. should take place as soon as possible, in order thereby to find
a basis for the future consolidation of mutual good-nexghbourly
relations. 7
' 'Words written across the ^-^^.^'^^^^^S^tXpS 1
of this document in Ribbentrop's handing appear to tead. n^ ^ J
on which we can negofcate 1. [^ f^ib^ 2. ^ov[ak J^o ^ ..
and British. Future — whether to Poland s advantage, p™
zosen Engldnder. Zukunft ob zum Heti Polens.]'
MARCg, 1939 125
No. 102
2050/447350-61
The State Secretary to the Legation in the Protectorate
Telegram
No. 128 Beblih, March 26, 1939— [2:20 p.m.] 1
[Received March 26 — 4:00 p.m.] 1
For Ambassador Ritter.
In the former Czecho-Slovak diplomatic and consular Missions
abroad, especially in so far as they are under British, French, American
and Soviet influence, there is an increasingly stubborn resistance to
the instructions issued by the former Foreign Ministry in Prague relating
to the smooth transfer of their affairs to the German representatives. 2
The relevant reports on this are being and will continue to be sent to
you regularly. The motive power behind this resistance is to be found
partly in an attachment to the former Benes system, but mostly in
those Governments to which these missions were accredited. These
former Czecho-Slovak Missions which are behaving so mistakenly or
are being misused by foreign countries, are rendering an ill service to
themselves and to the interests of the Protectorate. Hence we are
ourselves not disposed to continue to tolerate these manoeuvres and
propose taking counter measures against the refractory heads of
Missions, the personnel they are misleading, and their home interests.
However, we intend to make the Prague Government themselves
primarily responsible. Please call on the former Foreign Minister,
Chvalkovsky, during the course of Monday, March 27, and inform him
of the general measures which the Prague Government must now take
without delay, so as to set matters in order. The measures to be
specified remain to be confirmed in detail by telephone with the Foreign
Ministry in the course of Monday morning. They will include with-
\ : drawal of protection, expatriation, freezing of all salaries, sequestration
of property and income of the persons themselves and their dependents,
etc. It will also be expedient, in one or other particularly crass case,
to take immediate measures, to which publicity can be given, which
may serve as an example and produce a salutary effect. You are
requested to get in touch with the Foreign Ministry on the subject by
telephone during the morning of the 27th.
Wisizsacker
i Taken from the Prague copy (28/19481-82)
s See document No. 5.
[Editors' Note. On March 26, the twentieth anniversary of the
jjffoundation of the Fascist Formations, Mussolini made a speech at the
126
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Mussolini Forum in Rome. He formulated that part of his speech
which dealt with international questions under the following five
heads: —
1. Although he would consider perpetual peace as a catastrophe for
civilization, he thought a long period of peace was necessary to safe-
guard European civilization in its development. But, although
recently solicited [see document No. 114 below], Italy would not take
the initiative until her sacrosanct rights had been recognized.
2. The period of the tours de valse [i.e., taking turns with different
partners] was over. The Axis, invulnerable to any attempts to cause
rifts in it, was a meeting between two revolutions "in absolute antithesis
to any other conception of modern civilization ". What had happened
in Central Europe was bound to happen. If the great democracies
wept over the premature and somewhat dishonourable end of their
dearest creation, that was an excellent reason for Italians not to
associate themselves with them. When a people possessed of large
numbers of men and immense stores of arms was not capable of a
gesture, that showed it to be overripe for its new destiny. But, if
the desired coalition against the authoritarian regimes were to
come into being, these last would counter-attack in every corner of the
globe.
3. The barricades between France and Italy raised by the Spanish
war [spoken of in his speech of May 14, 1938, at Genoa] could be re-
garded as almost entirely demolished. The impending collapse of
Madrid would strike the last blow. The Italian problems in relation
to France were of a colonial character — Tunis, Jibuti, the Suez Canal.
Although the French Government were free to refuse to enter even a
simple discussion, in that case .they would have no cause to lament if
the furrow [solco] between the two countries became too wide to be
filled. Relations between States were relations of force only.
4. Geographically, historically, politically, militarily, the Mediter-
ranean was a vital area for Italy. Italian interests were "preeminent
but not exclusive in relation to the Slavs" in the Adriatic.
5. Italy had to arm at whatever cost, even if the Italians had to
make a clean sheet of everything that was called civil life.
The full text in Italian of this speech will be found in Benito Mus-
solini: Scritti e Discorsi, Edizione Definitive^ XII (Milan, 1939), pp.
154-160.]
MABCH, 1939 127
No. 103
I813/41517S-70
The State Secretary to the Embassy in Poland
Telegram
No. 76 Berlin, March 27, 1939—12:00 noon.
e.o. Pol. V2727.
For the Ambassador.
For your preliminary and personal information :
The Foreign Minister received the Polish Ambassador on Sunday at
midday. 1 The latter announced that Minister Beck was ready for a
discussion in Berlin, but only after tangible results of present talks had
been achieved through diplomatic channels. Lipski left a memoran-
dum which, in effect, offers a bilateral German-Polish guarantee for the
Free City of Danzig instead of the moribund guarantee of the League
of Nations. Instead of an extraterritorial strip through the corridor
for Autobahn and railway, the Polish Government offer far-reaching
traffic concessions to and from East Prussia, -while still maintaining
Polish sovereignty. Lipski characterized the present military measures
by Poland as purely defensive.
The Foreign Minister told the Ambassador that the Polish offer was
very unsatisfactory, and reserved his answer until after consultation
with the Fiihrer. (At present it is not to be expected that this answer
will be forthcoming very quickly.) The Foreign Minister urgently
recommended that the military measures should be rescinded, pointing
to the example of Czechoslovakia in May last year. The Foreign
Minister described any advance of Polish soldiers into Danzig as
constituting a casus belli for us.
Details to follow later.
. Weizsackek
1 Mar. 26. See document No. 101.
No. 104
;■"■■ 7485/E54043S
. The Charge d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
;.'No. 105 of March 27 Washington, March 27, 1939 — 12:36 p.m.
; Pveceived March 27 — 8:55 p.m.
W Villa 705.
1) With reference to your telegram No. 94 of March 23. l
I have today sent a Note to the Secretary of State in the sense of
r.part 1, para. 1, without requesting a reply. In view of the additional
$■. i Document No. 71.
128
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
customs duties now imposed, and the completely negative attitude of
the American Government in the same matter on the occasion of the
reunion of Austria and of the Sudetenland, it is certain that the
Treasury will not lift or modify the order of March 18. Therefore, I
did not consider even oral representations to be advisable in view of
the tension prevailing here at present.
2) Note in accordance with instructions in your communication of
March 7, W Villa 416, 2 handed over today.
Thomsen
2 Not printed (7485/E540429-35). This despatch instructed Thomsen to present a
Note stating Germany's intention to incorporate Austria and the budetenland into the
German customs area in the near future.
No. 105
5570/E30SS22
The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Fweign Ministry
No. 74 of March 27
Telegram
Belgrade, March 27, 1939—8:00 p.m.
Received March 27 — 10:50 p.m.
W 449 g.
With reference to my telegram No. 53 of March IS. 1
The representatives of the aircraft industry (Reiehsverband-
Dornier-Messerschmitt) who have arrived here, state that on in-
structions from the Reich Ministry for Air, issued at the instigation of
the Foreign Ministry, they have been forbidden until further notice to
submit tenders for the supply of aircraft which have been announced
here and are awaited by the Yugoslav War Ministry.
The representatives of these firms and the Air Attache, too, are
afraid that, despite previous assurances, a fresh delay in submitting
the tenders may cause grave resentment here and give rival French and
British firms an opportunity for disruptive manoeuvres.
If the lifting of the ban on the tenders cannot be expected in the |
next few days, I propose that the representatives of the firms be
authorized to submit their tenders on the express condition that the
total armaments credit is approved by the competent Reich depart- -J
ments.
Heeeen
i Document No. 21.
MARCH, 1939 J 29
No. 106
2050/447383
The Legation in the Protectorate to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 151 of March 27 Prague, March 27, 1939—8:25 p.m.
Received March 27—10:50 p.m.
With reference to your telegram No. 128 of March 26. i
1) Salaries of refractory Foreign Ministry officials have been stopped
since Thursday of last week.
2) Last Saturday I had the bank accounts here stopped of the
Ministers or Charges d'Affaires in Paris, London, Washington, Warsaw
Moscow and Santiago. After the inspection of the tax-returns, which
is taking place today, I will also have any remaining property con-
fiscated.
3) Legislative measures requisite for expatriation and expropriation
will be decided upon at today's Cabinet meeting.
4) I suggest postponing publication until measures under paragraph
3 are decided upon. I should then prefer publication to be effected by
the Prague Government.
RlTTER
Hencke
i Document No. 102.
No. 107
SI22/5I1 705-13
The Charge' a" Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
■■No. 556 Washington-, March 27, 1939.
Received April 5,
Pol. IX 602.
:■ Subject: American foreign policy; its aims and limitations.
. The American Government's pronouncements and measures of the
last few weeks show ever more clearly that President Roosevelt's bid
? for leadership in matters of world politics is aimed at annihilating
iNational Socialist Germany with all means available, and hence at
1 nullifying the New Order in Europe.
K; In order to save appearances the President has, of course, announced
|| in his message to Congress l that America, in her struggle against "law-
llwsness and blackmail ", will not use war measures, but only "measures
ifo Congressional Xecord, vol 84 pp. 76-79. Tho relevant passages f rom this
easage are printed in Peace and War, No. 124.
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
130
fermmy. Amenca^own fer^y has l**n partly
Fra nce and Britain, ine delivery of war materials at
by a ll -ans -aiUble and not £** ^ ^ ^ , d
°% ^rAmtSrthe sole purpose o£ combating Germany's exports.
One must start from the ^g^^^w world war, and
sufficiently a ^f "y^^^acoorded to the De-
^ h irZTi:^'^ to the totalitarian Powers -
mocracies, and his aeUDer ftvT > critically democratic principles
not merely to be traced to the hypocn ^ y convinced
which he voices on every °«^ a ^^d because she has bo
that Germany is the enemy ^ "^™£* America also will
upset the balance of P^J."^^* ^first. K the totahtarian
feel the consequences should sh e fail to get n hrst ^^
Powers establish and consolidate ****&*£* later int * a sitmt ion
w il U nKoosevelt'sview ^e manoeuvred ^^^^.^ is glad
wh ich can only end m t^^^f^^SoBCKy now. He does
of ^f^^^^^SS^ and reckons on a
not believe in the posaiauicy u Powers and the democracies,
trialof strength be ween the totahtananPo ^.^
These are America's &st ^"tS, view, be finished. Roose-
role as a great Power would, •a*™"™£ ^ is not t o be traced
veit ? r f as rt th° c^i^^ fau to A ™'
to the desire that the ^Sf 11011 ' T „ addition to being indicative :
by virtue of her might and g£*»~ r " t her a Sgn of innfr weakness
of an overdose of arroga-e it i much ra h e ^ gn ^ ^
and perplexity m face of ™ ™>Vf t tion in ^ Far East, a fact|
late if she were not already prepared jww. ^
MAKCH, 1939 13 J
"war-potential" is now being gradually reorganized for a state of
emergency. The armament industry is receiving "trial orders"; war
material, particularly aircraft, is being delivered to Britain and France
in order to speed up production; raw materials of military importance
which are not available in the United States are being imported and
stock-piled by way of precaution; the establishment of an armament
industry m Canada is being promoted; and manoeuvres of the armed
forces on land, sea and in the air are based on objectives far transcend-
ing the requirements of national defence. At this stage of the prepara-
tions nothing is said of sending troops to theatres of war outside
America because public opinion is, at present, not prepared for this.
Eoosevelt and his advisers are also probably of the opinion that, under
present conditions, the despatch of troops to Europe after the out-
break of war would be less decisive for its outcome than if the whole
of America's economic might were made available in good time.
In order to further this policy, Roosevelt is having recourse' to the
most ruthless propaganda, and he is being assisted by those forces
which see their triumph, and their business, in the annihilation of
Germany. The propaganda of Britain, Jewry and the Communists in
brotherly association has succeeded with the means at its disposal for
influencing public opinion in press, radio and cinema, in stirring up the
American people to a degree which is not even comparable with the
psychosis of the World War years, but far transcends it. The credu-
lous and easily led majority of the mentally dull American people has
completely succumbed to the insidious propaganda that Germany is
America's "Enemy No. I ",2 that Germany intends to attack America,
to impose its system upon her, has for this purpose covered the country
. with a network of spies and agents, is preparing for acts of sabotage in
■case of war and is, in short, that "Aggressor Nation" against which
j the whole world, including Russia, must defend itself. Even com-
^paratively reasonable people believe in the propaganda arguments that
^Germany's aspirations for colonies are merely to be traced to the
/desire to be in a position to attack America from the west coast of
^Africa with squadrons of aircraft, and that Germany's struggle for the
I'Latin American markets has only been entered upon in order to
^'liberate the German minorities" there by annexation of their areas
|of colonization, and thereby, at the same time, to obtain air bases from
Iffhich to attack the Panama Canal. Propaganda flourishes in such
Ifertile soil. In general, the average American understands nothing of
iBuropean history and European politics. He has an opinion on every,
: " ' g, however, if it is only suggested to him often enough. In addition,
e is the proneness to wild enthusiasm and the emotionalism for
jirhich the American is well known; instruments upon which every
ptator and every world reformer can play. After the American
ople have been persuaded that their most sacrosanct possessions are
132 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
threatened, it only needs, in certain circumstances, outside provocation
to bring public opinion to boiling point. As things are today the vas
majority of the American people agree with the Present's policy, that
is with intimidation of the totalitarian Powers by means short of
war"'* but the notion of having to go to France for this pohcy is un-
acceptable to them, and even propaganda cannot be expected to change
them immediately in this respect, even after the outbreak of a war in
Europe The picture would in all likelihood, however, immediately
change with the arrival of the first news of the effect of air attacks on
British or French cities and on the civilian population (they would not
he so sensitive in respect of German cities) or indeed when the first
American victims of this air war came to be lamented. It would then
need comparatively little effort to get the American people into a state
of war fever similar to that which existed after the torpedoing of the
"Lusitania". „ T . , . ,
Other circles, too, are utilizing the heat of tins propaganda against
Germany to cook their own soup; circles which would be glad to take
the war psychosis into their calculations, because it would serve their
political and other business ends if America were to participate most
actively in a war; circles which, however, are themselves icy cold and
sober m their calculations while engaging in this business. Among
them are the politicians who are rendered uneasy by the chaotic state
of domestic policy throughout the country, and who would like to
overcome, at one blow, unemployment and all its attendant dangers.
There are, moreover, the armament industrialists who scent big
business And, above all, there are the Communists, who see themselves
getting nearer their goal of making a Soviet State of America if the
whole world— with the exception of Russia— is embroiled in a life and
death struggle. It is these circles, too, which are striving to reinforce
America's willingness to participate by arguing that Germany is not
economically in a position to wage a protracted war, but would collapse
within a few months from lack of raw materials, and that therefore the
time to strike is now or never. _
If this one-sided picture of American public opinion under Roosevelt s
leadership were regarded as the only one, a false impression would be
gained of the forces and counter-forces in American politics, and their
possibilities and prospects. Roosevelt's "bold" foreign policy is popular
with the broad masses on whom he relies; but he is acutely aware that
it is not supported by many leading and authoritative circles^ The
bitterest enemies of his foreign policy are in the ranks of his own Party;
but they do not oppose him in the field of foreign pohcy because of their
resentment to his domestic policy. No, they are of the opinion that
Roosevelt's pohcy will sooner or later plunge the country into war,
and they consider it their duty, as patriots, to oppose this policy with-
out regard to Party political ties. Like the Republicans, who are m
MARCH, 1939 133
principle opposed to Roosevelt's adventurous foreign policy, these men,
leaders in the Senate and House of Representatives, express themselves
as wholly in favour of America's being suitably prepared for defence;
they have, however, important reasons for not wishing America to
become involved in European conflicts, and they express these reasons
in Congress, as well as over the radio and in the press — in so far as these
are available to them. In this connection, the Presidential election of
1940 is already casting its shadow before and, seen in the light of
American foreign policy, it assumes especial significance. It would be
wrong to suppose that, in general, Roosevelt's critics adopt, or will
adopt, a substantially different attitude towards Germany and the
totalitarian Powers. They have a different perspective, and approach
matters from the purely American point of view, needs and national
interests. For them, as American isolationists, it is an axiom wholly
compatible with American national dignity that America is 3,000 sea-
miles distant from the nearest continent, and is therefore unassailable.
It does not fill them with satisfaction to act as the world's schoolmaster,
for they realize America's limited possibilities with regard to both
foreign and domestic policy, and the everlasting dependence upon
British policy is a thorn in their flesh.
Whether or not America is prepared and in a position to take an
active part in a world war cannot irrefutably be affirmed or denied.
However, on sober consideration, the reasons against participation in
war are self-evident, and they can hardly be countered with factual
arguments even by Americans unless Roosevelt's uneasiness regarding
the threat to America's position as a World Power and to her world
prestige is regarded as justifiable.
The experiences of the World War are still all too fresh in the
memories of the American generation of today to allow them to con-
template, as desirable or without danger, a repetition of the abortive
experiment of "making the world safe for democracy". 2 The war
debts have not been paid, but their own war loans must be redeemed
and interest paid on them. The country is groaning under the heavy
burden of taxation and unbridled expenditure. In spite of the influx
of gold from all over the world, the budget deficit is becoming ever
greater, and the unemployment figure remains constant. The critics
ask: How can one, under such circumstances, lead the American people
into a war? And what are the foreseeable consequences of a war?
Nothing less than the establishment of a dictatorship, the very thing
which we supposedly wish to combat; and indeed, a dictatorship which
will, in all likelihood, never again give place to an old, sound democracy.
Before America ventures upon experiments in foreign policy, she should
first set her own house in order; diversionary manoeuvres cannot dis-
; guise the gravity of the domestic situation. More and more frequently
: ; one hears voices warning against interfering in European affairs which
lif
134 DOCUMENTS OK GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
do not concern America. Over there, it is much less a q»^ion of
ideological differences, as is always maintained here, than of the de-
cision of imperialist and geopolitical points of controversy which had
already existed for centuries when America developed into independent
nationhood. In face of the unbridled attacks by the American press
and public opinion on the policies of Germany, Italy and Japan, voices
are happily not lacking which reproach the <>ace-lovmg Demo-
cracies with their own sins, past and present. The history of he
origins of the British and French World Empires is examined under the
microscope, and the hypocrisy of the arguments which the sated
nations utilize in the struggle against the "have nots * is pulled to
pieces. Even the Communist danger is recognized to an increasing
decree Whenever this problem is brought up, the idea of entering into
a war/with Russia as a possible ally, folds little approval, and many
Americans are also conscious of the danger threatening civilization if
Russia should manage to keep out of a conflict. The Cassandra cries
which conjure up the danger of a German attack on America are
countered by the retort that Germany— as well as Italy and Japan-
will probably be so busy with the consolidation of their possessions
that even after a war victorious for them, they themselves mil be by
no means in a position to consider an American adventure And even
if it be admitted that the danger exists, the American defence forces
would be perfectly able to beat off any attack on American territory.
These predominant considerations of domestic policy must be
supplemented by an examination of America's position in foreign
policy, a position which robs the American magnetic field ot much of
the power of attraction ascribed to it by Roosevelt. Japan, even
though fully occupied with China, is not America's ally today as m
1917. America's western flank would be exposed if American armed
forces should become involved in a European conflict. Even if America
does not take an active part in a war at the outset, her capacity for
action will be hampered by the incalculable factor of Japan. For
America, too, a war on two fronts is no longer a mere chimera. In any
case, forces are being pinned down which might be needed m other
sectors. America cannot under any circumstances consider an offensive
war against Japan; nor would she come to Britain's assistance if
Britain's Ear Eastern possessions were attacked by Japan. As the
case of Guam* has shown, the signs indicate that America is not only
not seeking a war with Japan but will studiously avoid it. The reasons
for this are, on the one hand, her desire to maintain and, where possible,
to increase her trade with Japan and, on the other hand, her fear of
being denied access by Japan to raw materials in the Malayan islands.
* The proposal to spend *5,0Q0,0G0 on harbour implements on «to H"* <* G™« %
was defeated in the House of Representatives on Feb. 23, by 205 votes to 168.
MARCH, 1939 135
This fear also partly explains the United States' penetration of Latin
America. It is hoped to obtain there, with United States capital, sub-
stitutes for raw materials which may perhaps be lost. In spite of all
the optimism, externally displayed, regarding South America's loyal
friendship under the "Good-Neighbour Policy", 2 there are no illusions
here as to the reliability of the new friends. So much the more un-
scrupulous in its manifestations is United States policy, which does not
hesitate to connive with any Latin American Battista [sic], Trujillo or
Vargas, 5 but which cannot heap sufficient invective upon true national
leaders. There is complete awareness here that Latin America inclines
towards Europe from tradition and economic advantage and there is,
by this token, fear of the repercussions on Latin America of Nationalist
Spain's victory.
Finally, into the considerations of American policy there creeps the
anxiety as to whether the European democracies, for whose ideals
America is ready to sacrifice much, will always remain what they at
present appear to be, that is, democracies. The conferment of dicta-
torial powers on Daladier 6 has had an extremely sobering effect here,
' although the attempt is made to justify the need of these powers by
reference to the danger threatening from Germany and Italy.
Koosevelt believes that he is serving peace by piling up as much in-
flammable material as possible; no one will glorify him, least of all the
American people if, in the judgement of history, he appears as a
Herostratus.
Thomsen
5 Col. Fulgeneio Batista, Chief of the General Staff of the Constitutional Army of
Cuba, 1933-39; Gen. Rafael Trujillo Molina, President of the Dominican Republic,
193<W8; Getulio Vargas, President of Brazil, 1930-45.
* See document No. 22, footnote 2.
No. 108
52/31600-01
Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat
EM 21 Berlin, March 27, 1939.
Conversation Between the Foreign Minister and Lifski,
the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, on March 27, 1939
The Foreign Minister requested the Polish Ambassador to explain
the outrages in Bromberg l and remarked that these new excesses had
created a disastrous impression in Germany, as the suggestion here was
that they were being to some extent condoned by the Polish authorities.
:.. . I'On Mar. 27 the German press carried reports of anti-German demonstrations at
Bromberg, including accounts of the beating and maltreatment of German women and
: children.
136
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Once again it had been the Western League [Wet*mband\* about
which Germany had so often addressed complaints to Poland. In
Germany it was thought that if the Polish Government were well
disposed, they must surely be in a position to prevent such clashes.
The Foreign Minister most deeply deplored such a development in
German-Polish relatiens and emphasized that the German Government
must hold the Polish Government fully responsible for such occurrences.
The Polish Ambassador stated that he had no knowledge of the in-
cidents mentioned, but promised to make immediate enquiries. He,
too deplored the excesses, but explained them as being a result of the
nervous tension at present prevailing in Poland. He promised more-
over, on his own initiative to do everything possible to obviate the
repetition of such incidents. ,
When the Polish Ambassador asserted that similar incidents directed
against Poland had also occurred at functions of German clubs, the
Foreign Minister at once answered that, so far, the provocation had
always come from the Polish side.
When the Polish Ambassador asked whether a "few words to reassure
both peoples" could not be found, the Foreign Minister answered that
anything of that kind was not warranted by the situation as the provo-
cation and press attacks, as stated, had so far come only from the Polish
side If— and this could not be prevented much longer-the German
press henceforth replied to the Polish attacks, it would do so thoroughly.
In conclusion, the Foreign Minister remarked that he could no longer
understand the Polish Government. An evasive answer had been given
to the generous proposal which Germany had made to Poland. In any
case, the proposal transmitted yesterday by the Polish Ambassadors
could not be regarded by the Foreign Minister as a basis for a settle-
ment of the questions at issue.. Relations between the two countries
were therefore deteriorating sharply. ,,.,.,. ,j j
On taking leave the Polish Ambassador promised that he would do
everything in his power to overcome the difficulties.
DR SCHMIDT R[IBBENTE0P]
Minister
* A Polish nationalist organization.
3 See document No. 101.
No. 109
2561/524066
Memorandum by the State Secretary
St.S. No. 269 BERLnT ' March 27 ' 1939 "
I spoke to the Swiss Minister today about press reports, according
to which Paris and London had apparently been in touch with Berne in
MARCH, 1930 137
order to prepare for a Franco-British agreement regarding the protection
of Swiss neutrality. 1 If it was true that Berne had been approached
on this matter, Switzerland would thereby expose herself to the sus-
picion of being biased in her policy,
Herr Froelicher denied having any news from Berne, but remarked
that Switzerland could not prevent an agreement by third parties to
Tegard a violation of Swiss neutrality as a casus belli. In point of fact,
Switzerland would defend her neutrality herself and would not allow
anyone to come to her aid in this matter except at her direct request.
I replied to the Minister by saying that I would still advise him to
make enquiries of his Government and to let us know what the position
was regarding the alleged, even though merely semi-official, contacts of
the French and British Governments with Berne on this matter. What
had happened there would come to light anyway.
Weizsackek
i See also document No. 93, footnote 2,
No. 110
S104/455763
Memorandum by the State Secretary
St.S. No. 276 Berlin, March 27, 1939.
The Italian Charge d' Affaires asked me today whether Bulgaria was
not somewhat disturbed about our economic Treaty with Rumania. l
I replied to Count Magistrati that both the Bulgarian and the Hun-
garian Ministers had asked me whether the economic Treaty was linked
to any political agreements, and that I had categorically denied the
suggestion.
Weizsackek
if;:,
if-:.'
1 See document No. 78.
No. Ill
: JM4/56593S-39
Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IV b 1
immediate Berlin, March 27, 1939.
e.o. Pol. IV 2160.
The following may be said regarding the Hungarian-Slovak incident
on the eastern frontier of Slovakia:
1 This memorandum tras in reply to an enquiry from Ribbentrop which Sonnleithner
It transmitted to Altenburg in a minute of Mar. 26 (not printed, 7490/E540474).
138 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
On the morning of March 23 certain Hungarian detachments, ad-
vancing from the south and east, entered Eastern Slovakia from three
directions :
a) From Kapusany through Pavlovce in the direction of Miehalovce.
b) From Ungvar in the direction of Sobrance.
c) From Bereznyin the direction of Ubla-Svina.
From the outset the advance seems to have met with strong resis-
tance from the Slovaks and came to a complete standstill in the evening
of March 24. The line of demarcation occupied by the Hungarians at
the end of the encounters would probably be, apart from minor de-
viations, about 10 to 15 kilometres inside Slovakia, to the west of the
administrative boundary which, under the old regime, separated that
country from Carpatho -Ukraine. About 100-150 persons were killed ,
during the clashes and roughly twice that number wounded. It is to t
be regretted that, as late as the afternoon of the 24th, the Hungarian ■•■
Air Force carried out a bombing attack on the airfield at the volks- [
deutsch settlement at Zipser Neudorf, thereby causing the death of a ,;
number of civilians. ,.,,,, j
Following the outbreak of hostilities, Count Csaky had proposed ,
negotiations to the Slovak Government on the question of determining ;
the eastern frontier between Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukrame. After :
some hesitation, the proposal was accepted by the Slovak Government. .
Delegates from both sides met in Budapest for initial talks on Monday ;
March 27 at 12 noon. ,
Upon news of the clashes becoming known, the efforts ot the * oreign .
Ministry were directed towards the cessation of hostilities and towards :
persuading both opponents to settle their differences about the line of
the frontier at the conference table. Much pressure had to be brought
to bear on the Slovaks before the desired result was achieved.
Submitted to the Foreign Minister as instructed. ■
A[ltenbttrg]
No. 112
A625/3SS425-2"
Counsellor of Embassy Tippelskirch to Senior Counsellor Schliep
zu Pol. II 1008.1
Extract From a Letteb of March 27, 1939
I am trying to find out something about the attitude of the Soviet
Government towards the British enquiry concerning the anti-aggres-
i This is a cover note of Mar. 29 (not printed 1625/388424) signed by SehHep circuUt-
ing the above extract to various members of the Foreign Ministry. The full text of the
letter has not been found.
MAKCH, 1989 139
sion declaration. It is difficult to find out anything here, as the
negotiations are taking place in London. Nevertheless, it can be said
with some measure of certainty that, in the first instance, the Soviet
Government had replied to the British suggestion with a proposal for
a conference, 2 and had then agreed to the Declaration suggested by
Britain on condition that Poland should also accede and that the De-
claration should not be purely platonic. Confirmation of this last point
was however not obtainable. It is not impossible that, in addition,
certain requests regarding support from Britain, in the event of a
Soviet-Japanese conflict, were mentioned. A Secretary of Legation at
the British Embassy here dropped a remark to the effect that the
Russians had subscribed to the declaration, but not in the way the
British had wanted. In this connection a Soviet Note is reported to
have been delivered in London on March 23; another version says it
was handed in here. 3 A communique promised by the Soviets has
significantly not been forthcoming. An effort by Hudson to conduct a
political conversation with Litvinov is said to have failed in the early
stages.* In judging present Soviet foreign policy, two facts must not
be lost sight of: for one thing, unusual mistrust prevails here as to the
real intentions of the Western Powers towards the Soviet Union. The
Soviets suspect the Western Powers of trying to divert German aggres-
sion towards Soviet Russia in order to rid themselves of this danger.
t, What is more, the Soviets wish to join the Concert of Europe and
i': desire also a development which would preferably bring about war
between Germany, France and Britain, while they themselves can, to
begin with, preserve freedom of action and further their own interests.
This picture tallies also with Stalin's doctrine on the foreign policy of
the Soviet Union, expounded on the occasion of the recent Party
Congress. 6 Should I hear any further details today or tomorrow, which
!•■ is unlikely, I shall report by telegram. Meanwhile, I request that the
above be considered as a substitute for a report.
For the rest, the mood in the diplomatic corps towards us Germans
has of late become very reserved. We are endeavouring to counteract
this. For the present this results in a deterioration of our opportunities
\ of gaining information. This is regrettable, because, in consequence of
pthe well-known conditions here, it is in any case difficult enough to
f-fflft information.
The Japanese Ambassador told me that Litvinov had, for the first
• time, at the last conversation on the fisheries question, shown willing-
63 to make concessions. Accordingly, Mr. Togo viewed the matter
• l See document No. 75, and enclosure.
i A Note was handed to the British Ambassador in Moscow by Litvinov on Mar. 22.
|ij» British Documents, Third Series, vol. iv, No. 490.
''For Hudson's accounts of his talks with Litvinov see ibid., Nos. 505, 519, 531, 533
' 1545.
,:* S« document No. 1. - ■ -.
140
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
somewhat more hopefully. My personal opinion is that Litvinov's
changed attitude is due to Togo's having at last begun to make practical
suggestions. Apart from this, we have received confidential information
from Japanese military sources to the effect that units of the Japanese
Navy are being sent north to escort the Japanese fishing fleet when it
sails on April 1 . Incidentally, there was a further conversation between
Togo and Litvinov yesterday and yet another is said to be arranged for
tomorrow. It looks as if an understanding were not far off.
This morning a Secretary of Legation from the Japanese Embassy
here called on me. In the course of the conversation, he enquired
whether we were aware that Britain was making all possible prepara-
tions for war with Germany. He added, while asking that it be treated
confidentially, that he had information that Britain was withdrawing
the British contingents of troops from Hong Kong and Shanghai and
transferring them to Singapore, as Britain no doubt assumed that
Japan would support Germany. What might this Japanese have had
in mind in giving me this information 1 1 Does he want to incite us?!
Or to warn us ? !
No. 113
2881/584305-307
Consul General Wiedemann to State Secretary Weizsncker
San Francisco, March 27, 1939.
Dear Herb, von Weizsack.ee: I hope you do not mind if I make a
personal report to you now and then, and I leave it to you to submit J
to the Minister what you think fit. Needless to say, I expect no answer
as I know how busy you are. I feel very much at home here, and did ; ;
find conditions much better than I had expected. The general attitude ■;
of the American Government and of the American people towards
Germany and the recent events is well known. There exists, however, '
a good deal of understanding and receptiveness for our point of view,;
and this undoubtedly holds true more in the West than in the East. 1 1
entirely agree with those who know America well when they say that ;
only from the West, and, perhaps, from the South, can the population::
of the United States be influenced in favour of Germany. In the East;!
the Jews govern, so there is nothing to be done there.
My immediate intention is to make as many contacts as possible |
with authoritative circles and, if possible, gain admittance to them, |
without at first attempting to engage in any political discussions.;
Having once got a bit closer together, the other side are bound, of their ||
own accord, to raise the question: What do you think of the political |
situation? Naturally, I cannot quite avoid an answer. The explana- ;'
tion that all that has happened is no more than a partial redressing of \
MARCH, 1939 14J
wrongs done to us finds understanding almost everywhere. I have
repeatedly told people to imagine that Germany had won the war, and
had made of Ireland, against England, what the Entente has made of
Czecho-SIovakia against Germany. One American described the matter
still more drastically to his compatriots. He showed them the map of
Central Europe and pointed out Czecho-SIovakia as a thumb, and the
surrounding German territory as a part of the body not to he more
closely specified here, and asked his countrymen what they would do
\ : if such a thing should happen to them.
?■' The German-American Chamber of Commerce gave an inaugural
fV luncheon in my honour, at which officers of the highest rank as well as
;;.. a number of important businessmen were present. We Germans were
|- especially gratified by the fact that Mayor Rossi also came, in spite of
?• the fact that there was a luncheon at the same time in honour of La
| Guardia, 1 who had given a lecture in the Commonwealth Club shortly
| before. This was a gesture to the German element here which is to be
I particularly appreciated. Nor have I any complaints about the attitude
I . of the press or of the Communists. When I arrived here, the representa-
|? tive of the Communist newspaper was present as well as other journa-
fX lists. The newspaper afterwards published a polite article, and on his
|; departure the correspondent himself informed me, in apologetic terms,
&'■■ that the Party would probably have to send a picket on the following
. Saturday, as that was the manner in which opinions were expressed
here. In point of fact, the picket did not appear on that occasion, but
only last Saturday, in reply to the Czech events. Worthy of note in
this connection was the attitude of the police, who asked the day before
if they should arrest the whole lot beforehand and put them in jail, and
also the attitude of a right-wing trade union, which rang up and pro-
tj- 'posed that they should come as well and beat up the Communists.
if; Naturally, I declined both proposals.
A few days ago I was in Los Angeles for a short time, and there, too,
I was astounded by the violent anti-Semitism expressed in many
(I. circles. The Jews make the same mistakes here that they make every-
where else in the world: When they are in an authoritative position,
I' they employ only those of their own race and throw the others out, and
|: there are not a few of the latter in Los Angeles.
Naturally, here on the West coast the interest of businessmen is
ifocused above all on selling their products. My arrival was regarded
§ae an opportunity to make yet another drive in this direction. As a
fieault of the well-known measures of the American Government 2 there
|is, of course, nothing to be achieved here for the moment, but we are
able to say to the people : You see, we are doing everything we can, it is
^always only your Government who prevent a successful outcome.
. i Fiorello La Guardia, Mayor of New York.
1 See documents Noa. 56 and 71.
142
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
In short, I would like to tell you once more that I am very happy
here and quite optimistic. I am convinced that it will be possible—
within the bounds of reason, of course— to make successful progress
toward the objectives assigned to me by the Minister. If you, Mr.
State Secretary, wish to help me somewhat in my position, I would ask
you to see that I obtain all the funds promised me by the Minister and
by the Fiihrer. For it is only possible to achieve things here by personal
contact, and to this end one must go out oneself and also enter-
4-Qltl
Meanwhile, my kind regards to your wife. I have the honour to
\ours sincerely, Fa - Wibdbmahb
No. 114
533/242051-52
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
Rome (quik.) March 28, 1939—8 p.m.
Received March 28 — 10:45 p.m.
TOP SECRET
MOST URGENT
No. 109 of March 28
For the Foreign Minister.
Ciano asked me to come and see him today in order to communicate
the following to me in connection with the passage in yesterday's speech
by the Duce 1 in which Mussolini refused to take any kind of initia-
A few days ago the Duce had received a personal letter from Chamber-.
lain dated March 20, 2 which I was able to look through in the original
in Ciano's presence. In it Chamberlain first of all recalls his appeal of
September to which Mussolini had responded at once in those critical
days, and explains that he is turning to him again on the same matter.
Recalling the highly satisfactory course of the January visit to Rome ( s
he reminds the Duce of the question he then asked, whether he, Cham-
berlain, had any further wishes to discuss. At the time he had referred
only to his one great anxiety lest the Fiihrer might have new and
far-reaching plans, in view of the vast German rearmament, the
reasons for which were inexplicable. Mussolini had assured him
then that the Fiihrer desired and needed peace for the development
and internal consolidation of the Reich following the expansion of last
year. The events of recent weeks now appeared to him in complete
i On Mar. 26. See Editors' Note on p. 125. , . „ r w „ ,,,
2 For the text of this letter see British Documents, Thud Series, vol iv, No. 448
* Chamberlain and Halifax visited Rome Jan. 11-14. See **., vol. m, fco. 500.
MARCH, 1989 143
contradiction to this. As he had said in his speech of the 17th 4 these
events had produced a most profound impression, not only in Britain,
but throughout the world, above all because they seemed to prove that
the Fuhrer, by incorporating territories settled by non-Germans, con-
templated departing from the oft-proclaimed basic lines of his policy.
People were wondering whether this action were not the prelude to
farther similar actions, and whether other territories also were gradu-
ally to be brought under German control. If this were so, then such a
policy would lead sooner or later, and probably sooner, to a new major
conflict. Certainly no one wanted war, but every single State
would prefer it to the certain expectation of seeing themselves fall, one
after the other, under German domination. He had no desire to inter-
fere in the policy of the Axis, which he still looked upon as something
unalterable. He could not, however, reconcile himself to the dominat-
ing position of one single Power. What was happening now had
justified the gravest doubts. Fresh moves would change these doubts
to certainty. In these anxious days, therefore, he begged the Duce to
consider whether he could not take action to allay the present tension
and do something to restore shattered confidence. The letter closes
with the usual courtesy formula written by hand.
According to what Count Ciano told me, Mussolini confined himself
at first to a friendly acknowledgment of the letter; he intends, however,
to reply in a few days 5 reiterating to Chamberlain in friendly and
courteous terms that, although he is still prepared to cooperate for the
preservation of peace, any kind of participation or even initiative on
Italy's part in this respect would be out of the question until Italy's
just claims had met with consideration.
Mackensett
* See document No. 23 and footnote 1 thereto.
!' " < In a further telegram, No. 116 of Apr. 3 (375/208905), Mackensen reported: "In the
course of today's conversations, reported elsewhere, Ciano let me see a copy of Mussolini' s
■ : reply to Chamberlain.
The letter, written in Italian, is couched in very polite terms, but does not go beyond
jfe these courtesies. The Duce first recapitulates the lengthy [st'c] contents of Chamberlain's
W. letter and in reply refers to what he has repeatedly and not just recently declared in
^■public about the situation created by developments in Central Europe and about his
'■' own fundamental attitude to the problem of 'peace ' . With reference to Chamberlain's
■ 'suggestion that he should do something, he would, however, like to point out again that
; there could be no question of his taking any steps until Italy's just claims had been re-
s' cognized." For the text of this letter, see British Documents, Third Series, vol. iv,
:No. 596.
.:
144 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 115
1818/4U192-94
The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry i
PTa ,, Warsaw, March 28, 1939.
ri8a '* Received March 29, 1939.
Pol. V 2781.
Political Report
Subject: Bellicose Mood in Poland.
The excitement caused in Poland by the solution of the Czech
question has considerably increased since the reincorporation of tie
Memel territory.* Polish political and military circles are obviously of
the opinion that at any moment now the Danzig question may become
acute and that the danger of a German coup against Danzig hangs over-
head The wildest rumours are current among the population, as for
example that clashes have taken place between German and Polish
troops in Oderberg, that Minister Beck has been arrested and similar
fantastic reports. Of more serious significance is the appearance of a
war mentality, which is encouraged by the press, by anti-German
public demonstrations^specially in the provinces-which have already
led to incidents in many cases, and partly also by semi-official sabre-
rattling propaganda. It is widely believed today that war has become
inevitable and is imminent.
The practical measures adopted by the Government help to aggravate
the existing war-psychosis. In the course of last week the three age-
groups of reservists of 1912, 1913 and 1914 were called up; there were q
also partial call-ups— for specialist formations— of other age-groups, 1
and besides this there has been requisitioning of horses and lorries. .*
Furthermore, the Government have used the present situation as a pre- *
text for issuing an internal State loan for the purpose of expanding the '|
Air Force and anti-aircraft artillery. _ ;|
A much reproduced article in the military gazette Polska Zbrojma
"We are ready", is especially characteristic of the type of official.. |
defence propaganda. Among other things, it is there stated that the^
Poles in contrast to the Czechs, have no feeling of inferiority vis-a-w |
the powerful nations of the world. The number of foreign divisional
does not frighten Poland, for her own Army, its equipment and the|
warlike spirit of the Polish people suffice to assure Poland of victory. |
Numerous other articles which have since appeared daily in the presa^
axe infused with the same spirit and couched in the same language. ■ jj
This self-assurance and over-estimation of their own military strength,^
as expressed in the press, contains a certain danger in view of the Polish ^
i The document is stamped: "Seen by the Fuhrer, March 30, 1939."
2 See Editors' Note on p. 80.
MAECH, 1939 145
national character. That it is not merely a question of press pro-
paganda is shown by a vouched-for statement made by Gluchowski, the
Vice Minister for War who, in the course of a serious conversation,
stated that the German Wehrmacht was great bluff, for Germany
lacked the trained reserves to bring her units up to strength. When
asked whether he believed that Poland was really militarily superior to
Germany, Gluchowski answered "Why of course."
Characteristic of the mood in political circles was also an anti-
German demonstration staged in the last plenary session of the Senate.
The first reading of the Polish-Lithuanian Trade Treaty at which
Saulys, the Lithuanian Minister, was present in the diplomatic gallery,
gave Senator Katelbach the opportunity of assuring Lithuania, in the
name of the Senate, that Poland had sympathized very deeply with
Lithuania in the great ordeal she had just undergone. The two
Ministers present at the session and Count Szembek, Vice Foreign
Minister, joined in the "lengthy and tumultuous" applause which this
statement called forth.
MOLTKE
No. 116
2701/547916
The Embassy in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
B 993 Londoh, March 28, 1939.
Received March 29.
W VI 1166.
Subject: Economic sanctions against Germany.
With reference to our report B 894 of March 21. 1
I" The British Government have now stated unequivocally that they do
not intend to intervene in normal German-British trade, as had been
|, demanded from various quarters as "reprisal " for the German measures
% , in Bohemia and Moravia. Various questions in the House of Commons
a. yesterday as to whether an economic boycott and economic sanctions
^ : were intended against Germany were answered by a clear " No ". On
j a question by a member as to what the attitude of the British Govern-
ment would be if Germany introduced economic sanctions, the Under-
ISecretary, Butler, said that the situation arising then would have to be
teviewed by the Government.
The text of the questions and answers is in the official debates
lieport, 2 volume 345, No. 73, columns 1688/94. By order:
Dr. Weber
» l Not printed (2791/547901-07). In thi3 report Weber, First Secretary at the .London
^Embassy, discussed the possible effects of recent events on Anglo-German economic
delations concluding that the British Government were " clearly hesitating to intervene
Ijii normal Anglo-German economic relations without apparent season".
|. > i.e., Pari. Deb., H. ofV., lot. cit,
10
X46 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 117
2002/142301-03
Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IV b
Berlin, March 28, 1939.
zu Pol. IV 2114. 1 i
A conversation took place this afternoon in section VI of the General
Staff (Colonel Wagner), at which the Foreign Ministry was represented
by the following: Consul General von Druffel from Bratis ava, Senior
Counsellor Altenburg and Secretary of Legation von Nostitz.
Herr von Druffel brought forward for discussion the various com-
plaints of the Slovak Government* against actions of the military
authorities inside and outside the occupied zone of Slovakia. At the
close of the deliberations the following points were established:
1) From March 27 inclusive, the German Customs Frontier Protection
Force in Slovakia has been withdrawn to the Moravian-Slovak frontier.
2) The line of the Waag* continues to be the line of military occupa-
tion It is proposed that at a later date its exact course will be
determined by a mixed German-Slovak military commission.
3) A staff officer will be seconded to the Consulate General by the ^
end of this week, who will establish direct liaison between the Slovak |
Armed Forces and the OKW. _ |
4) The troops to the east of the military occupation line (only single ,;
detachments are involved) are to be recalled today by urgent order, i
5) The Wehrmacht lay claim to the entire war material of the former 3
Czechoslovak Army in the occupied zone of Slovakia. The removal J
must, however, be carried out in an orderly manner (documents to be j
handed over). Any disputes and legal claims are to be dealt with later |
and to be cleared up. Paw materials and machinery to remain vhmf
they are in the armament factories of the occupied zone. -
6) There will be no more requisitioning or removal of war materia^
east of the occupied zone. When necessary, special contact will bep
made with the Slovak Government. _:
7) The question is under consideration of conceding to the Slovaks
■ State an armed force of about four divisions, of which two will be mo^
tain divisions The Fiihrer's decision on this has still to be obtained.^
8) The Volksdentsche in Slovakia are, should the case arise, to bej
concentrated in their own formations under their own command. This,
would involve the formation of about 3 mountain battalions. . . j
ALTENBUBO'
iw^ minted (2002/442296-98); a Slovak note verbale dated Mar. 17, which set forth,^
^1^"^ complaints referred to in the document here prmted. • , ,|
i See document No 95 mihrer > s decision as conveyed to us by OKW. According
J£:Z S Z Waag hne 6 S to Mma" 'provision^' [«,««*,] (or was it •««
^tX^oei^MsT^eiteZl}). W[«rm»a]." See also document No. 99. . ;.|
MABCH, 1939 j^y
No. 118
52/3*605-06
The. Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most tjegent Wabsaw, March 29, 1939—3-43 p m
No. 54 of March 29 Received March 29—6:35 p.m!
For the Foreign Minister.
Foreign Minister Beck summoned me yesterday evening to tell me
the following: In the conversation of March 26, i the Reich Foreign
Minister told Ambassador Lipski that a Polish coup against Danzig
would signify a casus belli. This communication forced him to state in
turn, that if an attempt should be made by Germany to alter the status
of the Free City unilaterally, Poland would regard this as a casus belli
The same applied if such a breach of the Treaty a were to be made by
the Danzig Senate. M. Beck added that the Polish Government re-
gretted the exacerbation in relations caused by the German declaration
and that, far from having any aggressive intentions towards Danzig'
they still hoped to find through friendly negotiations a solution to
the Danzig problem satisfactory to both sides. He asked me to con-
!. vey this information to the Foreign Minister.
I answered Beck that this exacerbation had been caused, not by us,
.but solely by the Polish mobilization measures, which were entirely un-
justified, and furthermore, given their effects, they were a very dubious
■ step to take. Even now, as a result of the warlike atmosphere thereby
J created, and aggravated in an irresponsible fashion by press and
| propaganda, a situation had arisen holding very dangerous possibilities.
|'The serious incidents in Pomerellen were clear proof of this. I drew
^; special attention to the scandalous outrages in Liniewo 3 and reserved
|the right to refer to this matter again when I had more precise informa-
nt: tion.
^ Beck tried to justify the mobilization measures by saying that the
I'daim made precisely at this moment about Danzig, after the events
fin Czechoslovakia and Memel, had had to be interpreted by Poland
gas a danger signal. There was no cause for anxiety that difficulties
tjnight arise in consequence of the measures taken. So far he knew
i' 1 See document No. 101.
kl The words "breach of the Treaty" are an error in deciphering. The draft of this
tfegram m the files of the \\ arsaw Embassy (7804/E566358-60) has the word "attempt ' '
h place of them . r
!<* According to a despatch of Mar. 28 from the German Consul in Torun (not printed
(821/5*8761-63), a meeting of the local National Socialist Party in Liniewo on Mar 25
^forcibly broken up by a group of Poles who also destroyed all the furnishines of the
mmbly rooms and tore up a portrait of the Fiihrer and the German flag: on thf follow-
misrtit windows in the house of a German subject were smashed.
148 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
2 which the Fiihrer had given preeminence to maintammg the P ok y
Polish side. Moltke
No. 119
6783/E513480 . .
TAe Jtfimrfer »» *Ae Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
■ the hague, March 29, 1939— 19:15 p.m.^
CONFIDENTIAL THB : ^^ ^ ,
No. 18 of March 29 ** w 472 g __*
With reference to my report A667 of February 10. 1 '.jj
SfcSntmSe^inJhiS of the Netherlands Field Army* uta.3
me that Krupp have refused delivery to the Netherlands Army rf *
S s t^eSed light field howitzers, 10.5 cm latest model, togrite
5£ the requisite gunlimbers and ammunition, although Krupp m
laaYa tender and demonstrated the guns here in Holland m the nuddle
^£t S ™ I need not stress the overall importance of tins order
*£> ^1 probably go to France in the event of German refusal, »*
g ^Lt.-Gen. Baron van Voorst tot Voorst.
MARCH, 1989 149
request that Krupp be prevailed upon to fulfil it. I also request that I
be placed in a position to make an explanation to the General of the
Field Army who secured the order for Krupp against the pro-French
tendencies of the War Ministry. 3
Zech
3 A copy of this telegram was forwarded to the Reiehsgruppe Industrie, which in a
letter of Apr. 1 (not printed, 6783/E513503-04) expressed the view that the C.-in-C. of
the Netherlands Field Army had been misinformed since Krupp were still interested in
and endeavouring to obtain the Netherlands order. See also Addendum to this volume.
No. 120
2006/442953
The Director of the Political Department to the, Legation
in Hungary
Telegram
No. 100 Berlin, March 29, 1939—9:20 p.m.
e.o. Pol. IV 2203.
With reference to your telegram 87 of March 27. l
As already orally discussed in Berlin, we do not at present propose
to intervene as mediator in the negotiations between the Hungarian
and Slovak Governments on the frontier questions. You should evade
further discussion of the allegation that the Hungarian invasion of
Slovakia occurred with German approval, and contradict it if necessary
in conversation by drawing attention to the Hungarian dimenti already
f given.
I refer you also to the telephone conversation with the State Secretary
on March 28. a
WOERMANN 3
> Not printed (2006/442956). In this telegram, Erdmannsdorff reported that he had
' been asked by the State Secretary of the Slovak Foreign Ministry whether the statements
of some Hungarian Commanders, that the Hungarian invasion of Slovakia had taken
;■ place with German approval, were true.
' * No record of this has been found.
»Ia a memorandum of Mar. 31 (2313/484529) Altenburg recorded: "Minister von
.^Erdmannsdorff telephoned at 5:45 p.m. that Count Cs&ky had informed him that, with
Uncertain lega! reservations, the Slovak Delegation accepted this morning the Hungarian
I demands for establishing the frontier in Eastern Slovakia. The Hungarians are prepared
? to make certain economic concessions. Technical commissions are to be set up for this
jpas also for delimitation of the new frontier. The latter commission has already started
: 'i,mrk this afternoon."
150 DOCUMENTS ON GEEMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 121
1625/388421-22
The, Charge <T Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 99 of March 29 London, March 29, 1939—11:23 p.m.
Received March 30—2:40 a.m.
Pol. II 983.
With reference to my telegram No. 93 of March 25 (Pol. II 931). l
I. Statements made yesterday by Chamberlain in the House of
Commons and by Plymouth in the House of Lords, 2 as well as reports
in this morning's press, give the state of the negotiations on the question
of the British declaration projects 3 approximately as follows:
1) The British Government recognize de facto the position created by
the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia, as well as of the Memel
territory, but will in future oppose any changes by force in the map of
Europe. Direct threat of force is put on a par with changes by force.
"Aggression" is beginning to emerge in everyday language as synony-
mous for both.
2) Strengthening of the existing Anglo-French alliance to meet a
possible German attack in the west, even if this attack were to be
directed against Holland, Belgium, Switzerland and Denmark. In
addition, consultations on military assistance in the event of a German
attack on Poland or Rumania,
3) Independently of this, endeavours to develop the already existing
alliance between Poland and Rumania, so that the two States would
come to each other's assistance, not only in the event of a Soviet
Russian, but also of a German attack.
4) As a result of the negative attitude of all the States consulted, as
well as of the Conservative Opposition, Soviet Russia drops out as a
partner. Admission of the Soviets will be considered only after war has
already broken out.
5) The Balkan States too, like Russia, are to be held in reserve for
the present.
6) The idea of a conference has been abandoned. Instead negotia-
tions are to be carried on through diplomatic channels. Attempts are
i Not printed (1625/388417-18). In this telegram Kordt reported reasons for believing .
that the Netherlands had been sounded about, and had reacted unfavourably to, the y
projected British declaration,
2 On Mar. 28 Chamberlain stated in the House of Commons, in answer to a question .
about the European situation, that the Government were "actively continuing their '4
consultations with other Governments upon the issues arising from recent events ". In :|
reply to a further question he said that what the Government had in mind ' ' goes a great ',4
deal further than consultation". See Pari. Deb., H. t>f C, vol. 345, cols. 1883-1885; ;i
for Lord Plymouth's speech see Pari. Deb., H. of L., vol. 112, coU. 474-478,
3 See also document No. 83.
MARCH, 1989 jg I
being made to embody any results in secret agreements, which is how-
ever hardly practicable.
7) Introduction of conscription is improbable; instead there will be
intensified recruiting for the three branches of the Armed Forces on a
voluntary basis and, in particular, expansion of the Territorial Army.
II. The present state of the negotiations seems to rest on the follow-
ing considerations: The originally planned methods for security against
territorial changes through attack or threat of force have found but
scant welcome in all the countries concerned. Obviously the countries
consulted wish to avoid anything which could be interpreted as an
encirclement of Germany. Now Great Britain has adopted this stand-
point also. Hence the renunciation of direct Soviet Eussian coopera-
tion. It is not considered desirable to drive Germany to desperate
measures.
Poland and Rumania are not to be put in a position which must im-
pose a strain on their relations with Germany. This is the reason for
the proposed acknowledgement and development of the already
existing Polish-Rumanian defensive alliance. The proposed support
of Poland by Great Britain and France, in the event of a German attack,
is not to be given the character of a real treaty in favour of a third
party with a direct Polish claim for assistance, but will rather be in the
form of a declaration of willingness by Britain and France without the
need for acceptance. The circumstances are similar in the case of
Rumania.
III. Two systems of treaties are therefore apparently planned:
1) The French-British system for safeguarding the frontier in the
west.
2) An eastern system of treaties, the nucleus of which would be
formed by the Polish-Rumanian alliance.
Kohdt
No. 122
166/82518
Memorandum by the State Secretary
St.S. No. 279 Berlin, March 29, 1939.
;, The Hungarian Minister told me today that it is thought in Budapest
that the satisfactory and rapid conclusion of our economic Treaty with
: Rumania appears to be also due to the Hungarian military measures,
I" .under the influence of which Bucharest showed itself accommodating
V' towards us, Budapest rejoiced with us over our success.
h, I laughed at Minister Sztojay, and told him that the Rumanian offers
i to us in the economic field had been made a good deal earlier than the
152 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Hungarian military measures. I also said that I noted with pleasure
that Budapest also welcomed our economic agreement with Rumania
in the common interest.
In this conversation it also came to light that Hungary no longer
adheres to her intention to make over a few villages in Carpatho-
TJkraine to Rumania if Rumania gives her compensation tor them
elsewhere - Weizsacker
No. 123
3062/S1179S
Memorandum by the State Secretary
St S. No. 280 Berlin, March 29, 1939.
Referring to his last audience with the Fiihrer.i the Hungarian
Minister asked me today about our conversations with Poland regarding
■Danzig. He also hinted that Count Csaky would be prepared for his
part to counsel a conciliatory, attitude in Warsaw, should we so
W1 I ignored the latter idea as being futile. For the rest, I merely told
Sztojay that our conversations with the Poles were still continuing.
Certainly Warsaw had so far shown very little understanding. There
was still a great deal they must learn. 2
WeizsackerS
i See document No. 96, footnote 2. i miv,™.!" »„j. "Thanki"
a Marginal notes in Ribbentrop's handwriting: "[For] F[uhrer] , and. Inank.
a S» note?" Resubmit for next conversation with the Hungarian Minister or «
4/IV VvfeizsackerV' A memorandum by Weiasacker, St.S. No. 309 of Apr. 3 (not
printed; 7488^640466), records that he expressed the Foreign Minister's thanks to the
Hungarian Minister.
No. 124
52/34608-00
Memora-ndum by the State Secretary
St S No 282 Beklin, March 29, 1939. ;|
The President of the Danzig Senate, Greiser, and Staatsrat Br. |
Battcher, head of the Foreign Department of the Danzig Senate, called ;?
on me today to enquire about the state of the German-Polish discus- >j
sions on the solution of the Danzig question. - j
I acquainted the gentlemen—insofar as they were not already in-,;
forme d— with the treatment of this question during the last few months, j
and in particular with the essential substance of the conversations^
MABCH, 1930 153
of the Reich Foreign Minister with Ambassador Lipski on March 21
and 26. 1
On being asked by President Greiser what attitude Danzig should
adopt in future, I replied that in my opinion Danzig had no cause to
show the Polish Government a particularly accommodating attitude in
the treatment of Danzig-Polish questions (e.g., students' conflict 2 ),
but that, on the other hand, I did not consider it advisable to provoke
Poland in any way through Danzig. I thought it now possible to con-
duct a kind of policy of attrition towards Poland in order to make the
Polish Government more disposed to the solution we aimed at for certain
German-Polish questions, including also the Danzig question. Danzig
should continue to behave just as during the last few weeks and months.
President Greiser further asked what attitude Danzig should adopt
in future towards Professor Burckhardt ; the League of Nations Com-
missioner in Danzig. I replied that I considered it advisable for
Burckhardt not to return to Danzig for the time being as he only ran
the danger of being misused by the Polish Diplomatic Representative
there for Polish ends and to further the intentions of the Committee of
Three. 3 When Greiser asked if he, Greiser, should accept an invitation,
if it were issued, from the Committee of Three to go to London, I
answered that it would be better if he declined such an invitation, as
it was to be feared that he would merely be interrogated by the Com-
mittee of Three, treated disrespectfully and then dismissed.
Weizsackek
1 See documents Nos. 61 and 101.
* See vol. v of this Series, document No. 131.
* The Committee of Three, composed of representatives of Great Britain, France and
Sweden, was an organ of the League Council set up on July 4, 1936. Its purpose was to
■ give preliminary consideration to, and thus relieve the Council's agenda of, the numerous
;■■ Danzig issues referred to the League by the High Commissioner, See also vol. v of this
Series, chapter I.
No. 125
1522/373834-30
The Ministry of the Interior to the Head of the Reich Chancellery
VI b 701 X/39 Berlin, March 29, 1939.
8300
r'Subjeet: German-Polish Governmental negotiations on questions con-
""'' cerning national groups.
ly I enclose copies of the memorandum on the German-Polish negotia-
1 tions 1 for your information.
i Not printed (1522/373337-59). The minutes of the discussions held Feb. 27-Mar. 3,
H'1939. There are seven appendices containing the agenda, German and Polish proposals
W\ on specific items and draft press communiques.
154
DOCUMENTS ON GEEMAN FOREIGN POLICY
I would like to make a few general remarks on the negotiations con-
ducted with the representatives of the Polish Government:
The negotiations have given the following clear picture:
The Poles have no intention of making any change in their policy
towards the German national group. In less important spheres they
may be prepared to- make small concessions, but in matters affecting
the life of the German national group they are determined to pursue
with vigour their present de-Germanizing policy. The following two
fundamental considerations on the part of the Polish delegation ran
like a scarlet thread through the discussions: —
a) During the one and a half centuries of Prussian administration, a
definite percentage of the former Polish population has been Ger-
manized. The Polish Government regard it as their duty to bring this
section of the population back into the Polish national community.
b) The German national group, though it still only amounts to two
per cent of the total Polish population, nevertheless possesses such a
strong economic and cultural structure that it is able to exert a not in-
considerable influence on sections of the Polish national community
which lack stability. Therefore the German community must be re-
duced to a degree of insignificance commensurate with its numerical
strength.
Regarding (a) I replied to the Polish delegation as follows: The .
Germans did not first come into the country during the period of
Prussian rule. On the contrary, there had for centuries been a con-
siderable proportion of German settlers in the districts which fell to
Prussia in 1772 and 1793. Thus the Germans did not come to Poland
as conquerors, but were invited into the country by the Polish kings
and nobles. In all spheres of. cultural and economic life they have •
worked constructively in every way, so that they have acquired a
number of privileges. This, I explained, is perhaps the underlying reason
for the strong, centuries-old antipathy shown towards the German
community by the Polish people, to whom the Germans were held up
as examples by the Polish ruling classes of the time. Today the
Germans demand no privileges, but only that their most elementary.:
right to live should be respected.
Concerning the fundamental idea in (6), I asked the Polish delega-
tion how the Polish Government, in view of this consideration, en-
visaged the carrying out of the Minorities Declaration of November 5,
1937, 2 according to which any discrimination against the German
national group was to be ruled out.
In reply to this the Polish delegation could only state that all-
measures are kept strictly within the laws made by the democracy of
2 See vol. v of this Series, document No. 18.
MARCH, 1939 155
Poland, and are applicable to everyone. This basic view, in my opinion,
provides the key to the Polish attitude towards the German community!
that is, a frantic endeavour to appear as a great Power united in a single
national State, combined with an inferiority complex.
Concerning the position of the Polish national community in Ger-
many, the Polish delegation pointed out that the National Socialist
ideology is unfavourable soil for the prospects of a foreign minority
in Germany. The object of all laws, as indeed the laws themselves
openly declared, was the welfare of the German people. The dynamic
force of National Socialism, permeating as it did the entire German
nation, was so strong that no room was left for individual life to the
Polish national group.
The following conclusion can accordingly be drawn:
The Polish Government, on the basis of their "democratic" laws,
arrogate to themselves the right to torment and persecute the German
community, and deprive them of their rights, while at the same time
demanding privileges for the Polish national group in Germany. In
view of this basic attitude no constructive results could be achieved in
the discussions. By order;
Dr. Vollert
|: No. 126
}' 2908/566066-67
I Senior Counsellor Schliep to Ambassador Moltke
Berlin, March 29, 1939.
My Dear Ambassador: I beg to submit herewith Prince Bismarck's
memorandum 1 on his conversation today with Prince Lubomirski. 2
Herr Greiser was received this evening by the State Secretary 3 and
the Foreign Minister.* On being asked by the President of the Senate
what attitude Danzig should adopt, Herr von Weizsacker answered
that in his opinion Danzig had no cause to show Poland a particularly
accommodating attitude in the treatment of Danzig-Polish affairs; nor
did he, on the other hand, consider it advisable to provoke Poland from
Danzig in any way. In his opinion Germany would now adopt a kind
of attrition tactics towards Poland in order to make the Polish Govern-
ment more disposed to the settlement aimed at by us for certain German -
Polish problems. During this period of attrition Danzig should con-
tinue to behave as in the last few weeks and months.
\ i Not printed (52/34603-04). Bismarck had protested about the incidents in Liniewo
,. wA elsewhere, which had been reported from Torun (see document No. 118 footnote 3)
:; and the appeal to boycott the German element launched by several Polish organizations
;:;.* Counsellor of the Polish Embassy in Berlin.
'■ J See document No. 124.
* No material on this interview has been found.
1 56 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
The Foreign Minister also spoke on the same lines: Danzig should
adopt a Sphinx-like attitude towards Poland. Germany would stick
to her demands on Poland and continue to assert them emphatically.
Moreover, the Foreign Minister was of the opinion that the climax of
the present crisis had already been reached.
Heartiest greetings. and Heil Hitler!
Yours sincerely, ' Schliep
No. 127
2609/525462-64
Minister Blucher to State Secretary Weizs&cker
Helsinki, March 29, 1939.
Dear Baron von Weizsackbr: Knowing how fully occupied your
time is, I do not usually trouble you with private letters. Today I
would like to make an exception in connection with the Aaland
question. 1
You know that, with the exception of Germany and Italy, all the
signatory Powers have replied to the Finnish-Swedish Note 2 weeks ago.
Now the non-arrival of our reply is extremely awkward for the Finnish
Government, and especially for the Finnish Foreign Minister, because
the elections are due to take place on July 1, and by then the matter
must have passed through the tedious parliamentary channels common
to every democratic country. At every meeting with me the Foreign
Minister refers to the non-arrival of the German reply, and anything
that I can say in reply is but poor consolation.
At the same time the Foreign Minister is fully prepared for Germany
to make a reservation regarding the special Swedish rights and
about bringing in the League of Nations. I have the impression that
this reservation is not so awkward for him as the fact that we have
been keeping him waiting for weeks, especially as there are circles in-
side and outside the Government who regard the non-arrival of the
German reply as a slight to a small State, or who even suspect Mac-
chiavellian designs behind it.
In these days when Britain is courting Poland and Russia, and when
Mr. Hudson is expected here, 3 the Finnish attitude is not without
significance in the process of a possible regrouping of the Powers, at
least in Northern Europe. In this respect too, it would serve our
interests not to keep the Finns waiting any longer.
i See document No. 145 and also vol. v of this Series, chapter iv.
2 See the League of Nations, Official Journal, May-June, 1939, pp. 279-282, and vol.v
of this Series, document No. 464.
a R S Hudson, Parliamentary Secretary to the Department of Overseas Trade,
arrived at Helsinki for trade talks on Mar. 29. This visit was part of a tour which had
already taken him to Warsaw and Moscow,
MARCH, 1939 J 57
In particular, I would like the Foreign Minister, for his own sake,
to be able soon to present his Cabinet with the German reply In
these critical days, M. Erkko has clearly dissociated himself from
Russia and, in a certain sense, from Britain also, and because of this
has had to overcome much opposition among his Cabinet colleagues'
Continued non-arrival of the German reply is bound to weaken his
position in the Cabinet, and that runs counter to our interests.
In conclusion, therefore, I would like to urge that the reply to the
Aaland note be speeded up as much as possible. 4
I kiss the Baroness's hand and send kind regards to yourself
Heil Hitler! J
Yours sincerely, Blucher
* Margmal note: 1. Foreign Muuster has been informed. 2. Today I promised the
Swedish Mm.ster an early opportunity for a discussion. 3. Blucher has to be put off
for another brief penod. Herewith to the Under State Secretary, Wfeizsaclcer] 4. [4] "
No. 128
5570/E398823-24
The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 78 of March 30 Belgrade, March 30, 1939—8 :50 p.m.
Received March 31—1:50 a.m.
W 474 g.
With reference to my telegram No. 74 relating to the arms transac-
tion, 1
I. On instructions from the Ministry of War, Colonel Bosanovic in-
formed Military Attache von Faber officially yesterday that the progress
of the negotiations for the armaments transaction was causing grave
concern. The tender for anti-aircraft guns submitted by the firm of
Krupp could just not be discussed in view of the prices quoted. The
prices were several times higher than those asked by competitors
The Ministry of War still wishes to conclude a deal with Germany as
soon as possible. However, a prior condition was of course the quota-
tion of prices which were in some degree acceptable. He was urgently
requesting the Military Attache also himself to bring influence to bear
in order that the conclusion of a big armaments deal should not be
endangered by private firms demanding impossible prices.
n. Simovic, the Chief of the General Staff, who had asked Air
Attache von Schonebeck to call on him this morning, expressed on
behalf of the Ministry of War similar concern regarding the progress of
negotiations for the delivery of aircraft. The submission of tenders
1 Document No. 105.
158
DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POIJCCY
from the aircraft firms, urgently requested and long promised, was
repeatedly being delayed for some obscure reason. These tenders
formed, however, the indispensable basis for any negotiations, since it
could only be seen from them whether the prices quoted came at all
within the range of what was feasible for Yugoslavia. Since the Field
Marshal had approved in principle the conclusion of big arms transac-
tions on a credit basis, the difficulties which were suddenly cropping
up were not understood here. On the other hand, the smooth con-
clusion of the transaction would greatly enhance Germany's prestige
with the army and the public.
III. Consul General Neuhausen has been advised of the foregoing.
As he has just informed me he has, in consultation with Ministerial-
direktor Wiehl by telephone, cleared up the question of the ban on
tenders from aircraft firms to the effect that the tender may be sub-
mitted subject to a proviso regarding agreement being reached on the
question of credit.
IV. Like the Military and Air Attaches, I too have the impression
that the Yugoslav Ministry of War attaches the greatest importance to
speedy rearmament and urgently needs our assistance for this, with the
result that the exploitation of this difficult situation by the quoting of
exorbitant prices may cause serious and lasting resentment to the detri-
ment of the good name of German industry.
Heeeen
2767/535837
No. 129
Memorandum by th& State Secretary
St.S. No. 292
Beblin, March 30, 1939.
e.o. Pol. II 1049.
The Swiss Minister 1 told me today, in continuation of our recent
conversation, 2 that the Swiss Government were not involved either
officially or semi-officially in the discussions which were taking place
now between Britain and France with a view to cooperating for the
protection of Switzerland, Belgium and Holland. Switzerland knew no
more of these matters than what she had learnt from the press. She
regarded what was going on between London and Paris as res inter alios
acta.
Weizsackeb,
1 Hans Frolicher.
2 See document No. 109.
MARCH, 1989 J 59
No. 130
B21/005028-29
Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department
Berlin, March 30, 1939.
Economic Tension with the United States of Amebica
Caused by the Incoefobation of the Peotectoeate of
Bohemia and Moravia
1) American measures. l
The American Government immediately withdrew most-favoured
treatment from goods from the Protectorate and placed them on a par
with goods from the Reich proper [Altreich]. They have further directed
that, as from April 22, an additional duty of 25 per cent is to be im-
posed on all dutiable goods from the Reich proper, the Protectorate
and Memel. These measures against the Reich proper have long been
recommended by certain circles in America and also by some govern-
ment offices. Their introduction at the present moment may be con-
sidered merely as a political gesture of disapproval.
2) Effects of the measures.
Through the withdrawal of most-favoured treatment, the sale of
goods from the Protectorate in the USA is rendered very difficult.
As a result of the additional duty, the Greater Reich's export to the
USA, hitherto worth 200 million RM, will probably be cut by approxi-
mately 85 million RM. With this export of 85 million RM, we have
hitherto paid for the import of important raw materials (cotton and
copper) for which, if we must still obtain them from the United States,
foreign exchange will have to be expended.
3) Possible counter-measures.
The following might be considered:
(a) Immediate and complete cessation of purchases of cotton in
order to strike the United States at this sensitive spot in its economic
and domestic policy. 2 However, German economy would also be
harmed by this action, as long as we did not succeed in transferring our
orders for cotton to other countries, a transfer which would probably
be difficult. The desired effect on the USA is lessened by the fact that
the American Government have already introduced measures to ease
the political pressure at home by subsidizing their exports of cotton.
A decrease in our supplies of cotton from the USA will result from the
i See documents Noe. 14, 33, 56, 71 and 104.
2 See document No. 24.
1 60 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
actual situation, even though it is ordered and announced as a counter-
measure.
(b) Imposition of the maximum German tariff on imports from
America.
(c) Complete cessation of payments to USA on German debts.
All these measures, especially those specified under (b) and (c),
■would certainly provoke further American measures. First of all,
penalty duties would be imposed, as a result of which there would be
a complete cessation of German exports to the USA; further, also,
measures [would be taken] against German property and German
balances in the USA as well as against German shipping, as a result of
which trade between Germany and other countries would be seriously
affected (cf. previous memorandum of December 19, 1938). 3
4) The freezing of Czech credit balances (State and private) in
American banks, originally ordered, has meanwhile been rescinded.
American creditors with balances in the Protectorate are, through the
German foreign currency control introduced there, restricted in their
use of these credits without the need having arisen to institute special
freezing measures. The Protectorate's public and private debts to the
USA amount to approximately 28 million dollars, and the gold and
foreign currency credit of the former Czech Government with the
Federal Reserve Bank in New York amounts to approximately the
same, so that for this reason, too, a special order blocking American
claims against the Protectorate cannot be recommended.
5) Further procedure.
Definite German counter measures are not contemplated. Where
restrictions are possible (cotton) they will be made "unobtrusively"
[auf kaltem Wege]. The attempt will be made to obtain as much as
possible from the German- American exchange of commodities. It is
hoped to induce the United States Government to cancel the addi-
tional duties by dropping the German measures for promotion of ex-
ports which were the reason given for these additional duties.
Wiehl
3 Vol. iv of this Series, document No. 514.
No. 131
160/32534-45
Ministerialdirektor Wohlthat to State Secretary Weizsacker
W VI/373 Berlin, March 30, 1939.
Dear State Secretary: I transmit herewith for your confidential
information a copy of my report to the Field Marshal on the negotia-
tions in Bucharest. 1
1 i.u,, for tlio Ucmnm-ltLiiiiiuiitui Economic Tiyaty (document No. 7S).
MARCH, 1939 JgJ
I have submitted the matter to the Foreign Minister. Ministerial-
direktor Wiehl has also been informed. 3 I promised [Under] State
Secretary Woermann that I would forward this report, and I would be
grateful if you would acquaint him with it.
Heil Hitler!
Yours faithfully, 5 Wohxthat
2 Wohlthat also submitted a memorandum (not printed, 2104/455751-59), entitled
"Survey of the first economic effects of the German-Rumanian Economic Treaty" to
Wiehl on the same date. ' ' u
[Enclosure]
w VI / 313 Berlin, March 27, 1939.
Report on my Negotiations in Bucharest of
Maech 10-23, 1939
Submitted to Field Marshal Goring for his information.
My departure from Berlin was delayed several days as the Foreign
Minister's report, in which recommendations were to have been made
for the treatment of the Antarctic discoveries 3 and for instructions for
negotiations with Rumania, was only made on March 9. State Secretary
Weizsacker being agreeable, I set off on March 8. On my arrival in
Bucharest on March 10, I could see how important it was that my
journey had not been further delayed. Political circles in Bucharest
had reckoned with a Cabinet reshuffle if the German Government had
not empowered me to conclude a treaty, or had put off the negotiations.
The Ministers who would have been replaced because their pro-German
policy, which had been sanctioned by the King, had proved unsuccess-
ful, were: Gafencu, the Foreign Minister; Bujoiu, the Minister of
Economics and Slavescu, the Minister for Armaments.
Gafencu had informed the British that, as long as Rumania was
negotiating with Germany, they should make their proposals in writing,
and for the time being send no economic delegation to Bucharest. I
had agreed on this with Gafencu when I left at the end of February.
Bujoiu had been charged with the direction of the negotiations by the
King after he had obtained His Majesty's approval for his economic
policy after arguments with Constantinescu, the Finance Minister and
Governor of the National Bank, in two ministerial conferences under
the King's chairmanship, Slavescu had, as Minister for Armaments,
energetically advocated a policy of cooperation with Germany; I had
also convinced him of the better prospects of supplies from Germany
under the collective plan, compared with supplies from France and
Britain.
J This may possibly be a reference to the German Antarctic expedition, 1938-39
11
YQ2 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Gafencu asked me immediately on my arrival what political news I
had for the King as he needed the support of the King vis-a-vis the
other Ministers in order to push the treaty through the Cabinet. In
addition to bringing the actual terms of the treaty to his notice, I
endeavoured to bring home to him the immense political value of the
German proposal which was that, instead of a secret agreement, an
official State treaty should be concluded, for which the German Reich
Chancellor on the one side and the King of Rumania on the other side
would appoint their plenipotentiaries. As instructed, I did not go into
the matter of the decoration,* the personnel questions and Gafencu's
visit to Berlin. . .
The King had given instructions that the conversations were only to
be conducted by his Ministers. This led to loss of time as, after I had
convinced Bujoiu, the Minister for Economics, he had to keep reporting
to the Cabinet, which was meeting under the chairmanship of the King.
After the first news of the events in Slovakia and Prague, political
tension developed and continued to mount daily until the signature of
the treaty on March 23. On March 15 and 16, 1 was able to report that
Gafencu the Foreign Minister, was in agreement with the form of the
treaty and that the King agreed in principle to the draft treaty drawn
up with Bujoiu, the Minister of Economics.
A three hour meeting of the Cabinet and Privy Councillors took place
under the chairmanship of the King during the late afternoon of March
17 At this meeting Rumanian policy was laid down in respect of the
events in Czechoslovakia and the Hungarian invasion of Carpatho-
Ukraine the attuning of Rumania's policy with that of her allies,
Poland and Yugoslavia, the attitude to be taken in the Balkan Entente
and the Little Entente and the economic treaty with Germany. The
Cabinet clearly saw that far more than a commercial treaty in the usual
sense was involved. '
Since my arrival, British and French journalists had appeared in
steadily increasing numbers. The foreign diplomats, particularly the
British daily pressed the Rumanian Ministers for information on the
i See vol. v of this Series, document No. 261 , footnote 2 . The Wiehl telegram of Dec. 6
(2104/455845), there quoted, also includes the following passage: In view -of recent
Sittcal events in Rumania, it has been decided to drop the plan to confer a decoration
^Zrrnwn Prince " In a letter of Mar. 16 to Wiehl not printed, 2104/4o5796-97)
Gramsch aToS of the Four Year Plan, quoted the following passage from a letter
ftonVWohUnat- "I have learned from the Minister here that the prospects in the matter
of Sedecorations, which the King feels as a personal insult to hunself, are ex twmely
doubtful, « the suggestion for this" action is supposed to have been made t° the Pub™
Tretty You may act on this should any importance still be attached [by the Rumanians]
to a settlement of the matter."
MABCHj 1939 163
state of the negotiations with Germany. On Saturday, March 18, The
Times and the BBC London reported a German economic ultimatum
to Rumania. When the news reached Bucharest, I was holding a dis-
cussion with Bujoiu, the Minister for Economics, on the text of the
treaty, the signature of which I wished to effect on Monday, March 20,
if possible, in view of the threatening situation. Titeanu, the Rumanian
State Secretary for Propaganda, called on us at once at the Ministry
for Economic Affairs, and loyally discussed an official dementi which the
Rumanian Government proposed of their own accord and in which the
friendly character of our negotiations was to he emphasized. For his
part, Gafencu immediately telephoned Ambassador Tatarescu in Paris
and instructed him to make public Bucharest's ddmenti. Gafencu
similarly telephoned Tilea, Minister in London, who, it is true, did not
communicate the dementi officially to the British press. At that time
the Rumanians considered Reuter's Bucharest representative to be the
guilty person. It transpired during the course of the day that the
Western Powers were bringing unusual pressure to bear on Rumania in
order to prevent the conclusion of a treaty with Germany.
I was forced to infer from these events that the conclusion of a
secret treaty was no longer possible, and I changed the texts into that
of a State treaty which could, if necessary, be published, and a Secret
Protocol of Signature incorporating the objects and reciprocal promises
of the two Governments, which were not suitable for publication. In
spite of the fact that I completed the new texts with M. Bujoiu during
the night from Saturday to Sunday, signature could not take place on
Monday, as M. Bujoiu could, in the tense political situation, no longer
obtain the approval of the other Ministers. On Tuesday, March 21,1
negotiated for nine consecutive hours with M. Bujoiu and thought that I
had reached agreement with him by one o'clock in the morning. As it
further transpired at midday, Wednesday, March 22, that the Cabinet,
•with the King as chairman, was still discussing the treaty, I called on
Foreign Minister Gafencu together with Minister Fabrieius at five in
the afternoon, and pointed out to him the risk Rumania was running
by a further delay in signature. I stated that I would leave for Berlin
during the evening of Thursday, March 23, and I requested direct
negotiations in which the Foreign Minister himself should take part, or
immediate audience of the King. I was obliged to take this decisive
step as a critical situation had developed in the excitable southern
atmosphere, under the influence of world publicity and the mobilization
in Bucharest. The rural population called to the colours appeared in
masses in Bucharest and other towns. There was a partial breakdown
in transport. Milliards of Lei were withdrawn from the banks. The
population listened in to the radio announcements from London and
Paris. The leading political circles were convinced that an invasion
from Himgary threatened Transylvania, and that one from Bulgaria
164 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
threatened the Dobruja. It was said that the Russians were con-
centrating forces on the Bessarabian frontier The ™ ™ *£££
either Germany must restrain Hungary and Bulgaria, or that Britain
and France must guarantee the Rumanian frontiers. _
The question of whether the German-Rumanian treaty was signed or
not had, as a result of Britain's policy, become of decisive ^P<*tance
for Germany's position in South East Europe. Quite apart from the
fundamentally new trade policy adopted by us Germans under the
treaty, I was able to bring about the following political consequences
by concluding it:
1 The Rumanian people would be released by Germany from the
nightmare of mobilization and the threat to their frontiers.
2 The mobilization led to the entire people becoming conscious that
their future depended on the treaty and on cooperation with Germany.
3. Germany successfully asserted herself in Rumanian eyes in an
open trial of strength with Britain.
4 AH South East European countries" were compelled to see who
possessed the ascendancy on the Danube, supported by economic
realities: Germany with her modem forms of treaty, or Britam and
France with old claims and propaganda.
5 It was possible to inflict a decisive defeat in the European political
sphere on the British and French during Lebrun's State visit to London*
when Rumania, the greatest and richest country of South East Europe,
voluntarily concluded with Germany, in spite of all attacks, the most
important economic treaty in all her history.
The decisive negotiations began at seven o'clock in the evening at
Minister Bujoiu's home. Gafencu was present. Shortly before,
Minister Fabricius had received. a communication by telephone from
the Foreign Ministry in Berlin that they would attach the greatest
importance to signature during that very night. When it transpired
that the Rumanians were not agreed on three important points because
they feared for their sovereignty, I took such a strong line that Caknescu,
the Minister President, was brought in. Gafencu wished to have ex-
pression given in the text of the treaty to a peace policy. I declared that
a grand economic policy could only be effected in peacetime. He insisted
on his wish and then accepted my proposal to insert mthe preamble the
words' "in pursuance of their peaceful aims". Calinescu proved to be
an outstanding jurist, but one who could not reply to economic and
anancial arguments. From the King's appearance, I concluded that
he too regarded the prompt conclusion of the treaty as necessary. As
he' only put forward political arguments, I saw an opportunity to push
through all the German demands, made no further concessions m the
6 See document No. 84, footnote 2.
MARCH, 1988 1(J5
matter and only altered the wording. Calinescu resisted industrial
cooperation on a mixed industrial committee as the Rumanians feared
Germany would deny them self-determination in their industrialization.
The Rumanians further asked for a State credit of 200-250 million
RM and quoted to me as example the German credit loans granted to
Yugoslavia, .Poland and Turkey. I declined, and it remained a matter
of private credit. Finally, Bujoiu, who certainly did not speak from his
own conviction but was urged on by Constantineseu, the Finance
Minister, advocated various restrictive provisions in the matter of
financing and capital investments. Calinescu then left the meeting for
a time in order to obtain the consent of the other Ministers and the
King. The texts were completed by 4 a.m., after adoption of the Ger-
man wishes. Signature was, indeed, no longer possible during that
night but, at the earliest, at midday on Thursday, March 23, after a
fair copy had been completed and the Rumanian texts had been trans-
lated. Even though there was a certain risk in the delay of signature,
this was offset by the material advantages obtained under the treaty.
If there was no alteration in the political situation, the effect of the
signature on Britain and France would still be the same on Thursday,
at the end of Lebrun's State visit. Incidentally, the Rumanians con-
sidered Italian opposition to the German policy to be particularly
disturbing.
At midday on Thursday, Minister Bujoiu asked me to call on him,
as the Rumanians wished to have four points amended before signature.
It transpired that, in particular, the question of how Yugoslavia was to
receive the State credits had been raised. I refused orally to reopen
negotiations, and only agreed to one point where the Rumanians had
erred in favour of Germany, the phrase "as well as" being replaced by
the word "or".
The signature took place in the Foreign Ministry at 5:30 in the
afternoon. Gafencu concluded his address with the hope that Germany
would, as a result of the treaty, gain a similar position to the one she
had enjoyed in Rumania before 1914.
From the Foreign Ministry I drove straight to the audience in the
palace. The King was very satisfied with the terms of the treaty and
with its signature at this moment. He expected a general feeling of
relief from the news of the signature which, in fact, was spreading like
wildfire among the population, who were in a state of extreme tension
as a result of the mobilization. The King mentioned that relations
between the two countries were, however, not yet satisfactory on all
counts. On the basis of communications from the Foreign Ministry, I
could now hold out the prospect of Gafencu, the Rumanian Foreign
Minister, being invited to Berlin. In general terms, I also spoke
somewhat optimistically of the further questions, as Minister Fabricius
had received a communication by telephone from the Foreign Ministry
166 DOCUMENTS ON" GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
from which it appeared that the matter of the decorations would also be
settled. When the King asked what repercussions the linking of
Rumania's national economy with that of Germany would produce in
the sphere of foreign exchange policy, I explained to him the possible,
solution for a future settlement of inter-State liabilities in Europe. The
King believed that, with the present trend of British policy, these
questions could not be broached. The conversation took a markedly
polite course. When the audience ended, the square before the palace
was filled with an excited crowd of people. American and British
journalists asked me as I left the palace whether signature had taken
place. The Americans had wagered with the British that I would
succeed in concluding the treaty.
Rightly or wrongly, it was felt among the Rumanian people that
peace had been assured by the conclusion of the treaty. At my de-
parture from the station, which was surrounded by thousands of
peasants called to the colours, uniformed police officials were standing
in readiness to accompany the sleeping-car to the frontier, so as to
prevent its being stormed by troops or peasants, or even attacked by
Jews, who made no secret of their rage.
The following concomitants of the negotiations should also be em-
phasized. Tilea, the Rumanian Minister in London, was immediately
summoned home in spite of the fact that he is a friend of Gafencu and
Tatarescu. He was not allowed to take part in the ceremonies of the
State visit, and is said to have been recalled. Ausnit, 6 the Jewish in-
dustrial magnate, with his offers of large credits for an Anglo-French
syndicate, met with a refusal from the Rumanians, as I convinced the
latter that Ausnit and his friends wished to take their capital out of
Rumania in this way. Kaufmann, the leading Jewish banker, and
owner of the Banque de Credit, .with whom negotiations had already
been conducted for some weeks, sold the shares needed for a 51 per cent
majority to a Rumanian syndicate of which, among other people, the
Queen of Greece is a member, and gave the syndicate's brokers a firm
option on the rest of his holdings. By this means, Jewish influence was
successfully eliminated from this bank. The Deutsche Bank of Berlin
is to be a member of the pool which will control the bank.
On my return I gave State Secretary Korner 7 a brief account, and
will report to the Foreign Minister this afternoon.
Wohxthat
* General manager of the Eejita iron-works and director of many large Rumanian
industrial undertakings.
' Permanent Deputy to Goring as Commissioner for the Four Year flan.
MABCH, 1939 167
No. 132
1975/488349-50
The State Secretary to the Legation in Hungary
Telegram
No. 103 Berlin, March 30, 1939.
Sent March 31—2:15 a.m.
zu Pol. IV 2206 Ang. I.i
zu Pol. IV 2213. 2
With reference to your telegram No. 90 of March 29. 1
Bucharest Legation reported on March 29 : 2
"Hungary demands recognition of her new frontiers with Rumania
and proposes the issue of a declaration along the lines of the as yet un-
signed declaration of Bled^ between Hungary, Yugoslavia and Rumania.
Yugoslavia has already agreed. Rumania desires more precise details
as only a pledge of non-aggression is provided for, and no frontier
guarantee (such as was promised in the semi-official article in the
Pester Lloyd). Rumania thus renounces the villages and railways of
Carpatho-Ukraine, and Gafencu therefore expects to receive today, or
at the latest tomorrow, an answer which will make it possible to order
demobilization."
End of report.
For our attitude to the Bled Agreement I refer you to telegram No.
136 of August 26* f i ast year an <i despatch Pol. IV 922 of Feb. 20.5
As the Bled Agreement, the details of which we do not know, was ren-
dered obsolete by the collapse of the Little Entente, we can only in-
terpret the Yugoslav and Rumanian proposal to put the agreement into
force now as meaning that they still maintain their former common
attitude towards Hungary and are seeking a common settlement.
i la this telegram (7493/E540490), Erdmannsdorff reported: " The Foreign Minister
told me that the Yugoslav and Rumanian Ministers had conveyed to him their Govern-
ment's suggestion that the Bled Agreement should come into force. He had replied
that the Agreement would first have to be amended; in particular the minorities ques-
tion would have to be expressly mentioned under point 3, as much had changed since
Aug. 23."
2 In Bucharest telegram No. 134 (not printed, 7493/E540491-92). The first paragraph
read: " Foreign Minister Gafencu is obviously pleased with the Reich Foreign Minister's
invitation to him to come to Berlin for Apr. 4 and S. He will accept, provided he can
conclude by tomorrow evening his negotiations with Hungary about reciprocal de-
mobilization.' ' The second paragraph is reproduced in the document here printed, except
for the last sentence: "Unless this affair was settled, he said, his visit would be wrongly
interpreted."
3 See vol. v of this Series, document No. 223.
* Vol. v of this Series, document No. 221, which was sent as telegram No. 136 to
1 Not printed {7489/E540170). This despatch forwarded to the Legation at Budapest
copies of the documents printed as Nos. 28$, 2S7 and 289 in vol. v of this Series.
168 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Whether it lies within Hungarian interests, which are not identical in
respect of Yugoslavia and Rumania, to accept this proposal, we leave
to Hungarian judgement. We should, however, consider it better to
avoid giving an appearance of subscribing to the obsolete principles of
the Little Entente, and to envisage separate settlements with Yugo-
slavia and Rumania, according to the present state of relations with
them. There is also the consideration of whether it is advisable from
the Hungarian point of view, bearing in mind the events since last
August, to make the recognition of Hungarian military sovereignty
the subject of new agreements.
Please express your personal views on these lines during further
conversations. We have no intention of yielding to a possible request
for mediation. 6
Report by telegram.
Weizsackek.
6 The substance of the telegram cited in footnote 1, and also the second part of the docu-
ment here printed were transmitted by Weizsaoker to the Legation at Bucharest for
information in telegram No. 126 of Mar. 30 (not printed, 1975/438351-52).
No. 133
7634/E545385
The State Secretary to the Embassy in Turkey
Telegram
No. 66 of March 31 Beblik, March 31, 1939—1 :30 p.m.
zu W III 2150.1
With reference to your telegram No. 53 of March IS. 1
Should prominent Turkish personages approach you in the near
future with remarks like those of Numan, you can say that Numan's
statements on Turkey's assessment of the new situation have met with
sympathetic interest here. We were also pleased with the readiness
displayed by Turkey to cooperate actively in the development of
German economic relations with the Balkan States and we believed
that direct German-Turkish economic relations, too, could only benefit
thereby.
Please use the foregoing to inform Numan, on some convenient
occasion, that we appreciate his assessment of the situation all the more,
as in recent weeks such an understanding attitude has often been
lacking in the Turkish press.
Wbizsackee
1 Document No. 32.
MARCH, 1939 Jgg
No. 134
2767/535836
The Charged' Affaires in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 73 of March 31 Aotcara, March 31, 1939—5:00 p.m.
Received April 1—12:30 a.m.
Pol. II 1025.
With reference to your telegram No. 58 of March 24 1 and to my
telegram No. 62 of March 23. 2
As the version current here of the Turkish reply to the British dt-
rmrche of March 183 was that Turkey had declared her willingness to
examine "thoroughly and with particular good will" any inquiry that
might be made by Britain, I have today requested Numan to acquaint
me with the precise text of the Turkish reply. Numan said that the
Turkish reply was word for word as follows:
"In the event of such an enquiry being addressed to them the
Turkish Government would consider it carefully (a fond) and in the
friendly spirit which characterizes the relations between the two
countries." Nu.man added that Turkish policy had not, in the recent
critical days, budged an inch from the position which he had 'repeatedly
explamed to the Reich Foreign Minister. However friendly her rela-
tions with Britain may be, especially on Mediterranean questions they
could never lead to Turkey allowing herself to be used for a march
against Germany, or even against Italy.
Kholl
i Document No. 83, which was telegram No. 58 to Ankara
* Not .printed (5453/E366629). Kroll reported that he had been informed by Sara
coglu the Turkish Foreign Master, that in answer to an enquiry by the British Am*
bassador as to Turkey's attitude m the case of a German attack on Rumania he had
wd that Turkey would honour her obligations under the Balkan Pact KroU Sdded
"At my request the Foreign Minister then denned Turkey's obligation undeVtne Baikal
Pact by taking Rumania as an example. Turkey was only committed t , miUW
intervention if the Rumanian inner-Balkan frontiers were threatened by a Balkan Stete
The obligation did not arise if Rumania's non-Balkan frontier were attacked oMF she
were attacked by a non-Balkan State. In that event Turkey would remain neut™! w!
had answered the British Ambassador's question in the samVway " He
3 See document No. 58 and footnote 2 thereto. '
170 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 135
1975/438354-55 and 58
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram*
most urgent Bucharest, March 31, 1939—9:40 p.m.
Ho. 139 of March 31 Received April 1—3:00 a.m.
Pol. IV 2279.
With reference to your telegram No. 126 of March 30. 2
During the conversations being conducted in Budapest with a view
to achieving a ddtente in Hungarian-Rumanian relations and demo-
bilization, the Hungarian Ministers demanded recognition of the
Ruthenian frontier, that is the relinquishing of Rumanian claims to the
four villages and the railway line already mentioned. 4 Rumania, who
had mobilized in view of the possibility of villages and all railways to
be occupied 5 and had then, because of the large-scale advance by
Hungary right up to the Rumanian frontier, further increased her
partial mobilization, now saw 6 her hopes disappointed. As Rumania
does not want to make villages and railways 7 the subject of barter
negotiations, Gafencu wishes at least to try, on the basis of reciprocal
demobilization and as a quid pro quo for the recognition of the Ruthenian
frontier, to obtain from Hungary at least a reciprocal declaration of
non-aggression, and proposes that this should be agreed by Hungary . . .
(group missing) 8 but separately with Rumania on the one hand,
and Yugoslavia on the other. Hungary had pledged herself to such an
arrangement by initialling the Bled Agreement. 9 As a preliminary, «
Rumania and Yugoslavia had considered it most expedient to make
this proposal, which had today nothing further to do with the no longer
existent Little Entente.
I had 11 immediately informed Gafencu, in a purely private way, of
my serious misgivings over this course :
It was known what difficulties had been caused by the formula,
sponsored at the time by Italy, which had led to Bled; it therefore
i This telegram as received in Berlin was corrupt. Corrections taken from the draft
in the Bucharest Legation files (7063/E524157/1-4) ate indicated in footnotes.
2 See document No. 132, footnote 6.
3 This should read "Hungary",
* See documents Nos. 29 and 122. .
* The passage from "Rumania . . . occupied" should read: ' Rumania who, in view of
the possible occupation of the villages and railway line, had mobilized".
a This should read: "sees".
? This should read: "railway".
» This should read: "simultaneously".
» See vol. v of this Series, documents Nos. 221 and 223.
w This should read: "Therefore".
ii This should read: "have".
MAK.CH; 1939 171
appeared to me more expedient to treat the reciprocal demobilization
as a separate question, since the continuation of the present state of
afiairs was hardly tolerable from a military [and] economic point of
view. Indeed nervousness is steadily increasing in the country. My
Italian, 12 Greek 1 3 and Yugoslav 1 * colleagues also share this view and
these anxieties.
The Rumanian Government, who have already given way in the
question of the occupation of part of the Carpatho-Ukraine, who now
relinquish their claim to villagers] and railway line, and who, finally,
have been publicly castigated in a speech by Csaky, need something to
justify internal political " mobilization and demobilization. Still more
serious complications might easily ensue from this, especially as the
reasons for Hungarian stubbornness are not understood here. Gafencu
asked me, if possible, to find out privately what these reasons were.
There is also noticeable anti-German feeling amongst the people,
who think we have sufficient control over Hungary, and that she does
not undertake anything without Germany. That Foreign Minister
Gafencu cannot go to Berlin in view of the tension prevailing here,
which can only be overcome by diplomatic means, is a matter of sincere
regret to him and his King. He promised, as reported by telephone,
definitely to accept any date after Easter which might be fixed by the
Reich Foreign Minister, and not to undertake any journey abroad be-
fore making this visit; he also requests that the date be made public
as soon as it is agreed upon, which would have favourable political
effeet[s] as proving the solidity of German-Rumanian relations.
Fabeicius
12 Pellegrino Ghigi.
13 Konstantinos Collas.
14 Jo van Ducic.
15 This should read: "for internal polities'
No. 136
S849/E428347-48
The Charge d' Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 100 of March 31 Lokdok, March 31, 1939.1
Received March 31 — 7:45 p.m.
P. 3442.
According to Reuter, the Prime Minister made the following state-
ment in the House of Commons today: 2
1 The hour of despatch is not recorded.
2 From here on in English in the original. See also Pari. Deb.,H. of C, vo! 345 col
2415. '
172 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
"As I said this morning, His Majesty's Government have no official
confirmation of the rumours of any projected attack on Poland and
they must not therefore be taken as accepting them as true.
I am glad to take this opportunity of stating again the general policy
of His Majesty's Government. They have constantly advocated the
adjustment, by way of free negotiation between the parties concerned,
of any differences that may arise between them. They consider that
this is the natural and proper course where differences exist.
In their opinion there should be no question incapable of solution by
peaceful means and they would see no justification for the substitution
of force or threats of force for the method of negotiation.
As the House is aware, certain consultations are now proceeding
with other Governments. In order to make perfectly clear the position
of His Majesty's Government in the meantime before those consulta-
tions are concluded,'! now have to inform the House that, during that
period, in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish in-
dependence, and which the Polish Government accordingly considered
it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty's Government
would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all
support in their power.
They have given the Polish Government an assurance to this effect.
I may add that the French Government have authorized me to make
it plain that they stand in the same position in this matter as do His
Majesty's Government." 3
Kordt
3 See also document No. 137.
No. 137
7994/ES75618
The Charge d' Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 103 of March 31 London, March 31, 1939.*
Received April 1 — 4 a.m.
P. 3470.
With reference to my telegram No. 100 of March 31. 2
I learn that the phrasing of Chamberlain's statement was by Sir
John Simon. The Foreign Office spokesman, Peaked emphasized that
the prerequisite for British assistance is the fulfilment of both conditions
indicated by Chamberlain. It is particularly significant that British
i The hour of despatch is not recorded.
2 Document No. 136.
3 C.B.F. Peake, serving at that time in the News Department.
MARCH, 1930 273
assistance will become effective only when it is established, first that
German action clearly threatens Polish independence (in the judgement
of Britain) and, secondly, that the Polish Government "accordingly"
consider it vital to counter German action by military resistance.
1) The pledge of assistance on the fulfilment of both conditions
operates only for the period up to the conclusion of the negotiations
still in progress.
2) The first part of the statement leaves the settlement of all con-
troversial points, including colonial questions, open to negotiation.
3) The second part of the statement leaves it doubtful, to say the
least, whether military action against Danzig constitutes a casus belli
for the British Government.
4) The News Department of the Foreign Office has repeatedly and
urgently requested Baron Hahn, diplomatic correspondent of the
DNB, to point out to authoritative quarters that Chamberlain's
statement in no way represented a preliminary step towards a policy
of encirclement. The Prime Minister and the British Government
attached importance to this fact being established.
Kordt
No. 138
Me/211472
The Foreign Ministry to the Legation in Afghanistan
Berlin, March 31, 1939.
Sent April 12.
zuPol. V 2739.1
With reference to your report No. 419 of March 6, 1939.1
As regards social intercourse with the members of the Soviet Russian
Mission, we can only give general instructions from here that the
greatest reserve should be adopted, though this must always keep to
correct forms. For the rest, the final decision must be left to your
judgement according to the circumstances of each case.
In principle, the members of the German colony should not attend
functions arranged by the Soviet Mission, and should refuse any in-
vitations under a polite pretext.
By order:
Bismarck
_ i Not printed (388/211470-71). The Minister had sought guidance as to what invita-
|', tons to social functions given by the Russian Ambassador could be accepted by the
p Legation staff and the German Colony.
174 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 139
141/127223
Memorandum by the State Secretary
St.S. No. 300 - Berlin, March 31, 1939.
On his own initiative, the Belgian Ambassador today referred to the
Anglo-French conversations about assistance in the event of German
action against Switzerland, Holland and Belgium. 1 Vicomte Davignon
said that Belgian policy remained unchanged. London and Paris had
asked for nothing new and had received nothing new hi Brussels.
I replied that, even if nothing had been demanded of Brussels, never-
theless one-sided Anglo-French communications might have reached
the Belgian Government which might well have a perceptible effect on
our known treaty relations 2 with Belgium.
Davignon hastened to affirm that nothing whatever was known to
him of such one-sided communications.
The Ambassador will probably bring supplementary information on
his return from Brussels.
Weizsacker
i See document No. 93, footnote 2, and document No. 84.
2 For the German, Declaration of Oct. 13, 1937, to respect the integrity and inviol-
ability of Belgium, see vol. v of this Series, document No. 475. See also Belgium, The
Official Account of What Happened 1939-1940 (published for the Belgian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, London, 1941), Appendix 4.
No. 140
583/242054-57
Memorandum by the State Secretary
secret Berlin, March 31, 1939.
St.S. No. 301
The Italian Ambassador called on me today on returning from his
official visit to Rome.
Attolico wished to define the situation which had arisen in recent
■weeks. His most important observation was that a sense of practical,
politics led Mussolini to discount the possibility of a European war in
the near future. The Fiihrer's communication to the Duce 1 had not
been without its effect in this respect.
Attolico then went back a long way in order to speak of the reper-
cussions of the German occupation of Bohemia and Moravia and its
consequences, and described the following as a confidential and friendly
i See document No. 100.
MARCH, 1939 17<J
communication for my own private knowledge. He said that the re-
action in Rome was a "tremendous one". It should be fully realized
that, in the case of the Anschluss of Austria, Mussolini was not informed
until the last minute by the Prince of Hesse.2 During the critical
developments of last September, the Duce had espoused Germany's
cause to a degree that could not be surpassed. At the time of the
Vienna Award,* Italian policy was in favour of conceding more to the
Hungarians than we were, but later, when Germany feared a Hun-
garian advance towards Carpatho-Ukraine [Italy] firmly ordered
Hungary back behind the Award frontier line. Finally, during the
events in March, Italy was not informed until the last minute of a move
which was in glaring contradiction to Mussolini's well-known letter to
Runciman.4 Instead of the Italians now being given precedence, they
had, without prior notification, been drawn, as a partner in the Axis
into a game which must inevitably result in setbacks for Mussolini'
setbacks which had been very severe, perhaps even too severe. His
prestige had suffered in his own country (Attolieo claims to have heard
such remarks as: "Mussolini should be pelted with mud from the
gutter", and others). Besides this loss of domestic prestige, there had
been sacrifices for Italy in foreign affairs. His own game had been
ruined. It had been his turn to move, but he had been thrust aside.
Mussolini had, however, acted like a Grandseigneur and, in his great
speech in the Forum,* had described the Axis as unshakeable. It was,
however, necessary to formulate afresh and put in writing our mutual
interests within the framework of the Axis.
In continuation of the last argument, Attolieo said that, though the
Mediterranean had certainly been assigned by us to the Italians, the
adjacent countries and the Danube Basin also belonged to this area.
Advances were being made far too rapidly in this respect from the
German side— Attolieo mentioned Beich Minister Punk. Everything
was being drawn into the German orbit, and that too quickly. As an
example, Attolieo suggested that a prominent Italian economist,
perhaps Guarneri,* might come here and define Italo-German interests!
When Attolieo also mentioned Yugoslavia, I referred him to the
relevant passage in Mussolini's speech. Attolieo then stated that Italy
would always favour a consolidated Yugoslav State, but if it came to
disintegration, Italy would not allow anyone, not even the Hungarians,
to gain access to the Adriatic.
2 Prince Philip of Hesse See vol. I of this Series, documents Nos. 352 and 385. For
the record of Hesse s telephone conversation with Hitler on Mussolini's reception of the
message see Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. xxxi, document 2949:pS, exhibit
UoA-76, pp, doo— 370.
3 See vol, iv of this Series, document No. 99.
* See vol. li of this Series, document No. 488, enclosure
6 See Editors' Note on p. 125.
« Felice Guarneri, Minister for Foreign Exchange and Currency
176 DOCUMENTS ON GEBMAN FOREIGN POLICY
In conclusion Attolico summed up by describing tbe disagreements to
which he had to call attention as being not irreparable. The Axis,
for which he had already worked at a time when it was still quite un-
popular, was of prime importance to him. But he attached the very
greatest importance at this stage of his mission in Berlin to giving the
Axis a fresh impetus and to bringing the substance of his remarks to the
attention of the Fiihrer. He was not requesting an audience with the
Fiihrer, but he hoped that the Fiihrer would regard the matter as being
so important that he would himself arrange for an interview.
Summing up, one may perhaps say that Attolico represented his
Government as the deceived and discredited "receiver", to whom, in
the interests of future comradeship, it would be absolutely necessary
to allow a share in the spoils.
The Ambassador, with whom I had been obliged to break off the
conversation yesterday, continued it with me today — April 1 — and
hopes to call on the Reich Foreign Minister shortly, and, later, on the
Fiihrer. He did not wish his statements to me to be passed on now,
but would like to make them in his own words and with the impressions
gained in Rome freshly in his mind. Besides the military discussions
(Pariani-Keitel) 7 and possible economic agreements (Guarneri's visit to
Berlin), Attolico wishes to have our political ddsinteressement in Albania
and Croatia confirmed anew. Furthermore, he will probably return to
the plan, superficially discussed before, of taking the South Tyrolese
back into the Reich. 8
Weizsacker
' See document No. 57.
s See documents Nos. 143 and 163.
No. 141
115/117419-22
The Head of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle to the Foreign Minister
1 3 i i— G/Ea Berlin, March 31, 1939.
Subject: Events in Liechtenstein from March 23 to 26, 1939.
The attempt at a forcible Anschluss of Liechtenstein with the Reich
has been suppressed. The Liechtenstein and Swiss Governments re-
gard the matter as closed.
A Liechtenstein Anschluss movement has existed since March 15,
1938. l At that time Dr. Otto Schadler, the leader of the Liechtenstein
Vaterlandische Union, was received at the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle.
As the Reich Foreign Minister did not at the time desire an Anschluss
1 See vol. v of this Series, documents Nos. 509, G12, and 514.
MABCH, 1939 177
■with Liechtenstein, the following formula was agreed upon with the
leader of the Citizens' Party:
The Citizens' Party, which commands barely 50 per cent of the
votes, would try, under pressure of events and the general mood, to
nominate Dr. Vogt as Deputy Head of the Government, so as to ensure
a steady development in line with our policy. The radical wing of the
Party was to be held in check.
On the basis of this arrangement, the line taken by the Liechtenstein
Government was, up to February 1939, under the control of our col-
laborators. On the Anschluss of Bohemia and Memel, and in view of
the elections in Liechtenstein, the radical wing withdrew from the
leadership of Dr. Otto Schadler and Dr. Vogt. In spite of constant
warnings by Dr. Vogt, the Deputy Head of the Government, the radical
group, as a " volksdentsch movement", prepared a coup d'etat for March
22, 1939. The leaders of the volksdeutsck movement, Engineer Schadler
and Dr. Beck, made contact with the SA in Feldkirch. Seebacher,
the leader of the Feldkirch SA battalion, declared on March 22: "If the
Anschluss comes off in Liechtenstein we shall in any case get marching
orders from the competent authorities." The Liechtensteiners relied
on the help of the SA and, having regard to arrangements made with
the SA, they postponed the Putsch to the evening of March 24. An
SA battalion and a company of the NSKK in Feldkirch were alerted
on March 23 and 24, 1939.
Meanwhile the rumour of an invasion by the Feldkirch SA spread to
Liechtenstein. Dr. Vogt, the Deputy Head of the Government, drew
the attention of Dr. Tschofen, the Landrat of Feldkirch, to these
rumours and emphasized that, in his view, such a Putsch would not be
welcome in Berlin, either. By personal persuasion and arrest of the
leaders he succeeded in suppressing the Liechtenstein movement. In
view of this the SA also took no action.
When asked for information by the Berne Government, the Liechten-
stein Government stated that plans for a Putsch had existed but had not
materialized. The Swiss Legation called at the Foreign Ministry and
requested that further disturbances be avoided.
The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle immediately issued orders, partly
paralleling the instructions from the Foreign Ministry, to hold the
Feldkirch SA in check. On the evening of March 25, a representative
of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle arrived in Innsbruck and there, to-
gether with the Gauleiter, interrogated the SA leaders taking part. As
a result of the enquiries, the representative of the Volksdeutsche
Mittelstelle was able, by March 26, to get in touch with our collaborator.
Dr. Vogt. It was agreed that the Liechtenstein Government shouldj
in a telegram to Berne and in an official communique (see appendix), 2
* Not printed {115/117423).
12
178 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
deny any serious attempt at a Putsch, or even at interference on the
part of the Reich German authorities. Dr. Vogt will see to it that no
criminal proceedings are taken against the Liechtenstein ringleaders.
The Prince of Liechtenstein will probably be prepared, when he takes
the oath of allegiance on May 2, 3 to grant an amnesty for any sentences
that may have been passed. Negotiations through intermediaries are
still in progress. About thirty refugees are to be sent back from Feld-
kirch, as soon as it has been established that they will either incur no
punishment, or only a fine.
I have given orders, in agreement with the Gauleiter in the Tyrol, 4
that the Eeich Germans responsible be removed from the frontier area
and called to account for their actions.
Thanks to the speedy intervention of Dr. Vogt, collaborator of the
Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, as well as to the negotiations between the
Volksdeutsehe Mittelstelle and him, it was possible completely to avoid
the international consequences of this venture.
Heil Hitler!
LOBJENZ
SS-Obergruppenfuhrer
» Franz Josef II succeeded his uncle as reigning Prince of Liechtenstein on July 25,
1938; the official ceremonies of paying homage (Hvldigung) took place on May 29, 1939.
* Franz Hofer, Reichsatatthalter and Gauleiter of Tyrol-Vorarlberg.
No. 142
5570/E3DS823
The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in
Yugoslavia
Telegram
jj 83 Berlin, April 1, 1939 — 7:00 p.m.
zu W 449 (g), W 474 (g).i
With reference to [your telegrams] Nos. 74 and 78. 1
As Consul General Neuhausen is aware, the Field Marshal and the
Reich Foreign Minister have reserved for themselves the final decision
on the conclusion of the credit transaction, so as to attach political
conditions, should the case arise. Should the progress of negotiations
at your end warrant itj an effort will be made to obtain these decisions
about the middle of April. The date of the Field Marshal's return 2 is,
however, so far undecided. In case postponement of the conclusion of
the transaction should then appear expedient for political reasons, the
possibility of basing this on the technical or commercial terms of the
transaction should be held open.
1 Documents Nos. 105 and 128.
2 Goring was on holiday in Italy Mar. 21-Apr. 18.
APE1L, 1939 179
Please arrange for the industrial representatives to conduct negotia-
tions along these lines, and continue to report on the course of the
negotiations. I assume that the aircraft industries' tenders have also
been sent in meanwhile. Price questions will be examined here.
Further relevant information follows.
Wiehl
No. 143
2410/511062-63 .
Memorandum by the State Secretary
St.S. No. 303 Beklin, April 1, 1939.
Pol. IV 2364.
While discussing the South Tyrol in another connection with me
today, the Italian Ambassador recommended that the conversations
which had already taken place between Count Magistrati and Senior
Counsellor Heinburg 1 should be resumed, in order to review the
material available on the South Tyrol conditions.
Attolico then said that there must still be irregular connections
between Germany and the South Tyrol and hinted at Bureau No. 4 ( ?)
of the APA. 2 He also mentioned among others Gruppenfiihrer Wolff
of the SS. I denied from the outset that Gruppenfiihrer Wolff could
have any part in this and also at once expressed my doubts regarding
the Foreign Policy Office.
Then Attolico also mentioned the rumour at present circulating in
Munich that Mussolini intended to give the South Tyrol to the Fiihrer
as a birthday present.
As the Ambassador saw that I did not really believe his remarks, he
said that even if we spoke with the tongues of angels there would be
passive resistance among the peasants in South Tyrol, which was creating
an intolerable state of affairs. He had learnt this direct from the
Prefect of Bolzano. 3 Attolico added that he would take up the whole
subject of the South Tyrol with the Reich Foreign Minister as a part
of general Axis policy
I again informed Attolico about the stage reached in our scheme for
repatriating Reich Germans from the South Tyrol and promised him
that a detailed discussion would take place between Count Magistrati
and Senior Counsellor Heinburg. 4
Weizsacker5
1 No record has been found.
2 Auasenpolitisehes Amt (Foreign Policy Office), See Appendix V.
3 G. Mastromattei.
* See document No. 163.
* Marginal note: "I. Enquiries regarding para. 2 have not produced any positive
results. 2. File. Heifnburg] 12/4."
180 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 144
1I9,/1H>097
Memorandum by the State Secretary
St.S. No. 306 _ Berlin, April 1, 1939.
Today Attolico again broached the Croat question. 1 I gave him the
most formal assurance that everything had been done to allay his
anxiety about contact between the Croats and German authorities.
Weizsacker
1 See also documents Nos. 55 and 94.
No. 145
2943/570052-57
Memorandum by the Director of the Legal Department l
The Aaland Islands Question 2
1) After the Crimean War in 1856 Russia had to give an undertaking
to Trance and Britain not to fortify the Aaland Islands or to station
any military forces therein. In 1917, after her separation from Russia,
Finland, without more ado, claimed the Aaland Islands for herself.
However, a plebiscite in the Islands in 1919 resulted in a large majority
for union with Sweden. To remove the resulting tension between the
two countries, the Council of the League of Nations decided in 1921
that the Archipelago should remain under Finnish rule but should be
demilitarized and neutralized by an agreement between the interested
Powers. Thereupon the Convention on the non-fortification and neutra-
lization of the Aaland Islands was concluded in Geneva on October 20,
1921, under the auspices of the League of Nations. 3 The Signatory
Powers are Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Great
Britain, Italy, Latvia, Poland and Sweden, but not, however, Soviet
Russia. The provisions for demilitarization of the islands are very
thorough: "no fortifications or other military constructions, no garrison-
ing of armed forces, no landing of warships, etc." In the event of war,
the area of the islands is to be regarded as a neutral zone which may
not be used either directly or indirectly as a base for military operations.
On the application of one or more Signatory Powers, the Council of the
League of Nations must decide on measures necessary for securing the
1 The document is unsigned and undated. It bears the following marginal note:
"Memorandum by Ministerialdirektor Gaus for the Reich Foreign Minister."
2 See vol. v of this Series, chapter iv, and this volume, document No. 127.
* See League of Nations Treaty Series (Geneva, 1922), vol. ix, pp. 212-221.
APRIL, 1939 281
carrying out of the Convention or for preventing a violation of its
provisions. (Art. 7, I). Only in the case of a surprise attack upon the
islands may Finland herself take the necessary defence measures
{Art. 7 II).
2) On January 26 of this year the Finnish and Swedish Ministers
delivered Notes* with identical texts at the Foreign Ministry stating
that Finland and Sweden had agreed to a number of amendments to
the 1921 Convention and asking for the concurrence of the German
Government. With the assent of all Signatories, the matter was to be
submitted to the Council of the League of Nations. The main points
of the Fmno-Swedish agreement are as follows: the neutral character
of the island zone is to be maintained. Demilitarization, on the other
hand, is to be considerably curtailed. In the southern part of the zone
Finland is to have a completely free hand for military protective
measures. In the northern part she is to have the right to certain
defence measures for ten years: military training of the population
stationing of troops also from other parts of the country, mobile coastal
artillery, etc. In the event of danger of war Sweden shall, at the re-
quest of Finland, also be able to take part in the defence measures
Further, it is to be laid down that no belligerent Power shall have the
right to intervene on its own initiative by armed force to protect the
neutrality of the islands.
3) According to the 1921 Convention the decision on all measures
which prove necessary for the protection of the neutrality and demili-
tarization of the islands rests with the Council of the League of Nations
In principle this will remain unchanged under the n&w Finno-Swedish
proposals. By accepting these proposals therefore, which in substance
replace the old agreement by a new one, we would again be recognizing
the competence of the Council of the League of Nations. It is also a
contradiction in terms that the two Northern States themselves should
primarily base their proposals on the failure of the security system of the
League of Nations, that they should deduce therefrom the necessity for
direct Finnish and Swedish military measures, but that all other Signa-
tory Powers are to continue to be subject to the jurisdiction of the
Council of the League of Nations regarding measures permitted to them.
We could therefore for good reasons reject such a system and demand
the complete exclusion of the Council of the League of Nations. As a
result tedious negotiations for another settlement would then probably
be necessary and, if such a settlement proved possible at all, the parti-
cipation of the Soviet Union could probably not be avoided, though,
however, as a permanent Council Power, they also have a voice under
the present system.
4) In the opinion of our military authorities, Germany is interested in
* See vol. v of this Series, document No. 464.
1 82 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
the Aaland Islands remaining neutral in the event of war, as provided
in the 1921 Convention. In the present situation this no longer appears
assured if the islands are unfortified, as the Russians today have forces
sufficient to take possession of the unfortified islands even against the
resistance by Sweden and Finland. With the further growth of the
Russian Navy, Russian intentions will go beyond the defensive task
of securing the Gulf of Finland and will aim at political and military
supremacy in the northern Baltic Sea. On that account it must be
expected that the military leaders of the Soviet Union will strive for
the possession of the Aaland Islands, first in order to be in a better
position to interrupt German commercial sea-communications and
secondly to outflank German military approach routes to the Gulf of
Finland. The fortifications planned will obviously be regarded by
Finland as being also primarily directed against Russia. The Swedes
on the other hand, even though they have now expressed, at the insis-
tence of the Finnish Government, their agreement to the fortification of
the islands, have probably given more thought to the possibility that,
in a German-Russian conflict, Germany might occupy the islands as a
preventive measure in order to forestall the Russians. But, as our
military interests are primarily directed to the maintenance and pro-
tection of the neutrality of the islands, we need take no offence at
Sweden's proposed participation. 5 Should the case arise that in a
war Russia, Finland and Sweden were aligned against us, they would in
any case try to use the Aaland Islands as a base against us.
5) The High Command of the Navy wishes the opportunity to be
taken to discuss with the Swedish Government the maintenance of
deliveries of ore to Germany in the event of war and safeguarding
its transport. As the settlement of the Aaland Islands question is
an integral part of the Finnish and Swedish policy of neutrality, it
would in fact present a natural starting point for such a conversation
with the Swedes. The conversation would probably have to be conduc-
ted in such a way as not to make the discussion of the question of
deliveries of ore a direct condition of our assent to an amendment of the
1921 Convention. Nor can it be expected that it will be possible to arrive
at a precise and binding agreement with Sweden on deliveries of ore . We
can merely try to induce the Swedish Government to make a general
statement somewhat to the effect that, in the event of war, they do not
intend to take measures which might have an unfavourable effect on
the normal export of ore to Germany.
6) Taking all factors into account it would probably be advisable
not to make our agreement to the Finno-Swedish proposals dependent on
the conclusion of a differently worded new convention completely exclud-
ing the League of Nations. It would suffice for us to state that we could
6 Marginal note: "Only as long as Sweden is not a belligerent Power."
APRIL, 1939 183
no longer recognize as binding upon Germany any resolutions taken by
the Council of the League on the basis of the Convention. We can then
leave it to the other Powers to decide what conclusions to draw from
such a statement. It would also be advisable when answering the
Swedish Note to initiate the conversation on ore deliveries orally in the
way mentioned above. Before it is decided to treat the Finno-Swedish
proposals in this way, however, it will be necessary first to come to an
understanding with the Italian Government regarding the question of
the League of Nations.
[Editors' Note. On April 1 Hitler made a speech at Wilhelmshaven
dealing mainly with subjects of his own foreign policy, British "en-
circlement" and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement. For an English
translation of relevant extracts from this speech see Norman H.
Baynes: The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, April 1922 to August 1939
(London, 1942) (hereinafter cited as Baynes: Hitler's Speeches), vol. ir,
pp. 1590-1602.]
No. 146
1975/438360-01
The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 96 of April 2 Budapest, April 2, 1939—2:45 p.m.
Received April 2 — 6:00 p.m.
Pol. IV 2301.
With reference to your telegram No. 103. l
The Foreign Minister told me that the Bucharest report, that he had
demanded recognition by the Rumanian Government of the new
frontiers with Rumania, was incorrect. He would not do this, so as
to avoid Rumanian counter-claims. The Rumanian Government would,
in effect, be obliged to give recognition in the near future when they
claimed toll-rights on the connecting line of railway to Poland, which
ran through the eastern tip of Carpatho-Ukraine. He had pointed out
to the Rumanian Minister 2 that only specifically designated articles in
the Pester Lloyd were to be considered as semi-official. Consequently
Hungary had not promised Rumania any frontier guarantee. He had
declared his readiness to negotiate to the Rumanian Minister, but not
under the threat of Rumanian bayonets, therefore only after the com-
pletion of Rumanian demobilization.
With reference to the conversation between the Hungarian Minister
i Document No. 132.
s Raoul Bossy.
184 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
in Berlin and the State Secretary, 3 Csaky gave the assurance that the
Hungarian Government would not consent to the Agreement of Bled
coming into force now, even in an altered form, as was being suggested
by Rumania, supported by Yugoslavia. He had told the Rumanian
Minister that the world would laugh if recognition of Hungarian
military sovereignty were proclaimed now.
The Rumanian Minister had asked him, with a view to strengthening
Gafencu's political position in the country, to send a written com-
munication, designed for publication later, merely saying that the
Hungarian Government would respect the Rumanian frontier as scru-
pulously as hitherto. As to problems arising from the new frontier
delimitation, Hungary was ready to negotiate with the Rumanian
Government through diplomatic channels in the most conciliatory
spirit, in the hope of achieving complete understanding between the
two nations. This proposal contains in its first and last paragraphs
the substance of the Hungarian Foreign Minister's written communica-
tion of March 25 to the Rumanian Minister, telegram No. 85 of March
25 4 but omits the passage relating to Bled and mobilization, as
this, in the view of the Rumanian Foreign Minister, does not seem
suitable for publication. In the face of the new general political de-
velopment (London efforts) Csaky wants to give Rumania as little as
possible to go on and is not, for the present, considering negotiations
with Yugoslavia, in order to avoid even the semblance of a linking up
with the Little Entente. Erdmannsdokff
3 The reference is evidently to a conversation between the Hungarian Minister and
the Under State Secretary, Woermann, on Mar. 31. In a memorandum (169/82532) on
it Woermann wrote: "The Hungarian Minister called on me today and stated, on in-
structions from his Government, that Hungary now intends to enter into negotiations
with Rumania for a convention to include an agreement on no resort to force, and a
settlement on minorities. A little later.'corresponding negotiations would be entered
into with Yugoslavia.
"I told M. Szt6jay that we had had somewhat different information from Budapest and
Bucharest, namely that what was involved was putting into force the Bled Agreement
between Rumania, Hungary and Yugoslavia. I informed him of the instructions sent to
our Minister in Budapest [see document No. 132] adding that these were instructions on
language and not for his intervention in the negotiations. M. Sztojay referred to the
memorandum of February 10 handed to the State Secretary (memorandum by the State
Secretary No. 143 of February 17 [see vol. v of this Series, document No. 292 and foot-
note 1 thereto]). Hungary had already then stated that she would only negotiate bi-
laterally, in no circumstances on the basis of the Bled Agreement, and in slow tempo.
He added that there was no longer any question of agreements over Hungarian military
sovereignty with Rumania and Yugoslavia." The substance of this conversation was
sent, on Apr. 1, to Budapest in telegram No. 106 (not printed, 1973/438359).
* In this telegram (1975/438345) Erdmannsdorff gave the gist of a Note just handed
by Csaky to the Rumanian Minister as follows: ' ' The Hungarian Government will respect
the new frontier with Rumania as scrupulously as the old . This coincides with the former
Czech-Rumanian frontier. The Declaration of Bled of August 23, 1938 relates also to
this part of the common frontier. The Hungarian Government declare that they are
prepared to withdraw all defensive measures undertaken on account of the Rumanian
military measures, on the one condition that the Rumanian Government declare that
they have begun to withdraw the military measures undertaken since March 1 5. Twenty-
four hours later the Hungarian Government will act accordingly. The _ Hungarian
Government are prepared to negotiate in a conciliatory spirit with the Rumanian Govern-
ment through diplomatic channels on any question about the new frontiers."
APRIL, 1939 joe
No. 147
1625/383447-43
Circular of the State Secretary *
Telegram
Berlin, April 3, 1939—10:00 p.m.
The British Government's declaration of assistance to Poland
announced by Chamberlain in the House of Commons on March 3] 7?
according to its text, only of a provisional nature. It is delned to
clanfy the Bntish attitude during the intervening period which "sit 11
727 MeVe T Cl T e reSUltS in the B " itish eon ulion
with other Governments. As the British Government have found
SZJ ITh ° g 1° de 7 rumours of an iIKminent G ™ ^ on
Po and as being without foundation, the prematurely issued statement
of the declaration of assistance to Poland was in no way justified bTthe
foreign political situation, but was, rather, caused by the British Govern
ment s need to give the world and public opinion at home, which hTd
aheadv become impatient, a first result of the assiduous diplomat
actmty begun by the Foreign Office on March 18.3 [In these cSum
^^^*™**^^™«*°*«££
• ° Ur ] !T Tv. ^l BritiS ? att6mpt at enci ^lement, and on the dangers
incurred by the States who are a party to it, has already been expreSed
m the Fuhrer s speech at Wilhelmshaven on Saturday.* I n any con
venations please display a dispassionate and completely reser Ve d
attitude [and rebuff all conjectures on the probable German^ttituJ *
(From here onwards not for Warsaw.) In particular you are requested
^onte CU8S m ^ ^ "^^ ^ *""»* ^te of Gerni^pS
Weizsackbe
^S^mSS^^S^ " E " rope ' the Consulate at - Ge —' — th.
* See document No. 136.
3 See document No. 58.
:Ltirri»^ r Xttp we ii 3 deieted from the ^ ™™ **■**•
8 See also document No. 159.
No. 148
7B9/2W9V2
Memorandum by an Official of the Protocol Department
Berlin, April 3, 1939.
zu Prot. 3770 IV 101 >
f * 8:4 ? t m ^° n , April 2 ' ° n the ins *™tions of the Foreign Minister I
wekomed M. Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, in his saborfcoaclat
1 Not found.
186 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
the Schlesischer Station as he was passing through Berlin and asked
him if wished for anything during his stop in Berlin and for his journey
through Germany. 2
Foreign Minister Beck expressed no wishes. In cautiously and care-
fully chosen phrases and keeping his eyes all the time on Ambassador
Lipski, who was also present, Foreign Minister Beck again expressed
his pleasure and satisfaction at the Reich Foreign Minister's recent
visit to Warsaw. 3 He hoped that the Reich Foreign Minister had re-
turned with pleasant impressions and that he felt that his increased
knowledge of people and the impressions he gained from what he had
seen in Warsaw would be valuable and useful for his further work on
German-Polish relations.
I remained entirely receptive and left the Polish Foreign Minister's
compartment as soon as was compatible with the requirements of
courtesy.
Submitted to the Foreign Minister.
Von Halem
2 Beck arrived in London for conversations on Apr. 3 and left on Apr. 7. See also
British Documents, Third Series, vol. v, chapter I.
3 Pvibbentrop had had a conversation with Beck at Warsaw on Jan. 26, 1939, see vol. v
of this Series, document No. 126.
No. 149
Nuremberg document 120-C
Exhibit GB-41
Directive by the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht
TOP SECRET MILITARY BERLIN, April 3, 1939.
Officer Only 5 copies.
WFA. No. 37/39 g Kdos. Chefs. L. la 2nd copy
Subject: Directive for the Wehrmacht, 1939-40.
The "Directive for the Uniform Preparation for War by the Wehr-
macht" for 1939-40 is being issued afresh. 1
Part I ("Frontier Security") and Part III ("Danzig") will be issued
in the middle of April. 2 They remain basically unchanged.
Part II ("Operation White " 3 ) is attached herewith. 4 The signature
of the Fiihrer will be appended later.
For "Operation White" the Fiihrer has issued the following addi-
tional directives:
1 See also vol. iv of this Series, document No. 81.
B Handwritten marginal note : "Attached". These parts of the directive were issued
on Apr, 1 1 . See document No. 185.
3 Literally "Case White" [Fall Weiss]. The German code name for the attack on
Poland.
4 On the copy here printed Part II is not attached; it appears as Enclosure II to the
document printed below as No. 185.
APEIL, 1939 187
1) Preparations must be made in such a way that the operation can
be carried out at any time as from September 1, 1939.
2) OKW is charged with drawing up a precise time table 5 for
"Operation White" and is to arrange for synchronized timing between
the three branches of the Wehrmaoht through discussions.
3) The plans of the branches of the Wehrmacht and the details for
the time table must be submitted to OKW by May 1, 1939,
The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht,
Keitel
Distribution List
High Command of the Army . .1 Copy No. 1
High Command of the Navy . .1 ); 2
Reich Air Minister and C-in-C of the
Luftwaffe . , 1 •?
High Command of the Wehrmacht .2 „ 4 and 5
« A provisional time table was drawn up and submitted to Hitler on June 22 For
the text see Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. xxxlv, document 126— C, Exhibit
Go — 4o, pp. 443-445.
No. 150
(2S/250S74-75
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
S1CEET Rome, April 4, 1939—2:00 a.m.
No. 117 of April 3 Received April 4—4:40 a.m.
Reports reaching me today from a reliable source to the effect that
Italian-Albanian negotiations with the object of establishing a Pro-
tectorate were in progress and were expected to be concluded before
the end of this week, induced me to call on Ciano this evening. He
received me with the remark that he had been about to ask me to come
and see him for the same reason, as he considered it important to in-
form us as quickly as possible and, he added, the Hungarians too, as
to what was really happening.
According to his account, the King of Albania,! under the impact
of the dissolution of Czecho-Slovakia, requested Italy just over a fort-
night ago to make the present treaty relations closer. On the
23rd the King, alleging imminent anti-Axis activity by Yugoslavia
and Greece, had asked for the despatch of Italian troops. This Rome
had categorically refused when it became evident that the King, who
has always been a "voyou" and who had been deprived by the Italian-
1 Ahmed Bey Zogu, King Zog I of the Albanians.
188 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Yugoslav settlement of a card which he had frequently and readily
played, wished to involve the troops in "anti-Yugoslav machinations."
Thereupon the King's attitude had radically changed and had become
definitely hostile, with the result that not only had the negotiations
suggested by himself failed to make progress but threats and outrages
against Italians had -occurred, which, increasing daily, had now led
to a flood of telegrams to the Duce requesting protection, not only from
Italians but also from Albanians, by whom, with the exception of those
in his own circle, the King is hated. The Duce was now contemplating
sending an Italian battleship, as the troops, although they have been
concentrated at Bari for a few days, are not yet ready for embarkation.
Moreover, Mussolini had today instructed his Minister in Tirana 2 to
give the King a warning, amounting to an ultimatum, against acts pre-
judicial to the lives and rights of Italian subjects, and to state that,
even if these acts were the work of alleged gangs, he would be held
personally responsible. An attempt will also be made to continue the
negotiations, which are not being conducted here but in Tirana, in
order to achieve a closer Anschluss of Albania to Italy, which would,
however, leave intact the sovereignty and territorial independence of
Albania, and would, in any case, take a lesser form than a Protectorate,
such as is the case in Bohemia and Moravia. If the King is sufficiently
compliant, which Ciano did not appear necessarily to expect, negotiations
will take place with him, otherwise Italy will act independently. In any
ease, the Duce had no intention of putting up with further Albanian
attacks on the persons, lives and property of Italians resident there.
Ciano expects that matters will clarify themselves in a day or two.
In my presence he gave instructions for denials, through Radio Bari in
the Italian and Albanian languages, of rumours of more far-reaching
Italian intentions.
From his account it appeared that the whole question had developed
more quickly than was expected here.
Mackensen
2 Francesco Jacomoni di San Savjno.
No. 151
2707/53584"
Memorcmdum by the Foreign Minister
RM 22 Berlin, April 4, 1939.
Pol. II 1098.
The Turkish Ambassador 1 called on me today at 12:30 p.m. at his
own request. He informed me that he could repeat on behalf of his
i Mehmet Hamdi Arpag.
APBIL, 1939 jgg
Government the assurances that all rumours to tW *fw ,u * iL
E.IBBENTKOP
! See also document No. 134.
No. 152
5555/E395212
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 153 of April 4 Bhchaesst, April 4, 1939-8:30 p.m.
Received April 4—10:45 p.m.
The Rumanian Air Ministry today ordered 30 Ju 112 nghter^raft
audio spare engmes to a total of 5.1 mmion RM . The a r mS/v
wishes to appoint commissions as soon as possible ™Hpr ™ str ^
Economic Treaty to handle the total ^S^^^ **"
Pabeicius
No. 153
2767/535S39
Tke Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
I No. 156 of April 4 Bttchaeest, April 4, 1939-1 1 :45 p.m.
Received April 5—2:00 a.m.
t a tt - Pol. IV 2370.
:■ I. As Hungary refuses to make a declaration to Rumania relating
, to the fronts or to progression and also refuses to make ar^ terrf
tona concessions m the Carpatho -Ukraine, Rumania, who regards th e
■ direct cause for tens 10 n as being ehminated, will, neverthS TeS
I ^obihza ion tomorrow and complete it by Easter. Foreign IS'
|Gafencu toH me tins with the remark that he had suffered a ^Se
|Ee regretted this as he had needed support at present for his San
If ° y T?l ^T 1 ' 7 at h ° me and abroad " H™W, howevTSd
Ishown that she did not want a rapprochement with Rumania
190 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
II. On general policy Gafencu said that he would in no way allow
himself to be drawn into the encirclement policy against Germany. He
was the most decided opponent of the policy of collective security. If
Britain and France wanted to make a one-sided declaration that, in
the event of an attack on Rumania, they would regard themselves as
Rumania's allies, he could hardly fail to take note of this. It would be
a different matter, however ; if Soviet Russia were to participate in a
declaration of this kind, because that could be interpreted as an anti-
German attitude. He was sincere in his intention further to extend
relations with Germany, particularly in the economic political sphere,
and he was glad that he would be able to state this again in Berlin
soon. For the rest, he had so far no definite programme for the Berlin
conversations. 1
Fabricius
1 See document No. 135.
No. 154
1818/415223-25
The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry
Warsaw, April 4, 1939.
Received April 5.
Pol. V 3006.
Subject: Poland's attitude after Chamberlain's declaration.
Chamberlain's statement on Britain's readiness to render assistance
to Poland 1 has been received with satisfaction by public opinion in
Poland. The nervousness which last week amounted to a war-psychosis
has noticeably decreased, even if a certain patriotic excitement remains,
which is being exploited by war propaganda in the interests of the loan
for air raid precautions, towards which 140 million zloty have already
been subscribed. The press, however, was instructed to observe a
certain reserve as regards the attitude to the international situation as
created by the British guarantee, probably in order not to irritate
Germany unnecessarily, and not to arouse too great illusions here.
The following points of view are put forward in statements on the
political situation by leading officials of the Foreign Ministry: Poland
could feel a special satisfaction that there were no longer — particularly
as in the Treaty of Locarno — two different standards for security in the
west and in the east. As for relations with Germany, Poland for her
part was not aiming at any changes of the good relations created in
1 See document No. 136.
APRIL, 193» ]OJ
1934 As a result of alterations which had taken place in her immediate
neighbourhood and xn the sphere of Polish foreign interests, the "equi-
librium which had been one of the prerequisites of the German-Polish
Declaration of 1934 had been disturbed. In the constellation at that
time, Po and had had the French alliance, which had presented no
obstacle to the German-Polish tetente. If at present, after Germany's
great increase in power, Poland received in addition a British guarantee
this really only meant the restoration of the "equilibrium" and thu!'
in a certain sense, a return to the position of 1934
With regard to the Danzig question, the Foreign Ministry continues
to emphasize that Poland will not submit to force. On the other hand
the possibility and necessity of removing certain differences by negotia^
ton is admitted So far it is not clear whether, over and above this
Poland expects that, as a result of the final British guarantee, she will
be obliged to adopt an accommodating attitude in the Danzig question
It is nevertheless interesting that such rumours are circulating here and
he statement by the British Ambassador* to the same effect on which
I reported in telegram No. 56 of March 30,3 per h aps justifies the assump-
tion that, in connection with the frontier guarantee, London is aiming
at a settlement of the most important German-Polish differences
So far there are no signs that the intransigent Polish attitude in the
Danzig question has yet been in any way relaxed. Nevertheless there
seems to be a readiness for certain concessions in the minorities question
I hear from a reliable source that in the last few days the Polish Ministry
of the Interior has issued very emphatic instructions for the protection
of the German minority, and even the Western League * has received
orders to exercise greater moderation. The accommodating attitude to
the German minority is also interpreted by many as meaning that the
Polish Government want to avoid anything which might make the
western part of Poland appear as a source of constant unrest in the
eyes or the British.
According to reports here, the decisions in London seem, incidentally
to have been made very hurriedly. I learn from circles in close contact
with the British Embassy here that the news of such far-reaching British
assurances to Poland came as a complete surprise even to Kennard the
Ambassador. '
v. Moltke
a Sir Howard Kennard.
implications as a disturbance to peace told me tnrlatr th=+ ;„ """''S 'fuesuon and its
have to take into account the Germ™ character o dL^W V ' 6W th f Po1 ? would
onee the wave of chauvimsm now sweeping the country which w7 s undm hJS^ » '
dangering Beck's position, had subsided again " y undoubtedly en-
* See document No. 108.
192 . DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 155
1818/415241-49
The Consul in Gdynia to the Foreign Ministry
Gdynia, April 4, 1939.
Received April 11.
Pol. V 3112.
Whenever Volksdeutsche have called at the Consulate here recently
about their own affairs, I have always noticed that they assume that a
solution of the" Corridor question is imminent. When I question them
I am constantly told that some Polish newspapers had discussed the
question of the reincorporation of Danzig, and also that at the same
time speculations were being made in the Polish press on the possible
intentions of the German Reich regarding the return of the Corridor.
These questions raised by the Volksdeutsche are partly based on the
knowledge that the Polish armed forces are being mobilized.
On these questions by Volksdeutsche, which I have left unanswered,
I have heard the opinion, expressed that a large part of the Polish
population views the reincorporation of the Corridor very sympathetic-
ally on social grounds. It could be assumed that an average of two-
thirds of the population would in no way oppose the German troops if
they marched in, and this would apply especially to the rural population.
Among the people in the smaller towns in my consular district the
attitude of the Polish population would have to be assessed variously.
In places where much unemployment prevails, hopes of building up a
livelihood are based solely on the actions of our Puhrer.
It is thought that in certain places the entry of German troops could
not he carried out entirely without friction. The Polish coastal villages,
from the Pomeranian coast to Grossendorff, are said to be very pro-
Polish, especially as the Poles who live there have built themselves
houses for summer visitors so as to have a large source of income from
seaside tourists.
In Gdynia the population is largely made up of immigrant Galicians
and Congress Poles 1 with very few native Pommerellians and Cassu-
bians. Among these Cassubians are a number who have made large
profits from speculation in land and from housing when the city of
Gdynia developed, and they often possess large dwelling-houses out of
which they have made for themselves a very comfortable livelihood.
They come mostly from Cassubian peasant and fishing families, who
are now very anxious about their property and firmly opposed to every-
thing German.
1 From Poland as constituted after the Congress of Vienna in 1815, i.e. from the areas
formerly under Russian suzerainty.
AFEXL, 1930 193
Nevertheless it can be said generally that the indigenous Poles and
Cassubians who formerly lived under German rule in West Prussia
have been bitterly disappointed by the actions and attitude of the
Polish Government. They nourish a stubborn hatred towards the
immigrant Galicians and Congress Poles and would, generally speaking,
be glad if this area were again to come under German order and dis-
cipline.
Especially those Poles who have served in the German forces and
who on discharge had often been granted fairly large war disablement
pensions, which, however, have for the most part been cancelled by
the Polish authorities, are consistently accorded unfavourable treat-
ment in obtaining employment and are special sufferers from unemploy-
ment, which has naturally given rise to great bitterness against the
Polish authorities.
The mood of the Poles living in Gdynia is very serious and to some
extent depressed.
In the smaller towns, on the other hand, and in the country the Poles
are at the moment feeling very expectant and partially hopeful, especi-
ally as the economic conditions everywhere are in a parlous state under
the Polish administration.
A copy of my report is being sent to the Consulate General at
Toruii.
HOFMANN
No. 156
18S7/S900S7
Memorandum by the State Secretary
St.S. No. 313 Berlin, April 4, 1939.
At his visit today the British Counsellor of Embassy asked me about
the Fiihrer's intentions regarding the German-British Naval Agree-
ment. He wanted to know whether the Puhrer's statement in his
speech at Wilhelmshaven 1 was to be taken as a denunciation of the
Naval Agreement.
In reply I told Forbes that, as he knew, the denunciation of an
Agreement took place by notification through diplomatic channels.
Weizsackee
i See Editors' Note, p._ 183. The passage in Hitler's speech ran: "I once concluded
an agreement with Britain — the Naval Agreement. It is based on the ardent desiro
shared by us a!l never to be forced to fight a war against Britain. This desire can, how-
ever, only be a reciprocal one. If it no longer exists in Britain, then the practical
premises for the agreement have been removed. Germany would accept even a situation
of this kind with calm composure."
13
194 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 157
G563/E49029S
The Charge" d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 113 of April 5 Washington, April 5, 1939 — 6:56 p.m.
Received April 6 — 4:00 a.m.
W Villa 810.
With reference to my telegram No. 103 of [March] 25. l
Negotiations with interested parties on amending the Treasury de-
cision have so far been without result. The Customs Bureau inclines
to free from provisional additional duty, import transactions effected in
dollars, free Reichsmarks, and dividend mark credit balances, provided
such payment is satisfactorily proved at the time of the customs de-
claration; on the other hand, it is uncertain whether the Treasury will
approve of such amendments. In spite of urgent representations our
customs attorneys do not expect a decision within a week. In these cir-
cumstances, I request authority by telegram to hold informal talks with
the Customs Bureau and to promise the abolition of the Inland
Account Procedure 2 if removal of the additional duties can thereby be
attained by April 23. 3
Thomsen
1 Document No. 89.
2 See document No. 56.
* In telegram No. 119 of Apr. 15 (not printed, 4992/E281733) Clodins replied that the
Ministry of Economics intended to cancel the Inland Account procedure in respect of new
transactions, provided the U.S. Government would refrain from levying countervailing
duties except in cases of Inland Account transactions now being effected . The Embassy
was instructed to negotiate along these lines with the Treasury.
No. 158
100/6440S
The Foreign Minister to the Einbassy in Italy
Telegram
No. 162 of April 5 Berlin, April 5, 1939 — 7:15 p.m.
Received April 5 — 7:25 p.m.
For the Ambassador personally.
With regard to the Albanian question, 1 please inform Ciano from me
at the first opportunity that Germany in principle welcomes whole-
heartedly any strengthening of Italy and of Italian influence. 2
Ribbentrop
1 See document No. 150.
2 Marginal note: "Informed Ciano this evening, Cf. mytelegvam to Berlin [document
No. 171]. M[ackensen] 6/4."
APRIL, 1939 J 95
No. 159
1818/415223
The State Secretary to the Embassy in Poland
Letter-Telegram
Berlin, April 5, 1939.
Pol. V 3050.
For the Ambassador personally.
Lipski will probably be received here again before Easter At this
interview he will be told the following with reference to his last con-
versation with the Foreign Minister: 1
Our offer to Poland will not be repeated. The Polish Government
had apparently not fully understood the significance of this offer. We
could not help that. The future would show whether Poland had been
well advised. The counter proposal put forward by Lipski had, as was
known, already been rejected by the Foreign Minister as a basis for
negotiations.
End of the statement to Lipski.
Please do not enter into any further material discussions on the
German offer and the Polish counter offer. We must prevent Poland
from throwing the ball back to us and then manoeuvring us into the
position of appearing to have let a Polish offer go unheeded. Other
principal Missions have likewise been instructed not to enter into serious
discussions on the Polish question but rather to evade the subject
calmly and not to give any indication of further German intentions.2
, Weizsacker
i On Mar. 27, see document No. 108.
2 See also document No. 147.
No. X60
I62J/3S8436-37
Circular of the Foreign Ministry 1
strictly confidential Berlin, April 5, 1939.
Pol. II 10252 Ang. I.
According to reports and confidential information reaching us here, 3
the British encirclement action was inaugurated uniformly on March IS
by demarches by the British representatives in a number of capitals.
We are particularly well informed about the course of this d-marche in
1 Addressees were the Embassies at London, Paris, Brussels, Rome, Moscow, Warsaw
and Legations at The Hague, Berne, Belgrade, Budapest, Bucharest, Sofia and Athens
* Document No. 134.
3 See also documents Nos. 58 and 83.
196 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Ankara. There, on that date, the British Ambassador, Sir Hughe
Knatchbull-Hugessen, handed the Turkish Foreign Minister a copy of
his instructions from Lord Halifax, 4 the contents of which were roughly
as follows:
The Bumanian Minister in London, Tilea, had informed Lord
Halifax that Germany Jhad made a proposal to Rumania which had the
character of an ultimatum. This was that Rumania was to grant
Germany a monopoly of her foreign trade and control of her industry,
in return for which Germany would give assurances concerning the
frontiers of Rumania. M. Tilea asked what Britain's attitude would be
if Rumania were to reject this German proposal. Tilea also asked if it
would be easier for Britain to give an answer if an understanding were
reached on this question between Poland and Rumania and if the States
of the Balkan Entente undertook obligations over their external
frontiers also. Lord Halifax reserved his reply and asked to be informed
of the attitude Turkey would adopt in view of this situation. The
Turkish Foreign Minister replied in writing to the British Ambassador
that Rumania had not approached Turkey in this matter. Should
such an enquiry be addressed to them, the Turkish Government would
examine the matter closely and in the friendly spirit which charac-
terized relations between the two countries. They would not hesitate
to fulfil the obligations incumbent upon them within the limits of the
Balkan Entente.
This course of the British demarche clearly shows on how little
it was based and how surprising the British action was even to the
States of the Balkan Entente.
By order:
WoERMANN
* See also British Documents, Third Series, vol. iv, Nos. 390 and 407.
No. 161
2767/535S41
The Charge" d' Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
No. A 652 Moscow, April 5, 1939.
Pol. V 3124.
Political Report
Subject: Ddmenti regarding Soviet promises to deliver war material to
Poland.
The Soviet press of April 4, 1939, publishes the following Tass
communique 1 :
"The newspapers Temps and Oeuvre (of April 1, 1939) have repro-
duced a Havas report from Moscow which states that the Soviet Union
APRIL, 1939 jgy
has allegedly undertaken, or promised to undertake, to supply Poland
with war material in the event of war and to close its raw materials
market to Germany. Tass is authorized to state that this report is not
m accordance with the facts, as the Soviet Union has given no one
such promises and has undertaken no such obligations "
00 T ?^ eP ° rt iS Str ° ngly reminisc ent of the Tass communique of March
22 1939, concerning the denial of a promise by the Soviet Union to
render assistance to Poland and Rumania, i The present Tass com-
munique reflects the same attitude as was taken by the Soviet Govern-
ment in that case.
The Soviet intention in the Tass communique may be to counter
before Beck s arrival in London,* reports which have clearly been
spread for the purpose of prejudicing the Soviet Government's atti-
tude In view of the doubts expressed by Poland and Rumania
regarding military assistance by the Bolshevists, the Soviet Govern-
ment obviously attach importance to making it clear that they have
not promised military assistance to anyone. The Kremlin's distrust
of the policy of Britain and Prance, which can constantly be observed
here finds expression in the endeavour not to allow the power factor
which the Soviet Union represents, to be used as a counter in other
people s games, and to maintain freedom of action as long as possible
However, the Soviet Government's attitude does not by any means
indicate that they would not be prepared to give Poland military
assistance if the need arose, but merely that they wish first to see
fulfilled the conditions which they have laid down.
VON TlPPELSKIRCH
1 See document No. 75.
2 On Apr. 3.
No. 162
1625/388461
The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry
A I375 The Hague, April 5, 1939.
Received April 11.
Pol. II 1121.
Subject: Alleged Anglo-French promise of assistance to the Netherlands.
With reference to your despatch of March 31— Pol II 1009 l
During a conversation which I had with him a few days ago, the
foreign M inister s told me that he did not believe that an Anglo-
; l Not printed (5453/E366631-33). This despatch circulated a DNB report of Mar 28
on Anglo-French promises of ass^tance to the Netherlands, Belgium X S^Wland
:£S nS m L0,ldon ' Paris ' B ™^ ls > Berne, and The Hagu/an^uested fuXr
2 J. A. N. Patijn.
198 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
French agreement on mutual assistance in the event of an attack on
Holland had been concluded. In any case, not even a hint had ever
been given to him here in The Hague by the Trench and British
Ministers. Even the Netherlands Ministers in Paris and London,
when asked to report, because of French, newspaper announcements at
that time, had also replied that they had been unable to ascertain
anything authentic regarding an agreement of this kind. 3
Zech*
3 Marginal notes: (i) "[For] F[iihrer]. R[ibbentrop]. " (ii) "To Counsellor Hewel
with instructions from the Reich Foreign Minister to inform the Fuhrer. Schmidt 13/4."
(iii) "Transmitted by telephone to Counsellor Hewel at Berchtesgaden. [Signature
illegible] 14/4."
4 The following reply (1625/388462-64) was sent to The Hague on Apr. 18, and was
circulated to the principal Missions in Europe : ' ' The doubts expressed by the Netherlands
Foreign Minister regarding the existence of an Anglo-French agreement on mutual
assistance, in case of an attack on the Netherlands, are not easy to understand as,
judging from reports in our hands and from statements in the British and French press,
there can be no doubt at all of the existence of Anglo-French agreements for the event of
an attack on the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland. It is known that these agree-
ments formed part of the subject matter of Bonnet's conversations with British Ministers
on the occasion of the state visit to London of the President of the French Republic.
By order. W[oermann]."
No. 163
584/242256-50
Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IVa
Berlin, April 5, 1939.
e.o. Pol. IV 2419.
submitted on 8.4.39.
Minister Count Magistrati called on me today in order to discuss
with me questions concerning the South Tyrol, as had already been
announced by Ambassador Attolico during his conversation with the
State Secretary on April l. 1 He began by bringing up the following
particular requests and complaints.
1. The Austrians living in the South Tyrol who had acquired German
nationality through the reunion of Austria with the Reich were, owing
to their close links with the South Tyrolese and their numerous ties
with former Austria, a disturbing element and a source of anxiety for
the Italian Government. It would therefore be desirable if, under the
recently started resettlement scheme for German Volksgenossen and
Reich, nationals from the South Tyrol, consideration were given above
all to former Austrians.
2. Count Magistrati expressed his thanks for the information that the
music firm of Hieber in Munich had been forbidden to sell the gramophone
1 See document No. 143.
APRIL, 1930 J 99
record of South Tyrolese songs (Pol. IV 464}.* Nevertheless, he requested
that steps should be taken to forbid the sale of the record altogether
3. Count Magistrati brought the conversation back again to the
leaflets which had been distributed in the South Tyrol for some time
He drew particular attention to a leaflet that had recently been dis-
tributed in the South Tyrol (this is the matter of the leaflet forwarded
m the report of the Consulate General at Milan of February 3 of this
year-Pol IV .297 g),3 ^hich attacks the methods of administration
apphed in South Tyrol. I explained to him that, according to what we
have established by thorough enquiries, the leaflets had certainly not
been prmted m Germany, and that Reich German agencies and organiza-
tions had had nothing to do with the production and distribution of the
leaflets, and parfacularly not the Deutsche Auslandsinstitut in Stuttgart
According to the information we have obtained these leaflets had
also not been printed in Basle. The names of the firm found on the
leaflets, namely "Kiefer-Basel" and "Tip-Kia Basel" were unknown
m Basle and had obviously been chosen for the purpose of deception
4. Count Magistrati further alleged that, according to information
reaching him, there exists in Munich a National Socialist Students'
Society called "Innerkofler",* which publishes its information for
students by putting it up on the notice-board of the university. Italian
students studying in Munich, who had made enquiries about the
student society, had been astonished to be told that "Innerkofler"
was South Tyrolese. Count Magistrati contented himself with drawing
attention to this, and did not make a request for the name to be changed
5. With reference to Dr. Friedrich Lange's language maps Count
Magistrati repeated the request, already submitted in writing (Pol. IV
2182), s that the number of German-speaking inhabitants of the South
Tyrol printed on the maps be changed. On the language map he had
placed before us, the number of German-speaking persons in South
Tyrol is given as 270,000, whereas Magistrati himself estimates the
number at about 200,000. I explained to him that we had got into
touch with the competent home authorities « about this, and, as soon as
we had a statement from them, we would communicate with him further.
* ^\^i"^ (788 + 4/ fi 708 f >■ .° n ^ 20 ' 1939 the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle re-
quested the Gestapo to take steps to stop the sale of the gramophone record about which
Magistrati had complained to the Foreign Ministry. On Feb. 20 Heinburc wrote to
Magistrati (not printed, 78S4/ES70853) stating that this had been done g
3 Not printed (7886/E570876-79). The leaflet attacked ^£&rtS£ methods in the
South Tyrol and emphasized that the oppression of the German element was £t in
Lnd elsewhere S demandS f ° r the a PP^^tion of the principle of nationality in Tunis
* The name of a Tyrolese preacher and author
5 Not printed (7884/E570856).
/i^!."? !^™- 1 (l J 0t P r ™ ted ' 7884/E570S57-58) Hemburg drew the attention
of the Vo ksdeutsche Mittelstelle to the fact that the figures for the German-speaking
inhabitants m the former South Tyrol given on Dr. Friedrich Lange's linguistic map!
were not in accordance with the actual facts of the case and he therefore suggested that
the figures be omitted. es
200 DOCUMENTS ON GEKMAN FOBEIGN POLICY
After these particular requests and complaints Count Magistrate
turned to the fundamental aspect of the South Tyrol question. The
natural geographical frontier on the Brenner unfortunately did not
coincide with the ethnographical frontier. The South Tyrolese looked
upon themselves as German and could not be pacified as long as they
belonged to Italy. Although at the moment the situation in South
Tyrol was not disquieting, nevertheless at any time incidents might
occur which would place the heaviest burden on the Axis. Above all
friction might occur between the old-established South Tyrolese and
the newly settled Italians, the more so as the Italian Government were
still intending to bring into the South Tyrol as large a number of
Italians as possible. Therefore a radical solution of the South Tyrol
problem must be considered. In his view the only solution would be
the resettlement of all the South Tyrolese in Germany. He thought
the present time was particularly favourable for this. At the head of
Germany and Italy stood two men, bound by the closest ties of friend-
ship and whose authority was so great that such a resettlement could
be effected without difficulty. Besides, since the reunion of Austria
with the Reich there were now in Germany supplies of frozen Lire
amounting to several thousand millions out of which, on a clearing
basis, sums could be placed at the disposal of the South Tyrolese to be
resettled in Germany as compensation for property left behind by
them. It would be difficult for the Duce to submit such a plan to the
Eiihrer, as the South Tyrolese were Italian nationals, but Mussolini
would gladly agree to such a plan were the Fiihrer to propose it to him.
I maintained a completely receptive attitude to these general observa-
tions of Count Magistrate's. 7
Heinburg 8
7 Marginal note here in Weizsacker's handwriting: "Rightly so".
s A marginal note on the cover sheet (not printed, 7794/E566003} to this document
indicates that Ribbentrop saw it on Apr. 18.
No. 164
21S4/472057-5S
The Minister in Albania to ike. Foreign Ministry
TelegTam
urgent Tibana, April 6, 1939 — 2:50 a.m.
No. 14 of April 5 Received April 6 — 8:40 a.m.
Pol. IV 2395.
The Foreign Minister 1 described the situation as follows: The Italians
had often expressed doubts as to whether Albania on her side would
1 Ekrem Bey Libohova.
APBIL, 1930 201
fulfil her alliance obligations. From the Albanian side everything had
been done to dispel suspicion. Finally the Italians had proposed to
make the alliance closer, which Albania was in principle ready to do.
The Italian oral proposals had, however, been unacceptable because
they violated the independence of Albania. Thereupon the Italians
had formulated rather less far-reaching proposals ' in writing but
these too were unacceptable. Mussolini was suddenly pursuing the
matter with great urgency and had requested a reply by tomorrow.
This would be given in the course of the night to the Italian Minister 2
who would take it personally to Rome tomorrow. In the meantime
the Italian Consul in Valona had spread the rumour that Italian war-
ships with troops were on the way to Albania. A rumour had reached
here from Bari that troops were concentrated there destined for
Albania, These reports caused great excitement among the people and
there had been demonstrations but no Italian had been harmed. The
Minister expressed the hope that the Albanian reply would satisfy the
Italians. The Albanians had gone to the utmost limits of what was
tolerable for their independence. The Albanians would meet with
armed resistance any violent invasion by the Italians. The Italian
Minister maintained that Italians had been murdered, wounded,
threatened and insulted. Therefore all Italians were being evacuated
from Albania today and tomorrow. The Albanians furthermore had
mobilized. When I asked what Italy would do if Albania replied to
the Italian terms with counter proposals, he answered that Rome would
probably regard this as a rejection. With regard to the attitude of
other Powers in the event of a possible invasion by Italy, he referred to
the Croatian difficulties of the Yugoslavs and to the "understanding"
article in The Times "Italy and Albania ".3
It is my impression that the Italians have deliberately brought about
the existing conflict in order to establish a protectorate over Albania.
They have obviously not been successful in precipitating incidents.
So far I have not been able to ascertain that one Italian has been
murdered or wounded anywhere. The Albanians are said to have
15,000 men under arms instead of the normal 5,000 to 6,000. Mobiliza-
tion began on the occasion of the Giro affair 4 after which the Italians
ofiered the King help which he refused. Public feeling against the
Italians has turned to hatred. Valona and Durazzo are said to have
2 Francesco Jacomoni di San Savino.
*The Times on Apr. 4 had printed a despatch from their Rome correspondent review-
ing possible Italian intentions towards Albania.
* According to a previous report by Pannwitz, No. 181 of Feb. 28 (2184/472051-54)
Giro, an influential member of the Fascist Party, had been sent to Albania, at the request
of the Albanian authorities, as adviser on the training of youth. He had formed youth
organizations on the Italian Fascist pattern and also meddled in local politics. This had
culminated in his expulsion from the country.
202 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
been evacuated by Albanian troops and these to have taken up better
positions further inland. s
Pannwitz
5 In a memorandum of Apr. 5 (not printed, 116/66204) Woermann recorded that the
Albanian Minister enquired on behalf of his Government how Germany would react if
Italy were to land troops in Albania. Woermann replied that, as he must be aware,
Germany had no interest in the Adriatic and that a German intervention against Italy
was out of the question.
No. 165
1 975/43S36 3
The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 103 of April 6 Budapest, April 6, 1939 — 6:14 p.m.
Received April 6 — 10:55 p.m.
Pol. IV 2416.
The Foreign Minister invited me to call on him to inform me he had
just told the Rumanian Minister 1 that reports in the British press that
parts of Rumanian territory were to be returned to Hungary owing to
pressure from Britain were nonsense, as were British press reports of
an imminent attack on Rumania by Hungary. When the Rumanian
Minister again referred to the putting into effect of the Bled Agreement 2
he replied that this was out of the question. He was, however, willing
to negotiate a completely fresh agreement, which must, above all,
include provisions for the protection of minorities.
Csaky then handed the Rumanian Minister a Note, the second para-
graph of which is identical with the second paragraph of the text
reported in my telegram No. 101. 3
First paragraph, however, now reads: 4
"Mr. Minister,
I have the honour to state to you that the Hungarian Government,
from the start of the military operations in Karpatalja (former Sub-
Carpathian Russia) have ordered their troops to respect the whole
Rumanian frontier as scrupulously as has been done in the past." 6
Erdmannsdorit
1 Raoul Bossy.
2 See document No. 135.
3 Of Apr. 5 (not printed, 1975/438363-64). The second paragraph reads: "With
regard to questions which might arise as a result of tho new frontier line, the Hungarian
Government are ready to negotiate with the Rumanian Government, through diplomatic
channels, in the most conciliatory spirit with the hope of achieving a more perfect un-
derstanding between the two nations."
4 As previously reported, this passage had read: "That the Hungarian Government
would respect the Rumanian frontier as scrupulously as by [sic] the past." The full
text of the Note was sent by Erdmannsdorff in report A 144 of Apr. '6 (not printed,
5985/E440375-7U).
5 This passage is in French in the original.
APKIL, 1939 203
No. 166
2184/472060
The State Secretary to the Legation in Albania
Telegram
urgent Berlin, April 6, 1939— 9:45 p.m.
No. 19 [ ZU ] poi. iv 2402.1
With reference to your telegram No. 15. 1
Should the occasion arise we agree to take over the Italian interests
on the request of the Italian representative.
Beyond this, please observe complete reticence. You will not under-
take any action, or make any gesture whatsoever which might cast
doubts upon our unqualified approval of the Italian action.
Wetzsackeb,
i This telegram of Apr. 6 (2184/472059) reads: "The Italian Minister told me that the
Albanian counter proposals did not satisfy Borne and that he would receive a final
answer at 6 p.m. today,
"He asked me whether, if diplomatic relations were broken off, I would be prepared
to take over Italian interests in Albania. I stated my willingness to do so. Pannwitz."
No. 167
181S/415236-37
The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry
p - 34 Warsaw, April 6, 1939.
Received April 7.
Pol. V 3084.
Political Report
Subject: Observations by Chef de Cabinet Count Lubienski regarding
London.
Count Lubienski, Chef de Cabinet to the Foreign Minister, invited a
member of the Embassy to call on him today in order to communicate
the views of the Polish Government regarding the resumption of the
discussions on minorities. 1 I am reporting on this separately. 3
This communication was clearly only a pretext for further observa-
tions, which were probably based on instructions from Foreign Minister
Beck. Count Lubienski spoke somewhat as follows: the campaign
against Poland, which has been waged by the DNB in the foreign press,
and which was carried out by means of partly true, but also partly
1 See document No. 125.
s This report of Apr. 8 (not printed, 1836/419041) stated that Lubienski had declared
the Polish Government to be agreeable to a resumption of the negotiations at the end
of May or beginning of June.
204 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
distorted and tendentiously collected facts, was the real reason why-
foreign countries had feared that a direct attack on Poland was imminent.
This anxiety had then led to the attempts to make pacts which were to
protect Poland from an attack. Despite the pressure being simultane-
ously exerted by Germany in the Danzig question, Foreign Minister
Beck had rejected these British and French proposals for a pact and had
adhered strictly to the bilateral principle. If M. Beck had acquiesced
at all in the British guarantee declaration 3 it was as a direct result of
Germany's attempt to create in Poland a state of anxiety by means of
pressure — in any case a method which could never be successfully used
against Poland and especially not in the present circumstances. By
his intransigent stand on the Danzig question Foreign Minister Beck
had saved German-Polish relations, for if he had accepted the German
proposal he would have been forced to resign. Such a development
would without doubt have started a definite anti-German policy in
Poland, which might even have led in the end to an alliance with the
(Soviet Union. It was difficult to pursue a policy against the general
current of opinion, and Marshal Pilsudski had also encountered this
difficulty at the time when he had worked for an understanding with
Germany. A great deal of patience was required to bring such a policy
to fruition. But if one allowed oneself to be drawn away from broad
principles there was the risk that the supreme objective would be called
in question. The Polish Government still had a genuine desire for a
sincere policy of understanding with Germany, but without the use of
pressure and by maintaining the independence of both countries. In
speaking today of an encirclement directed against Germany, it should
surely also be remembered how much Poland had been encircled by
Germany through recent political events.
v. Moltke
3 See document No. 136.
No. 168
2130/465335
The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry
secret Belgrade, April 6, 1939.
G 110 W529g.
With reference to your despatch of March 21, 1939 W 421 g. 1
According to reports here the negotiations on the credit of half a
l Not printed (2130/465333). In this despatch Moraht asked for a report on the Italian
offer of a credit of half a milliard Lire to finance Yugoslav State contracts. Italy was said
to have received orders for 2 cm anti-aircraft guns and a small number of aircraft, A copy
of this despatch -was forwarded to Rome with a cover note of Mar. 25 (not printed,
2130/465332).
APRIL, 1939 205
milliard Lire previously offered by Italy for financing Yugoslav State
contracts have not yet been concluded.
The difficulty is said to lie in the question of the period of repayment
The Italians are said to have agreed to extend the repayment period of
four years, originally envisaged by them, to five years, but the Yugo-
slavs continue to demand a ten-year period. About two-thirds of the
credit would be used for war material and about one-third for
other purchases, including signals equipment for the Yugoslav rail-
ways.
The result of the present negotiations on the granting of the credit
cannot yet be gauged, but opinion tends to be that the agreement will
be concluded.
A further enquiry to Consul General Neuhausen shows that his in-
formation tallies in the main with that of the Legation. 2
von Heeeen
2 A copy of this report was forwarded to Rome by Moraht with a cover notn nt A nr u
(2130/465334). Moraht added : << It has meanwhue t^red t£a w ^XJwK
with the Italians for part of the total of 200 bomber a£craft and for the 7 5 cm an?,"
aircraft guns. _ But wo w.1 , on our side, ensure that the competition is kept within the
Lmito prescribed by ourpoht.cal relationswithltaly." A handwritten marginal n£e on
this cover note reads: "Neuhausen has told me about this in detail Mfackensen] 18/4 "
No. 169
52/31632-34
Memorandum by the State Secretary!
St.S. No. 316 Beklik-, April 6, 1939.
I invited the Polish Ambassador to call upon me today and in the
course of our conversation he of his own accord introduced the subject
of Beck's conversations in London.^ Lipski' maintained that, though
he had no detailed information, he could make certain basic principles
clear to me:
1) Poland wished to abide by the 1934 Agreement.
2) The Polish-British Agreements were bilateral and purely de-
fensive; there was no question of Poland joining a bloc.
I received these remarks of Lipski's with a smile and answered some-
what as follows: the most recent trend of Polish policy was now alto-
gether incomprehensible to me. Lipski knew as well as I did how
strained had been our relations before the seizure of power. •' N one
in Germany, except the Fiihrer, could have had the great conception
of 1934 and have realized it vis-&-vis Poland. From that time our
,i
i For Lipski's account of this conversation, see the Polisli White Book No 70
a Beck visited London Apr. 3-7, 1939. '
a i.e., by Hitler in 1933.
206 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
relations had undergone a constant and gratifying improvement. On
the basis of these good-neighbourly relations the Fuhrer had, as he
knew, initiated conversations with Poland at the beginning of 1939 and
had tried not only to settle the remaining points of difference between
us, but also to give Poland a generous guarantee for the Corridor
frontier. Poland had obviously not understood this offer. Instead of
its being gladly taken, and the work of 1934 completed, we had sud-
denly heard strange sabre-rattling in Poland. Though this had not
disturbed us, it was in strange contrast to the response which we were
entitled to expect from Warsaw. The Fuhrer's offer to Poland was one
which would not be repeated. The kind of answer to the offer which
the Polish Government had wished to give us had, as we knew, been
characterized to him — Lipski — by the Reich Foreign Minister, on
March 27*, as representing no basis for the settlement of the question
at issue. (Later in the course of the conversation I repeated that the
Polish answer was for us no basis for discussion.) The future would,
of course, show whether Poland had been well advised in her attitude.
I went on to say that 1 had not yet read the statement which it was
announced Chamberlain would make in the House of Commons this
afternoon. 5 But if what was already appearing in the press about
Beck's conversations was true, then I did not know how the Polish
attitude could still be reconciled with the spirit of the 1934 Agree-
ment.
Lipski tried to argue on this last point that the Polish-French Treaty
relationship had after all been compatible with the 1934 Agreement (!)
Lipski at the same time represented Polish troop concentrations in the
neighbourhood of Danzig as an understandable action, parallel with
troop movements taking place in other countries — such as Hungary,
Rumania and even Norway. Above all, however, Lipski maintained
that, at the time of the German entry into Czecho-Slovakia, we had
remained entirely out of touch with him, as a result of which, in con-
trast to last September, an understandable Polish nervousness had de-
veloped. Polish fears had been correspondingly increased by the
German ultimatum addressed to Lithuania. 6
I cut Lipski short immediately he mentioned an "ultimatum" to
Lithuania, ridiculed his observations on troop movements of other
countries — which were never directed against Poland — and told him I
would have understood if he, Lipski, had now thanked us for having
put no obstacle in the way of Warsaw's ardent desire for a common
* See document No. 108.
s For the text of this statement see Pari. Deb., H. ofC, vol. 34S, cols. 2996-7. In
it, the Prime Minister gave the terms of the Anglo-Polish communique of Apr. 6,
whereby the unilateral British assurance to Poland (see document No. 136) was supple-
mented by a corresponding Polish assurance to Britain and provision made for the con-
clusion of a permanent and reciprocal agreement.
« See Editors' Note on p. SO.
APRIL, 1939 207
Hungarian-Polish frontier. In short, I loftily and indifferently refuted
Lipski's statements with the relevant arguments, whereupon we parted. 7
Wbizsackeb
* A further memorandum by Weizsaeker, St.S. No. 320 of Apr. 7 (52/34635) reads-
For the sake of completeness it should be added, to memorandum No. 316 of Apr 6
(conversation with Ambassador Lipski) that Lipski characterized our action in Czecho-
Slovakia, as a threat to Poland. I replied that, as he knew, the Polish Government had
been told that Slovakia might also be discussed within the framework of the neneral
settlement [Gesamtberemigung] envisaged."
No. 170
023/250388
Memorandum by the State Secretary
St.S. No. 317 Beblin, April 6, 1939.
The Italian Ambassador telephoned me this evening to inform me
that developments between Rome and Tirana had reached a stage
which made military intervention necessary. Count Ciano had in-
structed him to inform the Reich Foreign Minister that Italian troops
would land on the Albanian coast on Friday, April 7, at 4:30 a.m. The
country was to be occupied; Attolico could give no further details of
Albania's future political status. Attolico thought that he could give
an assurance on behalf of Rome that any objections on the part of
Yugoslavia would be dispelled by direct approach in Belgrade. This
would be all the easier to achieve the more unrestrictedly the German
press supported Italy's action.
On the last point I promised Attolico our full support.
Weizsacker
No. 171
2184/472083-84
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
most ukgent Rome, April 7, 1939—1:15 a.m.
No. 127 of April 6 Received April 7—3:00 a.m.
Pol. IV 2472.
In accordance with your instructions by telegram No. 162 of April 5, 1
I made a statement to Count Ciano, who had asked me to come and see
him this evening at 9 p.m., which obviously pleased him and which he
acknowledged by asking me to convey his most heartfelt thanks to the
1 Document No. 158.
208 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Reieh Foreign Minister. He valued this statement all the more because
he had asked me to come and see him to inform me that the situation
in Albania had been so exacerbated that Italy would land large bodies
of troops at 4:30 a.m. tomorrow morning, at San Giovanni di Medua in
the northern part of the country, which in any case was hostile to the
King, as well as at Durazzo, Valona and Santi Quaranta. 300 aircraft
would accompany the landing manoeuvre, a further 200 were standing
ready. All Italians had already been evacuated but, in view of the
latest reports, there was the gravest anxiety about the Legation staff,
which had of course remained there. Another despairing telegram had
just been received saying that the Legation was completely surrounded
by gangs. He, Ciano, would himself go to Albania tomorrow morning
at 5 a.m. in his own aircraft, but would probably return here in the
course of the day. The King had completely lost his senses and was
pushing things to extremes. Outwardly the military occupation would
be represented as having a time limit, while, naturally, leaving open
the question of how the situation would actually develop later, and
what decision Italy would have to take. Outwardly sovereignty was
to be maintained, it had not yet been decided in what way. The word
"personal union" was mentioned, and — in contrast to recent conversa-
tions 2 — the word "protectorate".
During his visit to Belgrade in January, 3 he had already pointed out
the possibility of the development which would take place today and
had informed the [Yugoslav] Minister here during the last few days.
He said, however, that he would this evening show the Minister a re-
port from the Italian Minister in Tirana, about twelve days old, in
which the latter stated that, in demanding Italian troops, as men-
tioned in my previous telegram No. 117,* the King was planning a joint
action against Yugoslavia by invading as far as Nish, giving as the
reason for this his mission as the "Hitler of the Balkans", who was
called upon to organize the Balkans on the model of the order created
by the Fuhrer in Central Europe — ideas which Ciano characterized as
a touch of megalomania. This report would certainly make an im-
pression in Belgrade and help to create understanding for Italy's action.
Furthermore the Hungarians had very loyally stated their readiness to
demonstrate with six mobilized divisions in the event of any more
serious unrest in Yugoslavia. Ciano, however, did not seem to expect
any unfriendly acts of provocation on the part of Belgrade, if only be-
cause of the present internal weakness of the Yugoslav State. A very
great deal, he said, of course depended on German public opinion, in
particular the press, ranging itself quite clearly on Italy's side from
the first moment, and fully representing the justification, and indeed
2 See document No. 150.
a Jan. 18-23. See the Ciano Diaries, entries on these days.
i Document No. 150.
APRIL, 1939 209
the necessity, for Italy's action. He would ask me to lay very
special emphasis on this. In reply I said that my initial statement
made to him on behalf of the Foreign Minister, in conjunction with the
Fuhrer's latest speeches, left me in no doubt that in this hour Italy
could unreservedly rely on us.
Immediately after me, Ciano received the Hungarian Minister.
Mackensen
No. 172
2134/472065-66
Circular of the State Secretary l
Telegram
urgent Berlin, April 7, 1939—1:25 p.m.
e.o. Pol. IV 2409.
For confidential information.
The Italian military action which began this morning against
Albania is the result of serious differences between Rome and Tirana.
Its immediate aim is the occupation of the country for a limited time;
further action has presumably not yet been determined.
This action has our complete approval and will be wholeheartedly
supported by us in the press, on the radio, etc.
The Italian Government are endeavouring to spare Yugoslavia's
understandably sensitive feelings and, indeed, as a result of an ex-
change of ideas with Belgrade, they feel that they have good prospects
of success, so that no difficulties of any importance are to be expected
from that quarter.
Weizsacker
' Addressees were the principal Missions in Europe, except Rome, and those at Tokyo
and Washington.
No. 173
162Sj'3SS465-&S
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
No. 167 of April 7 Bucharest, April 7, 1939—4:00 p.m.
Received April 7 — 9:30 p.m.
Pol. II 1126.
Foreign Minister Gafencu told me he had received the following
information from M. Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, explaining his
new attitude in the matter of the mutual assistance pact between
Poland and Britain:
14
210 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
1) Poland was a Great Power and therefore could not place herself
under the protection of other Powers. For that reason Britain's uni-
lateral promise of protection must be replaced by a reciprocal agree-
ment.
2) A reciprocal agreement would avoid the system of collective
security, which Germany might consider as directed against herself.
3) Poland wished to take no action in association with Soviet Russia.
She therefore stood for a system of bilateral agreements. When
G[afencu] wanted to know my opinion, I evaded the question by re-
ferring to the Fiihrer's speech at Wilhelmshaven 1 against the encircle-
ment policy and observed that in my opinion Beck had nevertheless
succumbed to the enticements of British statesmen, but that it was
impossible to say anything until the final text of the agreement was
known. G[afencu] said he also had noticed this sudden change of .
attitude on the part of Beck. Rumania's attitude remained unchanged,
namely:
No reciprocal agreements; should Britain and France, however,
want to give Rumania a unilateral guarantee, he could not evade it.
When he asked my opinion I replied that Rumania must avoid any-
thing which might give support to British propaganda directed against
Germany; there was probably nothing more behind the Anglo-French
declaration. G[afencu] remarked: "Yes, a German declaration of that
kind would be of more use to me." In conclusion he again emphasized
that he was not participating in any kind of encirclement policy and
would not attach himself to any grouping of States directed against one
another.
Fabricius
1 On Api'. 1. See Editors' Note on p. 183.
No. 174
B209/E30S0G4
Memorandum by the State Secretary
urgent Berlin, April 7, 1939.
St.S. No. 318
This morning the Italian Ambassador addressed an urgent appeal to
me, asserting that Italy was no longer receiving any coal from Germany.
He then modified this remark by saying that we were falling short of
our promises. In a further conversation he said that deliveries were
showing a tendency to fall off. I told Attolico that, as he knew, I was
doing my utmost in this matter and had recently spoken about it to
Reich Minister Funk on the telephone. 1 However, in order to lend
1 See document No. 62,
APKIL, 1939 211
weight to his request, I would like to have figures; these Attolico was
not in a position to give. He will accordingly procure them
At the same time I contacted the Economic Policy Department in
order to ascertain our figures. Without these a mere general reminder
however urgent, would of course fizzle out at the Ministry of Economics!
Weizsacker
No. 175
5209/E30S030-3I
The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to
the Embassy in Italy
Telegram
™ G *™ Beblik, April 8, 1939-4:40 p.m.
zu Will 2737.1
With reference to your telegram No. 126. 1
The steady increase, of which you are aware, of coal exports from
January to March will be maintained in April also, as the Italians have
already been promised. In April we hope to reach a total of 700 000
tons The temporary fall in loading figures during the first few days of
April is due to the fact that, during the first few days of every month
obligations for regular orders with fixed delivery dates must be met'
In additaon indispensable supplies to German blast-furnaces for the
Easter holidays caused an unusual strain, particularly over coking coal
In order to satisfy Italy's urgent demand for an immediate increase
in deuvenes, a special increase in. consignments on account of later
deliveries wiU be made as from April 11. Already today, Saturday bv
ruthlessly ignoring other demands, 17,500 tons, instead of the usual
daily load of 3,500, have been consigned by rail, despite the particularly
difficult conditions of half a working day between two holidays We
would even have loaded 20,500 if the Italian Monopoly* itself had
not preferred to have 3,000 tons sent by sea.
Attolico who made a similar request, has been informed accordingly
and showed his satisfaction. But please also inform Ciano direct em
phasmng that a five-fold load today, improvised in 24 hours, really
represents a special feat of organization.
Clodius
i In this telegram of Apr. 6 (5209/E308029), Maokensen reported- "On ;„„+ ♦•
from . Cianc , Gia^ini urgently requested me Juse mTlXenT^h th P^h GoveT
ment in order that the consignment of coal, especially of cokinz coal wtXv/wi !f ovem :
rtill further, should be stepped up immediate!^. t£$^£M^£™£
dsquietmg Industrial establishments and gas works £ere on the point of closing do™
For political and economic reasons prompt German measures and the despatcTof ^
& ?S7 m f! asea ^ ^quested." [The rest of the telegram is corrupt.]
2 The State-owned company Azienda Carboni Italiani.
212 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 176
5570/B3988S8
The Minister in Yxvgoslavia to the, Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 101 of April 10 Belgrade, April 10, 1939 — 5:10 p.m.
Received April 10 — 9:45 p.m.
W 528 g.
For the Reich Ministry for Air.
When the Credit Agreement 1 is completed, the orders to be expected
for the Air Force consist, for the time being, apart from ground
equipment, of 50 Me. 109's and 50 Do. 215's, plus spare parts.
On April 8, 1 had a conversation with General Jankovic, who told me
that an order for 100 bomber aircraft was only possible if 50 could be
delivered in June, July and August. 2 Jankovic suggested that these
50 should be drawn from new stocks intended for the German Luftwaffe.
The Air Force here is prepared to buy these bombers with the same
equipment and so to commit themselves to using German weapons and
bombs. Only Dornier type, perhaps with Bramo 3 , will do.
The reasons for this early requirement are said to lie in domestic
policy.
This demand gives us the chance of strengthening and exploiting our
military influence here. 4
Heeken
i See document No. 142. „,„„,„™ j ,,~
2 A marginal note in Clodius' handwriting on another copy (3053/60 1 259) reads : Out
of the question."
3 Aero engines produced by the Brandenburgische Motorenwerke.
*A marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting on another copy (3053/601259)
indicates that this telegram was referred to Wiehl.
No. 177
625/250760-61
The Charge d' Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry
A 1471 Paris, April 10, 1939.
Received April 12
Pol. II 1137.
Subject: Statements on the political situation by the French Minister
of Marine, Campinchi.
A few days ago the French Minister of Marine, Campinchi, expressed
his views on the political situation very frankly, to a source which I
know to be reliable. They were reported to me as follows :
APRIL, 1939 213
"Germany's treatment of Czecho-Slovakia," Campinchi had said,
"proves that the Fuhrer is committed to a policy from which he can
no longer turn back." Further ultimata and further acts of occupation
would therefore doubtless he attempted. But even if one admitted
that the Fuhrer intended to rest satisfied with the present situation,
that would be no argument in favour of the maintenance of peace . As a
result of Germany's policy, especially the elimination of Czecho-
slovakia, Europe had been thrown so much out of balance that German
hegemony had come threateningly near. For Europe, therefore, there
was now only the alternative of accepting such German hegemony
without demur or resisting it. Britain and France were ready and
determined to do the latter. These were the reasons why he, Campinchi,
had for some weeks considered war to be inevitable.
He knew that Germany was not afraid of war, especially because
she thought she could bring it to a victorious end in a very short time
with her superior Luftwaffe. This view was a dangerous illusion.
Germany today was weaker than on the eve of the World War and she
would have as her opponents, not only the nations of Europe, but the
whole world with the sole exception of Italy and Japan. The result of
the war would therefore undoubtedly be the defeat of Germany. In
that case a peace would he imposed upon her, in comparison with
which the Peace of Versailles would be as nothing. The peace treaty
which ended the next war must be on the pattern of the Peace of
Westphalia, i.e. it must completely dismember the Reich and split it
up into its component parts. Only then could there be any hope of
peace for a relatively long period.
It was often imagined that leading military circles in France shrank
from war. This view was false. During the September crisis he,
Campinchi, had been in constant touch with General Gamelin and he
could give an assurance that the latter had pronounced himself in the
strongest terms against the surrender of Czecho-Slovakia. Only
recently there had been another conference between the Defence
Ministers and representatives of the General Staff, at which General
Gamelin had again made no secret of his views. Gamelin was of the
opinion that France's strategic and military position, whatever the
losses it had suffered recently, left no doubt as to a successful outcome
of a war.
It is well known that from the first M. Campinchi has been one of
those who adopted a sharp tone in the French Cabinet, but who have
not been able to carry their point at the decisive moment, or who have
fallen from power. In spite of this, his remarks seem to me to be of
interest, all the more so as I have reason to assume that he was counting
on their being passed on to me. They typify the fact that the atmo-
sphere here is largely dominated by the thought of war, which is held
to be inevitable. The Government programme, as also revealed in the
214 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
emergency regulations, 1 subordinates everything to national defence
and the increase of armaments, and, both in Parliament and among the
people, no objection has been raised to this since the events of March
in Czeeho-Slovakia, as was the case during the September crisis. A
sign of weakness, however — a point which Campinchi did not mention —
is the wide-spread view that, before a clash of arms with the authori-
tarian States, France must be more strongly armed and must therefore
increase her efforts in that direction.
Brauer
1 See document No. 22, footnote 2.
No. 178
100/64455-50
The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy
Telegram
most urgent Berlin, April 11, 1939—4:40 a.m.
No. .176 of April 11 Received April 11—8:00 a.m.
For the Ambassador personally.
For Field Marshal Goring. 1
I learn that you are going to Rome on an official visit lasting several
days from April 15. 2 As I only learned indirectly of your departure for
Italy at the time, I was under the impression that it only involved a
private visit. I also gathered from a recent conversation with General
Bodenschatz that you would be seeing Mussolini and Count Ciano in
Rome, but I did not understand that this was an official State visit.
I have therefore so far issued no. official notification from the Foreign
Ministry to the Italian Government and have not given any special
instructions to the Embassy in Rome. The Embassy in Rome has
now informed me, on my enquiry, that an official programme for your
Rome visit is apparently being arranged with the Italian Government
direct, but since you have said nothing to the Foreign Ministry or to
Ambassador von Mackensen, the latter was therefore unable to give any
authoritative information in answer to enquiries about your visit from
the Italian side. The Embassy in Rome is thus placed in a somewhat
awkward position vis-a-vis the Italians. This is not right and I do not
consider that the arranging of an official programme for your visit
without the participation of the official Reich Mission, which is re-
sponsible for this, is proper. I should be grateful if you would inform
1 This telegram was forwarded to Tripoli (see enclosure to document No. 252) where
GOring had gone from his holiday in San Rsmo.
2 Goring visited Rome Apr. 14-16 and had conversations there with Mussolini and
Ciano. See documents Nos. 205 and 211.
APBIL, 1939 215
Ambassador von Mackensen as soon as possible and communicate
your wishes for the Rome visit direct. Ambassador von Mackensen
has been instructed by me to contact you at once and then make final
arrangements for your Rome programme with the Italian Govern-
ment.
RlBEENTBOP
No. 179
2422/311714
The Chargi d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 115 of April 10 Washington, April 11, 1939—11:31 a.m.
Received April 11 — 7:30 p.m.
Pol. IX 632.
I. Italian action against Albania has clarified two points here:
1) The attempts hitherto repeatedly made to detach Italy from the
Axis were futile. There is therefore no point in repeating them.
America has been forced to recognize the fact that the Axis is unshake-
able.
2) The British attempt at encirclement has been thwarted. All
endeavours to force a unilateral British guarantee of independence on
the Balkan States, which are disunited among themselves, come too
late; British assistance is of problematic value.
Britain's readiness to associate herself with the Polish, the Russian,
and the other smaller dictatorships merely to hold Germany in check
is not having any effects favourable for Britain on the mood of political
circles here. However, the Government and a large part of the press let
it be understood that they approve of any means of combating Ger-
many and Italy.
II. After Spain's accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact 1 and the
further improvement in Europe of the political and strategic position
of the totalitarian Powers, it is to be expected that America will transfer
to Japan the favours hitherto accorded to Italy, and will attempt, by
rousing Japanese distrust of her treaty partners, to weaken the totali-
tarian ring.
Thomsjbn
i On Mar. 27, 1939. See vol. m of this Series, documents Nos. 767 and 768.
216 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 180
1975/438372-7*
The Minister in Rumania to ike Foreign Ministry
Telegram 1
most urgent BUCHAREST, April 11, 1939 — 6:35 p.nv
No. 173 of April 11 Eeceived April 11—8:20 p.m.
Pol. IV 2506.
With reference to my telegram No. 171 of April ll. 2
Foreign Minister Gafencu sent for me and said that Csaky's state-
ment, obtained through our mediation, was welcomed with gratitude.
In contradiction to this, however, were :
i) The daily attacks by Hungarian radio and press aimed at foment-
ing the aspirations of the minorities.
ii) The peculiar attitude of the Hungarian Foreign Minister who had
[passage corrupt] 3 in the spirit of Bled, had then supplemented the
Rumanian counter proposal by amending it, i and who now would not
make any statement at all beyond that regarding the immediate coup
. . . (group missing). 5
In view of the present tension in Europe, it was therefore not easy
for the Rumanian Government to demobilize, although the Govern-
1 This telegram, as received in Berlin, was corrupt. Corrections taken from the draft
in the Bucharest Legation file (7063/E524158-60) are indicated in footnotes.
2 Not printed (5453/E366635). In this telegram Fabricius briefly reported having
carried out his instructions with Gafencu. These instructions related to a telegram
Fabricius had sent on Apr. 7, "So. 169 (1975/438369), in which he reported: " The King has
reversed the previous decision to demobilize, because the Hungarians have stopped demob-
ilizing and are provoking frontier incidents. Also, amongst the Hungarian and German
minorities in Transylvania and the Banat, the idea is obtaining increasing currency that
Hitler is coming , . , (group missing}, which gives rise amongst the Rumanians, in
both town and country districts, to anti-German feelings, which are visibly growing.
Feelings are running so high that incidents have been of frequent occurrence.
"The Minister of the Court, Urdareanu, who spoke of this most emphatically, drew my
attention to the dangers inherent in the widespread belief amongst the population,
though not the Government, that Germany was behind Hungary. The Government them-
selves again had the feeling that Hungary was planning a coup, against which Rumania
must defend herself. In the present situation, mobilization entailed heavy expense daily
for both sides, and, as the fields remained untilled, economic losses, which would weigh
heavily against the loyal fulfilment of our economic Treaty which Rumania intended."
The Foreign Ministry acted on this report by telephoning enquiries to the Legation in
Budapest, who replied in telegram No. 106 on Apr. 8 (not printed, 1975/438370) that
Csaky had disclaimed all knowledge of frontier incidents, described the Rumanian
assertion about a Hungarian coup as "complete nonBense", and stated that Hungarian
troops on the Rumanian frontier had been demobilized; further he attributed Rumanian
tardiness in demobilization to a desire to exert pressure on Hungary to ratify the Bled
Agreement, and was proposing to take counter measures. This reply was repeated to
Bucharest by the Foreign Ministry on Apr. 9 in telegram No. 152 (not printed, 7635/
E545389— 90), with instructions to Fabricius to convey Csaky's dementi to the Rumanian
Government (an intention of which Csaky was being informed) and to express the German
desire to see a speedy ditente in Rumanian-Hungarian relations, which was likewise being
expressed in Budapest.
3 The Bucharest draft reads: "who had at first proposed making a statement".
* See documents Nos. 132 and 165.
* The Bucharest draft reads: "which he had made to us".
APBIL, 1939 217
ment wished to do so, as they desired to continue the policy of rapproche-
ment with Germany. He, Gafencu, needed some kind of declaration
from Budapest, even though he had told the Hungarian Minister here
only yesterday that he did not want one, because he had seen that
nothing could be achieved through him. He was now, therefore, con-
fidently appealing to the Reich Foreign Minister and asking him to pre-
vail upon Budapest to make the following declaration, for which Csaky
had from time to time indicated his willingness:
"I have the honour to inform you that the Hungarian Government
will respect the Hungarian-Rumanian frontier as conscientiously as
they have done in the past.
"The Hungarian Government are prepared to negotiate with the
Rumanian Government, through diplomatic channels, on any issues
arising from the correct frontier demarcation, in the hope of a better
understanding between the two countries."
If necessary the first paragraph could also be made reciprocal.
Gafencu told me that he was doing everything possible to prevent
Rumania from being involved in the British encirclement policy. For
that reason he had even sent Secretary General Cretzianu to London"
to make his views clear there, as he did not trust Tilea. But he asked
us also to support him and strengthen his position so that he could
carry through the big economic agreement with us.
I told Gafencu that I thought it would be extremely difficult to
obtain a new declaration from the Hungarian Foreign Minister. We
had mediated on Saturday when we recognized that, in view of the
anti-German feeling among the population, Rumania's « demobiliza-
tion was in our interests. Nevertheless, I would pass on his request for
further intervention by the Reich Foreign Minister.
I would like to support this request, as its fulfilment, followed by
Rumanian demobilization, would contribute to a considerable easing
of the tension in South Eastern Europe, and would strengthen Gafencu's
position in the Cabinet and with public opinion. My colleagues, who
utilized the Easter holidays to make a tour of Transylvania, ' have
affirmed how difficult the position of the German minority there would
become if mobilization continued any longer. Finally, the attitude of
Csaky in first making proposals for declarations himself and then com-
pletely withdrawing them seems incomprehensible.
Fabeicius
6 The Bucharest draft reads "new".
? See also British Documents, Third Series, vol. v, Noa. 37 and 65
« The Bucharest draft here reads "rapid" in place of "Rumanian."'
218 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 181
1625/388470-71
The Minister in Switzerland to ike Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 43 of April II Bebne, April 11, 1939—9:23 p.m.
Received April 12 — 1:30 a.m.
Pol. II 1139.
Federal Councillor Motta, who has been ill for weeks with high blood
pressure and is still in need of rest, was unable to receive me again until
today. He is going on about six weeks' convalescent leave soon.
As to the reasons for the call-up of troops and frontier defence
measures under the authorization of the Federal Council of March 24,
he assured me that this had not been due to the report put out by the
Agence Fournier 1 that 700,000 troops had been deployed by us on the
Swiss frontier, nor to the attempted Putsch in Liechtenstein, 2 nor to
Polish partial mobilization, nor to a warning by France or any other
Power. The Federal Council had only undertaken such measures as
were necessary to restore calm at home, although, as he admitted to
me, they had had exactly the opposite effect on the population. Part
of the troops called up had been released again and other frontier
measures which, he assured me, had been taken uniformly on all
frontiers, had for the most part been rescinded.
Concerning the Anglo-French guarantee agreements, Motta told me
that, on the day that Bonnet and Lebrun left for London, 3 the Director
of the Political Department of the French Foreign Ministry* had
summoned the Swiss Minister in Paris, Stucki, and had informed him
that Britain and France intended jointly to give a promise of guarantee
to Switzerland, the Netherlands and Belgium. Stucki had answered,
with perfect correctness, that he took note of the information with
thanks but would like at the same time to state that this declaration
was not of Switzerland's seeking and that it remained for her to decide
the moment at which she might consider it necessary to make use of
the guarantee. Motta went on to say that, in the event of a violation
of Swiss neutrality, it was indeed a foregone conclusion that the other
Powers interested in Swiss neutrality would come to Switzerland's aid
and that thus the promise of a guarantee need not have been given.
Only today has he informed Minister FrOlicher, who is here, of the
French Foreign Ministry's statement to Stucki. Proceedings had been
instituted on account of the inflammatory report by the Agence Fournier
i A French News Agency, with headquarters in Paris, and a sub-office in Geneva.
2 See document No. 141.
3 On Mar. 21.
* fenile CharvtSriat.
APRIL, 19S9 219
(cf. my despatch No. 867 of March 29) ;S he himself moat strongly dis-
approved of the report. 6
Kochee
* In this report (not printed, 2025/443988-90), KScher analysed the reasons which
had prompted the measures of the Federal Council and the rumours which had suddenly
appeared on Mat. 25 and 26 : an article in the Geneva Suisse, of Mar. 28, pointed out that
the Zurich correspondent of the Agence Foumier had originated the report that 700 000
German troops were stationed in Vorarlberg, a report which had at once found its wav
into the Pans edition of the Daily Mail and was repeated on Strasbourg radio on Mar 28
A copy of this telegram was sent for information to the Missions in Europe in a
circular of Apr. 26 {not printed, 1625/388472-73), with the addition of the comment that
Stucki s statement, that it was for Switzerland to decide the moment at which she thought
she mast make use of this guarantee, could not be regarded as correct.
No. 182
1025/388*92-93
The Charge d' Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
Airgram
No. 114 of April 11 Londok, April 11, 1939.
Received April 12 — 11:30 a.m.
Pol. IV 2521.
The conversation with the Italian Charge d'Affaires, 1 on which I am
sending a detailed memorandum, 2 yielded the following facts for
assessing the situation created by Italy's occupation of Albania:
Already last week the Italian Government had initiated their action
by a statement to Britain that they regarded Albania as an exclusively
Italian sphere of interest. 3 The British Government replied that they
recognized Italy's predominant influence in accordance with the 1921
resolutions,* but must protest against the claim to exclusive interest.
Chamberlain's statement in the House of Commons that Britain had
no direct interests in Albania, but was only interested in Albania inso-
far as a threat to peace was concerned, 5 induced Mussolini to send a
personal message to Chamberlain.^ In this message Mussolini refers
to Chamberlain's statements and says:
1) that Italy's action in Albania does not affect the Anglo-Italian
Agreement, 7 and
2) that there is no factor in this action which justifies Britain's
anxiety about the maintenance of peace.
i G. Crolla.
2 Not printed (2184/472093-98).
3 See also British Documents, Third Series, vol. v, No. 88.
* The Declaration by Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan regarding the integrity of
thefrontiers of Albania, signed at Paris, Nov. 9, 1921. See B. F.S P vol 117 vv iV-53
5 See Pari. Deb., B. of 0\, vol. 345, col. 2995.
« For the text of this message see British Documents, Third Series, vol. v, No. 83.
7 Of Apr. 16, 1938, brought into force on Nov, 16, 1938. See B. F.S P vol 142
pp. 147-156, see also British Documents, Third Series, vol. ni, chapter vi
220 DOCUMENTS' ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
In the course of the exchanges Italy made two statements to the
British Government: 8
1) that the withdrawal of volunteers from Spain would- take place
in accordance with the Anglo-Italian Agreement immediately after the
big Madrid parade, 9 and
2) thatltalyhadnointentionofoccupyingCorfuorofattackingGreece.
The Italian Charge d' Affaires added that it had been all the easier
for his Government to make these statements because, in any case, they
had previously agreed with Franco that the Italian volunteers would
leave Spain after the big parade and because, even before the occupation
of Albania, they had told the Greek Government of their own accord
that they would respect the territorial status of Greece including the
islands [statut territorial et insviaire).
Lord Halifax had been very pleased about both statements and had
asked the Italian Government's consent to his making use of them in
Thursday's session of the House of Commons. 10 Mussolini had agreed
to this.
Halifax told the Italian Charge d'Affaires that in the forthcoming
session of the House of Commons the British Government would try to
subdue the excitement of British public opinion, which is undoubtedly
considerable. They would of course be obliged to use sharp words
against Italy's action; but Italy must have patience, Britain wanted to
maintain the relations based on the Anglo-Italian Agreement "in the in-
terests of European peace " . In conclusion Halifax had used the simile :
"although the window panes are shattered, the bridge is still intact ".
Th. Koedt
8 See also British Documents, Third Series, vol. V, No. 110.
9 The Victory Parade, which took place on Way ]9, 1939.
10 i.e., on Apr. 13.
No. 183
051 9/E43 7200-64
The Embassy in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
B 1171 London, April 11, 1939.
Beceived April 12.
W VI 1352.
Subject: Results of the visit of the Secretary to the Department of
Overseas Trade to Warsaw, Moscow, Helsinki and Stockholm.
With reference to my report B 1086 of April 3, 1939. 1
Mr. R. S. Hudson, Secretary to the Department of Overseas Trade,
returned to London on April 4 from his round trip to Warsaw, Moscow,
Helsinki and Stockholm.
■ Not printed (540I/E366678).
APRIL, 1939 221
The Embassy learns in strict confidence from a member of Hudson's
party that the talks which he had in the various capitals produced no
concrete results. Nevertheless it was agreed that Russian, Finnish and
Swedish trade delegations would come to London in the near future.
With the exception of the Russian delegation these will be composed
of economic and industrial representatives from the countries in ques-
tion, so that probably only in the case of Russia can talks on a new
trade agreement be expected. In the case of the Swedish and Finnish
delegations every effort will naturally be made by the British Govern-
ment and by British industry to represent Great Britain both as a
potential buyer and seller, in order at least in this informal way to
place trade relations with these countries on a better foundation, in
the hope that the relations initiated by Mr. Hudson may thereby be
permanently strengthened and developed. Even if, in order to achieve
this aim, the British Government are prepared to put the state credit
machinery of the Export Credit Guarantee Department into action to
a large extent, the lack of understanding so far shown by British manu-
facturers for the requirements of these countries and the high price of
British goods, together with a sales organization to some extent badly
neglected in the countries mentioned, might prove a considerable
obstacle to the comprehensive development of mutual economic re-
lations which is earnestly desired. There is therefore no need to attach
too much significance to the Finnish and Swedish trade visits, although
it is probably worth while following their course and their results, in
order to recognize in time the starting points for possible counter action.
Worthy of more serious consideration are the negotiations for the
conclusion of a new trade agreement, which are to take place here soon,
between the Russian Governmental Delegation and the British Govern-
ment. In spite of the scanty information given by the British press on
Hudson's conversations on the subject in Moscow, it seems certain,
according to statements by my informant, that during Hudson's stay
in Moscow all disputed points in Anglo-Russian economic relations were
discussed in very great detail and that, at that time, agreement in
principle was already reached on the more important questions
at issue. 2 This is all the more likely because the desire for a change in
political relations with the Soviet Union provided an opportunity of
showing the goodwill of the British Government in the economic field,
while on the other hand Russia was also afforded more scope for
making concessions in view of the existing state of Anglo-Russian
economic relations. According to my informant, all authoritative
circles in Russia regard Britain's attempts at rapprochement with the
greatest scepticism, which Britain hopes to surmount, at least in part,
by suitable treatment in the economic field. The resistance formerly
2 See British Documents, Third Series, vol. iv, .Nos. 505, 519, 531, 533 for Hudson's
reports on his talks in Moscow.
222 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN TOKBIGW POLICY
put up by British public opinion to far-reaching cooperation -with Russia
can be considered as having been almost overcome as a result of the
latest trend of feeling here. The previous report under reference*
already gave in detail the questions to be dealt with at the Anglo-
Russian economic negotiations. It is beyond doubt that over and
above this the British Government are prepared not only to pass over
completely the question of Russia's pre-war debts, but also to invest
new funds in Russian trade and industry by means of credits. In this
connection it may be mentioned that rumours have been circulating
here for some time that Britain is anxious to link up the Russian rail-
way system in Turkestan with the railway system in British India
(Peshawar), a project which assumes additional significance in the
present circumstances. It has so far not been possible to establish how
far negotiations about this are actually pending.
Comparatively little had. been made public about the Anglo-Polish
economic negotiations in connection with Hudson's visit to Warsaw,
and Beck's visit to London. 4 It is certain that Beck's staff did not in-
clude an economic expert and that his stay in London did not lead to
the transaction of a credit or a loan. Both in the Government and in the
City Poland was expected to receive a considerable loan, as this question
had already been one of the subjects of Hudson's talks in Warsaw.
The sum mentioned then varied between 20 and 25 million pounds. It
is also a fact that, in view of the political situation, British banks,
which so far have mainly financed Polish trade and industry (as for
example Kleinwort) refuse to allow Poland further credits without a
guarantee from the Treasury. Beck is therefore said not to have
attempted to make contact with City circles. I also hear in con-
fidence that the Polish Government intend to set up a new industrial
centre in south-eastern Poland, which is later to form the backbone of
the Polish armaments industry. The Polish Government are seeking
loans and delivery credits mainly for the financing of this enterprise.
The British Government are keenly interested in this project and want
British industry to take a share in developing the enterprise. It seems
that Hudson's moderate optimism with regard to his talks in Warsaw
is primarily based on this. However, it will probably depend, in the
main, on the further development of political relations between Poland
and Great Britain, which are not [sic ? now] under discussion here,
whether and to what extent British participation in this project has
any prospect of success. jjy or( i er:
Weber
3 The report cited in footnote 1 is not relevant here; it does, however, refer to report
B 693 of Mar. 6 (not printed, 584iyE425700-03) which is presumably meant. In it
Kordt reported "from a reliable official source" that Hudson's instructions were to test
Russian readiness to revise the existing trade treaty.
* Hudson arrived in Warsaw on Mar. 19, 1939, and left for Moscow on Mar. 23. Beck
visited London from Apr. 3-7.
AntlL, 1939 223
No. 184
52/341355
Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I
Berlin, April 11, 1039.
On April 10 the Intelligence Department [Abt. Abwehr] of the High
Command of the Wehrmacht gave the following general assessment
of the present military situation in Poland:
"Poland is safeguarding the crucial area of the Corridor against any
surprise attacks by maintaining troops on the frontier in a continuous
state of alert."
VON NOSTITZ
No. 185
Nuremberg document 120-C
ExhiMt OB- 41
Directive by the Fuhrer
TOP SECRET MILITARY BERLIN, April 11, 1939.
BY OFFICER ONLY 5 Copies
2nd copy
OKW No. 37/39 g. Kdos. Chefs. WFA/L I
Subject: Directive for the uniform preparation of war by the Wehr-
macht for 1939/40.
I shall lay down in a later directive the future tasks of the Wehr-
macht and the preparations to be made in accordance with these for
the conduct of war. Until that directive comes into force the Wehr-
macht must be prepared for the following eventualities:
I) Safeguarding the frontiers of the German Reich and protection
against surprise air attacks. (See Enclosure I).
II) "Operation White." (See Enclosure II).
III) Taking possession of Danzig. (See Enclosure III). Enclosure IV
lays down the regulations for the exercise of military authority in
East Prussia in the event of hostilities,
Adolf Hitler
Distribution List
High Command of the Army 1 Copy No. 1
High Command of the Navy 1 Copy „ 2
Reich Air Minister and C-in-C of the Luftwaffe 1 Copy „ 3
High Command of the Wehrmacht (Operations
Office/National Defence Office) 2 Copies Nos. 4 and 5
224 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
[Enclosure IJ
SAFEGUARDING THE FRONTIERS OF THE GERMAN REICH AND PROTEC-
TION AGAINST SURPRISE AIR ATTACKS. 1
[Enclosure II]
OPERATION WHITE
The present attitude of Poland requires, over and above the plan
"Frontier Security East" the initiation of military preparations, to
remove if necessary any threat from this direction for ever.
1.) Political Requirements and Aims
German relations with Poland continue to be based on the principles
of avoiding any disturbances. Should Poland, however, change her
policy towards Germany, which so far has been based on the same
principles as our own, and adopt a threatening attitude towards
Germany, a final settlement might become necessary in spite of the
Treaty in force with Poland.
The aim then will be to destroy Polish military strength, and create
in the East a situation which satisfies the requirements of national
defence. The Free State of Danzig will be proclaimed a part of the
Reich territory at the outbreak of hostilities, at the latest.
The political leaders consider it their task in this case to isolate
Poland if possible, that is to say, to limit the war to Poland only.
The development of increasing internal crises in France and resulting
British restraint might produce such a situation in the not too distant
future.
Intervention by Russia, if she were in a position to intervene, cannot
be expected to be of any use to Poland, because this would mean
Poland's destruction by Bolshevism.
The attitude of the Baltic States will be determined wholly by German
military superiority. 2 [In the course of further developments it may
1 Not printed. For the full text see Tried of the Major War Criminals, vol. xxxrv,
pp. 382-387. This directive required the provisions for safeguarding the frontiers of the
Reich to be so organized that frontier arid air defence could be put into effect if the
situation required without general mobilization. The following points in this directive
bear on foreign policy:
1 , The focal point of the preparations for frontier security is in the West.
2. First priority must be given to extending the Western fortifications as a permanent
installation, so that they may be held against an opponent three or four times superior
in strength. In the second place the Eastern fortifications must be completed and
advanced to the Polish frontier south of the Oder-Warthe bend.
The "Special Orders" attached to this directive (for the full text see Joe. cit.) state,
under section 2 ("Legal Bases"), that: "it is to be assumed that a state of defence
or state of war as defined in the Reich Defence Law of September 4, 1938, will not be
declared. All actions and requirements connected with the implementation of mobiliza-
tion are to be based on peace-time legislation". For the Reich Defence Law, which was
kept secret on Hitler's instructions, see loo. cit., document 2194-PS, exhibit TT8A-36,
vol. xxix, pp. 316-327.
2 The word "superiority" is crossed out by hand in the original and "demands"
inserted.
APRIL, 1939 225
become necessary to occupy the Baltic states up to the border of the
former Courland and to incorporate them in the Reich.] 3
Germany cannot count on Hungary as a certain ally. Italy's attitude
is determined by the Rome-Berlin Axis.
2.) Military Conclusions
The great objectives in the reconstruction of the German Wehrmacht
will continue to be determined by the antagonism of the Western
Democracies. "Operation White" constitutes only a precautionary
complement to these preparations. It is not to be looked upon in any
way, however, as the necessary prerequisite for a military conflict with
the Western opponents.
The isolation of Poland will be all the more easily maintained, even
after the outbreak of hostilities, if we succeed in starting the war with
sudden, heavy blows and in gaining rapid successes.
The overall situation will require, however, that in all cases pre-
cautions be taken to safeguard the western frontier and the German
North Sea coast, as well as the air above them.
Against the Baltic States — Lithuania in particular — securitymeasures
are to be carried out in case of a Polish march through this country.
3.) Tasks of the Wehrmacht
The task of the Wehrmacht is to destroy the Polish Armed Forces.
To this end a surprise attack is to be aimed at and prepared. Camou-
flaged or open general* mobilization will not be ordered earlier than the
day before the attack and at the latest possible moment. The forces
provided for "Frontier Security West" (section I, "Frontier Security")
must not be employed for the time being for any other purpose.
All other frontiers are to be kept under observation only; the
Lithuanian frontier is to be covered.
4.) Tasks for the Branches of the Wehrmacht
a) Army
The operational objective in the East is the annihilation of the
Polish Army.
For this purpose the German Wehrmacht, on the southern flank,
may enter Slovak territory. On the northern flank, communication
between Pomerania and East Prussia must be established quickly.
The preparations for the opening of operations are to be made in
such a way that, even without waiting for the planned deployment of
mobilized units, positions can be taken up by the troops immediately
available. A camouflaged assembly of these units just before the day
of attack may be provided. I reserve for myself the decision in this
matter.
3 The sentence in square brackets has been deleted in the original and a marginal
note added: "deleted according to OKW 37/39 II Ang. of April 13".
* This word is inserted by hand in the original.
IS
226 DOCUMENTS ON GEKMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Whether the forces provided for "Frontier Security West" will be
deployed there in their entirety, or whether part of them will be avail-
able for some other employment, will depend upon the political situa-
tion.
6) Navy
The tasks of the Navy in the Baltic Sea are as follows:
1) Destruction and/or elimination of the Polish Naval Forces.
2) Blockade of all sea-lanes to the Polish naval bases, especially
Gdynia. The neutral shipping in Polish harbours and in Danzig is to
be given a time limit for sailing at the beginning of the invasion of
Poland. After its expiry, the Navy will be free to take blockade
measures.
The disadvantages for the conduct of naval warfare caused by this
time limit must be accepted.
3) Suppression of Polish maritime trade.
4) Securing of the sea-route between the Reich and East Prussia.
5) Protection of German sea-communications to Sweden and the
Baltic States.
6) Reconnaissance and protection, as far as possible in an incon-
spicuous manner, against intervention by the Soviet Navy from the
Gulf of Finland.
Suitable naval forces are to be provided for defence of the North
Sea coast and its approaches.
In the southern part of the North Sea and in the Skagerrak such
measures are to be taken as are deemed advisable as precautions against
surprise intervention in the conflict by the Western Powers. These
measures are to be restricted to the absolute minimum. Their incon-
spicuousness must be assured. It is of decisive importance to avoid
here any sort of action which might aggravate the political attitude of
the Western Powers.
c) Luftwaffe
The Luftwaffe, except for necessary forces left in the West, is to be
used for a surprise attack on Poland.
Besides destruction of the Polish Air Force in the shortest time pos-
sible, the tasks of the German Luftwaffe are principally as follows:
1) Interference with Polish mobilization and prevention of planned
strategic concentrations by the Polish Army.
2) Direct support of the Army, especially support of the spearheads
starting immediately after the crossing of the frontier. A possible
transfer of air units to East Prussia, before the beginning of operations,
must not endanger the element of surprise.
The first crossing of the frontier by air is to be synchronized with the
operations of the Army.
Attacks against the harbour of Gdynia may be undertaken only after
expiry of the sailing period for neutral ships (see number 46).
Strong points of air defence are to be set up above Stettin, Berlin
and the Upper Silesian industrial district including Mor. Ostrava and
[Enclosure III]
. TAKING POSSESSION OF DANZIG
Surprise occupation of the Free State of Danzig may become possible
independently of "Operation White" by exploiting a favourable
political situation.
The preparations are to be made on the following basis-
, The "Division of Power of Command in East Prussia in case of
hostilities {see Enclosure IV) will be put into effect according to
Occupation by the Army will be carried out from East Prussia
The Navy will support the action of the Army by intervention from
the sea, according to detailed orders by the Commander-in-Chief of
the Navy The naval forces involved are to be instructed to cooperate
with the Army. r
The extent to which Luftwaffe units can participate in the occupation
will be decided by the Reich Air Minister and Commander-in-Chief of
the Luftwaffe.
Details on cooperation are to be settled directly between the branches
of the Wehrmacht. 6
s In the "Special Orders" attached to "Operation White" ffor th* fi,ii *=„*
#.. pp. 392-396) the following points bear on forei^poUcy -lectin Irloeat^hl '<? ^
°" "J™ 8 24 ' 1939 > K ° itel ^sued a directive on "Operation White » in which he ordered
the OKH to prepare measures to capture intact the bridges over theLower vS?
and, m view of the importance of the bridge at Dirschau to consult wftl t£Tw Vlstula '
whether in the event of a coup de main against th£ bridge the l^S eWn7min°t
be endangered by previous naval measures in the Bay of Danzig (2X ri?T 3^61
« In the "Special Orders" attached to "Taking Possession of rWrt„» it P '^ J\,
*$%£?■& PP " > "ff^ ^ f °?J OWil * ^ beToTfore^oSfy. <** ^ *"
Section I General" states that "it is to be assumed that hv t»k;™
the Free State of Danzig a purely German territory^ wXbe restored to fc ™f °- "T °t
the German Reich after a long period of separation 7 '. restore <* *° the sovereignty of
Section 3 ("Mobilization") states that "the operation involving fh n +<,n„~
of Danzig will be carried out by units of the peLe-tinie wTh™fcht o^ivT.S 0ss ^ slon
mobilized reinforcements so th/t no civilian nSbflitaS met^e, are £l ^Ed?*
A draft order received by the Commander-in-Chief of the Naw from tVSn ,'
Officer commanding the Naval Air Force on July 27, 1939 concern^ *™* 6 Gen 5 al
of the German Free State of Danzig on (Y-Davl " ItoZT g ^-iT he ° ocupatton
the reunion of the German Free S fate of D^n^h ^ %££ G^^Sa^
the innate occupation of Danzig by the Wehrmacht for the protect^™ f"heG e ™™
populate. No hostile intentions are entertained towards Poland, w Irog a7the K
sns p; s to*2 e oo) mp lon y • nMd force (see foc - cit - doou ™ ent AmS
228 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
[Enclosure IV]
ORGANIZATION OF COMMAND IN EAST PRUSSIA IN CASE
OF HOSTILITIES 7
' Not printed ( for full text see he. eit., pp. 400-402) . Attached to this document are two
further directives. The first (enclosure v) contains "Boundaries of the Zones of Opera-
tions of the Army ", signed by Hitler. The second (enclosure vi) contains "Directives for
the War against Enemy Economy (Economic Warfare) and Measures for the Protection
of our own Economy ". It is prefaced by an order, dated May 10, and signed by Hitler
that the Commanders-in-Chief of the three branches of the Wehrmacht are to report by
August 1, 1939, on measures taken in accordance with this directive (for the full text
see foe. tit., pp. 402-408).
No. 186
J 625/388496-97
Circular of the Foreign Minister l
Telegram
Berlin, April 12, 1939—9:05 p.m.
zu Pol. II U422 [Aug.] I.
As is known to you, the British Government, in agreement with the
French Government, are continuing their efforts at encirclement
directed against Germany and Italy. You are requested not to make
any d-marche in this matter. In conversations which may occur you
should express yourself on the following lines :
We do not expect any further States to be hoodwinked by the British.
Should further Governments nevertheless fall a prey to the enticements
of the British, we should deplore this in the interests of the States
themselves. We would regard any participation in, or connection with,
such a combination as being directed against us and would react
accordingly. In this connection you could recall the words of the
Fiihrer in his speech at Wilhelmshaven on April 1, when he said,
"Whoever declares himself ready to pull the chestnuts out of the fire
for the Great Powers must expect to get his fingers burnt in doing so.' 1
For the rest you should, in conversations, handle the whole affair
with great composure and ridicule the nervous zeal with which the
British are trying to harness other States to serve their own ends.
Ribbentrop
1 Addressees were the Missions at Brussels, The Hague, Berne, Luxembourg, Copen-
hagen, Oslo, Stockholm, Helsinki, Tallinn, Riga, Kovno, Bucharest, Sofia, Belgrade,
Athens, Ankara. The copy here printed is as despatched and incorporates amendments
by Ribbentrop telephoned from Sonnenburg (not printed, 1625/588502), Under
Angabe II (not printed, 1 625/388501) this telegram was repeated on the same day for
information to Paris, London, Rome, Washington, Moscow, Tokyo, Warsaw, Budapest
and San Sebastian.
i Not printed (1625/388494-95). This is the original draft of the telegram showing
Ribbentrop's amendments.
APRIL, 1989 229
No. 187
2043/570O02-O1
Memorandum by the Stale Secretary
St.8. No. 332 ^ Berlin, April 12, 1939.
Pol. VI 992.
Today I invited the Swedish Minister! to call and spoke to him in
the following terms about the Aaland question: In consequence of
well-known occurrences in the sphere of general politics, and against
our own wishes, in dealing with the Finno-Swedish proposals in
connection with the Aaland question we had been unduly delayed. 2 The
Minister must not, however, thereby conclude that our attitude towards
the question of the neutrality of the Aaland Islands and their fortifica-
tion was in any way negative. Given this as a general premise, he
would the more clearly understand what I now wished to communicate
to him. In dealing with the problem, we had come upon two points
which caused us some difficulty. One concerned our understandable
reserve over the function of the League of Nations in the Aaland Conven-
tion, as we are not members of the League. I did not wish to speak
further on this question at present.
On the other hand I did wish to discuss the fact that, according to
the Swedo-Finnish proposals, the Swedish Government were to occupy
a position apart from the other signatory Powers, which would materi-
ally alter the whole system of the Convention. We had, therefore,
reached the view that the right to take military defence measures should
be accorded solely to Finland, under whose sovereignty the islands lay.
Notwithstanding the historical antecedents, with which I was familiar,
I believed the German view to be well founded. There naturally
existed a certain relation between the position we had adopted towards
the special rights claimed by Sweden and the attitude of Sweden in the
event of war. I was fully cognizant of the views upon this question
officially announced by the Swedish Government. We must, however,
also reckon with influence being exercised by other States with which
Germany might possibly clash. This was an allusion to certain
utterances by the Swedish Minister, Westman. 3 Our anxiety at the
prospect of Sweden slipping over to the other side might perhaps be
removed by a Swedish declaration to be made direct to us. With such
a statement in our hands, the task of formulating our note of reply in
1 Arvid Richert.
2 See documents Nos. 127 and 1+5.
3 In a report from Stockholm, A 556 of Apr. 4 (not printed, 2902/565809-08), Wied
stated that on Apr. 1, Westman, the Minister of Justice, had said in a speech atNorrkBp-
ing that in the September crisis of 1938, Britain had begun to make preparations for
an economic blockade even against States which she knew would remain neutral in the
event of war.
230 DOCUMENTS ON GEKMAN FOREIGN POLICY
the matter of the Aalands might be considerably simplified. I sug-
gested to M. Richert the possible phrasing of a statement to be handed
to us somewhat as follows:
"The Swedish Government declare that they will, wherever it is the
concern of the Government, ensure that the normal Swedish exports
to Germany suffer no prejudice in the event of war."
Actually what I was proposing here was a matter of course; but as
an official declaration to us it would none the less have a certain value.
In conclusion, I again mentioned our positive attitude towards the
whole question of neutralizing and fortifying the Aalands, and told the
Minister that my conversation with him was the first since he had
called on me with his Finnish colleague. 4 In the interests of a smooth
settlement of the matter, it was certainly not necessary to make any
communication to the Finnish Minister about our conversations. I
would, however, like to ask for a Swedish statement in reply.
The Minister will report upon our conversation and will call on me
again.
Weizsacker
4 See vol. v of this Series, document No. 464.
No. 188
1625/388514-15
The Charge" a" Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 215 of April 13 Paris, April 13, 1939—4:00 a.m.
Received April 14 — 1:10 a.m.
Pol. II 1177.
With reference to my telegram No. 211 of April 13. 1
The declaration made on behalf of the French Government by
Daladier on the promise of support to Rumania and Greece gives rise
to the following observations:
1) The declaration means the temporary abandonment of the policy
France embarked on at Munich of assuring the peace of Europe by
coming to a direct understanding with the authoritarian States. In
the place of this policy comes the creation of a cordon of States, in part
bound by treaty to the Western Powers. France is thus returning to
i Not printed (5453/E366636-38). This telegram communicated the text of a state-
ment by Daladier to the press on Apr. 13 which contained a "declaration to the nation"
announcing, in terms similar to those employed by Chamberlain in the British Parlia-
ment (see document No. 189), the French Government's guarantees to Rumania and
Greece. In addition Daladier announced that the French and Polish Governments
reaffirmed their alliance: "France and Poland guarantee each other immediately and
directly against any threat, direct or indirect, which menaces their vital interests."
APRIL, 1933 231
the system of collective security, in a new form, and is participating in
the attempt, probably mainly inaugurated by Great Britain, to en-
circle the totalitarian States.
2) The Franco-Polish Alliance is severed from its connection with
the League of Nations, as it existed in the Treaties of 1921 and 1925 a
and reshaped on the lines of the British guarantee. That Russia is
not mentioned might be due to consideration for Poland and Rumania
although this would not necessarily mean that Russia is to be omitted
as a factor m the new system. The long and frequent visits of the
Soviet Ambassador to Bonnet during the last few days and the clearly
visible decline of opposition to the Franco-Soviet Pact seem to me
significant.
3) The French declaration obviously proceeds from the assumption
that certain acts already planned by Germany or Italy may be expected
m the near future; its intention is to set a limit to further expansion by
the authoritarian States. The text of the declaration is designed to
strengthen the resistance of smaller States in the event of threats to
them.
+ 4) Besides this, France is trying to save her prestige with the smaller
fatates, which has recently been severely shaken. She also desires,
however, to bind herself by this declaration and to bar the way to
further concessions in the face of expansion by the authoritarian States.
5} On the other hand, France shows no tendency to take military
or diplomatic action against the previous advance of the authoritarian
States. The reason for this is that now, as ever, she does not want war.
6) The reason for the sharp and precise tone of the declaration may
also be that, after the events of March in Czecho-Slovakia and again
after the occupation of Albania, the Government took very extensive
military measures, and the resultant nervousness of the French people
with the rumour-mongering, which the Government did little about
have engendered an idtefixe that French interests were threatened The
French Government therefore need the declaration to justify themselves
and are probably also trying to avoid giving the impression that their
tar-reaching measures were so wide of the mark.
7) The fact that the Daladier Government have made far-reaching
declarations, decisive for war and peace, and have adopted them
without consulting or even informing Parliament, shows that Daladier
feels extremely strong and is not afraid of any repercussions at home.
Difficulties will probably only arise when he is obliged to cancel his
extensive and over-hasty measures.
■ Brauer
a The Political Agreement between France and Poland agreed in Paris, Feb. 1 9 1 92 1
(for the text eee BF.S.P., vol. 118, pp. 342-343) and the Treaty between France and
lroW a c g ^ d r 8 o , LO0a ^° , , 0Ct - 16 vio 9 ^ (f ° rth6 t6xt See British Whi^Pap^S
Protocol ofths Locarno Conference, 1925 {and Annexes) together with the Treaties between
France and Poland and France and Czechoslovakia, Cmd. 2525 of 1925).
232 DOCUMENTS ON GEBMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 189
T8S:/ES71141
The Charge d' Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry
Airgram
No. 120 of Anril 13 London, April 13, 1939.
Received April 14 — 10:50 a.m.
Pol. II 1180.
According to Reuter the text of the guarantee declaration in favour
of Greece and Rumania in the Prime Minister's speech today in the
House of Commons is as follows: 1
"His Majesty's Government feel that they have both a duty and a
service to perform by leaving no doubt in the mind of anybody as to
their position. I therefore take this opportunity of saying on their
behalf that His Majesty's Government attach the greatest importance
to the avoidance of disturbance by force or threat of force of the
status quo in the Mediterranean and the Balkan peninsula.
Consequently they have come to the conclusion that in the event of
any action being taken which clearly threatens the independence of
Greece or Rumania and which the Greek or Rumanian Government
respectively considered it vital to resist with their national forces His
Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the
Greek or Rumanian Government as the case might be all the support
in their power.
We are communicating this declaration to the Governments directly
concerned and to others, especially Turkey, whose close relations with
the Greek Government are known.
I understand that the French Government are making a similar
declaration this afternoon." 2
KOKDT
1 The text of the statement is quoted in English in the original. See also Pari. Deb.,
H.ofC, vol. 346, col. 13.
2 See document No. 188, footnote 1.
No. 190
1625/388517
The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 36 of April 13 Sofia, April 13, 1939—5:45 p.m.
Received April 13 — 9:00 p.m.
Pol. II 1178.
With reference to your telegram No. 49 of April 12. 1
When I took leave today of King Boris at a private interview, we
i Document No. 186, which was sent as telegram No. 49 to Sofia.
APRIL, 1989 233
spoke at length about British policy. The King assured me that up
to the present no attempt had been made here to involve Bulgaria in
the British policy of encirclement. King Boris took a very unfavour-
able view of the situation and thought that Britain was growing "old".
KCMELIlir
No. 191
511/235509-10
The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 105 of April 13 Belgrade, April 13, 1939—7 :00 p.m.
Received April 14 — 1:10 a.m.
Pol. IV 2559.
The Foreign Minister asked me to call on him today, in order, as he
said, to discuss the general situation. He then passed at once to
Yugoslavia's attitude during the events in Albania. He thought that
during the last few days Yugoslavia had given clear proof of her loyalty
to the policy of friendship towards the Axis. Although events had taken
place on her very frontier, she had, with full confidence in the political
aims of the Axis, refrained from all military measures such as were
now being taken in many countries and had contented herself with
reinforcing her frontier defences for the purpose of apprehending
Albanian refugees. This attitude was in keeping with the firm resolve
of the Yugoslav Government to maintain to the full and in all circum-
stances their friendly relationship to the Axis Powers. He asked me
to convey to the Reich Foreign Minister the categorical assurance that
he, Cincar-Markovic, would adhere to the end to the policy of friendship
towards the Axis Powers inaugurated during recent years, and would
tolerate nothing which was in contradiction to it. Recently this had
not always been easy for him for I must know how deeply the Yugo-
slav public had been disturbed by Italy's invasion of Albania; a . . .
(1 group mutilated) » which circles opposed to the Government we're
naturally exploiting. He was always being asked about Germany's
attitude and reference was always being made to rumours reported in
the French press about German troop movements on the Yugoslav
frontier. If he characterized these rumours as being without founda-
tion and recalled statements made by Germany, that German policy
wanted a strong Yugoslavia, he met with the objection that, in view of
the rapid development of the present political situation of Greater
Germany, this attitude on Germany's part might quickly change. In
lln the Belgrade draft. (8419/E692833-35) this group reads: "disturbance \Beun-
rtmigung] . L
234 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
these circumstances, it would mean a tremendous enhancement of
Yugoslav foreign policy, as represented by Mm, and of his personal
position, if the interest of German policy in a strong and internally
consolidated Yugoslavia could again be stated by authoritative German
quarters in a way which would impress Yugoslav public opinion. He
asked the Reich Foreign Minister, as his old friend, to give him as much,
support as possible in these difficult days for Yugoslavia. He had also
been wondering if there were any possibility of a meeting with the Reich
Foreign Minister.
I promised Cincar-Markovid that I would transmit his request and
also referred him to Italy's definite assurances regarding the integrity
of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia's loyal attitude to the events in Albania
was naturally recognized to the full in Berlin, as it was in Rome, and
I had not the slightest doubt that our fundamental attitude towards
Yugoslavia was completely unchanged and in keeping with the sincere
friendship which had long been felt by us for that country.
As the completely impeccable attitude of the Government in the
Albanian question is established, and as there is also no doubt of their
firm resolve to reject categorically any attempt to involve Yugoslavia
in a combination hostile to the Axis, I urgently recommend that the
Foreign Minister's wishes may be granted as far as possible.
Heebjen
No. 192
509/285393
The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 106 of April 13 Belgrade, April 13, 1939 — 7:00 p.m.
Received April 14 — 11:35 p.m.
Pol. IV 2557.
During a conversation on another subject, Simovic, Chief of the
General Staff, today drew the attention of the Air Attache 1 to the
present extremely nervous state of the population and expressed the
fear that the agitation among the Volksdeutsche of the Voivodina,
which has been increasing of late, might lead to incidents which would
seriously prejudice German-Yugoslav relations.
I am assured by volksdeutsch circles that, in our view, 2 Halwax and
his friends, adherents of the Revival Movement [Erneuerungsbewegung],
1 Lt.-Col. von SchOnebeck.
2 In the Belgrade draft of this telegram (9538/E6723 13) this reads " in fact " and not "in
our view ". Gustav Halwax -was one of the four signatories of the Declaration of Apr. 10,
1938, which set up the volksdetUsch United Front. Considerable material on volksdeulsdi
activities in Yugoslavia has been filmed on Serial 7494. See also document No. 94.
APRIL, 1939
IST ZTi l I h T St Tf Iy eXP ° Siag tkemse1 ^ in their work of agita-
tion, and have been hinting that they are following Berlin's instruc-
A.IIIZ T^ ™ tL ?\* hat any UDreSt is at P"*»* politically un-
it 2 :i?r mmend that the ^^^^ xmiJL ^ m^ d
Heeren
aiffigft^ " The ma " er " Wg d6aH With by CuIW PoIi ^ ^P-tment.
6733/E513500
No. 193
Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic
Policy Department
Berlin, April 13, 1939.
WsilgiHI
T i 6 ^^ f Mtaiy Attaeh « 2 called on m « today and informed
me that the Netherlands Government continued to attach St
portance to placzng the order for 120 light field howitzers S Z-
77;l I°l ITT" ° f *"*** h0We ™> ** ™ absolutely eential
hatthe first 20 be made available as early as October 1, 1939 I had
the impression that the Netherlands Government atta h such j£j
importance to the fulfilment of this request that, were it not forth
coming, the order would not be placed with Germany
+ ^ 6 r + a ^fT 7 th th6 A " G - K - < Herr ™ n Waltershausen) I told
the Military Attache that I did not think it would be possible"" omp ly
TutVthe 20 ™ S ° f deH r y - ? C MUt ^ ' ««** -S th" t
surely the 20 guns, as it was SU ch a small number, could be taken from
current manufacture for the German Array
I promised the Military Attache that he would soon have a reply 4
II Xit ~ 1 *°, th t Ec ° n0mic Poli ^ Apartment, Son
II, with the request for further action. Please keep me informed
Clodius
! See document No. 119
K[reutzwald] 10/5." «"°™<>d the Netherlands Legation (M. v. Boetzelaer).
236 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAK FOREIGN POLICY
No. 194
1975/438375
The State Secretary to the Legation in Rumania
Telegram
No. 157 Berlin, April 14, 1939 — 5:05 p.m.
zu Pol. IV 2506.1
With reference to your telegram No. 173. l
1) The communication of your telegram No. 167 [sic] 2 to Budapest
Legation was done not with a view to mediation but — in accordance
with its contents — with a view to verifying the facts in our own in-
terests. The instructions given in our telegram No. 152 3 to tell Gafencu
about the Hungarian dementi served merely to express our hope for an
early easing of tension. [As you know, we have always refused to
mediate up to now, and will not do so in the future. Please make this
clear to Gafencu when an opportunity occurs.] 4
2) For the declaration already given by the Hungarian Foreign
Minister to the Rumanian Minister on April 6,6 please see our despatch
by courier, Pol. IV 2483. 6
Weizsackbr
1 Document No. 180.
2 An error for No. 169. See document No. 180, footnote 2.
3 Not printed. See lot, tit.
* The passage in square brackets was deleted before despatch.
s See document No. 165.
6 Not printed (5985/E440377).
No, 195
1625/388625-26
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 183 of April 14 Bucharest, April 14, 1939 — 10:00 p.m.
Received April 15 — 2:15 p.m.
Pol. II 1197.
In the last few days Foreign Minister Gafencu has repeatedly men-
tioned the Anglo-French declaration of guarantee. 1 Tremendous
pressure had been exerted on him from abroad and also from certain
circles at home to conclude a bilateral agreement. The King and the
Government, however, had been firm in their resolve not to enter into
any agreements which might be directed against Germany even in the
slightest degree. He had therefore sent Secretary General Cretzianu
1 Of Apr. 13. See documents Nos. 188, footnote 1, and If
APML, 1030 237
to London 2 and Paris to make it clear to the Governments there that
Rumania would enter into no agreements which might involve her
in the British encirclement policy. Minister President Calinescu, who
happened to take part in the conversation with me, emphatically con-
firmed this. On the other hand the Rumanian Government did not
think that they should decline a unilateral promise of a guarantee
especially as some of their neighbours had revisionist intentions
about Rumanian territory. It was, of course, clear to the Govern-
ment that this could not mean Germany as they were convinced
of Germany's good intentions. Rumania would in fact welcome it
if the German Government would also make such a declaration of
guarantee in Rumania's favour.
I replied that I considered the British declaration of guarantee as
being fairly worthless. It could have fruitful results perhaps only
against Soviet Russia. In my opinion, however, it had not been made
for the sake of its effectiveness, but only by way of British propaganda
against Germany. I ridiculed the shelter of the umbrella and recalled
that it had been of no avail to the Negus, Schuschnigg, Benes and del
Vayo: neither did I think it worthy of so great a country as Rumania
to have resort to such protection.
These remarks were not very pleasing to M. Gafencu; he said that
the British proposal had cost him many a sleepless night. In the end,
however, he had agreed, as, after mature reflection, he had been unable
to find anything in it which disturbed his relations with the Reich. He
had guided the press and that very day he had been reproached by
the French Ambassador because its tone was not cordial enough. He
referred in particular to articles in Timul [sic % Timpul] and Universal
which had been inspired by him. Curentul was going too far with its
flat rejection.
When in reply to this I referred to the telegram of the Jew Hefter in
Le Moment,* which mentions the special services of Tilea in bringing
about the declaration, by saying that Tilea's activity was based on the
instructions of the King, Gafencu thumped the table in fury and said
that behind this were Tilea's mean tricks.
Gafencu read me his telegram to his Minister in Berlin, which sets
out the above points of view on Rumania's attitude.
I urgently recommended that he should not allow himself to be mis-
led by Reuter reports from Paris and Bucharest which constituted in-
trigues aimed at discrediting the Rumanian Government, and thus
Gafencu, in our eyes. I urged Gafencu to stay in Berlin until'the parade
on April 20.-*
Fabhicius
2 See also document No. 180, and footnote 7 thereto,
a French language newspaper published in Bucharest.
* i.e., for Hitler's birthday.
238 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 196
1625/38S509
Circular of the State Secretary 1
Telegram
Berlin, April 14, 1939—9:40 p.m.
zu Pol. II 11662 Ang. I.
Drafting Officer: Senior Counsellor von Rintelen.
The Legation at Tallinn reports 2 that an authoritative Estonian
military personage stated informally that Estonia had received the
oSer of a guarantee of the integrity of the Estonian State and Estonian
sovereignty, not only from the Soviet Union, 3 but also from Britain.
If this is the case it can be assumed that a similar offer has been
made by Britain to the other Baltic States. If you can learn anything
about this without revealing our source, please report by telegram.*
Weizsacker
1 Addressees were the Missions in London, Moscow, Helsinki, Riga and Kovno.
* Report A 157 of Apr. 8 (not printed, 1625/388507). In telegram No. 37 of Apr. 14
{not printed, 1625/388510) Woermann requested the Legation at Tallinn to check this
report with the Estonian Foreign Ministry. See also document No. 202.
3 In a circular telegram sent, for information, on Apr. 6 (not printed, 406/214341-42) to
Moscow, Warsaw, Helsinki, Riga, Kovno and Bucharest, Bismarck repeated an earlier
Tallinn telegram, the original of which has not been found, which reported that a Soviet
Note had been sent to the Estonian Minister in Moscow on Apr. 1, declaring Estonian
independence to be a matter of vital importance to the U.S.S.R.; that the Estonian
Note of Apr. 3, in reply, had stated that Estonia would defend her sovereignty against
all aggressors; and that a similar Soviet Note had been received on Apr. 1 by the Latvian
Government. The text, in French translation, of a Soviet declaration dated Mar. 28, and
an Estonian Note in reply, dated Apr. 7, were forwarded by the Legation at Tallinn to
Berlin on Apr. 15 with report No. A 166 (not printed, 466/226999-7003).
* Replies were sent from London on Apr. 21 (1625/388578-80), from Moscow on Apr.
17 (7891/E571169), from Helsinki on Apr. 17 (7891/E571152), from Riga on Apr. 19
(7637/E545407) and from Kovno on Apr. 15 (7637/E540405) and were all in the negative.
No. 197
449/222623
Memorandum by the State Secretary
St.S. No. 337 Berlin, April 14, 1939.
After I had informed Ambassador Attolico this morning of the initial
draft of instructions to Athens and Bucharest and of similar instruc-
tions to Ankara, 1 in order thus to prepare the way for a conversa-
tion between the Reich Foreign Minister and Count Ciano, Attolico
telephoned me again towards evening to tell me of a conversation which
he had had shortly before with the Reich Foreign Minister. 2 Attolico
i Not printed (1625/388598-622). See document No. 203, footnote 2.
a No record has been found.
APRIL, 1030 900
he Duce Th. D P °S t0 ^ ^ that the iatter liad s P ok en to
S^ ? D ™ *«* ^t attach the slightest importance to the
British guarantee to Greece. He took the view that Greece was de
pendent on the grace of Italy and he would not go beyond the exchange
of views between Rome and Athens which had taken place a fe w S
ago As far as Rumania was concerned, Mussolini was of the opinion
vi sft I " ^ t0 ^ ^ d °™ a Ut ' S d ^ ^ «2SS
Weizsacker
3 Evidently Gafeneu is meant. See document No. 203.
No. 198
230/15I8S7-9S/2
Note by the Deputy Director of the Information and Press
Department
■g, „ -c ■ ,,. . Berlin, April 14, 1939.
For the Foreign Minister.
At 6:30 this afternoon Ministerialrat Bohmer 1 telephoned me and
told me the following:
He wanted to inform me that the Propaganda Minister, Dr. Goebbels
on the occasion of a meeting with the Yugoslav Foreign Minister
Cmcar-Markovic, had received a request from the latter that Yugo
da™ s conduct during the last few days should receive special Re-
cognition m the German press.* He particularly desired this because it
would strengthen his (Cmcar-Markovie's) position in Yugoslavia In
reply I told Herr Bohmer that before such a desire could be fulfilled £
must be studied, and that it could not be carried out in the German press
without the consent of the Press Department of the Foreign Ministry
Thereupon Dr. Bohmer asked me to get in touch with MnisterialrS
Fritzsche 3 to whom he had already conveyed the wish of the Reich
Propaganda Minister. As far as he knew, Herr Fritzsche intended to
quote Yugoslav press comment in several newspapers and thus to make
special reference to Yugoslavia's attitude.
After I had ^cussed this question and also the question of ex-
pediency, what should be said, and presentation with the State Secre-
tary, I contacted Herr Fritzsche and gave him the following instruc-
tions: With reference to the fulfilment of the Propaganda Minister's
wish, the Press Department of the Foreign Ministry considers that in
Mllf. ^ tlTe Sh ° Uld be appUed and treated as
1 Dr. Karl Bohmer of the Ministry of Propaganda
2 Goebbels went on a tour of South East Europe and Eeypt Mar 25 T„™ fi
* Director of the German Press Department i/the M^^o^nl
240 DOCUMENTS ON GEEMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Favourable Yugoslav press views to be published in three news-
papers in a not too prominent position. A commentary in the following
terms to be given: "It must be admitted that, in the present general
uncertainty, Yugoslavia has displayed remarkable calm. It appears
at the same time that, in judging the situation, Yugoslav policy is con-
ducted with special skill and that Cincar-Markovi6 has adapted himself
realistically to events~in line with the pacific policy of the Axis Powers."
For his further information, I told Herr Fritzsche that this action
must on no account be made to appear too obvious as that would not
strengthen but weaken Cincar-Markovi6's position.
Dr. Schmidt
No. 199
:F19/478-474
SS-Gruppenfiihrer Heydrich to Foreign Minister Rifobemtrop
Berlin, April 14, 1939.
Dear Party Comrade von Ribbentrof: I am sending you enclosed
a report on the views of Italian circles regarding the dissolution of
Czecho-Slovakia.
I have also sent a copy of the report to Minister President Goring,
Minister Lammers. Reichsleiter Bormarm, and the Reichsfiihrer— SS.
Heil Hitler!
Heydrich
[Enclosure]
SECRET
Subject: Italy's foreign policy.
On March 22, 1939, a private conversation lasting many hours took
place between a confidential agent and an important representative of
Italy's cultural and political interests.
With reference to recent political events, the Italian in question stated
that these had been observed in Italy with very mixed feelings. It was
the view of the widest Italian political circles that Italy's political
position at the end of last year, and thus Mussolini's policy, had been
completely unsatisfactory. It was commonly said that this unfavour-
able development began with the Anschluss of Austria to the Reich.
As a result, Italy had lost an important key position in European
politics. Italians had hoped that a substitute would be found in
Hungary, but they must now realize that such hopes have proved
abortive because:
1. Hungary does not possess that key position in Europe which was
Austria's.
APBIL, 1939 241
2. Hungary therefore shows little or no interest in European politics.
3. Political conditions within Hungary are so chaotic and unsatis-
factory that she cannot be brought into play as a political factor with
sufficiently decisive effect.
4. The leading Hungarian statesmen display so vacillating an attitude
in the foreign policy of their country that, from the Italian point of
view, they cannot be regarded as reliable.
Italy was now obliged to realize that her wish— to allow Germany to
become only so strong as not to embarrass Italy— has not been
attained but that the German Reich had strengthened its position in
Europe to a degree far exceeding what Italy, from her point of view,
can consider tolerable. This was already shown hy the fact that, in
its foreign policy, the German Reich appeared to have little or no're-
gard for Italy, and was acting in complete independence of its Axis
partner. Italy had the feeling that she was fast being excluded more
and more from South East and Eastern Europe by the policy of the
preponderant Great Power, Germany.
Naturally, Central European policy was, from the Italian point of
view, of secondary importance by comparison with Italian interests in
the Mediterranean. It must, however, also be admitted that Italy, in
pursuance of her aims in the Mediterranean, had not received that back-
ing from the Reich for which she had hoped. As to the colonization of
Abyssinia, it must be acknowledged that this country had, up to the
present , fallen far short of expectations . Apart from the general unrest
of the Abyssinian population which caused the Italians great diffi-
culties on all sorts of occasions, it had so far not been possible to push
forward the economic development of the country to any considerable
extent. For one thing the necessary funds were lacking. Above all,
however, direct access to Abyssinia was not assured as long as
Italy had not acquired a decisive voice in the management of the
Suez Canal Company, and did not possess Jibuti and the railway from
there to Addis-Ababa. The'only advantage was that Abyssinia could,
to a very considerable extent, absorb Italy's surplus population, as a
result of which the pressure of population has somewhat abated in the
Kingdora of Italy . Italy 's immediate and exclusive interest , therefore ,
was to win decisive advantages from Britain and France in the Suez
Canal question and in that of Jibuti.
There was no serious intention of annexing Tunis; on the contrary,
it would doubtless be accepted as satisfactory if an assured national
and economic existence were granted to the Italian population there.
The Tunis question was therefore no reason for serious dispute between
Italy and the Western Powers.
As regards the Spanish affair, the Italian view might be expressed
somewhat as follows:
The Italian volunteers in Spain formed, in the Italian view the
16
242 DOCUMENTS ON GEB.MAST FOREIGN POLICY
nucleus and major part of Franco's troops, as it was they who, in fact,
had gained the military successes. If Franco now believed that, their
work done, he could simply send these Italians home without more ado,
he would be mistaken. The recall of these volunteers was exclusively
the concern of Italy, and Italy would only take this step if Franco
offered compensation for services rendered. It seemed to the Italians
that a naval base in the Balearics (Majorca), which they regarded as
a counter-weight to Gibraltar and the French sea communications in the
western basin of the Mediterranean, would constitute such compensa-
tion.
The Fascist Grand Council would deliberate in Rome on these vital
questions of Italy's and in particular on her attitude towards Germany.
He further stated that in political circles the following alternatives
for the shaping of Italy's future foreign policy were being discussed:
According to the first alternative, the object of foreign policy should
be gradually to loosen the bonds with Germany because, although
Germany had hitherto been esteemed as a powerful friend, she must
today be feared as too powerful; besides which, the Reich no longer
sufficiently appreciated the support and readiness to help accorded by
Italy. This alternative could not, indeed, be characterized as parti-
cularly moral, but morals could not be allowed to play a part in a
nation's vital policy. Moreover, this solution would be universally and
most readily accepted and understood by the Italian people. It would
also, in the view of very wide circles, be the most likely to succeed in
obtaining from the Western Powers the concessions in the Mediter-
ranean indispensable for Italy's future development. It is said that
concession to Italy of a controlling interest in the Suez Canal Admini-
stration and the cession of Jibuti, with the railway, could be obtained
without too much difficulty in return for- Italy renouncing the annexa-
tion of Tunis, if the outbreak of hostilities could thereby be avoided.
According to the second alternative Mussolini — as in the autumn of
1938 (Munich) — should once again play in grand style the role of media-
tor between the two camps of the European Powers, so that he might
thereby appear in Europe as the great peacemaker. In this event the
Italians could indulge in the justifiable hope, not only of avoiding a war
exceedingly distasteful to them, but also of obtaining concessions for
themselves from both camps. In this event, Italy would not even be
obliged to take up a hostile attitude toward her former ally, Germany.
She would also, however, come to be regarded in a friendlier light by
the Western Powers. Germany, it is thought, would not be unwilling
to grant Italy concessions if thereby hostilities of an unprecedented
magnitude were to be avoided. The Western Powers would be guided
by similar ideas; and in the view of the Italians this alternative had the
positive advantage of rehabilitating Mussolini in the eyes of Italians
after the disillusionment over his recent Axis policy.
APRIL, 1939 243
No. 200
B21/B005776-30
President, Roosevelt to the FUhrer and Chancellor
Telegram from Washington The White House, April 15, 1939.1
His Excellency Adolf Hitler,
Chancellor of the German Reich,
Berlin.
You realize I am sure, that throughout the world hundreds of
millions of human beings are living today in constant fear of a new war
or even a series of wars. The existence of this fear, and the possibility
of such a conflict, is of definite concern to the people of the United
States for whom I speak, as it must also be to the peoples of the other
nations of the entire western hemisphere. All of them know that any
major war, even if it were to he confined to other continents, must bear
heavily on them during its continuance and also for generations to
come. Because of the fact that after the acute tension in which the
world has been living during the past few weeks there would seem to be
at least a momentary relaxation, because no troops are at this moment
on the march, this may be an opportune moment for me to send you
this message. On a previous occasion 2 I have addressed you on behalf
of the settlement of political, economic, and social problems by peaceful
methods and without resort to arms. But the tide of events seems to
have reverted to the threat of arms. If such threats continue, it seems
inevitable that much of the world must become involved in common
ruin. All the world, victor nations, vanquished nations, and neutral
nations will suffer. I refuse to believe that the world is, of necessity,
such a prisoner of destiny. On the contrary, it is clear that the leaders
of great nations have it in their power to liberate their peoples from
the disaster that impends. It is equally clear that in their own minds
and in their own hearts the peoples themselves desire that their fears
be ended. It is, however, unfortunately necessary to take cognizance
of recent facts. Three nations in Europe and one in Africa have seen
their independent existence terminated. A vast territory in another
independent nation of the far east has been occupied by a neighbouring
state. Reports, which we trust are not true, insist that further acts
of aggression are contemplated against still other independent nations.
Plainly the world is moving toward the moment when this situation
must end in catastrophe unless a more rational way of guiding events
is found. You have repeatedly asserted that you and the German
people have no desire for war. If this is true there need be no war.
1 The full text is in English in the original.
- On Sept. 26, 1038; see vol. n of this Series, document No. 632.
244 DOCUMENTS ON GEBMAN FOKEIGN POUOY
Nothing can persuade the peoples of the earth that any governing
power has any right or need to inflict the consequences of war on its
own or any other people save in the case of self-evident home defence.
In making this statement we as Americans speak not through selfish-
ness or fear of weakness. If we speak now it is with the voice of
strength and with friendship for mankind. It is still clear to me that
international problems can be solved at the council table. It is there-
fore no answer to the plea for peaceful discussion for one side to plead
that, unless they receive assurances beforehand that the verdict will
be theirs, they will not lay aside their arms. In conference rooms, as
in courts, it is necessary that both sides enter upon the discussion in
good faith, assuming that substantial justice will accrue to both: and
it is customary and necessary that they leave their arms outside the
room where they confer. I am convinced that the cause of world peace
would be greatly advanced if the nations of the world were to obtain
a frank statement relating to the present and future policy of govern-
ments: because the United States, as one of the nations of the western
hemisphere, is not involved in the immediate controversies which have
arisen in Europe, I trust that you may be willing to make such a
statement of policy to me as the head of a nation far removed from
Europe in order that I, acting only with the responsibility and obliga-
tion of a friendly intermediary, may communicate such declaration to
other nations now apprehensive as to the course which the policy of
your government may take. Are you willing to give assurance that
your armed forces will not attack or invade the territory or possessions
of the following independent nations: Finland, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium,
Great Britain and Ireland, France, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland,
Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia,
Russia, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, Iraq, the Arabias, Syria, Palestine,
Egypt and Iran [?]. Such an assurance clearly must apply not only to
the present day but also to the future, sufficiently long to give every
opportunity to work by peaceful methods for a more permanent peace.
I therefore suggest that you construe the word "future" to apply to a
minimum period of assured non-aggression — ten years at the least— a
quarter of a century, if we dare look that far ahead. If such assurance
is given by your government, I will immediately transmit it to the
governments of the nations I have named and I will simultaneously
inquire whether, as I am reasonably sure, each of the nations enume-
rated above will in turn give like assurance for transmission to you.
Reciprocal assurances such as I have outlined will bring to the world
an immediate measure of relief. I propose that if it is given, two essen-
tial problems shall promptly be discussed in the resulting peaceful
surroundings, and in those discussions the government of the United
States will gladly take part. The discussions which I have in mind
APRIL, 1939 245
relate to the most effective and immediate manner through which
the peoples of the world can obtain progressive relief from the crushing
burden of armament which is each day bringing them more closely to
the brink of economic disaster. Simultaneously the government of the
United States would be prepared to take part in discussions looking
towards the most practical manner of opening up avenues of inter-
national trade to the end that every nation of the earth may be enabled
to buy and sell on equal terms in the world market as well as to possess
assurance of obtaining the materials and products of peaceful economic
life. At the same time, those governments other than the United
States which are directly interested could undertake such political
discussions as they may consider necessary or desirable. We recognize
complex world problems which affect all humanity but we know that
study and discussion of them must be held in an atmosphere of peace.
Such an atmosphere of peace cannot exist if negotiations are over-
shadowed by the threat of force or by the fear of war. I think you will
not misunderstand the spirit of frankness in which I send you this
message. Heads of great governments in this hour are literally re-
sponsible for the fate of humanity in the coming years. They cannot
fail to hear the prayers of their peoples to be protected from the fore-
seeable chaos of war. History will hold them accountable for the lives
and the happiness of all — even unto the least. I hope that your
answer will make it possible for humanity to lose fear and regain secu-
rity for many years to come. A similar message is being addressed to
the Chief of the Italian Government. 3
Franklin D. Roosevelt
s This was sent to Mussolini by the American Secretary of State on the same day.
No. 201
2422/5U972
The Charge' d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 120 of April 15 Washington, April 15, 1939 — 3:50 a.m.
Received April 16 — 2:20 a.m.
Pol. IX 674.
I hear confidentially from political opposition circles that Roosevelt's
appeal l was principally brought about by news of the failure of the
Anglo-French policy of alliance.
Thomsen
l Document No. 200.
246 DOCUMENTS ON QEEMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 202
1796/408808-0*
The Charge' d' Affaires in Estonia to ike Foreign Ministry
Telegram
No. 34 of April 15 Tallinh, April 15, 1939—6:15 p.m.
Received April 15 — 8:30 p.m.
The Deputy Foreign Minister, Opik, lias just told me categorically
that no offer of a British guarantee has been made either at the Foreign
Ministry or at the Estonian Legation in London. 1 Discussions to this
end could not have been conducted by other Estonian authorities, as
otherwise the Foreign Ministry must have been informed of the matter. 3
Passing to the Soviet offer of a guarantee, Opik said that Estonia
regarded the Russian declaration as a powerful threat aimed at the
occupation of Estonia, and that her answer, although polite, had been
in the form of a most emphatic rejection. The Estonian Government
had, therefore, regarded the Soviet military demonstration on the
frontier on Easter Monday as a further threat and, in consequence, had
themselves caused reports of the military parade, which had roused
the greatest alarm among the frontier population, to be published in
the press, in the interest of reassuring both Estonian and world public
opinion. Estonia had on various occasions urged in Moscow publica-
tion of the declarations. However, since Litvinov had again told Rei,
the Estonian Minister, that he refused to allow publication on the
grounds that Latvia was also opposed to it, the Estonian Government
had now decided to send to neighbouring States and Great Powers a
translation of both declarations without the agreement of Moscow.
Acting on instructions from higher authority, he handed it to me for
transmission to Berlin, urgently requesting, however, that for the
present it should be treated in strict confidence. When I asked about
Latvia's attitude, Opik said that Estonia continued to regard it with
the deepest distrust, as far as the Soviet Union was concerned. The
original translation 3 of the declarations is being despatched today.
Bock
1 See document No. 196.
2 In telegram No. 38 of Apr. 18 (not printed, 7891/E571164), Book reported that an
official of the Estonian Ministry of the Interior, as well as other sources he named, were
quite definite that conversations on an English guarantee to Estonia had taken place,
adding that a joint Anglo-Polish demarche was involved.
3 In French. See document No. 196, footnote 3.
APRIL, 1989 247
No. 203
1623/388545-46
The Stale Secretary to the Embassy in Italy
Telegram
No. 184 Berlin, April 15, 1939—8:00 p.m.
e.o. Pol. II 1233.
For the personal information of the Ambassador.
It has been under consideration here whether to ask the Rumanian
and Greek Governments for statements as to whether and in what way
they were parties to the declaration of guarantee by the Governments
of Britain and France, and what attitude they have adopted, and intend
to adopt in future , towards the British and French action . In accordance
with their answers we would then consider our attitude towards these
countries. The matter was discussed here on these lines on April 13
with Attolico, 1 who after a telephone conversation with Ciano and after
the latter had spoken to Mussolini, gave as the Duce's reply that Italy
did not consider action on these lines to be expedient at present. As
to Greece, Italy did not wish to go beyond the recent exchange of
views between Rome and Athens. As to Rumania, Italy considered
that it would be best to discuss the matter during Gafencu's forth-
coming visits to Berlin and Rome. No decision has yet been reached
on our further attitude in this matter. 2
WeiZSACKER
1 According to document No. 197, this conversation took place on Apr. 14.
* According to a note by Sonnleithner of Apr. 22 (not printed, 1625/388597), the draft
telegrams prepared for despatch to Bucharest, Athens and Ankara (see document No.
197, footnote 1) were cancelled on Ribbentrop's instructions. It would seem that, as
far as Bucharest was concerned, the question was settled by a telegram to Fabricius
on Apr. 16 (not printed, 169/82573), in which the latter was informed that no action on
his part was required, as Ribbentrop would personally discuss the matter during Gafencu's
visit.
No. 204
975/438383
The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
togent Budapest, April 15, 1939 — 11:53 p.m.
No. 118 of April 15 Received April 16 — 3:20 a.m.
Pol. IV 2593.
The Foreign Minister told me that the reason for the ddtente in
relations with Rumania was that the Rumanian Foreign Minister
248 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
had today handed the Hungarian Minister in Bucharest 1 the follow-
ing Note:
"I have the honour to inform you that as a result of statements
made to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Hungarian Parliament
by Count Csaky, the Hungarian Foreign Minister, expressing the
Hungarian Government's intention to respect the frontiers of Eumania,
a statement with which you acquainted me this morning, the Royal
Rumanian Government have decided to release the older classes which
have recently been mobilized." 2
Gafencu had added that he could not comment on Csaky's proposal
for concluding a minority agreement until he had ascertained the views
of the King.
Erdmannsdoeff
i Ldsilo do Bfirdossy.
2 The text of the Note is in French in the original.
No. 205
J19/487-479
Unsigned Memorandum
April 15, 1939.
Record of the Conversation between Field Marshal
goeing and the dlice in the presence of count clano.
The Field Marshal stated that he had been charged by the Fiihrer by
telephone to convey to the Buce on behalf of the German Reich the
most sincere congratulations on the settlement of the Albanian affair.
Germany had been immensely pleased with the Buce's swift and
determined action in Albania and recognized with great satisfaction
the increase of power thus accruing to the Axis. In Germany's opinion
the successful accomplishment of this affair should likewise be described
as a very considerable strategic gain for Italy.
This led Field Marshal Goring to speak of Yugoslavia and he men-
tioned that a week after the Czech affair a confidential business agent
in South East Europe had informed him (the Field Marshal) that
several Croat representatives, who were followers of Dr. Macek, would
like to be received by the Field Marshal. He (Goring) had replied that
this interview could not take place and that if those concerned thought
they ought to discuss political questions with a foreign Government,
but not with their own, they should then approach Rome and not
Berlin. Germany firmly held the view that Yugoslavia belonged one
hundred per cent to Italy's sphere of influence. Germany had only to
APRIL, 1939 249
safeguard her normal economic interests there. Moreover he (Field
Marshal Goring) was very well acquainted with conditions in Yugo-
slavia. He was a friend of Stojadinovic and knew the Prince Regent
very well. He knew that as a result of the latest events Yugoslavia
was a prey to great anxiety and a perhaps understandable fear. Any
Yugoslav statesman who saw matters clearly, must realize in his own
mind that a guarantee by the Western Powers was completely illusory,
whilst on the other hand Yugoslavia had in Hungary and Bulgaria two
neighbours who, despite all protestations to the contrary, were, after all,
claiming portions of her territory. It was clear in these circumstances
that Yugoslavia could only survive if she formed close links with her
two other great neighbours, Italy and Germany, for only thus could she
ensure her existence in face of any claims by other neighbouring
countries.
Yugoslavia's internal situation was fairly critical. The Croats and
the Serbs more or less counterbalanced one another. The Croats could
for example dislocate any mobilization of the country by obstruc-
tionist tactics. If Yugoslavia should turn too much to Britain and
Paris it was only necessary to give the Croats some encouragement and
the Yugoslavs would be completely incapable of action. Stojadinovic'
had understood this situation and had therefore adapted himself to
close cooperation with the Axis. The Axis had its own interest in the
peaceful development of affairs in Yugoslavia. If, however, Yugo-
slavia's attitude in foreign affairs should become uncertain and thus
come to be regarded with suspicion by the Axis Powers, then such in-
terest would cease.
It should be made plain to the Yugoslavs that in the event of war
with the Western Powers the Axis countries would expect a benevolent
neutrality from Yugoslavia, thus making it possible for Italy and Ger-
many, if need be, to purchase the necessary material from Yugoslavia.
Stojadinovic' and the Prince Regent had realized this necessity. Prince
Paul, however, as a result of his British connections, changed his mind
very frequently. However firmly convinced he was at a given date
of the necessity for a pro-Axis policy, a short stay in England had
usually sufficed to shake this conviction again.
Stojadinovic's resignation 1 had, moreover, come as a complete
surprise to Germany. The Duce interposed here that it had almost
involved a coup d'ttab, and in any case not a normal parliamentary
crisis. The Field Marshal stated that Britain's desires were one of the
chief causes of the disappearance of Stojadinovi6. Prince Paul had
sacrificed him because he had become too powerful. Furthermore, the
leader of the Slovenes, KoroSec, who was a priest, had also defected
i The Stojadinovic' Cabinet had resigned on Feb. 4, 1939, after a Government crisis
in which five Ministers had tendered their resignations.
250 DOCUMENTS ON GJERMAK FOREIGN POLICY
and the whole affair had been carried out in rather an underhand
manner, after the members of the Government had taken their leave of
Stojadinovic at 11 p.m., as if nothing had happened. Then, an hour
later, they had addressed a letter to Stojadinovid informing him that
they were resigning from the Government. However, Stojadinovic
had still believed that he had Prince Paul on his side, only to learn
next day that the latter was apparently in the plot too. Now attempts
were being made to discredit Stojadinovic in the Axis countries and
to accuse him of all kinds of things which were probably untrue. He
had in any case been a clear-headed man and a better partner for Italy
and Germany than his present completely insignificant successor. 2
In the further course of the conversation the Field Marshal turned
to economic questions and gave the Duce the Fuhrer's assurance that
Germany would not act unilaterally in carrying out major economic
actions in South East Europe, but would consult Italy each time before-
hand. The Euhrer attached great importance to letting the Duce
know that Germany did not wish to make an exclusive claim to South
East Europe.
With reference to the former Czecho-Slovakia, Field Marshal Goring
mentioned the fact that, on the basis of the amounts of war material
available, of which the Duce had already been informed in detail, 3
Czecho-Slovakia, even in her reduced state, doubtless had to be regarded
as the most strongly armed country in the world in relation to
population. In reply to a question by the Duce about the quality of
the Air Force, the Field Marshal replied that approximately 1,500 air-
craft including trainers had been available, but that neither the fighter
aircraft nor the bombers, which were built from a Russian prototype,
which was in its turn based on the American Martin bomber, could be
claimed as a modern air weapon. In any case the powerful armaments
of Czecho-Slovakia showed how dangerous this country would have
been in a serious conflict, even after Munich. The position of both
Axis powers had been made easier by Germany's action, and also, among
other things, by the fact that economic possibilities, resulting from the
transfer of Czechoslovakia's great production capacity (armaments
potential) to" Germany, [sentence incomplete?] This contributed to a
considerable strengthening of the Axis vis-a-vis the Western Powers.
Furthermore Germany no longer needed to keep one single division
ready for defence against that country. This too was an advantage
which would in the last analysis benefit both Axis Powers.
In respect of Poland too Germany's action in Czecho-Slovakia ought
to be regarded as an advantage for the Axis in the event of Poland
finally joining the anti-Axis powers. Germany could then attack that
2 DragiSa Cvetkovic.
' See document No. 52.
APBIL, 1989 251
country from two flanks, and was only 25 minutes flying time from the
new Polish industrial centre, which had heen moved further into the
interior of the country for the very reason that the other Polish in-
dustrial districts were so near the frontier, but which had now come
to be situated near a frontier again, as a result of what had
happened.
Continuing, Field Marshal Goring pointed out that the various
stages of the Czecho-Slovak operation had developed within a very
short time and at breakneck speed. He had been in San Remo and
had continuously received news from the Fiihrer which showed that
the situation was changing from day to day in an unforeseen manner.
The final decision had only been made under dramatic circumstances
in the night when Hacha came to Berlin. To the Reich Chan-
cellor's complete surprise, Hacha had not only made the proposal
to come to Berlin, but during the negotiations had also used the expres-
sion "that the Czech people were confidently placing their destiny in
the hands of the Fiihrer ". * Moreover, Hacha, who had a weak heart,
had had another heart attack during the discussions, so that a doctor
had to be called and had to give him injections. It was not until 5 a.m.
that the affair had been finally settled. The only thing that was
actually certain the day before Hacha's visit, and had been carried
out the afternoon before, was the occupation of the district around
Mor. Ostrava and Vitkovice, 5 which Germany undertook so swiftly
because reports from Poland indicated that the Polish Government
intended to occupy this territory at once should any disorders break
out in Czecho -Slovakia. In any case the whole Czech affair had been
bound up with constant surprises and precipitate developments. For
example even Germany did not quite know what the Slovaks eventually
intended to do. Thus Curcansky had one day sent a telegram to
Germany requesting assistance, 6 and immediately afterwards the rest of
the Slovak Government had denied his right to send such a telegram.
One thing alone had been plain to Germany, namely that she could not
remain inactive if the Slovaks should declare their independence.
The Field Marshal then went on to speak of the date when Germany
would best be prepared for a major trial of strength. In connection
with this he pointed out that, at the moment, Germany was compara-
tively weak at sea, since the two new battleships, which had been
launched recently, could not be put into commission until next year
and two further battleships would not be launched until next year.
In the ease of the Luftwaffe, too, a regrouping was in progress and a
* For the circumstances of Hacha's visit to Hitter, see vol. iv of this Series, documents
Nos. 207 and 216.
6 See ibid., document No. 225.
6 No such telegram from Burfsansk^ has been found but see document No. 10, and
vol. iv of this Series, document No. 209.
252 DOCUMENTS ON GEKMAN FOREIGN POLICY
change-over was being made to a new type of bomber, the " Ju 88",
the production of which still had to be got under way. This new Ger-
man bomber had such a great range that not only could Britain herself
be attacked but it would also penetrate further westward to bomb
shipping bound for Britain from the Atlantic Ocean. Germany would
of course be ready for action if any conflict suddenly broke out. When
considering at what date the armaments position would be most
favourable, the two facts mentioned above, namely the still inadequate
armament at sea and the change-over to the new type of bomber in
the Luftwaffe, should not be disregarded. Moreover a monthly pro-
duction of 280 " Ju 88" aircraft could be expected by the autumn and
350 a month of these aircraft by the end of the year. On the basis of
these considerations, he concluded that in nine months or a year's time
the situation, viewed from the military angle, would be more favour-
able to the Axis. On the other hand, rearmament had not yet pro-
gressed very far in Britain and France. In many cases factories were
only just being built for the production of war material. In any case
Britain could scarcely produce any results worth mentioning before
1942 from her increased air rearmament, which was now commencing.
However, the Fuhrer considered it to be almost out of the question
that Britain and France would not stand together. In any conflict
both countries would, in the German view, support one another to the
uttermost. Only if Britain were to reverse her political course com-
pletely, and if the costs and risks of her present policy were to become
too high, would she perhaps resign herself to limiting her efforts to the
preservation of the Empire and give the authoritarian countries a free
hand to secure their vital needs. At the moment Britain had a weak
Government which had yielded to pressure from the left. Thus Britain
had deviated from her old policy of rendering assistance only on the basis
of her own judgement of the actual situation in each case and, by a
complete break with her traditional policy, had now committed herself
in advance to lend assistance, and, indeed, under conditions which could
be determined by the other partner. Another question of course was
how Britain could implement her guarantee commitment in actual fact.
How for example did she intend to aid Poland or Rumania ? She had
no opportunity of sending troops and could actually only fulfil her
commitments by starting a general war.
Taking all in all it should be emphasized that the Axis was in a very
strong position, and that, in the event of a general conflict, it could
defeat any likely opponents.
The Duce drew attention to the grave internal crisis in Yugoslavia
due to the conflict between Croats and Serbs. The Axis was interested
in a united Yugoslavia only if this country sided with the Axis. If the
present internal crisis were settled it would be necessary to keep a
sharp look-out on the Axis side. If the Croats and the Serbs should
APKIL, 1939 253
reach agreement, it would be necessary to be on the alert to see what
course the country's foreign policy then took. The Duce then asked
the Field Marshal for his opinion on the probable development of this
internal crisis and on the question of whether, in the event of a general
conflict, Yugoslavia would be for or against the Axis, or whether she
would remain neutral.
The Field Marshal replied that he thought Yugoslavia's attitude
would be one of benevolent neutrality. In his view one ought not,
however, to wait for the settlement of the internal crisis, but link
Yugoslavia up with the Axis beforehand. Moreover he did not believe
that agreement between Croats and Serbs would be very easy to achieve.
There were very extensive demands by the Croats for almost com-
plete autonomy, in which the link with the Old Serbs would only be
guaranteed by the personal union of the ruling house, joint foreign
policy and joint supreme command of the army (with different Serbian
and Croat army groups!) [sentence incomplete].
The situation had changed very much to the disadvantage of the
Yugoslavs. The Axis could exert pressure on Yugoslavia through Hun-
gary too. Moreover Yugoslavia had made a request to Germany for
a credit of over 200 million without linking this directly and officially
with political conditions. 7 He had, nevertheless, hinted unofficially
that such a large sum could not be provided until the attitude of the
country in foreign policy had been clarified. This situation would
have to be explained to the Yugoslavs clearly and forcefully. He (the
Field Marshal) intended to speak quite frankly and without reserve to
Prince Paul with whom he was well acquainted personally. Yugo-
slavia would have to join the Axis. Count Ciano enquired about the
possibility of Yugoslavia joining the Anti-Comintern Pact. The Field
Marshal replied that the present Foreign Minister had given an evasive
answer to the question just as Prince Paul had done. For the most
part the Yugoslavs pointed out that they were known to be such anti-
Bolshevists that it would not be necessary for them now to join the
Anti-Comintern Pact as well. The Duce for his part also stressed the
necessity of explaining the situation to the Yugoslavs in clear and
definite terms. Italy would have an opportunity to do this during the
visit of the Yugoslav Ministers to Venice.
Owing to the lateness of the hour the discussion of further questions
was then adjourned until 5 p.m. on Sunday April 16.
' See document No. 21.
254 DOCUMENTS ON G-ERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
No. 206
350/202192-9*
Unsigned Memorandum
Berlin, April 15, 1939.
List of Requirements of the High Command of the Wehrmacht,
the fulfilment of which is expected from the Slovak Govern-
ment UNDER THE GERMAN-SLOVAK TREATY OF PROTECTION OF MARCH
23 ! OF THIS YEAR.
1 ) The military forces of occupation east of the protected zone will be
maintained until the removal of Czech arms and Czech war material
from the occupied area is completed.
The date of withdrawal will be determined by the High Command of
the Wehrmacht.
2) In the protected zone all measures may be adopted by the
Wehrmacht which are necessary for the protection of the territory, the
troops and important military installations there. The Slovak Govern-
ment will be informed insofar as special services are required of them.
The following are, inter alia, among the sovereign rights [Hoheits-
rechte] of the Wehrmacht:
Occupation of military and also public and private buildings.
Use of all forms and means of transport.
Use of factories concerned with war economy, including duty-free
export.
Duty-free import of all goods and raw materials necessary for the
supply of German troops and factories concerned with war economy.
Provision of postal services for German troops and maintenance of
the necessary installations.
Telecommunications.
Intelligence Service [Abwehrdienst].
3) The regulations for the protected zone (para. 2) apply to the
localities: Trencm, Kupra east of Trenein, &lina, Dubnika and Bystrica
and also the former Czech ordnance factories in the Waag Valley. 2
The ordnance factorieSj as former Czech property, are subject to the
same conditions as the State ordnance factories in the Protectorate.
Their use etc. is the concern of the Reich.
4) The Slovak Government's own military forces:
Slovakia may not maintain any armed units inside the protected zone.
Pursuant to Article 3 of the Treaty of Protection, the Slovak Govern-
ment's own military forces will be computed at 1 per cent of the popula-
tion of the country and incorporated in two or three divisions. The High
Command of the Wehrmacht is awaiting proposals from the Slovak
1 Document No. 40.
2 Marginal note in Woennwm'e handwriting against this paragraph: "No.'
APRIL, 1939 255
Government on organization (including period of service and employ-
ment of reservists), disposition and equipment of these forces, and re-
serves the allocation of German arms and ammunition (including
practice ammunition) until after examination of the proposals.
Until the question of arms and equipment is finally settled, arms
now in use up to the maximum required for 3 divisions may he retained.
Particulars of this stock, according to numbers and types, are requested
as soon as possible.
Efforts will be made to replace them soon with German arms and
equipment so as to ensure a regular flow of fresh supplies.
5) German fortified zone in Slovakia.
Slovakia may not maintain any armed units inside the zone, which
is hounded by the Moravian-Slovak frontier and by the line laid down
in the State Treaty with Slovakia. The para-military formations
(Hlinka Guard) in this zone will be permitted to retain their side-arms.
In this connection a time-limit for the evacuation of the Slovak armed
units might be fixed with the Slovak Government in consultation with
Army Group Command 5. The greatest speed is urgently requested.
6) The Slovak Government will make the export and import of war
material from and to Slovakia dependent on special permits and will
issue or refuse such permits only in agreement with the Reich Govern-
ment, or the High Command of the Wehrmacht, which is the competent
authority within the Reich Government. They will hereby subscribe
to the definition of war material valid in the German Reich and will
be prepared to arrange for a close supervision of the permit enforce-
ment on their frontiers by the customs authorities. A special agree-
ment for the German-Slovak frontier is reserved for the time being. 3
* Undated marginal note: "A conversation took place today with Tiso, Buriiansky
Tuka and others in State Secretary von Weizaaoker's office on means of dealing with the
requirements. W[oermann]. " The conversation referred to by Woermamti is evidently
the conference of Apr. 19 (document No. 235). A telegram of Apr. 17 from the Consul
General and Charge d'Affaires in Slovakia (not printed, 23 13/434552) appears to indicate
that a copy of this document was sent to him on Apr. 15 and that the OKW's require-
ments had been communicated to Tiso, who had asked for further discussions whilst
declaring that the Slovak Government did not wish to make difficulties.
No. 207
2446/514900
Note by the Deputy Director of the Cultural Policy Department
Berlin-, April 15, 1939.
e.o. Kult. A 1386 g.
Note on telegram No. 106 of April 13, 1939. 1
I have most urgently requested Dr. Henninger of the Volksdeutsche
i Document No. 192.
256 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Mittelstelle to see that the German national group in Yugoslavia keeps
completely quiet. Herr Henri in ger said:
1) Herr Hal wax would probably be coming to Germany for a year
at the end of April on a grant and this would put an end to one source
of constant unrest.
2) Dorfmeisterj the representative of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle
in Graz, would be instructed at once to make it clear to the Volksdeubscke
in Yugoslavia, especially in the Voivodina, that they must keep quite
quiet.
3) The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle would take the necessary steps
to cut down still further the local contacts between Styria and Lower
Styria in Yugoslavia.
Herr Henninger also said that he could give the most definite assur-
ances that no instructions at all had been issued from Berlin for in-
tensified agitation among the Volksdeutsche in Yugoslavia.
Submitted herewith to the State Secretary and to Political Division
IV for information.
Twardowsei
No. 208
134S/421071-72
State Secretary Weizsacker to Ambassador Mackeiisen
Cypher Letter
By express courier. Berlin, April 15, 1939.
Dear Friend: In case you have not yet heard, I should like to tell
you that Ciano told the Reich Foreign Minister yesterday through
Attolico that he would like to meet him soon for a talk. The reply
given to Ciano was that Herr von Ribbentrop would also very much
welcome an early discussion but, because of arrangements about which
you know (Rumanian visit, celebrations for the 20th of this month, [
Hungarian visit), he could not consider a meeting before the 22nd.
Nothing has so far been said about an agenda for this meeting {Gardone
was mentioned), it is probable, however, that the somewhat different
methods followed by the two Axis Powers in handling the British ques-
tion prompted Ciano's wish.
Best wishes and Heil Hitler!
Yours ever, Weizsacker
Hitler's birthday.
APRIL, 1939 257
No. 209
2951/576551-53
State Secretary Weizsacker to Ambassador Mackemen l
April 15, 1939.
Dear Friend: I should like to add to my cypher letter of today 2
that according to my private information a further Hitler-Mussolini
meeting is looming on the horizon. It is not for me to express a personal
opinion on this but I presume that a serious German-Italian exchange
of views might be beneficial. Perhaps the Axis Powers do not assess
the situation in precisely similar terms at present, so that an exchange
of views would he worth while.
It will be of interest to you that, according to Herr von Ribbentrop's
view, not one British soldier would be mobilized in the event of a
German-Polish conflict.
Heil Hitler!
Yours ever, E. Weizsacker
1 The letter is handwritten.
2 Document No. 208.
No. 210
5570/E398852
The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department
to the Legation in Yugoslavia
Telegram
urgent Bebltn-, April 16, 1939—1:00 p.m.
No. 101 W 564 g.
From the Air Ministry for the Air Attache.
As the State Secretary already told the Yugoslav Charge d'Aff aires
on April 6, 1 the delivery of 50 bomber aircraft in the months of June,
July and August is impossible. Furthermore, as the political prerequi-
sites and general credit conditions have not yet been clarified, nothing
definite can at present be said on delivery at a later date either. Final
decisions will be made here after the return of the Field Marshal about
April 20. The presence of the Air Attache" is desirable at least a few
days beforehand.
Cloditjs
1 No memorandum by Weizsacker recording his conversation of April 6 with
Kovaievic has been found, but see document No. 176.
li
258 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN 1TOMGN POLICY
No. 211
0e/468'J3-V0T
Unsigned Memorandum 1
Beblin, April 18, 1939.2
Record of the Conversation between Field Marshal Goring and
THE DTTCE, IN THE PRESENCE OF COUNT ClANO IN
Rome on April 16, 1939.
The first subject of the conversation was the Roosevelt Memoran-
dum » and here Field Marshal Goring expressed the view that one
St well gain the impression that Roosevelt was suffering from an
mdp erTt mfntal disease.* The Duce raised the question of how to
SKSi the Roosevelt Memorandum. One could either not reply a
aU o" se one would have to say "No". Meld Marshal Going replied
that from his first impression of the document, he personally was of
he oSa that Roosevelt should not be favoured by the Heads of
he Governments with a reply but that the Press should be made to
reply in strong terms. The Fiihrer wished to wait for the time being
and would be Interested to learn the Duce's views on this matter.
The Duce replied that in any case they could wait until after April 20,
S ince the document was not one which required an immediate answer
Moreover he pointed out that the list of the countries to be guaranteed
also included Palestine and Syria, territories which were under the
jurisdiction of France and Britain. Roosevelt was surely not very
W Siuing,^S again emphasized the detailed statements
alreadv made in the previous conversation on the subject of relations
S Yugoslavian and then went on to speak of Britam. Italy's
Nations with that country were bad; only ma purely formal sense
were they good. By comparison, however, Italy's feeling towards
France was extremely bitter. In reply to a question from the Fxe d
Marshal as to whether the Duce believed that France and Britain would
3 together under all circumstances, in the event of a conflict the
Tatter said he was convinced that Britain and France would stand
together in any major conflict. One just had to face the fact that it
was a real alliance.
In connection with the change in Polish foreign policy as regards the
"hTs^nTmorandum would appear to have been drawn up by the interpreter Schmidt,
"TaSSS^I P^tedf ^r^ratr^onvenience, under the date on which the
conversation took place.
3 Document No. 200. ,, t
* See also the Ciano Diaries, entry for Apr. IS, 1W«.
c See document No. 205.
APRIL, 1939 259
attitude of that country towards Germany, which Field Marshal
Goring emphasized, the conversation then turned to Russia. In this
connection the Field Marshal referred to Stalin's speech at the last
Conference of the Communist Party, » in which Stalin had stated that
the Russians would not allow themselves to be used as cannon fodder
for the capitalist Powers. He (the Field Marshal) would ask the Fiihrer
whether it would not be possible to put out feelers cautiously to
Russia through certain intermediaries with a view to a rapprochement
so as to cause Poland anxiety over Russia as well.
The Duce welcomed this idea most warmly and said that in Italy
too they had had similar ideas for some time and, without saying
anything definite, had also already adopted a more friendly tone
towards the Russians through the Italian Ambassador in Moscow 7 in
connection with economic negotiations, a gesture which had met with
a very keen response from Potemkin, the State Secretary in the
Russian Foreign Ministry.
On this point Count Ciano said that the Russian Charge d'Aff aires,
who had often failed to call on him for months on end, had called on
him twice in one week in a very friendly manner, apparently in this
very connection.
The Duce stated that a rapprochement between the Axis Powers and
Russia was naturally dependent on the attitude Japan would adopt.
If Japan had no objections to such matters, this rapprochement could,
as Count Ciano had already stated, be effected with comparative ease.
The object of such a rapprochement would be to induce Russia to react
coolly and unfavourably to Britain's efforts at encirclement, on the lines
of Stalin's aforementioned speech, and to take up a neutral position.
That would make a very great impression in the democratic world.
The Axis Powers could tell the Russians that they had no intention of
attacking Russia. Since Bolshevism was not tolerated in Italy and
Germany, Russia would naturally not be expected to tolerate National
Socialism and Fascism within her own territory. Moreover in their
ideological struggle against plutocracy and capitalism the Axis Powers
had to a certain extent the same objectives as the Russian regime. It
was, however, important to know what Germany's attitude towards
the Ukraine was.
In reply to the Duce's last question, the Field Marshal said that,
according to statements by the Fiihrer, Germany had no designs
whatsoever on the Ukraine, and that ever since he had been a member
of the Cabinet he (the Field Marshal) had not set eyes on a single
document dealing with the Ukraine and that the whole question had
only been raised in British newspapers for propaganda purposes against
Germany. Only recently the Fiihrer had told the Field Marshal again
6 See document No. !.
'• Augueto Rosso.
260 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
that he had no designs whatsoever on the Ukraine. It was moreover
interesting to note that there had been absolutely no further mention
of Russia in the Fiihrer's latest speeches. Any declaration of neutrality
on the part of Russia would in any case not fail to make a deep im-
pression on Poland and the Western Powers. If Russia declared her
neutrality Poland would then not lift a finger in a general conflict. .
In reply to a question by the Duce, the Field Marshal went on to
say that, of the 35 million inhabitants of Poland, only 14 million were
real Poles. Poland's air armaments were not particularly good and
consisted mostly of obsolete French and British aircraft. The Polish
artillery dated for the most part from the war.
In the event of the Axis Powers reaching a decision to seek a rap-
prochement with Russia, the Duce thought that Italy's method might
be through a trade treaty with Russia. The Field Marshal also referred
to the Russian desire to expand the scope of the Russo-German econo-
mic treaty. 8 If Germany gave her consent to this, talks with Russia
would be possible immediately. The Duce considered the matter to
be important because Britain was also making advances to the Russians
at the moment.
Referring to the political situation, the Duce declared that he con-
sidered a general war to be unavoidable. He merely wondered when
would be the most favourable time for the Axis Powers and who
should seize the initiative for such a war.
Field Marshal Goring was of the opinion that the Axis Powers ought
to wait a little longer until their armaments had reached a more
favourable stage in relation to those of the democracies. The Duce
repeated in more precise terms his question as to the most favourable
time for such a conflict, whereupon Field Marshal Goring pointed out
that in the years 1942/43 the ratio of armaments between Germany
and Britain would be appreciably more favourable, especially in the
naval sphere, and that France's rearmament would be hampered by
shortage of manpower so that even now the whole emphasis of French
preparations was already placed on defence.
"What ought we to do until the time is favourable for a general
conflict ? " the Duce then asked. Field Marshal Goring replied that the
Axis Powers must rearm to the teeth and should even now place them-
selves in a state of mobilization. Germany had already done this.
All measures taken by him (Field Marshal Goring) were based on the
assumption that mobilization was already in progress even if it had not
yet been proclaimed publicly. There were only three factors restricting
German rearmament: productive capacity, the supply of raw materials
and the available labour. In no circumstances would Germany abandon,
for financial reasons, a defence measure which she regarded as necessary
s See vol. iv of this Series, documents Nos. 478, 479, 481-491, and 495.
APRIL, 1939 261
The Duce agreed that the same applied to Italy and summed up his
impression of the discussion to the effect that the Axis Powers still
needed two to three years in order to join in a general conflict well-
armed and with the prospect of victory.
Field Marshal Goring referred to the importance of Tunisia. Once
Italy had conquered Tunisia, Britain's position in the Mediterranean
would be finished. Malta was doubtless very troublesome to Italy,
and the Duce agreed, saying that in British hands this island con-
stituted a threat to Italy. He (the Duce) was moreover of the opinion
that the warlike mood of the Western Powers would soon blow over
if the Axis countries lay low and undertook no further action for the
time being. In this connection Field Marshal Goring stressed the im-
portance of the United States to public opinion the world over. Things
could become very different there also if Roosevelt were no longer
President, and his prospects of re-election were, without doubt, none
too good. By means of her good connections with South America,
Italy could certainly successfully counteract American influence in
that continent. The Duce agreed with this, but mentioned that, for
some reason which he could not quite understand, Italy's relations
with Argentina were not particularly good.
The Duce also expressed his satisfaction at the visit of the German
Navy to Spain,* of which he was informed by the Field Marshal, who
moreover considered it very important for Italy and Germany to be in
perfect accord regarding their further intentions in Spain, particularly
in the economic sphere, since there was no point in both countries
competing with each other there. Germany hoped furthermore that
Italy would remain in the Balearics.
Count Ciano stated in this connection that there was a secret treaty
with Franco, under which, in the event of a general conflict, Italy
would be granted air bases not only in the Balearics but also in other
parts of Spain. Field Marshal Goring described the fortification of the
Balearics as being of the utmost importance, since it could be assumed
that in the event of a general conflict France would immediately occupy
these islands. The Duce stated that Italy, too, would occupy the
Balearics with the utmost speed, but nevertheless admitted that the
fortification of these islands would relieve the situation in the first days
of the conflict.
Field Marshal Goring pointed out that it might be sufficient to place
guns, not of the latest design, at the disposal of the Spaniards, since,
in the case of the Balearics, it would always be a matter of close
defence against an opponent attempting to land on the islands and
s In despatches of Apr. 11 (not printed, 8424/E592996-98) the Foreign Ministry
notified the Embassy in Spain and the Legation in Portugal that German naval units
under the command of Admiral Boehm would be visiting Spanish and Portuguese har-
bours while on a training cruise.
262 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
that, therefore, long-range artillery would not be required to ward him
Count Ciano replied that Italy had delivered a fairly large amount
of artillery to Spain but so far had not received any payment for it.
He described the costs falling on Italy from the Spanish Civil War as
being very high. - _
With reference to Turkey Field Marshal Goring stated, in reply to a
question from the Duce, that he knew very little about the country and
merely had the general impression that British influence was very
great. The Duce and Count Ciano held divergent views about Egypt.
Count Ciano maintained that King Farouk was anti-British, while the
Duce cast doubts on this, speaking in German— apparently so that
Count Ciano should not understand him. The conversation then
turned to the Arab question. The Duce expressed the view that, by
anti-British propaganda among the Arabs, the Axis Powers could
probably achieve a state of tension, but not a revolution. In the event
of war, however, the prospects of fomenting an Arab uprising would
be more favourable. Since Italy's Albanian venture the Arabs were
certainly rather doubtful— so the Duce said— as to his role of Protector,
which he had assumed symbolically with the Sword of Islam. 10
Count Ciano then explained how Italy was aiding the Arabs. Direct
supplies of arms were too risky; Italy was therefore giving them money
and they had so far always succeeded in buying arms through Greek
middlemen with the help of the funds thus received. The British,
however, had now barred the way to Palestine so thoroughly that
direct imports were impossible. But the import of arms was easier by
the roundabout route across Syria.
In reply to the Duce's question as to where, in the Field Marshal's
opinion, the present critical points for the possible outbreak of a conflict
lay, the Field Marshal said that in his view these were Poland and
Tunisia, to which the Duce at once replied that in that case there was
only one critical spot, namely Poland, as Italy did not intend to take
any action against France for two to three years. The Field Marshal said
that his statement about Poland was to be interpreted as meaning that
more serious difficulties might arise only if the German minority in
Poland were very badly treated and the prestige of the Third Reich
abroad thus jeopardized. The Fiihrer had told him (the Field Marshal)
that he was not planning anything against Poland.
The Duce then finally turned to the discussion of economic
questions and described the "synchronization of Italy's and Germany's
endeavours towards autarky" as one of the chief tasks in the economic
sphere . This met with the full agreement of the Field Marshal , who pro-
posed issuing the appropriate instructions to the economic authorities.
10 The " Sword of Islam" was presented to Mussolini outside Tripoli on. Mat. 18, 1937.
See vo!. v of this Series, document No. 564.
'■":!
APRIL, 1989 263
At the conclusion of the conversation, the results of the Rome dis-
cussions were summed up by the Field Marshal and the Duce as follows r
Yugoslavia: Friendly attitude while waiting for further develop-
ments in the internal policy of this country and with the prerequisite
of Yugoslavia adopting a clear pro-Axis line. Germany to recognize
Croatia as being purely in the Italian sphere of influence.
Russia: Germany and Italy ought to endeavour to play the so-called
petit jeu with this country. Possibilities for a rapprochement existed.
Spain: Germany and Italy would continue to aid Franco, especially
in the economic reconstruction of his country, in order to enable him
to maintain a strong attitude towards other countries. He would, of
course, be expected to adopt a definite pro -Axis line, a line which the
Duce believed he could expect of him as a "loyal" man.
General situation: Germany and Italy will not allow themselves
to be provoked into a conflict but will await what they consider to be
the right moment. They will continue to build up their armaments
and, with a view to joint action later, will enter into discussions regard-
ing the synchronization of their autarky and also cooperation between
their air and naval forces. In the meantime they will continue the
"press war" most vigorously, but otherwise will not undertake any-
thing on a larger scale. (When the Field Marshal mentioned in this
connection that Germany had quite recently acquired a number of
territories and needed peace to digest them, the Duce agreed most
emphatically.) "Talk of peace and prepare for war, i.e., victory"
should be the motto for action of both countries.
The above summary was once more read out by me in French at
the Duce's request and met with the approval of those participating in
the conversation.
In conclusion the Duce also observed that both countries would
maintain a firm attitude and calm outlook and would disdainfully
brush aside all the stupid attempts to discover signs of disunity
between the Axis Powers.
No. 212
2943/570005
The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
urgent Helsinki, April 17, 1939 — 2:50 p.m.
No. 35 of April 17 Received April 17—5:55 p.m.
Pol. VI 1027.
The Foreign Minister has learned from Stockholm of the German-
Swedish special negotiations about the Aaland Islands, 1 and assumes
1 See also documents Nos. 127, 145 and 187.
264 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
that, in them, Germany will make her consent to Swedish special
rights dependent on an assurance of Sweden's neutrality. He seems
to agree in principle with such a solution. From other sources, how-
ever, the Foreign Minister hears that the Russian Baltic fleet, including
aircraft-carriers, is to sail from Leningrad on April 21. 2 In view of the
tense situation the Foreign Minister is considering proposing to the
President that, unless the question of the Aaland Islands can be settled
within two days by the course followed so far, they should find some
other way of safeguarding this group of islands. The Foreign Minister
would not disclose more of his plans to me.
Blucker
a In telegram No. 40 of Apr. 18 (not printed, 2943/570006) Bliicher reported that sound-
ings made at the Finnish General Staff on the allegedly imminent sailing of the Russian
fleet had shown that no such report had been given to the Foreign Minister from that
quarter.
No. 213
2422/511973-74
Circular of the Foreign Minister 1
Telegram
MOST URGENT Berlin, April 17, 1939—2:00 p.m.
IMMEDIATE P°l- ^ 678 '
PRIORITY
Included among the countries for which Roosevelt, in his message
to the Fiihrer, 2 suggests an assurance by Germany that German forces
will neither attack nor invade is (relevant country to be inserted accord-
ing to the appendix). You are requested to put the following questions
orally but in a formal manner to the Foreign Minister there at once, if
at all possible today:
1) whether (insert name of country) feels herself in any way
threatened by Germany,
2) whether the Government there had authorized Roosevelt to make
his proposal or had in any other way actuated it.
Please send an answer at once by telegram.
For your personal information only, I wish to state that we are
addressing these questions to the Governments of all countries men-
tioned by Roosevelt with the exception of Britain, France and their
l Addressees were the Missons at: Helsinki No. 49, Tallinn No. 38, Riga No. 57,
Kovno No. 40, Stockholm No. 49, Oslo No. 35, Copenhagen No. 58, The Hague No. 44,
Brussels No. 59, Lisbon No. 78, San Sebastian No. 259, Berne No. 44, Luxembourg
No. 20, Budapest No. 125, Bucharest No. 163, Belgrade No. 102, Sofia No. 54, Ankara
No. 85, Teheran No. 56 (2422/511975). This telegram was sent to Athens as No. 53 on
Apr. 18 (2422/511976-77).
a See document No. 200.
APKIL, 1939 265
satellites, and also of Poland and Russia. We are in no doubt that
both questions will be answered in the negative, but nevertheless we
should, for special reasons, like to have authentic confirmation at once.
I request you to hold appropriate language in your ddmarche. We
assume that the Foreign Minister there will be in a position, and also
prepared, to make a statement accordingly without further ado.
Only for 12 {Berne): Your question should include Liechtenstein also. 3
RlBBENTROP
3 Marginal notes: "To be resubmitted immediately after despatch (Iraq, Arabia and
Egypt) (Foreign Minister's Secretariat)." "B[rucklmeier]". This telegram was Bent
to the Legations at Cairo and Bagdad (also covering Saudi Arabia) on Apr. 19 (2422/
No. 214
S913/E622170
The Minister in Latvia to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram
tjkgekt Riga, April 17, 1939—10:47 p.m.
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